Leibstandarte Division and Schweppenburg

[Jeff Duquette]

A bit of interesting information regarding German Mechanized\Motorized formations in France at the time of the Normandy Invasion. The following is excerpts from a report by General der Panzertruppen Leo, Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg. These are Schweppenburg’s personal estimates of the fighting quality of all Panzer and PanzerGrenadier divisions in France, 1944.

The list at the bottom is his ranking of these various formations. The ”A” category formations are those Schweppenburg deemed as the highest quality formations. Presumably the "A" divisions are those units possessing the highest combat power and greatest esprit-de-corps. The ”D” category units were the most ill-prepared for combat, or presumably those divisions possessing the lowest combat power, and marginal morale.

It is interesting to note that the veteran 1st SS Panzer Division, Leibstandarte, is bringing up the rear of this list. Conversely the 12th SS Panzer Division, Hitler Jugend -- in theory a “green division” -- is right up there at the top of Schweppenburg’s list. The report is apparently dated 6 June. Certainly a different perspective on Leibstandarte in Normandy reltive to the one we have all been raised on from M. Reynold's and "Steel Inferno". 21st Panzer falls in at the lower middle of the list. Scweppenburg's assesment of the 21st also seems helter-skelter relative to those of us who have read Von Lucke.

Schweppenburg’s List:

2nd Panzer Division: "The division commander was a good leader in the field, but less experienced in training. The division was well backed with personnel and materiel by the Generalinspektion. Genoberst Guderian was in command of this division before the war.

9th SS Panzer Division: The performance of this division depended on the outstanding military personality of its commander, Oberf Bittrich, who was a first class trainer.

12th SS (Hitlerjugend) Panzer Division: This commander was also good in training and possessed a will and a passion for advanced methods. The quality of conscripts was high, but that of the subordinate officers and NCOs was poor.

Panzer Lehr Division: The division was well provided for by the Generalinspektion. The commander (sic. Fritz Bayerlain) was very modern in his thoughts and methods. There were deficiencies in infantry tactics and teamwork (combined arms).

11th Panzer Division: The commander was well experienced in mobile warfare. The division was thoroughly schooled in higher training methods. It had an adequate cadre of seasoned subordinate officers and was augmented by conscripts from 273rd Reserve Panzer Division.

2nd SS Panzer Division: The remnants of this division, which in 1944 was re-formed in France, still had sufficient veterans from the period when its first commander (Obstgrf Paul Hausser) had given the division very high standards. The division had the best tank battalion in the West.

21st Panzer Division: The division was reorganized after the African campaign with undesirable personnel from a large number of divisions. Even very thorough and -experienced training could never overcome this basic fault. Part of its materiel was manufactured in French factories.

9th Panzer Division: There were too many changes in division commanders and principal staff officers and too much interference with training by employing the troops to build fortifications and so forth.

17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division: Its performance depended on two men, Brigf Ostendorf, its first commander, and Standf Fick, commander of the Panzer Grenadier regiment. The materiel was poor. The division, which was organized and trained in haste, was quite efficient but deteriorated rapidly after Ostendorf was wounded in Normandy.

10th SS Panzer Division: The division was unlucky in its assignment of division commanders.

1st SS PanzerDivision: A type of "Praetorian Guard," the division was bled white in Russia and was unable to refill the gaps resulting from casualties and sending out cadres (the 12th SS Panzer Division was formed by a cadre from the 1st SS Panzer Division). Discipline was a sham; the NCOs were poor. The division did not have time for thorough training before the invasion.

Order of Combat Efficiency

<UL TYPE=SQUARE>

A. 2nd Panzer Division

9th SS Panzer Division

12th SS Panzer Division

Panzer Lehr Division

B. 11th Panzer Division

2nd SS Panzer Division

21st Panzer Division

C. 9th Panzer Division

17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division

116th Panzer Division (probably)

D. 10th SS Panzer Division

1st SS Panzer Division

[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 02-18-2001).]

[Forever Babra]

Leibstandarte? That's German for "over-priced hamster" isn't it?

[Guest Germanboy]

I read that as well - would you recommend the book it was in (forgotten the title). I have come to think that 1. SS Panzerkorps has been given its (maybe) unwarranted reputation by a combo of Panzermeyer's memoirs and the incapability of a lot of the UK commanders, who would naturally blame their failures on the quality of the enemy, rather than on their own lack of skills. It should also be noted that von Schweppenburg may have had an axe to grind there too. Difficult to judge, really.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Apache]

I would tend to agree re the reputation being a result of a combination. To some extent I think the same was true of Rommel. Undoubtedly an excellent and very gifted commander but the 8th Army was also in an appalling state until Monty took over. Then the tide changed somewhat.

