Leibstandarte Division and Schweppenburg

[Jeff Duquette]

Barbra Said:

I'm sorry you (or G. Blackburn) are "irritated" or "enraged" by my statement that Commonwealth forces were "less than stellar" in their performance.

I would say “irritated” more correctly describes my emotion regarding your blanket statement on the universally poor performance of Commonwealth troops in Normandy. Perhaps Blackburn and other Canadian Vets would fit into the “enraged” category. IMO these types of blanket qualifications are meaningless. It’s the same thing as saying all Germans units were crack\elite airborne ranger units that ate nails for breakfast. That’s simply not the case as demonstrated by Schweppenburg’s list of divisional assessments. Luftwaffe field divisions come to mind.

I guess I would be more interested in hearing your reasoning as to why you feel Commonwealth formations performed so poorly in Normandy rather that throwing out something that you obviously believe to be common knowledge.

Do you think I'm a German apologist or revisionist? Those who know me, know That’s not the case . It's just my assessment based on a) what info I've read over the years; and experience.

Frankly I hadn’t thought about it one way or the other. But now that you have brought it up…are you a German apologist\revisionist? (whatever that is?)

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Quoting George Blackburn:

It is irritating to the point of enraging to read critical analyses of the shortcomings of men and officers engaged at the spearhead of operations by critics with not a single day of frontline experience. Well-rested, well-fed, safe and secure, writing within the relaxed atmosphere of their homes or offices, with no responsibility for men's lives resting on their decisions, they are sickeningly arrogant. Clearly, when all the sinister mystery is removed from any battlefield as to what the enemy has over there beyond those trees, or among the silent rubble of that village, or in the dead ground just over that ridge, any fool can decide what should have been done and the best way of doing it.

And there is something particularly obscene about the works of historians who conduct coldblooded analyses and write without emotion of the accomplishments of units and the "fighting qualities" of men while never giving any indication they recognize and understand the frailty of the human spirit and the resolve of all men, regardless of training or background, when forced to live for days without end in a continuing agony of fear, made manageable only by the numbing effects of extreme fatigue.

I am sure that arrogance is no more alien to the world of military historians than to any other walk of life. But I think Mr. Blackburn has done a disservice to the profession here. It is their job to "...conduct coldblooded analyses and write without emotion..." because it is their job to draw whatever lessons can be learned from the information that comes to hand about military operations. It seems to me that a fair proportion have been under the gun themselves, and generally they have great respect for those who have served at great peril and discomfort to themselves. Indeed, it is the men who were at the sharp end who provide them with the information on which their analyses are based.

Finally, it is often said that no-one who was not there can ever know what it was like. To a large extent this is true. But so what? Should we give up trying to understand what the Siege of Troy was like simply because none of the present generation was there? And "being there" as a source of understanding may not be all that it is cracked up to be. A battle is a very hectic and confusing thing. No one person can see it all in the moment it unfolds, and most of the ones who are there are preoccupied with the urgent task of trying to stay alive and whole, and trying to the best of their abilities to carry out their mission. People in such circumstances do not always make the most careful of witnesses. To repeat, a battle is a confusing place to be.

To toil in the stacks of an archive is certainly not likely to be as heroic as fighting on the field of battle, a proposition most historians are not going to contest. And there is nothing to commend the notion that any one historian, or school of historians should be embraced uncritically. But they too have their job to do, and I think it best to allow them to get on with it.

Any historian who has fudged his sources, or drawn conclusions unsupported by the available evidence ought to be openly discredited and discarded. But that is a long way from suggestion that the entire profession consists of nothing but posturing ignoramuses.

Michael

[Sirocco]

Originally posted by Forever Babra:

I don't believe the Commonwealth units were up to par, any more than I was up to par on the Litani.

"...we saw the enemy busily emplacing his anti-tank guns. Brave they were, no doubt, these Anglo-Saxons, but we were rapidly closing to point-blank range, so that their efforts were meaningless; they would never be ready to fire in time. Courage or madness? we asked ourselves... The guns were literally dismantled, shields flying through the air, wheels hurled across the field. The Tommies screamed, throwing their arms in the air as they died, or somersaulted, horribly mutilated."

Caen : Anvil of Victory, p.232

We weren't always brewing tea. When compared to the Americans we - the Commonwealth countries - tend to downplay our achievements and sacrifices, and, in comparison, to make too much of our failures. But no-one should mistake the fact that thousands of Commonwealth soldiers risked their lives every day, fighting an enemy that was battle-tested and determined, and just as the Americans did, making their fair share of mistakes, but getting it right often enough that the German hold on Normandy was broken.

