The Platoon -- A Maneuverist Perspective

[SirOscar]

Pillar

Sorry I did not mean to offend but now I am totally lost on what point it is that you are trying to make. I came into this late and most likely I am missing entirely what you are trying to get at. However it was not I that started being malevolent. I stated I thought you were wrong in your ideas and you slammed me for not reading your posts then challenged me to quote you, so I did. Anyway back to the points that you made, the end of the quote I used from you was

"The maneuverist however, is concenred with the destruction of the enemy king ONLY."

Notice how only is in all caps, how did I miss the point? I also think that your mentor of Maneuverist ideas, Leonhard, is way off base with his analogy, to compare chess to real combat is like using night as an analogy for day. There is just no comparison, not only is the ALL important "fog of war" missing from chess but there is a clear cut object, the king, there are hard and fast rules, heck I could go on and on about the differences. By the way I have never heard of this Leonhard, what is his background? Does he have any first hand experience? If not then I would tend to hold the views of someone who has "been there, done that" like Bullethead in a little higher esteem.

Once again I do NOT want to get into personal battle over this, it gets us nowhere, if you want to argue the merits of ideas then great I am all for that, that's how I find out, more times then not that I am full of it.

ADDED he he he I just noticed this thread put me over the top, I am now an official member yeaaaaaaaaaa!!!!

[This message has been edited by SirOscar (edited 02-22-2001).]

[CavScout]

Originally posted by ScoutPL:

YOU must need to go back and read past posts since you obviously missed the one where I explained that I purposely wanted CavScout to think he had found a gap so I could attack his flank with my reserve forces. I presented weakness on that side in hopes of drawing him across the map and giving me an open flank.

Another key point is that CavScout continued to acheive Mass and Security while keeping his Objective in mind the entire time. He didnt go bumping into my line until he found a gap. From his point of view it looked like he had destroyed, broken or suppressed (dare I say attrited) the majority of units on that flank, so he decided to commit his Main Effort there.

Some good points. Also bear mind, this was my description of my view of what was happening, if it jives with reality is another thing.

ScoutPL points it was his intention to draw me to that side, me I was just scared of fighting Panthers so I went the other way!

[L.Tankersley]

Originally posted by Pillar:

I've never claimed there was any new techniques in Maneuver warfare. ...

What is important, and I've stressed it right from my first post in this thread, is the thought process. ... Maneuver theorists try to make explicit that thought process.

The contribution to military art which Maneuverists offer is not so much of inventing a military art, as much as identifying and making explicit aspects of military art which they feel are important.

BINGO. Now I begin to understand what you're going on about, and where the confusion is arising. So you're saying that "maneuver theory" as you use the term really refers to the manner in which a military practitioner will go through his decision-making process to decide what course of action to undertake? So for example, a "maneuverist" and an "attritionist," when presented with the same problem, might reach exactly the same decision about what to do, but the method in which they would reach that common conclusion would differ? And this difference in thought process also potentially implies a difference in terminology (a la "surfaces" and "gaps" from up-thread)?

I'm trying to come up with an example, but I am hindered by my lack of familiarity with either school of thought. But let me just walk through in general terms: The task at hand is to reduce an enemy strongpoint (perhaps it controls a vital road junction). An attritionist presented with this problem will analyze the situation in a certain way (possibly involving METT-T [or what is it now, MTETT?], identifying likely enemy defensive arrangements, and possible fire sacks), and eventually develop a course of action to follow. A maneuverist presented with the same problem will approach it by thinking about different things. These things may (indeed, must) encompass all the things the attritionist needs to think about, but they are mentally organized and dealt with in a different fashion. The end result is a course of action that may be identical to the attritionist solution, but which was arrived at through a different thought process.

Is this right?

[edited to fix the quote, and again to balance the parentheses]

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Leland J. Tankersley

[This message has been edited by L.Tankersley (edited 02-22-2001).]

[This message has been edited by L.Tankersley (edited 02-22-2001).]

[Guest Pillar]

Pillar,

YOU must need to go back and read past posts since you obviously missed the one where I explained that I purposely wanted CavScout to think he had found a gap so I could attack his flank with my reserve forces. I presented weakness on that side in hopes of drawing him across the map and giving me an open flank.

