Did the British make Rommel look better than he was?

[Jasper]

An article called "Advance and Attack" from Oct 1942 starts with:

"In connection with the handling of his armored units there are four principles from which the Boche rarely departs:

1. The primary role of the tank is to kill infantry.

2. The main weapon of the tank is thus the machine gun.

3. The tank can only be successful if used in conjunction with all arms.

4. Tanks must be used enmasse."

Given points 1 and 2 - is the author attributing allied perceptions of tank warfare to German doctrine? And so missing is his misinterpreting German doctrine of the time?

Later on he makes an interesting observation about the German 88mm:

"The 88-mm though it has proved a very effective antitank gun is primarily included in the "Box" to protect "soft skinned" vechicles from air attack." I suspect he thought the use of 88-mm antiaircraft gun as an antitank gun was 'gamey' and that the Germans shouldn't do it.

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Check out http://www.geocities.com/funfacts2001/ or

http://hyperion.spaceports.com/~funfacts/ for military documents written during WWII.

[This message has been edited by Jasper (edited 02-01-2001).]

[Tiger]

Given points 1 and 2 - is attributing allied perceptions to German doctrine? And so missing the point?

Yes this would be a correct assumption.

The first two that you list is how the British and Americans thought tanks should be used. Of the major powers in WW 2, only Germany and the Soviets realized that the main role of a tank was to kill other tanks, that killing infantry was secondary. Both these same two powers built their tanks with the ability to be easily up-gunned, a feature the Allies were somewhat deficient in. Seems like this British officer is trying to attach British ideas of tank use to the Germans and make it stick. Suggested reading "Armoured Firepower, the Development of Tank Armament 1939-45" by peter Gudgin

*Tiger*

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Tiger:

Yes this would be a correct assumption.

The first two that you list is how the British and Americans thought tanks should be used. Of the major powers in WW 2, only Germany and the Soviets realized that the main role of a tank was to kill other tanks, that killing infantry was secondary. Both these same two powers built their tanks with the ability to be easily up-gunned, a feature the Allies were somewhat deficient in. Seems like this British officer is trying to attach British ideas of tank use to the Germans and make it stick. Suggested reading "Armoured Firepower, the Development of Tank Armament 1939-45" by peter Gudgin

*Tiger*

I wonder why the German PzKpfw.IV was built as a support tank then... it was built for KILLING infantry. Their main anti-tank tanks was the PzKpfw.III wasn't all that "easy" to up-gun either. In fact its inability to up-guned lead it to its demise.

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by CavScout:

I wonder why the German PzKpfw.IV was built as a support tank then... it was built for KILLING infantry. Their main anti-tank tanks was the PzKpfw.III wasn't all that "easy" to up-gun either. In fact its inability to up-guned lead it to its demise.

Not quite - ironically it ended as an infantry support tank - Panzer III N with 75mm howitzer short.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

Not quite - ironically it ended as an infantry support tank - Panzer III N with 75mm howitzer short.

I meant as the anti-tank tank.

[dalem]

I would think that the main role of the MBT throughout WWII remained killing infantry. The Russians and Germans were the first to apply the concept of the marriage of infantry killing with self-protection (i.e. anti-tank capability). In order to keep killing infantry you have to stay alive against the medium-and high-velocity guns out there...

-dale

[Tiger]

The PZ-IV was upgunned at various times during it's use, eventually to a long 75. When the chassis would no longer allow for upgunning, they were converted into fixed super-structure excellent tank-hunters, eventually even the 88 was mounted on a Pz IV chassis,the Nashorn, as was the 150mm Hummel.

The Pz III went from 37mm to a long 50mm, and the very successful StuG Variants armed with a 75mm.

Both of these tanks are pre-1940 models, btw.

The British and Americans clung to the notion that they were to be used solely for infantry support. The US armed forces even fought against having a seperate tank arm created from the infantry.

*Tiger*

Excerpts from P. Gudgin's "Armored Firepower, The Development of Tank Armament 1939-45":

"The story of the development of British tank armament in the Second World War is one of too little, too late. A fundementally wrong appreciation, prior to the outbreak of war, of how tanks would be employed in a future war, coupled with poor intelligence on Germany's tanks and their employment, led to late development of adequate armament and ammunition throughout the early years of the Second World War."

and "...Tanks so designed as to be incapable of being upgunned. The narrow hulls of British tanks, carried entirely between the tracks, meant that no larger diameter turrent ring could be fitted and thus no larger turrent for a gun of larger calibre."