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[This message has been edited by Sirocco (edited 02-18-2001).]

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Sirocco:

The point I was making was that while the HJ was built around a cadre from the LAH, most of the men came from the HJ movement. You seemed to be making the point that the HJ was a carbon copy of the LAH, when it was not.

The quoted report is being taken literally, without taking into consideration all the relevant facts.

Sorry Sirocco, crossed wires. I was talking about Canadian COs and not Canadian soldiers in my post about why some people may have made more of the Germans than they deserved. Thoroughly confused now?

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Sirocco]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

Thoroughly confused now?

You have achieved your goal, Germanboy.

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Sirocco:

You have achieved your goal, Germanboy.

Good - there is nothing more gratifying to a German than achieving a goal.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Forever Babra]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

I guess I would be more interested in hearing your reasoning as to why you feel Commonwealth formations performed so poorly in Normandy rather that throwing out something that you obviously believe to be common knowledge

There was, primarily, the lack of staff training for most officers, which led to every sort of logistical and operational malfunction at all levels. Corps and Army level artillery was not on call when it was needed, and seldom in sufficient quantity. Tactics in light of previous experience had not progressed to reflect the absolute need for close infantry/tank cooperation. As a result, dangerous animosities developed between the infantry and the armour, as each blamed the other for not supporting. Such in-fighting hindered combined operations as neither could (or felt they could) rely on the other. Most of the units involved in the Normandy fighting were trained in doctrine from 1942, that is when they were sufficiently trained at all. Many divisional commanders were lax in this regard; and most of the training for Normandy consisted in how to get off the beach -- insufficient attention had been paid to forseeable conditions after that, with the result that once ashore, confidence waned.

As a consequence of this poor leadership, changing leadership, heavy enemy resistance, and "victories" measured in yards and heavy casualties, morale plummeted, desertions went up, courts martial went up, and further operations suffered. Not surprisingly, after the eventual breakout, morale improved, as did combat efficiency.

For a more detailed examination, explained much better in 300 pages than I can do in a paragraph or two, I would refer you to Lt. Col. Dr. John A. English, Failure in High Command - The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign ISBN 0-919614-60-4.

If you just want to read how great the good guys are, try Whitaker, Whitaker & Copp, Victory at Falaise - The Soldiers' Story ISBN 0-00-200017-2

But now that you have brought it up…are you a German apologist\revisionist? (whatever that is?)

No.

[This message has been edited by Forever Babra (edited 02-18-2001).]

[lassner.1]

Regarding a comparative analysis of combat performance in the Normany campaign (British, Canadian, US, and German) I highly recommend the recent Ph.D. dissertation by Russell A. Hart (Russell A. Hart, “Learning Lessons: Military Adaptation and Innovation in the American, British, Canadian and German Armies during the 1944 Normandy Campaign,” Ph.D. diss., The Ohio State University, 1997) I think that it will be published later this year or next. It is an outstanding and nuanced piece of research, as well as a great read.