What is your point? (Honestly here)

Another key point is that CavScout continued to acheive Mass and Security while keeping his Objective in mind the entire time. He didnt go bumping into my line until he found a gap. From his point of view it looked like he had destroyed, broken or suppressed (dare I say attrited) the majority of units on that flank, so he decided to commit his Main Effort there.

I.E. He found your weakpoint.

Had he gone "bumping into" the line until he found a gap he would have ascertained this information as well.

Also this back pedaling of yours is rather disappointing. You have always been an advocate for maneuver, maneuver, maneuver. You even started this thread with a broad proclamation about maneuver (at many different levels of command). I can get quotes if you'd like but would rather just refer you to your first post as a whole. I see nothing but statements in that post, not questions. Hardly the kind of writing someone looking for advice or opinion would write. And you also seem a pretty smart guy to me, so you should be very aware of what sort of response such a post would receive. I even asked you if I could respond in kind and you agreed.

If I espouse my own view and try to convince you, you get upset. This time I tried being more passive, and you call it "back pedaling". Well ScoutPL I guess I can't win with you.

I think the most telling evidence on this board so far has been the "maneuverists" reluctance to take up my challenge and "put their money where their mouth is" as some other great mind said earlier on this board.

[Bullethead]

Sir Oscar said:

The reason this seems so untrue to me is just last night I finished reading Citizen Soldiers by Stephen E. Ambrose(very good book by the way, I highly recommend it) I always knew that non battle field attrition in WWII was bad but there was a table in the book that STUNNED me. It was a table listing all the U.S. Infantry Divisions in EOT WWII, what was amazing about the table was he broke down casualties by battle and non-battle causalities, most divisions had close to equal amounts of causalities and in fact some had more. Example 36th inf division, 227 days on the line 11,238 battle causalities 14,919 non-battle causalities. 45th inf division, 230 days on the line, 10,458 battle casualties, 15,991 non-battle causalities. This chart just blew me away.

Did Ambrose define what "non-battle casualties" were? This term was often used in the WW2 US Army as a euphemism for "combat fatigue". If Ambrose is including such cases in his figures, then a lot of the "non-battle casualties" were in fact the direct result of combat. Guys who came through more or less physically intact but were so wounded mentally as to be out of action.

Also, when you consider actual non-battle physical injuries taking guys out of action, you're including all the truck wrecks in the supply convoys and such. This is a background condition--the calculation of effective combat power of the front line troops already takes this into account before battle is joined. Hence, it's not "attrition" because it's the starting condition.

Finally, how many of these "non-battle casualties" were things like cases of the clap contracted when the unit was in the rear for rest and refit? Enough to keep a guy in sickbay and off fatigue parties for a couple days, and thus going on the records as a "casualty", but having no effect at all on the combat power of the unit when it was in the line?

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-Bullethead

In wine there is wisdom, in beer there is strength, in water there is bacteria.

[Ksak]

Pillar

Lighten up. Go back and read your first post where you (rather pretentiously I thought) announced that you had "shifted the paradigm" and formulated the concept of splitting a squad into fire and movement teams, and then spent the next 99 posts either denying it or dissing the contributors who lived with FM 7-8 tucked under their pillows.

What did you expect?

[Guest Pillar]

Something more mature.

LOL, a guy who has a problem with the word "Paradigm" is telling ME to lighten up?

I haven't been "dissing" anyone, nor have I denied anything.

Is listening to other points of view "denying" that I like maneuver theory? Come on.

I'm surprised even Bullethead hasn't told you "where to go" yet Ksak.

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 02-22-2001).]

[Ksak]

No problem with the word. Just the pompous snots that overuse it.

[Bullethead]

Pillar said:

Was his primary strategic goal the direct destruction of the enemy army? Was it possible to defeat them indirectly?

Yes, he almost always tried to directly destroy the enemy army in battle. That was really all he could do, being a continental power lacking command of the sea. The only time I can think of he tried an indirect approach (his "continental system" of boycotting Brit goods Europe-wide) failed miserably, while the counterposed Brit blockade and peripheral actions caused him a lot of problems. So he eventually decided to invade England and kick their ass directly, but Nelson short-circuited that at Trafalgar.

That [the above] determines the answer to this question. Points B,C, and D seem in accordance with manuever theory.