Of the US tanks:

"Unlike the German and Soviet tank policy-makers, those in the United States had no very clear idea either of a tank's main function or of the importance of firepower among a tank's characteristics. They were further hamstrung by the subordination of tank development and tactics to the Infantry branch, by the seperation of the tank destroyer function from the tank arm, by the prevailing isolationalism before the Second World War and by the resulting shortage of Research and Development funds for the Army. The result was that, on the outbreak of war in 1939, the US army had fewer than 500 tanks in the whole of the United States.

Despite an amazing build-up of tank production in a very short time after the outbreak of war, the tanks to be produced, although reliable and easy to maintain, would be under-armoured and under-gunned for much of the war, relative to those of both the Soviet Union and Germany."

On the Germans:

"The makers of German tank policy, both before and during the Second World War, were quite clear that a tank's firepower was its most important characteristic. High priority was given to the development of a range of weapons around which suitable tanks could be designed and this policy succeeded brilliantly; the tank weapons with which Germany entered hostilities in 1939 were equal or superior to any which were then aligned against them. This superiority was maintained throughout the war by a judicious and far-sighted policy of development, whereby a new gun, or an improved version of an existing weapon, was always available when required. Briefly, the story of German tank armament development during the war is one of continuous increases in gun calibre, barrel length (and consequently, muzzle-velocity) and weight of projectile; existing tanks were upgunned with the improved version, or, if this were not possible, a new tank was designed to receive it."

[This message has been edited by Tiger (edited 02-01-2001).]

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Tiger:

The PZ-IV was upgunned at various times during it's use, eventually to a long 75. When the chassis would no longer allow for upgunning, they were converted into fixed super-structure excellent tank-hunters, eventually even the 88 was mounted on a Pz IV chassis, as was the 150mm Hummel.

The Pz III went from 37mm to a long 50mm, and the very successful StuG Variants armed with a 75mm.

Both of these tanks are pre-1940 models, btw.

The Pz IV was turned into a anti-tank tank because the German Pz III was not up to the task.

You said, "only Germany and the Soviets realized that the main role of a tank was to kill other tanks" yet the Pz IV of germany was an anti-INFANTRY tank.

Then you go to say, "Both these same two powers built their tanks with the ability to be easily up-gunned, a feature the Allies were somewhat deficient in."

Ironic that the Pz III was unable to be up-gunned into a decent tank for the war. The Pz IV was but changed roles from a support tank to a AT tank.

ironic it was Germany who ended the war with a mryid of tank design while the US had stuck with one for almost the entire war.

The Germans and Soviets realized the main purpose of the tank was to kill other tanks, the British and Americans clung to the notion that they were to be used solely for infantry support. The US armed forces even fought against having a seperate tank arm created from the infantry.

You do know there where those in the German army who battled against the Panzer arm?

[This message has been edited by CavScout (edited 02-01-2001).]

[Major Tom]

Actually, I would claim to differ regarding at least the British. Pre-War, British theorists and American designs had developed most of the tactics used by the Germans and Russians. The British had two types of tanks, Infantry support tanks (Matilda, Matilda II, Valentine, Churchill) and Cruiser battle tanks (Vickers Mark III, Cruiser series, Crusader, Cromwell, Comet). ritish Cruiser tanks were designed to kill other tanks, while British Infantry tanks were designed to support Infantry.

The German Mark III started with a 37mm Gun, and was upgraded to a long 50mm Gun (as was mentioned). The Mark III was primarily a AT weapon, with earlier Mark IV's being primarily Infantry support. As these tanks became obsolete (like ALL tanks eventually do) they were modified to continue in service in other forms. The Mark III went to the CS role and the Mark IV went to the AT role. However, when they were in their roles they were highly specialized. AT tanks had trouble with Infantry while CS tanks could not handle other tanks.

The all-round Sherman/Cromwell types were probably better tanks than the average German tanks (Mark IV/III) as they could fill in just about any role that they were required. Although they didn't surpass the German's in one particular aspect, they were better troubleshooters. So, by 1944 when Western Allied armour was more 'universal' like the Sherman they were much more useful than the German tanks. It doesn't do much good if you have a bunch of tanks sitting around without their optimal enemy in front of them.