As a Ph.D. in military history and an internationally published historian may I suggest that people who are interested in the issue of the combat effectiveness of German units examine the Zustandberichte (situation reports) located either at the NARS (National Archives and Records Services, Washington, D.C.) or the BA/MA (Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, Freiburg, Germany). While incomplete, these are an **invaluable** resource for obtaining the combat effectiveness of German units at any given moment in time throughout the war. This is not to say that they are objective in a “scientific” sense, since they are ultimately judgements. But they are the judgements of the soldiers and officers at that front and at that moment in time. Moreover, if one is lucky, one can even cross check them, for example finding both regimental and divisional Zustandberichte on a particular unit. To back up for a moment, the idea of a combat evaluation rating was already well entrenched in the German army during the interwar period, but during the annexation of Austria in 1938 the Germany army began to evaluate how einsatzfähig (operational) a unit was or was not. It is essential to note that this term was not used synonymously to mean fully combat ready. Units were denoted einsatzfähig that were at the same time identified as either questionable or not suitable for combat. Einsatzfähig was used to denote a unit that had been able to be mobilized in a more or less complete fashion, and then able to join the invasion of Austria but which may have had significant combat inhibiting problems. A unit deemed not einsatzfähig was one that was unable even to mobilize properly and march out to the border (See, for example, Erfahrungen bei der Probemobilmachung, Bad Reichenhall 8. April 1938, Stab Geb. Jäg. Reg. 100, RH 37/6717, BA/MA.). The German army high command (Oberkommando des Heeres) converted it peace time evaluations into a combat rating system which reflected these nuances in September 1939. This was a four level rating for units that were einsatzfähig and included the following ratings: 1) “[e]insatzfähig für alle Aufgaben” (operational for all assignments); 2) “operational, though only partly for the attack”; 3) “fully operational for defensive assignments”; and 4) “partly operational for defensive assignments.” Units that were below a 4 rating were “nicht einsatzfähig.” (Beurteilung des Kampfwertes der Divisionen Mitte Dezember 1939, 13.12.1939, Generalstab des Heeres, RH 2/1520, p. 68, BA/MA). As I mentioned before there are varying forms and types of what are soon referred to in the Wehrmacht as Zustandberichte and they are, in many cases, very detailed above and beyond the 1-4 level combat rating. One finds the number of operational AT guns, in the case of infantry divisions and regiments, as well as tanks, in the case of panzer divisions. They also include juicy details such as, “the panzer division is a 2 rating but would be a one if not for the fact that our panzer grenadiers were slaughtered last week by some IS-2s and these new guys suck.” This, of course is the rating system to which Schweppenburg is referring. Unfortunately almost all of the reports that I have in my library are from the Austria campaign, the Polish campaign, the Russian campaign, and some for the Norway and Finnish campaigns. I might have some from the west but I would have to check. If anyone is interested please feel free to write me an e-mail. I am very busy these days but I would be happy to help out any scenario designers if I can.

[Jeff Duquette]

Mike Said:

To toil in the stacks of an archive is certainly not likely to be as heroic as fighting on the field of battle, a proposition most historians are not going to contest. And there is nothing to commend the notion that any one historian, or school of historians should be embraced uncritically. But they too have their job to do, and I think it best to allow them to get on with it.

Any historian who has fudged his sources, or drawn conclusions unsupported by the available evidence ought to be openly discredited and discarded. But that is a long way from suggestion that the entire profession consists of nothing but posturing ignoramuses.

Exactly…although I think Blackburn characterizing historians as ignoramuses is perhaps pushing the intent. His experiences in Normandy, IMO, give him a unique perspective into the fighting there. Not because he was able to sit back and observe the campaign from a situation of detached clarity, but because he gives us insight into the fighting there which won’t come purely from toiling monk like in the secluded back-rows of libraries and Archives.

Advice that is often given to young writers is “write about what you know, and what you have experienced”. It is evident from Blackburn’s prologue that he researched “The Guns of Normandy” by interviewing survivors from the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. In addition, based upon his bitter commentary on past Historical Works on the 21st Army Groups Performance in Normandy, it is also evident that he has done his homework in the secluded back rows of Archives and Libraries. And yet Blackburn chanalizes “The Guns of Normandy” onto his own experiences in Normandy.

I am not going to defend everything Blackburn says in the Prologue of “Guns Of Normandy”. Nor would I defend an argument that people should only write about what they have experienced first hand. If I believed that than I wouldn’t be writing posts about WWII German Panzer Divisions on obscure wargame forums. However, it is rather evident that Blackburn feels very strongly about armchair historians assessment of the fighting quality of Canadian Units in Normandy. And I also think his commentary is appropriate relative to a blanket disregard for what Commonwealth Troops were up against in Normandy. When someone says Commonwealth troops consistently fought badly in Normandy, I guess I would like to know why someone thinks that. What monk like toiling in archieves and libraries has brought them to this conclusion.

It is the same reason I want to know why Schweppenburg felt the 1st SS Panzer Division falls into the ”D” category of his Combat Efficiency list. The ”D” rating, in my mind, has been somewhat addressed by various secondary information posted by Sirocco. Someone reading the late 43 early 44 East Front casualty stats on LAH as well as LAH being stripped of what few veterans remained in order to furnish HJ and 17th SS PZGrD with cadres could reasonably come to the conclusion that LAH was a shell of a division and combat effectiveness was probably low.

The question regarding the inferiority of Commonwealth Unit Performance still remains. You won’t find grand-sweeping arrows on any campaign maps detailing Commonwealth operations around Caen during June and July of 1944. But the German Army in France was bled white as a result of Commonwealth efforts during this time period. Ultimately this would lead to the success of Cobra. The ugly merits of attrition.

Am I a Canadian apologist\revisionist? No I’m not. I am an American…if that is pertinent. I’ve never been to Canada, although I saw it once from the American Side of Niagara Falls.