So bascially, your answer is that despite doing all these maneuvers and basing his plan of campaign upon using maneuver to achieve his goal, he's still an "attritionist" because his maneuvers were simply stepping stones to planned attrition, even if on terms favorable to him? This is why some of us have trouble accepting your point of view. The terms don't make sense

My own answer is that Napolean was neither an "attritionist" nor a "maneuverist". He was just applying all the principles of war in pursuit of his stategic goals better than his contemporaries were doing.

Using attrition at the tactical level to facilitate maneuver at the operational level seems in accordance with Maneuver theory to my knowledge. Correct me if I'm wrong.

But von Falkenhayn was the German head honcho so he was using attrition at the strategic level to facilitate maneuver at the strategic level. How does that fit "maneuver theory"?

Here's the kicker though, von Falkenhayn had WHICH operational goal here?

That's difficult to say, because his plan doesn't dovetail neatly into modern warfare theory as either you or I perceive it. The answer I feel most comfortable with is that there were no operational goals as we understand that term today. Verdun was THE German offensive effort in the West in 1916. Its ultimate goal was to win the war by means of attrition. It was conducted by a full army (commanded by the German Crown Prince), and (to give an idea of the strategic scale) after a while 15 full divisions were withdrawn from its strength to meet a new Russian threat.

So it was a strategic offensive whose goal was attrition. There was a lot of back-and-forth maneuver through horrendous barrages and MG fire on both sides at the tactical level, but this just stoked the strategic attrition forges. There doesn't seem to be an operational level involved.

In any case, this is all exceeding the parameters of the problem. I guess I should have pointed out von Falkenhayn was the top dog in the army under Supreme Warlord Wilhelm, though.

But anyway, as of now, you're saying Falkenhayn was a "maneuverist" because he used attrition to try to faciliate maneuver.

OK, recap time. It seems to me that the definitions "maneuverist" and "attritionist" as used by "maneuver theorists" are flawed because they don't fit what I consider the prime examples of the opposing views on how to conduct campaigns. Napolean to me is a guru of maneuver, while von Falkenhayn is the epitome of attrition.

Also, it seems that the definitions used by "maneuver theorists" are based on the commander's ultimate subjective intent, rather than what he actually does. That is, whether or not the ultimate intent is ever fulfilled, or even communicated to other people at the time, academic hindsight can "infer" this intent and thus pronounce that General X was a "maneuverist" or an "attritionist".

IOW, Falkenhayn wanted to maneuver at some indefinite but hoped-for time, so he's a "maneuverist", even though his campaign had no allowance for maneuver and had attrition as its express object. OTOH, Napolean is an "attritionist" because all his maneuvers were intended to set up massive battles, even though he is considered by many as the archetypical practitioner of modern (what some call "maneuver") warfare.

I find these "maneuver theory" definitions unworkable. One of the goals of military science, just like physical science, is to develop a theory that allows accurate prediction of future events. In military science, the future events of most relevance are those stemming from decisions made by your opponent, so the goal is to predict what your oppenent will decide. Because the definitions used by "maneuver theory" judge past events (not to mention being based on the shaky ground of inferred subjective intent), they are useless in the practical world of anticipating your opponent when your nation's fate on the line. Or so it seems to me.

Moving on to extra credit:

First, because Germany could not win a war of attrition.

That's debating the truth of a "given" again. I "gave" it as true that the Germans could win a battle of attrition because that's what von Falkenhayn believed. And in fact it seems more French died at Verdun than Germans, despite the Germans being on the attack most of the time.

Second, Verdun from my understanding had some sort of sentimental value to the French. This means the enemy will to fight is going to be FUELED by any attempt at "attrition" at Verdun. The harder the Germans press on Verdun, the harder the French will push back. Why attack into the enemy strength?

This was all part of von Falkenhayn's plan. He wanted attrition so he needed to fight over a place the French would not surrender. The harder they tried to keep it, the more of them he could kill. That was his thinking. Hence he chose to fight at Verdun.

If Germany had "superior firepower" to throw at France's strength, it logicall holds that they had "superior firepower" to throw at Frances weaker areas. Why go for enemy strength?

Because, as given, the 2 years of Western Front war to that point had shown again and again that even the maximum attacking strength that could be mustered in a given sector was incapable of breaking through even relatively weak defenses. This is why I gave the inability of frontal attacks to achieve breakthrough as a "given". It just didn't work. And it kept on not working until masses of tanks appeared, although constant refinement of technique even without many or any tanks did cause some nervous moments, such as the 1918 German offensives.