[Atlas]

Apache,

You may say what you will about Rommel post-Afrika Corp, but the man was a genius on the coast of North Africa - on par with Robert E. Lee in Virginia. Rommel's march through Northern France was as equally impressive.

-Atlas

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Atlas:

Apache,

You may say what you will about Rommel post-Afrika Corp, but the man was a genius on the coast of North Africa - on par with Robert E. Lee in Virginia. Rommel's march through Northern France was as equally impressive.

-Atlas

That is a very good comparison, because both of these generals benefitted a lot from having inept, timid and bumbling opponents. That is not to say they were not good - I believe a good part of generalship is to know the enemy's weaknesses and apply your strengths to exploit them. Having said that - what would have happened if Lee or Rommel had to fight a mirror-image of themselves? I am sure the story would have been different then.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Sirocco]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

It is interesting to note that the veteran 1st SS Panzer Division, Leibstandarte, is bringing up the rear of this list. Conversely the 12th SS Panzer Division, Hitler Jugend -- in theory a “green division” -- is right up there at the top of Schweppenburg’s list

The LAH returned from the Eastern Front in April 1944 and was being rebuilt in Belgium when the Allies landed in Normandy. The HJ was a freshly-raised division. That's the truth behind the figures.

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[Sirocco]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

I have come to think that 1. SS Panzerkorps has been given its (maybe) unwarranted reputation by a combo of Panzermeyer's memoirs and the incapability of a lot of the UK commanders, who would naturally blame their failures on the quality of the enemy, rather than on their own lack of skills.

I think Canadians might take issue with that.

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Sirocco:

The LAH returned from the Eastern Front in April 1944 and was being rebuilt in Belgium when the Allies landed in Normandy. The HJ was a freshly-raised division. That's the truth behind the figures.

Sorry, don't understand what you mean by that. 12th SS was built around a core of NCOs and junior officers who transferred from 1st SS, AFAIK. I still think that von Schweppenburg's remarks go against the accepted wisdom on the performance of 1. SS Panzerkorps.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Sirocco:

I think Canadians might take issue with that.

Of course - that should have read 'Commonwealth Commanders' instead of 'UK Commanders'.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Guest Rommel22]

I think the absolute reason why the Tide turned in N africa was the result of the suplly sitution. The Brits were right at their ports and Rommel was hundres of kilometers from his own ports.

Plus the lack of Armor, 150 working tanks, mostly italian and outclassed German armor.

Brits, some 1300 tanks, brittish and American leand lease.

Good info Jeff!!!!

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Rommel22's War Diarys site.

http://rommel22diarys.homestead.com/MyPage1.html

"I saw 5 Germans walking down the side of the road, so I followed them for a few yard to get closer. Then I shot them! Later that day I found out the war has been over for a few weeks." - someone

[Sirocco]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

Sorry, don't understand what you mean by that. 12th SS was built around a core of NCOs and junior officers who transferred from 1st SS, AFAIK.

The LAH had a combat strength of 41 officers and 1,188 NCO's and men in March, 1944. The new LAH was to be rebuilt around the survivors of the old division. While the first 10,000 volunteers to the HJ reported in Berlin in July 1943, the LAH was fighting in Italy and on the Eastern Front. In fact the LAH was so short of grenadiers while it was rebuilding in Belgium in May, 1944, that it had to transfer 2,055 men from the HJ.

I still think that von Schweppenburg's remarks go against the accepted wisdom on the performance of 1. SS Panzerkorps.

Not when you consider the respective positions both divisions were in at the time.

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[Sirocco]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

Of course - that should have read 'Commonwealth Commanders' instead of 'UK Commanders'.

The Canadian Army was all volunteer, and as such it was one of the strongest arms the Allies had.

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Sirocco:

The Canadian Army was all volunteer, and as such it was one of the strongest arms the Allies had.

I was talking about COs, not soldiers, and the Canadian Army had its fair share of failures among these. Worthington Force anyone? Even Stacey can not really brush over that one.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Jeff Duquette]

Sirocco Said:

The LAH had a combat strength of 41 officers and 1,188 NCO's and men in March, 1944. The new LAH was to be rebuilt around the survivors of the old division. While the first 10,000 volunteers to the HJ reported in Berlin in July 1943, the LAH was fighting in Italy and on the Eastern Front. In fact the LAH was so short of grenadiers while it was rebuilding in Belgium in May, 1944, that it had to transfer 2,055 men from the HJ.