[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 02-18-2001).]

[Jeff Duquette]

Whoops…this thread is moving quicker than I can write.

lassner.1…excellent in site. Thanks for posting.

Barbra:

Haven’t read your post yet but will after I make the wife dinner. Sorry when it comes to the wife I’m a whipped man.

[lassner.1]

Jeff Duquette,

As I wrote in my post (above) Schweppenburg is claiming credit for something that is, in fact not his idea, but rather an institutionalized combat evaluation rating system of the Wehrmacht. It started during the interwar period and was far more nuanced than Schweppenburg gave any indication of.

[Major Tom]

I guess that the comparisons of Lee and Rommel are pretty good. Both of them benefitted from history. Lee was not quite the brilliant strategist as history makes him out to be (Antietam, Gettysburg, Richmond?) just like Rommel wasn't totally brilliant as well (El Alemain, Crusader, Normandy, Tunis). They were indeed competent, but, had their share of war losing disasters as well.

Rommel's advance through France wasn't individually brilliant. It was actually fairly boring, except for nearly being overrun by the British 1st Army Tank Brigade. When compared to other armoured Divisions, Rommel's didn't perform substantially better. When Rommel and Lee really shined is when they had everything going for them. They did very well when their supply lines were short (ie. when they counter attacked) but did poor when their lines were longer (ie. when they were counter attacked). Just as McClelland and Auckinlek (SP) weren't able to get a knock out blow, neither was Rommel or Lee. Remember, they both lost in the end.

[Jeff Duquette]

lassner.1 Said:

As I wrote in my post (above) Schweppenburg is claiming credit for something that is, in fact not his idea, but rather an institutionalized combat evaluation rating system of the Wehrmacht. It started during the interwar period and was far more nuance than Schweppenburg gave any indication of.

I think the idea that Schweppenburg is taking credit for “the list” is perhaps my fault in the way I presented the original quote. After reading your post it is apparent that “the list” and its ratings were based upon a well-established German Army assessment system. Presumably the “1” through “4” rating you have detailed corresponds to the “A” through “D” rating in Schweppenburg’s original report. This would seem to dispel the idea that Schweppenburg's information is based on personal bias, prejudice, or some sort of axe to grind with the Waffen SS.

“4) partly operational for defensive assignments.” In essence this implies that LAH as a division was somewhat capable of conducting defensive actions…is there an implication as to Divisional Morale here as well, or is that stretching the intent of the rating system?

I highly recommend the recent Ph.D. dissertation by Russell A. Hart (Russell A. Hart, “Learning Lessons: Military Adaptation and Innovation in the American, British, Canadian and German Armies during the 1944 Normandy Campaign,” Ph.D. diss., The Ohio State University, 1997) I think that it will be published later this year or next. It is an outstanding and nuanced piece of research, as well as a great read.

An associate of yours? How did you become familiar with Hart’s dissertation?

For posterity…as you appear to be fairly familiar with this subject matter…any thoughts on the June 44 rating of LAH. In addition, based upon actual LAH performance during the campaign, do you have any insights into how this June Divisional assessment may have been proved right or wrong during the Normandy Campaign?

[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 02-18-2001).]

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

When someone says Commonwealth troops consistently fought badly in Normandy, I guess I would like to know why someone thinks that.

Frankly so would I. Just about the only place I've run into that claim is on the internet, and it's usually put forward in that form by people who, judging by their style of argument, couldn't find their own asses with either hand even with the help of a mapbook and a compass.

The more general rap on British/Commonwealth forces (and this comes also from the enemies who opposed them) is that the men in the trenches fought with dogged courage and determination, but whose skills were only average. They were rated mostly as better on defense, where their fighting qualities shown in a better light than offense.

With exceptions, their leadership is what came in for the greatest criticism. The descriptive word that comes up most often is 'phlegmatic'. While some commanders (like O'Connor in Libya) revealed breathtaking brilliance, most never seem to have caught the tempo of modern warfare. Which is odd, since by and large they seem perfectly intelligent to me. They could apparently suss out a strategic situation as well as anyone. Their covert operations ran circles around the Germans, who never seem to have quite caught onto that game. It was only in the application of the techniques of mechanized warfare that they came up so disappointing. And since that is an area that has received a great deal of attention (especially, let it be said, among wargamers), it has tended to taint their reputation, perhaps unfairly.