Furthermore, if they did break through at Verdun or kill a lot of French, what good would that do their now tied up, committed and worn out "firepower"? The alliance would simply replace it's losses or even mount a counter attack somewhere else (Somme?)

If you are in a boxing match and the other guy hits the mat first, you win even if you're wobbling and bleeding. Winning is all that ultimately matters in war, although it's of course quite nice to come through relatively unscathed as well. Falkenhayn had by 1916 accepted that coming through unscathed was out of the question, so he was just concerned with winning.

As to the Entente replacing its losses, you're off track there in WW1. They never did and the effects of the WW1 losses are still felt today in England and France. Not as much now as in WW2, however, when they were a major factor, but still noticeably. Drive through many an English or Scots village for example. In the town square, you'll see a WW1 memorial with more names on it than live in the town today. Beside it is a WW2 memorial with maybe 10-25% that number of names on it. Also don't forget, America wasn't in the war yet.

What might have worked, is a deceptive operation (with lots of hate propoganda against the french) against Verdun with a main effort somewhere else, just going off the "Givens" here.

Nope, the "givens" said that all frontal attacks were futile. A deception at Verdun and an attack elsewhere means doing a frontal attack elsewhere, because it's also "given" that the entire front is continuous. IOW, there was no option at all but frontal attack into prepared defenses at some point. Which in the past had only gotten a lot of people dead for no territorial gain.

So the answer to the question, IMHO, is that Falkenhayn had NO better option than a campaign of attrition, at least as he understood the situation. If he had to attack to win the war, if this attack had to be frontal, and if he could expect it to go nowhere and only kill a bunch of folks, then it seems to me only logical to try to make it kill more of the enemy, so as to eventually wear him down.

Subsequent research has shown that if the Germans had done a few things differently at critical times in the battle, they might have broken through at Verdun and won the war. But von Falkenhayn wasn't expecting such opportunities, so didn't see and/or failed to grasp them, if they ever existed. If this is true, then von Falkenhayn's plan was based on the false assumption that breakthrough was impossible. Had he known that, he would probably have done things differently. But based on the info he had, he made what I think was the only possible choice, however horrible it was (but when is a wartime decision NOT horrible?).

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-Bullethead

In wine there is wisdom, in beer there is strength, in water there is bacteria.

[This message has been edited by Bullethead (edited 02-22-2001).]

[L.Tankersley]

Originally posted by L.Tankersley:

BINGO. Now I begin to understand what you're going on about, and where the confusion is arising. So you're saying that "maneuver theory" as you use the term really refers to the manner in which a military practitioner will go through his decision-making process to decide what course of action to undertake? So for example, a "maneuverist" and an "attritionist," when presented with the same problem, might reach exactly the same decision about what to do, but the method in which they would reach that common conclusion would differ? And this difference in thought process also potentially implies a difference in terminology (a la "surfaces" and "gaps" from up-thread)?

FYI, I have received an email from Pillar basically confirming the above. For me (at least) this was a minor epiphany; before I figured this out, I was thinking Pillar was just nuts. Now I understand where the comms breakdown is, and at least in general terms the direction he is trying to take the discussion. Hopefully this will help some other people understand what the discussion is about from Pillar's POV and allow everyone to start talking to one another rather than past one another.

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Leland J. Tankersley

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by L.Tankersley:

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Originally posted by L.Tankersley:

BINGO. Now I begin to understand what you're going on about, and where the confusion is arising. So you're saying that "maneuver theory" as you use the term really refers to the manner in which a military practitioner will go through his decision-making process to decide what course of action to undertake? So for example, a "maneuverist" and an "attritionist," when presented with the same problem, might reach exactly the same decision about what to do, but the method in which they would reach that common conclusion would differ? And this difference in thought process also potentially implies a difference in terminology (a la "surfaces" and "gaps" from up-thread)?

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FYI, I have received an email from Pillar basically confirming the above. For me (at least) this was a minor epiphany; before I figured this out, I was thinking Pillar was just nuts. Now I understand where the comms breakdown is, and at least in general terms the direction he is trying to take the discussion. Hopefully this will help some other people understand what the discussion is about from Pillar's POV and allow everyone to start talking to one another rather than past one another.