Good stuff Sirocco. I was just leafing through Reynold’s “Steel Inferno” again and found that same info…and was about to post it It’s been over a year since I read Reyonlds, but as I recall he tends to focus more on the Hitler Jugend division and Hvy Panzer battalion 101, rather than LAH. Most of the meat on LAH from Reynold’s tends to focus on the the defeat of LAH at Mortain.

Regarding the Commonwealth performance as a whole in Normandy, it should be pointed out that the British\Canadian & Poles were up against many of the toughest German Formations present in France during 1944 (arguable some of the toughest formations in the Germany Army in 1944). Many of the Commonwealth divisions going into Normandy were Green…without even the advantage of drawing veteran officer and NCO cadres from veteran formations (ala Hitler Jugend or 17th SS PGrD). So the situation in France was: Predominantly Green Commonwealth Troops in the Attack, against Veteran Troops in the defense who were in excellent defensive terrain. All things considered I would say the Commonwealth Army performed pretty damned well in Normandy (flame away if that floats your boat).

Germanboy:

Regarding Schweppenburg having an axe to grind, that is always a possibility, but an axe to grind with whom and why? If he had animosity against the Waffen SS…why than the outstanding rating by him for the Hitler Jugend Division, and the Comment regarding the the 2nd SS having the “best Panzer Battalion in France”?

[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 02-18-2001).]

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

All things considered I would say the Commonwealth Army performed pretty damned well in Normandy (flame away if that floats your boat).

Germanboy:

Regarding Schweppenburg having an axe to grind, that is always a possibility, but an axe to grind with whom and why? If he had animosity against the Waffen SS…why than the outstanding rating by for the Hitler Jugend Division, and the Comment regarding the the 2nd SS having the “best Panzer Battalion in France”?

Jeff, I totally agree on the performance of the Commonwealth units. Having said that - there were an awaful lot of COs up to Corps Commander level who were 'given something else to do' when their inability became clear. A number of divisional COs had to go.

Regarding Schweppenburg - I don't think he has an axe to grind, I just think there may be a possibility, but as you say, the good rating he gave 12th SS says otherwise.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Forever Babra]

Schweppenburg's analyses imply a degree of autonomy in German divisional commanders which is surprising to me.

Regarding the performance of the Commonwealth units in Normandy, I would rate it as less than stellar. Even after four years of experience in Africa and Italy, tank/infantry cooperation was almost universally poor. Were it not for a staggering superiority in air and naval assets, the outcome would have been very different IMO.

I'm not surprised at the rating given the LAH -- like the 7th Armoured Division (The Desert Rats), by 1944 they were "spent". A soldier can be too experienced. Sometimes it takes a green unit to get a job done. A green soldier has something to prove. A green soldier is worried what others will think of his performance. A green soldier still believes it will be someone else who gets hit. The veteran suffers none of these positive delusions, and is usually less willing to take risks.

And a young replacement will look to his NCOs. If those NCOs are shy, the replacement is not going to take over for them.

[Sirocco]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

I was talking about COs, not soldiers

The point I was making was that while the HJ was built around a cadre from the LAH, most of the men came from the HJ movement. You seemed to be making the point that the HJ was a carbon copy of the LAH, when it was not.

The quoted report is being taken literally, without taking into consideration all the relevant facts.

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[Sirocco]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

The ”D” category units were the most ill-prepared for combat, or presumably those divisions possessing the lowest combat power, and marginal morale)

The phrase "ill-prepared for combat" can be taken to mean "refitting"...

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[Forever Babra]

Originally posted by Sirocco:

The phrase "ill-prepared for combat" can be taken to mean "refitting"...

It could, and probably does, but the notation "Discipline was a sham; the NCOs were poor. The division did not have time for thorough training before the invasion..." would imply other problems.

[Sirocco]

Originally posted by Forever Babra:

I'm not surprised at the rating given the LAH -- like the 7th Armoured Division (The Desert Rats), by 1944 they were "spent".

The LAH was spent in the Ukraine in 1943, then again in Normandy, and once again in the Ardennes, but each time it was rebuilt, and each time it performed well in combat.

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[Sirocco]

Originally posted by Forever Babra:

It could, and probably does, but the notation "Discipline was a sham; the NCOs were poor. The division did not have time for thorough training before the invasion..." would imply other problems.

The decimation of the division on the Eastern Front earlier, perhaps..?

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[Sirocco]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

All things considered I would say the Commonwealth Army performed pretty damned well in Normandy

I do think the Commonwealth effort in Normandy doesn't get the appreciation it deserves, for whatever reason.