[Major Tom]

Originally posted by CavScout:

Ironic it was Germany who ended the war with a mryid of tank design while the US had stuck with one for almost the entire war.

And what a tank it was!

(sarcasm mode off)

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Major Tom:

And what a tank it was!

Good enough I suppose, not the best of course.

[Tiger]

You miss the point Cavscout in your usual "America is always the best/can do no wrong stance".

The British and Americans held to the beliefs that tanks should be subordinate to the Infantry throughout much of the war.

The Germans and Soviets did not see tanks as soley infantry-killers subordinate to the Infantry arm; they realized that to operate in the anti-infantry role, they would need to kill other tanks first.

British and American tank development was behind Soviet and German in terms of usage and firepower.

Back to the original post, I believe Rommel made the British look better than they were in the African Campaign due to lack of supplies. This officer's report in question seems biased with British ideas about tank useage. Both points #1 & #2 seem to be a rather typical British policy view on tank usage early on.

*Tiger*

[This message has been edited by Tiger (edited 02-01-2001).]

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Tiger:

You miss the point Cavscout in your usual "America is always the best/can do no wrong stance".

Did I say that? No. But your unabashed worship of all things German has blinded you again.

The British and Americans held to the beliefs that tanks should be subordinate to the Infantry throughout much of the war.

The why was the Sherman designed to be a "break out" tank and not an infantry support tank?

The British certainly had infantry support tanks but they had their cruiser tanks as well.

The Germans and Soviets did not see tanks as soley infantry-killers subordinate to the Infantry arm; they realized that to operate in the anti-infantry role, they would need to kill other tanks first.

Are you arguing that the Pz IV was meant to kill other tanks in its initial design? The Pz III was to kill tanks, the Pz IV wasn't.

British and American tank development was behind Soviet and German in terms of usage and firepower.

Usage?

Back to the original post, I believe Rommel made the British look better than they were in the African Campaign due to lack of supplies. This officer's report in question seems biased with British ideas about tank useage. Both points #1 & #2 seem to be a rather typical British policy view on tank usage early on.

Of course, Rommel was great and unbeatablem right? When he lost it really wasn't his fault. I guess you can blame the supply situation when Rommel ignored German High Command and launched out for the Suez only to be defeated.

Cav

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"Maneuverists have a bad case of what may be called, to borrow from a sister social science, "'Wehrmact penis envy.'"--D. Bolger

Co-Chairman of the CM Jihad Brigade

Founder of the CMers who like playing the Allies Club

[Silver Stars]

Ok.....nothing against tiger, but i have a problem with the previous statement made about German armor theory...

quote:

"the tank weapons with which Germany entered hostilities in 1939 were equal or superior to any which were then aligned against them. This superiority was maintained throughout the war by a judicious and far-sighted policy of development, whereby a new gun, or an improved version of an existing weapon, was always available when required. "

ok, the statement that German AFVs(i assume that tank weapons means the same thing) where equal or superior to any AFV aligned against them is more then pushing it. In the beginning blitzkreig of 1939 most of the German panzer arm was either made up of Pz Is(machine guns on treads) , Pz IIs(really only a recon tank, only usead as MBT in Poland) and a smattering of Czech tanks. These tanks were not deadlier then thier Allied opposition, thier big advantage was they were quick and Blitzkrieg Doctrine had them massed together. While the french and english did have heavier tanks (Somua and Matilda), they were scattered here and there, and only saw mass groupings in a few battles like Arras.

And by the time IIIs and IVs started to see larger numbers production wise in 41, these tanks were bieng outmatched by the russian T-34. This does not look like a careful plan of steadily upgunning and improving Germanys existing tanks to me.

Germany only had superior tanks when the Tigers and Panthers appeared, and they were only Truly superior to most of the American and British designs; Russia could deal with these tanks more effectively, especially the KVs and ISs......

OK, I have ranted....again, nothing against tiger, I just have doubts concerning the resource material he is referring too......

nothing personal.....=D

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"Life is pain. Anyone saying otherwise is selling something."

[Tiger]

your unabashed worship of all things German has blinded you again.