Great. Now we have arrived at a distinction without a difference.

FWIW, I think there is indeed a difference between attrition and maneuver warfare, even an important one, but for the maneuverists to be able to apply their intent in real life is extremely contingent, much more so than they are willing to admit. So basically you end up fighting attrition warfare whether you will it or not, which I take it is what Bullethead has been saying.

Michael

[Bullethead]

L.Tankersley said:

So for example, a "maneuverist" and an "attritionist," when presented with the same problem, might reach exactly the same decision about what to do, but the method in which they would reach that common conclusion would differ? And this difference in thought process also potentially implies a difference in terminology (a la "surfaces" and "gaps" from up-thread)?

FYI, I have received an email from Pillar basically confirming the above.

Something doesn't add up here. If the "maneuverist" and the "attritionist" come to the same conclusions about their course of action when confronted with the same problem, then why bother having 2 "schools" of thought? I mean, the "same decision about what to do" means that they move their units in the same ways to the same points to shoot at the same targets.

Thus, an outside observer would be unable to tell the "attritionist" from the "maneuverist" from watching the battle. In which case, the whole "maneuverist vs. attritionist" distinction is completely academic. And not only does this distinction have no practical effect, its very existence is totally unprovable because the distinction is based on the unknowable subjective thinking of the commanders.

Somehow, I feel this can't be what Pillar meant. Otherwise why bother with all this thread?

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-Bullethead

In wine there is wisdom, in beer there is strength, in water there is bacteria.

[windstarz]

Ok Germanboy,

This can only be decided by us. You want to be the Attritionist or Manueverist? 750,000 guys each , large map, lots of trees and big hills. Turns, let me see. 1 min x 60 x 24 x 365. Yeah that should do it.

Let me know when you can start. Oh yeah, and don't forget to do an aar of the whole battle.

wind

[L.Tankersley]

Originally posted by Bullethead:

Something doesn't add up here. If the "maneuverist" and the "attritionist" come to the same conclusions about their course of action when confronted with the same problem, then why bother having 2 "schools" of thought? I mean, the "same decision about what to do" means that they move their units in the same ways to the same points to shoot at the same targets.

Yes, but don't get too hung up on the "same conclusions;" it's also possible they might reach different conclusions. But even if they didn't, a different "school of thought" could still be valuable, for example if it gave you the correct answer quicker, or was easier to apply or to teach. It might also (and probably would) tend to lead you down certain paths in preference to others, which might or might not be a good thing.

See, the chess analogy makes sense to me now, too. When you're planning your next move in chess, you examine the board position and decide what to do next. The specific thought process involved is different for different people. One person might first look to see whether there are any moves he can make to gain an advantage in material. Another person might first look to see if there are moves that would grant a positional advantage. Another person might evaluate all the possible board configurations that could result from legal moves to see which would be least advantageous for his opponent. A fourth (and presumably poorer) player might make moves based on the aesthetic appeal of the board configuration that would result. Ultimately, each player has the same array of possible moves to consider. And in many cases, they will arrive at the same decision. But they won't always come to the same decision, and if you ask them about how they decided the way they did, they will give you different answers. And that (I think) is the same distinction that is being drawn between "maneuver" and "attrition," it is a proposed paradigm shift to a different way of thinking about the problem. [i make no statement about better or worse, because I still haven't the foggiest notion of how it is different. I accept that it is for purpose of argument, because if it's really just different terms for the same thing, then I agree it's a pointless semantic debate.]

Thus, an outside observer would be unable to tell the "attritionist" from the "maneuverist" from watching the battle. In which case, the whole "maneuverist vs. attritionist" distinction is completely academic. And not only does this distinction have no practical effect, its very existence is totally unprovable because the distinction is based on the unknowable subjective thinking of the commanders.

After the fact? Probably. But my take is that the whole point of "maneuver theory" is to propose an alternative way for the commanders to undertake their unknowable subjective thinking. I think that delving into whether past commanders utilized "maneuver theory" is a great big red herring, because as you say, we can't know what they were thinking. [This is probably also why Pillar has a hard time answering your questions about whether various historical commanders were using maneuver or attrition theory -- you think you're asking about actions but he is interpreting the question as one about thought process so of course he can't answer definitively.]