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[Jeff Duquette]

Barbra Said:

Regarding the performance of the Commonwealth units in Normandy, I would rate it as less than stellar. Even after four years of experience in Africa and Italy, tank/infantry cooperation was almost universally poor.

I will say this again, the majority of Commonwealth units and especially Canadian formations in Normandy had never seen action before. The British 7th AD is one of the few exceptions. The same situation existed with the US ARMY in the Omaha and Utah lodgements. Only the 1st and 4th ID had seen action prior to Normandy.

Barbra’s post reminded me of something George Blackburn said in “The Guns of Normandy”.

And since no one can properly appreciate the valour and judge the effectiveness of the frontline soldiers, and the gunners who supported them, who does not fully appreciate the unparalleled severity of the fighting in Normandy, an earnest effort has been made to capture the high tension overlaying every minute of every hour of every day for weeks on end, when massive opposing forces were committed to endless offensive operations designed to overwhelm and destroy each other in a bloodbath that was pursued with unabated fury for almost three months, with neither side allowed any flexibility of manoeuvre — the Allies confined by the perimeters of the bridgehead, and the enemy denied any planned withdrawal by their Fuhrer.

However, locating material describing what it was like at the cutting edge of 1st Canadian Army from the middle of July until the end of August — in effect the fighting from Caen to Falaise that entrapped the German armies in Normandy — was very difficult. No one has succeeded in accurately describing the ferocity of the battles for Verrieres Ridge and beyond. And perhaps no one ever will, for few who served with the rifle companies of the infantry battalions, including artillery FOOs and their crews, managed to survive more than a few days…

…Far from accurately portraying the ferocity of the deadly clashes in battles of attrition reminiscent of World War I, the war historians tend to give the impression that it was some sort of game, played out by cunning generals, with the outcome hinging on the level of "aggressiveness" shown by one side or the other - most particularly on that of the "junior commanders."

It is irritating to the point of enraging to read critical analyses of the shortcomings of men and officers engaged at the spearhead of operations by critics with not a single day of frontline experience. Well-rested, well-fed, safe and secure, writing within the relaxed atmosphere of their homes or offices, with no responsibility for men's lives resting on their decisions, they are sickeningly arrogant. Clearly, when all the sinister mystery is removed from any battlefield as to what the enemy has over there beyond those trees, or among the silent rubble of that village, or in the dead ground just over that ridge, any fool can decide what should have been done and the best way of doing it.

And there is something particularly obscene about the works of historians who conduct coldblooded analyses and write without emotion of the accomplishments of units and the "fighting qualities" of men while never giving any indication they recognize and understand the frailty of the human spirit and the resolve of all men, regardless of training or background, when forced to live for days without end in a continuing agony of fear, made manageable only by the numbing effects of extreme fatigue.

I think I would have keeled over in shock had I come across one historian, purporting to describe the battles on the road to Falaise, who once acknowledged that those battles (like those in every major operation extending over several weeks) were not fought by alert, well-rested, well-fed, healthy men, but by men suffering utter exhaustion, from heat and dysentery and the never ending itching induced by lice and sand fleas, from never being allowed to stretch out and get a night's sleep, and from continuously living with grinding tension arising from the irrepressible dread of being blown to pieces or being left mangled and crippled.

[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 02-18-2001).]

[Forever Babra]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

It is irritating to the point of enraging to read critical analyses of the shortcomings of men and officers engaged at the spearhead of operations by critics with not a single day of frontline experience. Well-rested, well-fed, safe and secure, writing within the relaxed atmosphere of their homes or offices, with no responsibility for men's lives resting on their decisions, they are sickeningly arrogant

I spent six months in a combat zone, though I was never in a position of command. I have eaten earth when the mortars fell. I have heard myself yell meaningless things when the bullets were snapping. And lest you think I levy criticisms unjustly, I have levied them equally harshly against myself and my comrades, because, to be frank, we sucked at soldiering and I was glad to be quit of it.

Of course it was miserable in Normandy. When you cram a few million men into a small corner of the globe, give them guns and artillery and aerial bombs, it cannot be otherwise.

ALL combat is a misery. From the dawn of time it has been a nasty, bloody, painful experience. But a unit defines itself on whether it can perform in spite of the discomforts. I don't believe the Commonwealth units were up to par, any more than I was up to par on the Litani.

I'm sorry you (or G. Blackburn) are "irritated" or "enraged" by my statement that Commonwealth forces were "less than stellar" in their performance.

Do you think I'm a German apologist or revisionist? Those who know me, know THAT's not the case . It's just my assessment based on a) what info I've read over the years; and experience.

Shalom.

[This message has been edited by Forever Babra (edited 02-18-2001).]