Not hardly, Cavspout. I like to think most book authors, especially those who've researched this this and have been in their profession longer than you, know more of what they're talking about than you do. I certainly do not think Rommel was unbeatable and never wrong and never said so. In responding to the original post I said that the first two points seemed more along the lines of British theory at the time and I still believe so.

*Tiger*

ps~ ps~ Silverstars, the British 2-pounder had no high-explosive capability at the time nor even in the desert war. The matilda was extremely slow as an AFV. I believe you're rating the 1939 German AFVs against later British designs rather than 1939 equivalent Allied models. Don't forget that the British and French tanks in 1939 do not equate to heavier = better. Those heavier French tanks were taken out with side shots from these "inferior, lighter" German tanks and AT guns. It's a book about tank armament and the author is referring to overall tank policy and armament, i.e the policies of the Soviets and Germans being ahead of British and American policies throughout the war. I do not question that what you say is not correct, however I think it must be tempered with other factors that weigh in. If you're talking about tank armament, the Soviets and Germans clearly had the advantage over British and American armament throughout the war. I'll give you the author's bio:

"Peter Gudgin served as an officer with the 48th Royal Tank Regiment in the Second World War, and saw action in Tunisia. His post-war Army career included regimental and staff jobs, as well as appointments as Assistant Military Attache' in Bonn and the Hague. On his retirement from the Army in 1969 he was the Technical Advisor to the Commandant of the Royal Armoured Corps Centre and later joined Dunlop to manage military sales and marketing until retiring in 1987. Since then Peter has pursued a writing career and has had eight books published on tank design and use, including With Churchills to War (1996) for Sutton Publishing.

[This message has been edited by Tiger (edited 02-01-2001).]

[Jasper]

Excerpts from P. Gudgin's "Armored Firepower, The Development of Tank Armament 1939-45:

"This superiority was maintained throughout the war by a judicious and far-sighted policy of development, whereby a new gun, or an improved version of an existing weapon, was always available when required."

Really? It's 1942 the T-34/76 shows up. To pull some quotes from Achtung Panzer

http://www.achtungpanzer.com/t34.htm

"Very worrying", Colonel-General Heinz Guderian, Commander of Second Panzer Army.

"We had nothing comparable", Major-General F.W. Mellenthin, Chief of Staff of XLVIII Panzer Corps.

"The finest tank in the world", Field-Marshal Ewald von Kleist, First Panzer Army.

"This tank (T-34) adversely affected the morale of the German infantry", General G. Blumentritt.

Personnally I think P. Gudgin is full of sh*t.

[Tiger]

Jasper, Gudgin is referring to the German superiority over British and American tank armament and policy. Gudgin places both Soviet and German armament and tank policy higher than the British and US, and I happen to agree with him. If you want to get into Soviet vs German, it can be said at least that the Germans were able to upgun and develop superior armament to that of the Soviets, which is one of the reasons they maintained a 4-1 kill ratio over the Soviet tanks till late in the war, even being out-numbered. The Soviets basically had to play catch up once the up-gunned long 75 Pz IV, Tiger, and Panther entered service. The T-34 development was frozen for a year or so until they realized they'd need to upgun it to match the new superior German armaments being fielded. I don't say this from being "uber German" as I'll play the Soviets as much as the Germans in CM2. Why do I play the Germans more than the Allies in CMBO? They have neater toys.

Obviously this has touched some deep feelings people have with whether or not "their side" is getting slighted but I don't see it in that light.

*Tiger*

[This message has been edited by Tiger (edited 02-01-2001).]

[This message has been edited by Tiger (edited 02-01-2001).]

[Guest Andrew Hedges]

Originally posted by Jasper:

1. The primary role of the tank is to kill infantry.

2. The main weapon of the tank is thus the machine gun.

3. The tank can only be successful if used in conjunction with all arms.

4. Tanks must be used enmasse."

Given points 1 and 2 - is the author attributing allied perceptions of tank warfare to German doctrine?

This is a correct statement of German doctrine at the time. As to 1., the Germans preferred to use AT guns to knock out tanks. Preferably, the Germans would encircle enemy units, including enemy tanks, and let them wither on the vine (by destroying, say, gasoline supplies. German doctrine never sought to have giant tank vs. tank battles. However, the Germans did realize that tanks would inevitably fight other tanks, and equipped their tanks accordingly. But, as a matter of doctrine, tanks should be used against infantry.