Somehow, I feel this can't be what Pillar meant. Otherwise why bother with all this thread?

Well, that was throwing me for a while, too. But based on his email to me, it seems that this is at least part of what he meant. And it does make him look a lot less like a nut to me.

[Edit to fix formatting -- only one mistake in all the above, not bad huh? ]

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Leland J. Tankersley

[This message has been edited by L.Tankersley (edited 02-23-2001).]

[SirOscar]

Bullethead

Wrote "Did Ambrose define what "non-battle casualties" were?

Nope unfortunately he did not, since the non-battle casualties were so high, I like you assumed battle fatigue was included in the non-battle stats. However he really kept going over and over the poor general health of the American army in the winter of 44/45 due to Bradley's and Ike's belive that the war would be over before winter, they had plenty of winter gear but they were all sitting at the docks, they were having such a problems with getting supplies to to the front lines that they thought it would be a waste to bring up gear that would "not be needed" Also you have to consider that many of the non-battle casualties were repeats, guys could get minor wounds or trench foot etc many times, where as the battle casualties often meant death, capture or war ending injuries. In any case the numbers still blow me away, and some divisions actually had upwards of %250 replacement rates from D-Day to end of war, I just never realized how bad things were for the America GI in ETO. Sorry for getting so off topic but it looks like this thread has broken down anyway. I will keep a lookout for post by you, your arguments tend to be very logical and you seem to be able to discuss them without upsetting people, a very nice skill.

[Guest Madmatt]

Hello gentleman.

Just a friendly reminder to keep civil about all of this. This is a forum for discussion of ideas and concepts and for those more adept at argument they can even entertain a little rhetoric now and then. What it isn't is a podium to ridicule, insult or cast dispersions at other participants.

One more thing, I believe Henri said:

"Fionn was kicked off this forum for behavior of this kind, and if BTS were even-handed, they would do the same to you."

If I were you I would refrain in the future from commenting on events of which you really were not informed or a part of. Although he and I differ greatly on that matter, Fionn's banning was far more complex of an issue than almost anybody is aware.

So, while views are obviously diametrically opposed on the general theme of this thread, and to be honest I am still trying to discern exactly what the theme is, it does not need to get any more heated the ambient heat generated from striking the keys on the keyboard.

So, go and play nice so I can patrol the forum against *real* abusers.

Madmatt

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by windstarz:

Ok Germanboy,

wind

Why? Are you French?

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[nijis]

I haven't quite slogged my way through the whole terminology debate here, so please excuse me if I'm talking out of my ass, but while maneuver warfare as Pillar described it round about page 5 of this thread might be a concept worthy of a military history dissertation or two, it doesn't work in CM because in CM the only way to destroy the opponent's will to fight is through attrition.

CM scenarios where pure maneuver would work -- say the capture of Cherbourg, where if the allies get a tank to the gate they win the game -- are the result of lots of stuff that can't be modelled in a tactical context, and wouldn't be much fun in competitive contests. Maybe in CM3 they'll model the effect where two Mark Is in the back half of the board gives a morale hit to any troops from the green Ninth Army (notice I didn't use the generic "French"). But in CM as it stands, if you don't shoot they don't rout.

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"I can't listen to music too often... It makes me want to say kind, stupid things, and pat the heads of people... But now you have to beat them on the head, beat them without mercy."

V. I. Lenin

[This message has been edited by nijis (edited 02-23-2001).]

[ScoutPL]

I will declare Pillar the ultimate dabate "maneuverist" since anytime the waters get a little hot he pulls his feet out rather quickly. I have yet to get a reply directed specifically at any of my posts, instead he sidestepped them by agreeing with Bullethead who is saying the exact same things I am. Also, Bullethead has been far unkinder to Henri then I have ever been to poor picked on Pillar so I think his trying to seperate the two of us is rather comical.

As always lets go back to the bottom line. There simply aren't two seperate schools of thought on this matter. There just happen to be some "fringe" guys (L&L, as they have become to be called, for example) who feel there is a better way of defining or explaining how most modern military officers (American anyway) have been trained to fight. Ask anyone on this board who has went through American military training and they'll tell you the same thing. So who are you going to believe?