Michael

[Jeff Duquette]

Babra Said:

As a result, dangerous animosities developed between the infantry and the armour, as each blamed the other for not supporting. Such in-fighting hindered combined operations as neither could (or felt they could) rely on the other.

Well I guess I would have to agree with this portion of your assessment, having seen similar accounts of “grumbling” between tankers and Infantry in both American and Commonwealth campaign histories. Perhaps a reflection on the Norman terrain, and compartmentalization of the typical Normandy battlefield. Norman Boccage was apparently navigable by the average grunt with an Enfield or Garande. Tankers on the other hand were very restricted in the ability to maneuver. A severe disadvantage to an attacking armored force. The most likely avenues of approach by tanks in Boccage country would not be much of a mystery to defending German units. This is part of the reason why simple chunks of steel welded to the hulls of Shermans and Stuarts (rhinos) was such an important innovation to the Normandy Battlefield. The Germans also suffered from this same “road bound” armour attack problem during their attacks on the 30th ID around Mortain.

[Simon Fox]

I don't find the assessment of the 21st Panzer as particularly suprising, after all the "green" Commonwealth units which struggled ashore and then milled around confused as to what to do next had little trouble in disposing of it's counterattacks on the 6/7th June.

Babs,

Some good points about "green" and "veteran" that are all to often ignored. "Green" troops if properly trained and led may well have a well-spring of "willingness" which they will lose with time. Even so I cannot agree entirely with your views on Normandy. They strike me as too closely aligned with those of Max Hastings. I think you place too much emphasis upon issues of armour-infantry cooperation (which would have been a waste of time in Normandy anyway) at the expense of other deficiencies. On the whole I think the performance of Commonwealth forces in Normandy could have been better for a whole host of reasons. But I seriously doubt that, given the quality of the opposition, remedying these would have made any significant difference to the progress or outcome of the campaign. The only real difference I could see would be the acheivement of the same aims with less casualties. Making blanket statements about performance is always a problem given the variable performance of different divisions, even given the relative evenness of allied divisions. I don't see much mention of the very variable quality German infantry divisions (oops sorry, forgot they were fighting the Americans, hehe).

Generally, to quote an interesting reference does not always imply that one agrees wholeheartedly with every point that author makes.

"Normandy was a defender's paradise. It was bad tank country and our poor supporting armour lost many tanks, particularly to Panzerfausts (German bazooka detachments) firing at about thirty yards' range or less. We soon learned not to allow our "tame armour" to wander outside immediate infantry protection. In retrospect, Normandy is now a surrealistic dream, totally lacking the stark clarity of subsequent battles: a pastiche of heat, dust the stench of bloated cattle, the litter of dead tanks, rusting guns and wildly scattered grenades and small arms ammunition. We fought from one hedgerow to the next, up tortuous, overgrown sunken lanes: ideal country for the German defender but appalling for attacking infantry. However, no arm but infantry could take and hold the Normandy bocage."

"Over the last twenty years it has become the custom for some of our younger military writers to extol the professional ability of the Wehrmacht whilst decrying that of our own fighting arms, particularly our armour and infantry. This has perplexed me because it runs contrary to my experience. My 18 platoon were better soldiers than any we fought. So was D company and the whole 4th Battalion, The Somerset Light Infantry. Admittedly it was a good battalion but I find it hard to believe that it was unique. This tendency among writers is understandable. They are too young to have taken part in the operations about which they write and therefore they have to rely mainly on official records and personal interviews with those who were present.

Official documents so often contain "the story for the record". Written after the battle, they are extraordinarily incomplete and sometimes too subjective. Interviews with old soldiers, whatever their rank, can also be misleading. Memory fades or becomes distorted and, particularly with the British, little thought has been given over the post-war years to battles long ago. Sadly, interviews with all but a few ex-infantrymen must necessarily be of limited assistance because very few of them survived long enough to have much to contribute.

I suspect the Germans show more enthusiasm for being interviewed and because of this, in all probability, are a more colourful source of information. They have a different attitude to the war and the German public has a different and superior attitude to them than is shown by the British public to our old soldiers. Although they lost, the German soldiers and their families are proud of their exploits, many of which were considerable. It is, of course, very much in their own interest to encourage the theory and myth that, although superior as fighting men, they were beaten only by numerically superior forces and firepower. In my experience this was not so. In many attacks the prisoners we took outnumbered our attacking force and German units which would continue to resist at close quarters were few indeed. Unlike us, they rarely fought at night, when they were excessively nervous and unsure of themselves. Where we patrolled extensively, they avoided it. I can remember only one successful German patrol and not one successful night action. If our positions had been reversed I doubt they would have performed better than we did. Without doubt, some Wehrmacht formations were extremely professionally competent but many were not. Some of the enemy infantry fought with fanaticism but most did not. It has been suggested that we overcame the Germans by overwhelmingly superior firepower and aerial bombing. The RAF undoubtedly dominated the skies above us, but it was my experience that German infantry and armour had far superior firepower to ours. Their guns and mortars could also produce a devastating display.