As to 2. -- that is correct for the time period, too. The 20mm gun on the PzII and the 37mm gun on the 38(t) and the PzIII are not going to be of much use against infantry. Also, much German practice at this time was (1) attack infantry with tanks; (2) wait for British armored counter-attack; (3) knock out some British armor and retreat; (4) into a prepared ambush zone where your AT guns can take out the British tanks; and (5) repeat.

But don't confuse the German doctrine in 1. with the US tank destroyer concept. The TD concept was not wrong because it thought that tanks should fight infantry; it was wrong because it believed that tanks would never encounter enemy tanks, and so did not need to be equipped to deal with them when they did encounter them.

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by Tiger:

Of the major powers in WW 2, only Germany and the Soviets realized that the main role of a tank was to kill other tanks...

Interesting claim. I had always heard it that the Germans at least (I admit I know less about Soviet doctrine) intended their tank formations to get behind the enemies front and shoot up his artillery, command and control, and logistics. If they ran into any enemy armor on the way, they were expected to deal with it with dispatch, but that wasn't usually their primary mission. This is why, in contradistinction to the British, they were armed with a gun that could fire HE as well as AP.

Michael

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by dalem:

The Russians and Germans were the first to apply the concept of the marriage of infantry killing with self-protection (i.e. anti-tank capability). In order to keep killing infantry you have to stay alive against the medium-and high-velocity guns out there...

But wasn't the biggest threat to tanks not other tanks but anti-tank guns? If that is the case, it's even more important to have an effective HE round available.

Michael

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by Tiger:

The British and Americans clung to the notion that they were to be used solely for infantry support.

This is a peculiar claim to put forward. It is true of the British I-tanks only. The British also had a completely different class of tank, the Cruiser. It was essentially intended to perform the classical role of the cavalry in exploitation. It was fast and lightly armored in expectation that it would only be encountering lightly armed support troops in the logistic zone.

As for the Americans, the argument has been put forward, and I think adequately supported, on this board that the primary tank, the Sherman, was designed mostly as an expoitation vehicle, though more heavily (and one might say realistically) armed and armored. That it happened to perform well as an infantry support tank was an incidental plus. To get a true idea of what the Americans thought of as an infantry support or breakthrough AFV, I would refer you to the T95 GMC.

Michael

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Andrew and Michael have in my humble opinion shed the most light here, as opposed to heat.

There has been considerable confusion about armored doctrines and the revolution in armor doctrines during WW II, in large part because such confusion existed at the time, and played no small part in the slowness of development of doctrine by some powers. But these issues have been mistated and oversimplified afterwards, and where during the war by other parties in debates over armor doctrine.

The first thing to understand clearly is that the confusion arose from participants conflating *two* distinct issues about the use of armor. If it had not been for that confusion, the historical participants would have had a much easier time figuring it all out. The two distinct issues are *combined arms* and *concentration*.

Proper modern armor doctrine, which the Germans had before the war broke out but others did not, stressed *both* combined arms *and* concentration. It realized there was no contradiction between the two, that in fact they were issues at right angles to each other. Tanks should work with infantry, and against infantry as well as any other kind of enemy, as part of a combined arms team. And tanks should be used en masse, in large, dedicated formations, in Panzer divisions. Both. A Panzer division had 2 or 3 tank battalions, 3 or 4 infantry battalions, and 3 artillery battalions. They were expected to work closely together as a combined arms team, along with recon, FLAK, PAK, and engineers.

The *French* made the mistake in doctrine of thinking that armor must support the *line* infantry, *spread out* all along the line. The French were *right* that tanks should work with infantry. The French were *wrong* that tanks should be spread out, instead of concentrated into armored formations. Incidentally, the Russians usually made the same mistake, in practice, in 1941 only. By the end of the 1940 campaign in France, *no* western power still made this particular combination of doctrinal positions, this particular mistake. By 1942, the Russians did not either. This mistake is sometimes referred to, regrettably for the sake of any clarity involved, but at least briefly, as "infantry thinking". These led to single tank battalions supporting whole *leg* infantry divisions all along the line.