I brought out the CavScout/ScoutPL fight as an example of a "attritionist" tactic of offering a "gap" for maneuver that allowed me to utilize maneuver to "create" an enemy weakness, in other words strike my enemy's flank. I dont think a recognized, self created gap is a weakness, per se. It may lool like that to the bad guy, so I guess you could applaud him for going for it, but it really wasnt one. Understand now?

"If I espouse my own view and try to convince you, you get upset. This time I tried being more passive, and you call it "back pedaling". Well ScoutPL I guess I can't win with you."

Dude, you're not going to win, because you have nothing to convince me of. I understand perfectly well the principles you are trying to support. You just have them misapplied and misinterpreted. Thats been the point of most of the posts directed at you and Henri.

"If some of you can't handle voicing your OWN opinions, you certainly aren't ready to hear mine."

What does this mean? I voiced my opinion rather voraciously in the first couple pages of this board, most of which you chose to ignore. You, sir, are the one who has continually dodged the bullet by stating you wanted to "read" more or digest Bulletheads comments, rather then voice your opinions. If you're beginning to think you were wrong in the choice of arguments you've been persueing then you should come on out from under the bed and say so.

And yeah, bud, I'm still the same old ScoutPL, never presented myself as anything different.

[L.Tankersley]

Originally posted by Bullethead:

Somehow, I feel this can't be what Pillar meant.

I have gone back and read (or at least skimmed) this thread, paying particular attention to Pillar's posts, and I am more convinced than ever that this is what he meant. He explicitly says several times that it's not what he ends up doing in his examples that he's concerned with nearly so much as why he does them, and that the debate (from his perspective) is really about the decision-making process.

I think the issue has gotten confused by all the discussion of TTPs, and of whether a given course of action is "attritionist" or "maneuverist" in nature. That's not the point. In fact, technically I don't think you can describe an action as "attritionist" or "maneuverist" in the way Pillar uses the terms. I think his examples are further hindered by the fact that he isn't current or ex-military and so doesn't have real-world experience, and it's hard to generate a good example illustrating the point he's trying to make with that deficit.

His original post in this thread contains the following text:

What I'm going to do is attempt to describe how I might use a single platoon against an enemy platoon, one on one, using improvisation and unconventional methods. Everything here is situational. To understand what takes place in this article, you *must* be thinking about the situation, the terrain, the enemy etc. It's not a "formula for platoon commanders", it's more a way of thinking.

The following comes from a "Maneuverists" perspective and those who favour "Attritional" methodology will probably not agree with this. Nonetheless, it's my personal way of thinking and I don't claim it to be the ONLY way to do things. I just wanted to show how a Maneuverist might use a platoon or a squad and explain WHY.

When he says "those who favor Attritional methodology will probably not agree with this," he is not saying that they will not agree with the end result, but that they will not agree with WHY he decided to do what he did. (The fact that the example was not particularly good and generated a lot of criticism of the actions has further clouded the issue.)

ScoutPL just said:

As always lets go back to the bottom line. There simply aren't two seperate schools of thought on this matter. There just happen to be some "fringe" guys (L&L, as they have become to be called, for example) who feel there is a better way of defining or explaining how most modern military officers (American anyway) have been trained to fight.

THIS is the issue: whether L&L have actually defined a new way to think about the problems facing commanders in the field, or they've just dressed the same old thought process up in fancy new terminology. Now, P&H's posts haven't given me any real insight into HOW the maneuverist reaches his decisions (and they've been focused on concrete situations and responses, which has tended to focus discussion on courses of action rather than process of analysis), but I think there is at least the potential for an informative discussion as to how the two processes differ (if in fact they do at all).

Is this making sense to anybody else, or have I just fallen down the rabbit hole? ScoutPL, you said above somewhere you had perused one of L&L's books for a few hours; does my notion make any sense? [Oh, and I'm looking forward to the next installment of your Bn defense article.]

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Leland J. Tankersley

[This message has been edited by L.Tankersley (edited 02-23-2001).]