I now have little doubt that, for the first two months in Normandy, we lacked two things: comprehensive and imaginative training and personal experience of battle. We were also seriously handicapped by our casual attitude. Too many junior officers did not think for themselves and persistently relied on the narrow teaching of the Battle Schools, whose dogma had assumed the proportion of holy writ......

....The British infantry platoons and companies were overtrained in and bored stiff with basic infantry tactics which, as far as they went, were good. Much of this training unfortunately had been in the hands of Battle School instructors who themselves lacked battle experience and imagination. These tended to become pedagogues: disciples of the DS (Directing Staff) solution about which no argument was tolerated.

Possibly, like most of our infantry, they suffered from the consequences of the pre-war shortage of creatively intelligent regimental officers. Too few of them were professionally dedicated to the extent that they could visualise how battles would be fought and identify the problems that might arise in planning them. They seemed to lack the capacity to think relentlessly through these things until solutions were found. Much of their time had been spent policing the British Empire. Also, unlike the Germans, we British instinctively avoid displays of keenness. The enthusiast, particularly if he became innovative, is an embarrassment. Thus the battlefield became our teacher and, inevitably, it extracted a grim price in blood and time."

Sydney Jary, 18 Platoon

------------------

"Stand to your glasses steady,

This world is a world of lies,

Here's a toast to the dead already,

And here's to the next man to die."

-hymn of the "Double Reds"

[Forever Babra]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Just about the only place I've run into that claim is on the internet, and it's usually put forward in that form by people who, judging by their style of argument, couldn't find their own asses with either hand even with the help of a mapbook and a compass.

My, my, such tempers and flames today. For the record, I did not say, or even imply, Commonwealth troops were bad soldiers. I said their performance was less than stellar; and by "their", I am referring to 21st Army Group's performance. Not exactly a damning criticism.

Just so it's perfectly clear: Commonwealth troops weren't bad; their opponents were just better at the task of making war. History is useless if we don't learn from it.

[Forever Babra]

I think I have to chime in again and reiterate that my criticisms of 21st AG fall at the staff and operational level. I do hope people stop interpreting this as me saying "Pommies suck, Jerry rocks".

It is easy to be wise after the fact, in the warmth and comfort of a writer's chair, but to conduct a military study without some degree of Clausewitzian critical analysis would be to defeat the very purpose. The old adage that one learns best from mistakes is not without foundation. Looking at Canadian Army performance in Normandy up to the end of July 1944, it would seem fair to say that the lives of many soldiers were unnecessarily cast away. While some, and not a few commanders, have argued that lack of combat experience related directly to the loss of life, this contention cannot entirely be sustained. As has been shown in the case of the RHLI, and the 12th SS for that matter, inexperienced units did prevail in the face of the enemy, provided their commanders exhibited the requisite tactical skill and leadership. Judging from the performance of the 272nd Infantry Division, neither can the myth of German fanatacism be used to explain excessive Canadian losses. What then can? In the case of the SSR and the Black Watch, the conclusion is inescapable: surely those who left them exposed in open wheatfields to be harvested like so many sheaves. As for the other units introduced piecemeal to battle, and whose soldiers gave all that mortals could, the responsibility must rest with the High Command

-- Lt. Col. Dr. John English, Failure in High Command - The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign.

[This message has been edited by Forever Babra (edited 02-18-2001).]

[lassner.1]

Jeff,

A few more details on the Zustandberichte first. While the reporting was institutionalized and Wehrmacht-wide, there was still considerable variation depending upon time and place. For example, at the start of the war the reports seem to be only on the divisional level and higher. Further, they took place between campaigns (Austrian, Czechoslovakian, Polish, and French) and on a monthly basis. Once things started going to hell in the east (c. late ‘41 beginning ‘42) the OKH and OKW started the reports again but now from army level all the way down to the regimental level. Then, throughout the war and depending on where you are geographically, there are local variations in the type of information contained within the Zustandberichte, its format and its *frequency* (I have seen weekly reports at the divisional level). However, they *always* are with the 1 to 4 rating. Finally, one can, if the evidence survives, cross reference Zustandberichte; and in certain instances I have seen regimental commanders that rate the unit one way and divisional commanders that rate the same regiments in a different manner. The same is true for corps vs. divisional Zustandberichte. That said, it is a rare occurrence to see, for example, a regimental rate the regiment as a 2 and the divisional commander to rate it differently (either up or down).