After 1940 and before 1943, the *British* doctrine on armor was the common position of the western Allies. The British figured out that armor had to be used *en masse*, unlike the way it had been employed in France. The British were *right* to think this. But the British thought that employment of tanks en masse, meant that they should *not* be expected to work with infantry. The British thought the tanks would be slowed down to a walking pace if "forced" to work with infantry, and that they must be freed up to operate "at their own speed".

This led to the British creating independent, brigade-level armored formations with main guns that had no HE shells at all, using only a few howitzer tanks for any role except tank-vs-tank. *Older* British tanks that were not fast enough to be used in the new manner, were parcelled out among the line infantry (these tended to be more heavily armored - the Matilda and Valentine series are examples). The British developed armored division models that had 3 times as many tank battalions as infantry battalions, in which the infantry was almost an afterthought. The still represented progress, because at least the tanks had some divisional artillery to work with.

The British had *misidentified* the problem, and had solved *only half of it*. Because the infantry had been spread out, and because it was indeed a mistake to spread the tanks out, when the British concentrated the tanks they *seperated* them from the infantry. The British thought concentration of armor, and working with infantry, were mutually exclusive *opposites*. They simply are not. This mistake is often called, in short hand, "cavalry thinking".

The U.S. had the same doctrine as the British *until* the 1943 revision of the U.S. armored division model. The Russians used British style massed armor independent tank brigades from 1942 through mid to late 1943, when the Tank Corps organization began to correct the deficiencies of this "tank heavy", tank-"fleet", model. The Russian breakthroughs at Stalingrad were conducted with the British or cavalry doctrine. In the course of 1943, they were in the process of moving from that mistake or half-measure, toward combined arms.

The 1943 U.S. armored division used 3 tank, 3 infantry, and 3 artillery battalions, plus recon, TD, AA, and engineers. It is very closely modeled, organizationally, on the German Panzer division as that existed earlier in the war. With it, the U.S. moved away from the British or cavalry doctrine, to a true combined arms doctrine.

The Germans, incidentally, were *decreasing* the tanks per Panzer division as the war progressed, because they found the practical best combined arms ratios of troop types, was even more towed-gun and infantry heavy, than the pre-war Panzer division model. Which was far *lower* than British, mid war or "cavalry" model to begin with.

True combined arms means concentrated armor formations that *are* expected to work with infantry. That is *armor* thinking, because the other arms are *all* there, to support the *tanks*, not the other way around. The tanks do *not* operate independent of infantry, as the British or cavalry model thought. *Nor* are they scattered to every unit along the front, rather than concentrated into armored divisions.

In the course of the war, the other powers adopted the combined arms doctrine, but the British retained armor-heavy, "cavalry" armored doctrine until the end of the war. They continued to blame all the early-war failures on "tanks working with infantry", aka "the French stuffed up, and we fixed it". Many historians *bought* this line, but it is *not* what was going on.

The Russians achieved practical infantry-armor cooperation in the course of 1943, and their cooperation with towed direct fire ATGs and such also improved in that year, and in 1944. But they never managed to integrate on-call indirect fire by artillery assets, into the combined arms team. This was for reasons of their own artillery ideas, which went in an entirely different (and not terribly sensible, IMnsHO) direction.

The Americans achieved good combined arms cooperation by 1943, with the new model armored division. They did, however, retain a tendency to parcel out some of their tanks to support infantry divisions. This was *not* a reprise of the French mistakes of 1940. The U.S. was fielding armored divisions with 300 AFVs and 200 halftracks and scout cars, which is concentrated armor by anybody's measure, and twice what a Panzer division had by late-war.

But *all* U.S. "infantry" divisions were fully motorized, and with a single tank battalion and a single TD battalion attached, as well as armored recon, a U.S. *infantry* division had about half as many AFVs as a German *Panzer* division (1/4th as many as a U.S. Armored division). This too was combined arms. And it did not mean the U.S. was not using concentrated armor; it was. The U.S. just had enough to do *both*, to have concentrated armor divisions *and* to have combined arms in the line infantry divisions. It is arguable whether a few extra armored divisions would have been preferable.

Over the course of the war, the Germans were *also* moving toward combined arms along the entire front, by producing more TDs and assault guns and assigning these to the infantry divisions. They also developed a tendency to use their Panzer divisions directly in the line for defense, giving them longer frontages than the infantry divisions. This effectively dispersed much of their concentrated armor and probably made them far less effective than they could have been. In part this was a result of rigid defense orders, which failed to exploit all of the power of concentrated armored teams on defense and counterattack.

It is *not* all a story of "working with infantry - wrong - working alone - right". On the contrary, the superiority of German doctrine for the middle third of the war, was precisely that they *were* stressing working with the other arms, including the infantry, while the Allies erroneously thought that was their previous mistake, and were purposefully avoiding such cooperation.

It is a case of going to the wrong alternative or to another extreme. It was caused precisely by getting confused about what was implied by "infantry". Infantry is just infantry, and does not itself mean "spread out all along the front". It is an "accident" of "infantry" that infantry *is* spread out all along the front. That is not its "essence".

Tanks should not be spread out all along the front *evenly*, but should be concentrated into locally denser bodies of armor. But those dense bodies of armor should have their own infantry support and most definitely should work with it.

For what it is worth...

[dalem]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

But wasn't the biggest threat to tanks not other tanks but anti-tank guns? If that is the case, it's even more important to have an effective HE round available.

Michael

Hmm. Pretty subjective topic, and I guess I'd side with folks that said "it depends". But assuming that they're all threats (guns, infantry, other tanks) then a design that can handle all three in one package is your best bet, in my opinion.

-dale

[Guest Mr. Johnson-<THC>-]

I think maybe you generalizations are getting a little too broad there Jason. I don't think its fair to catorgrize these countrys in this way you are. I think there were commanders that thought along the lines of combined arms not matter which army branch they were in or which country they worked for. Sometimes these commanders were underneath say a Infantry commander who cared about his infantry and thought Tanks should just drive up and win the battle, and order the tanker to do so, so his infantry could move up unmolseted, often too disasterous results for the tankers. Some commanders for all sides in WW2 got their jobs just because they were higher in the social ladder, not great, innovative thinkers.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

"fair to categorize these countries"

I am talking about the doctrines of their military commanders. Each country had an elaborate process for settling issues of doctrine, involving lots of fighting over how to do things and you name it. But each country, at the different times I cited, decided those questions in different ways, and organized their forces accordingly.

It doesn't much matter what lieutenant Jones in the nth Hussars thought about proper tank doctrine and combined arms, if he was part of an independent brigade of ~80 cruiser tanks out in the Libyan desert, and the nearest commonwealth infantry was 30 miles away in a mined-in fortified "box". He was not consulted in the matter.

The high commands planned out how they expected the tanks to be used, but they did not just stop there and issue their findings as suggestions. They organized the units according to their doctrine, decided how many items of equipment of what kind each formation of a given type would have, and how many men from what branches of service and military specialties. The ordered that equipment produced in the combinations they had planned for, and issued them, and assembled the men and the weapons, and trained them in their doctrine, and then deployed them to a battlefield somewhere as units.

And if a general in the field with command of a division found he had 100 tanks and 40 armored half-tracks and 80 infantry squads and 75 artillery pieces and mortars plus 25 anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, then the troops under his command were going to have very effective combined arms integration, with tank platoons and infantry platoons and artillery batteries in balanced numbers to support each other.

But if a colonel instead found himself equipped with 40 medium tanks and 3 squads of scouts on motorcycles, he was not going to wind up achieving much in the way of combined arms cooperation. He might notice what was going on around him and try to help other units - but that would not amount to much, when they weren't under his command and took orders from somebody else, and besides his own orders tell him to attack toward this village with all of his tanks, and that is what he is going to do. And what he is going to get in the way of infantry help or guns helping is going to depend entirely on accidents of the battlefield. Which is not going to amount to much, compared to the above.

The first of those is typical equipment mixes the Germans were providing their Panzer forces throughout the war (with minor variations). The second of those was a typical Russian armored formation in 1942-3, or part of a typical British one (with armored cars instead of motorcycles) in North Africa.

Why the differences? Because of doctrine, as decided by higher ups. But once decided, it cemented into weapons mixes and unit deployments. Could occasional ad hoc arrangements change some of those? Sure. But you can bet those arrangements were easier to arrange in sensible ways, in the case of the formation that had the right mix to work from.