Now in (roundabout) answer to your questions 1) “is there an implication as to divisional morale?” and 2) “how was this rating reflected in the 1SS performance in Normandy?”

I do not have any Zustandberichte for the 1SS LAH for the course of the war, *but* the reference to the 1SS from the US Official History of the Normandy Campaign *does* cite the Zustandberichte and gives us the first piece of the puzzle. Out of a “Sollstand” (i.e., the strength a unit should be) of 45 Stug III, 21 Pzkpfw III, 101 Pzkpfw IV, and 81 Pzkpfw V, the 1SS LAH had an “Iststand” (i.e., actual strength) of 45 Stug III, no Pzkpfw III, 50 Pzkpfw IV, and 38 Pzkpfw V. So in terms of armor, the division was almost 50% below strength. This would have been good enough to knock a 1 rating to a 2 or even a 3. (I would be very curious to see the report because the division might well have lost a substantial number of motorized vehicles for supply. Zustandbericht mid war on contained a special section to describe the “Beweglichkeit” (mobility) of the division. This certainly could have contributed to a lower rating.)

Schweppenburg gives us another piece of the puzzle: the unit had been mauled in the east and was shipped to the west to be rebuilt, though not before loosing veterans as the cadre for new SS divisions. This certainly knocked the divisions rating down 1 and probably 2 points. I have seen a number of Zustandberichte in which commanders say “we are a 4 now, but after a few more weeks/months of training we will be a 1.”

So what we can say at this point – without having seen the actual extant Zustandberichte – is that the division was 1) mauled in the east 2) missing almost 50% of its armor and ?% or other support vehicles 3) suffering from yet another personnel loss in the form of vets for “division building” and 4) suffering from the huge intake of green recruits. Thus Schweppenburg’s evaluations of the 1SS LAH - that “discipline was a sham,” “the NCOs were poor,” and that the division did not have time enough to train – are hardly surprising. I think that it would be a safe and balanced judgement to deduce that these negative factors had a significantly negative impact on the morale of the troops.

Your other question is more difficult for me to answer since I am rather vague on the 1SS LAH’s actions in the Normandy campaign. Off the top of my head I believe that the 1SS LAH was held in reserve even after the fighting started. Of the SS panzer divisions engaged in Normandy most of the fighting was done by the 2nd, 10th and 12th SS Panzer Divisions. It may have been due to the 4 rating that the 1SS LAH had received. But there must be some decent sources, both primary and secondary, that discuss the 1SS LAH’s performance in that campaign. Once can just compare them with the 4 rating to see how accurate it was.

Whew! Hope all this helps!

[lassner.1]

Jeff,

Oh, and yes Russell Hart is a colleague of mine. He just got a job as a military historian at a university in Hawaii.

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by Forever Babra:

My, my, such tempers and flames today.

Sorry, Babs, that wasn't directed at you but at certain personages I have encountered in usenet newsgroups who make snide, carping, and wholly unjustified criticisms of our allies.

You, on the other hand at least seem to try to achieve some kind of balance and accuracy. Don't take it personally.

Michael

[Jeff Duquette]

lassner.1

Thanks for the well considered post. It was enjoyable to read through your sort of "flow chart approach" to my question. Very logical approach to question. I appreciate that your conjecture was both limited and well defined in each case in which it was employed.

I look forward to seeing Russell Hart's work in print. Sounds very interesting. I took a few courses at the U of H in Manoa Valley back in the early eighties. Nice campus. Numerous good looking co-eds there (or as the locals call the gals: "wahines")

I get the impression that your personal forte is the Eastern Front. Are you by chance considering a similar work to Hart's for the Eastern Front?

[lassner.1]

Jeff,

One point of clarification - the Zustandberichte were done weekly and monthly, so it would be very interesting to see just when the 1SS LAH started "moving up" in the ratings. What I mean to highlight here is that just becasue it was a IV rating in June 44 doesn't mean it was in July.

Certainly a study like Russell's for a given campaign in the east would be extrememly interesting. It would also be far more problematic, and not just for reasons of language. Right now, however, I have my hands full with a project that has me writing (and rewriting) up to 15 hours a day. Whatever time is left over goes to CM

[Jeff Duquette]

I just wanted to touch bases on this animosity issue between Tankers and Infantrymen in Normandy again. This is not intended as an excuse, simply an implication of the unique problems associated with combined arms efforts in Normandy.

One of the quotes that Simon Fox was kind enough to present was quite powerful and sums up the very unique terrain\fighting conditions in Normandy: "Normandy is now a surrealistic dream, totally lacking the stark clarity of subsequent battles: a pastiche of heat, dust the stench of bloated cattle, the litter of dead tanks, rusting guns and wildly scattered grenades and small arms ammunition. We fought from one hedgerow to the next, up tortuous, overgrown sunken lanes: ideal country for the German defender but appalling for attacking infantry. However, no arm but infantry could take and hold the Normandy bocage."

Armour and Infantry Coordination in Normandy

"Although infantry divisions normally fought in more enclosed country than armoured divisions, and the tanks of the Second Armoured Brigade were less exposed to the long range of German guns, in open country they were at the same disadvantage from German tanks and antitank guns. In order to avoid antitank fire the Shermans of the Second and Fourth Armoured Brigades had to choose routes to their objectives separate from infantry companies, which often followed straight barrage lines and moved much slower than they did. Both faced the staff college problem of 1936-37 of how to coordinate the movement of infantry and tanks moving at different speeds on different routes and preferring different terrain. Guy Simonds's solution in 1938 had been to base the attack on the tanks, but the problem of getting the infantry forward quickly was unsolved until Totalize introduced the armoured personnel carrier (APC) to the Canadian and British armies....And it was the tanks' causualties that persuaded him to use them at night for protection against antitank guns." (Graham: 136-7)

Lt. General Guy Simonds, II Canadian Corps Commander in Normandy had witnessed the first attempt to capture Verrières Ridge, by the British:

I saw the attack go in. The first wave of armour came out in the open, and within seconds 20 or 30 British tanks were brewing up. The attack was catastrophic. 877 tanks attacked. 437 were lost. One could not help but be impressed by the camouflage and marksmanship of the German gunners, whether in tanks or manning anti-tank guns

Among the soldiers who fought that first battle, was the Canadian, Radley-Walters:

I found that the anti-tank fire and the defensive positions were getting stronger rather than getting weaker and every time you attacked anywhere along the Verrieres ridge as a tanker, you generally came back walking.

[Forever Babra]

Good quotes, Jeff. I was hunting for something along similar lines, and it demonstrates some of the staff shortcomings I was alluding to. For weeks, months really, the primary complaint among the allied tankers was that they had been, in some cases for years, trained on open English moors and were totally unprepared for the close Norman countryside. Yet, once the Bocage had been breached, Caen taken, and the Shermans ready for their perceived mobile breakthrough across the wide plains to the south, the tankers discovered that now they had no cover, and suffered even more than they had previously. Then the complaint became that the country was too open. It becomes apparent when analyzing any isolated action, that the commanders of the armoured units in particular just weren't up to scratch. I think it was Simonds himself who summed up the situation by saying "The best tank country is the one with no anti-tank guns."

Hill 195 is a stark example. Worthington, untrained in night moves with tanks, attempted a surprise night march to take this objective to begin phase II of Totalize. Somehow disoriented, he begins a bizarre night ride through the German Army, and finally reports the succesful capture of the objective -- except he is some four miles away from his reported location, completely beyond support, and amongst an aroused and enraged SS. His force is destroyed utterly, partly by the RAF, the few survivors fleeing to the safety of some nearby Poles, who failed to provide supports to the embattled Canadian tankers, though they witnessed the fight. Some 47 tanks of the BCR were lost, almost their entire tank strength. Commanders too often didn't seem to have the tactical wherewithal to change orders they deemed unreasonable or unworkable. Simonds was a very notable exception, but the men around him seldom displayed his ingenuity.

Meanwhile, the A&SH, binned their orders to take Hill 195 and devised a plan of their own. Unaided by tanks at all, they used their superb scouts to infiltrate the entire regiment inside German positions on the position, surprised them, and took the objective without a single casualty.

Unfortunately, almost every Canadian, Polish and British action between June and August has a similar story; some achievement marred by some other tactical or operational fiasco. The pattern is too prevalent to ascribe it all to "conditions" in Normandy or the fanatacism of the Germans; there was mismanagement too, and the record of 21st Army Group reflects it.