[ASL Veteran]

Having recently been through this whole debate from the opposite perspective, I don't want to get heavily involved in this thread too . However, I just want to point one thing out ... Falkenhayne did not use attrition in an effort to maneuver. No, Falkenhayne used attrition as a means to an end. Falkenhayne never had any plans to go anywhere and was concerned lest a breakthrough occur. He restricted the reserves thrown into the battle with the specific intention of making it impossible for his sub commanders to break through. A breakthrough was the last thing on his mind. Once this fact is understood, attrition can be understood. Attrition is not the act of fighting itself, nor is maneuver the act of moving in and of itself. I believe that Jason Cawley defined the differences between maneuver and attrition quite nicely - I merely disagreed with his ... broader application of the terms.

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When we were in the Bocage country we were assaulted by them Tigers ... you know what I mean by assaulted huh? WELL I MEAN ASSAULTED!!!!

[ASL Veteran]

Oh yeah, one more thing. Verdun held a special *political* significance to the French *prior* to the German attack there - which was why that spot was chosen in the first place. Falkenhayne *knew* the French would be forced to fight at Verdun with everything they had - which was exactly what he wanted. What that political significance was is beyond me - maybe one of our French CM players can explain that one. However, I do know that the French Government was seriously worried that if Verdun was lost, that the Government would collapse or be replaced. No French politician was going to want to go out of office being known as the 'bungler' who couldn't hold Verdun!

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When we were in the Bocage country we were assaulted by them Tigers ... you know what I mean by assaulted huh? WELL I MEAN ASSAULTED!!!!

[Guest Pillar]

Bullethead,

I believe I was implying that VF was using "attritionist" mentality and that Napoleon was using "maneuverist" mentality.

My response seems to have been interpreted the opposite by you. When I said "he had WHICH operational goal" my point was to show that all VF was after was attrition. Whether you think that was a good choice or not, I think it can accurately be labeled "attrition" thinking. Also, based on your "givens" I said Napeolons actions "appeared within the realm of maneuver warfare." Maneuver Warfare does not mean "no fighting".

Anyhow, I just wanted to clear that up since it pertains to a relevent question you asked. The rest has gone over to email.

[ScoutPL]

Leonhards work defines what he believes to be the "perfect" maneuverist doctrine. Which by the way isnt practiced by any modern army to the standard he would like to see. I feel that this is simply because its rather unrealistic.

A substantial chapter in Leonhards book is focused on the US performance of the Gulf War. He feels the Coalition should have identified the Iraqi command and control and support network as their "primary vulnerability", rather then the republican guard. He thinks they failed to do that and if the Iraqi's had decided to fight the outcome would have been very different. He even goes as far as to say the Coalition forces really didnt do that great of a job, they just had an even worse enemy. There are two arguments against this. One, you could argue that the Coalition forces did identify the C&C assets and supply network as the Iraqi's main vulnerability and took it out in the 30 day air campaign before the ground war even started. When we crossed into Iraq, the Iraqi divisions we faced had been without effective leadership or resupply for weeks. The second argument is more of a strategic one. The coalition forces identified the RG as the Iraqi "primary vulnerability" since without the RG the Iraqi armed forces would be defunct for months or even years to come. The air campaign, on an operational level, destroyed the Republican Guards support infrastructure and the RG became the strategic main vulnerability. Therefore it became the focus of the ground campaign.

Lind does a good job of putting what is in most Army and USMC combat arms manuals into civilian form for general consumption. I think Bullethead has done a great job illustrating this point, the main reason I havent felt it necessary to post anything except an occasional jibe at Pillar. (Isnt it great how he disappears for days when I come on? Yes Pillar, I am aware that's an exageration on my part)

As far as this being about decision making versus TTP's. How do you seperate the two? If you use manueverist decision making you're going to have to use maneuverist TTP's to support your maneuverist plan, right? How about Pillar and Henri were trying to make distinctions where there are none. Your decision making process is driven by your doctrine which also drives your TTP. The two are too interlinked to be seperated.

Modern day US doctrine is extremely maneuverist in scope. Lenonhard, and Lind to a certain extent, just feel like it isnt being properly implemented or adhered to. Pillar and Henri's outlook has always been that American doctrine was inherently flawed because it wasnt maneuver driven at all (with the possible exception of the USMC, which for some reason Henri thinks is entirely out of sync with the the other four services in the US Armed Forces). I think we can all agree they were wrong in that assumption. Perhaps Leonhard has a point, I dont know for sure. What I do know is that doctrine usually only works perfectly in a perfect environment. And we all know how often that kind of environment occurs on the battlefield.

[Bullethead]

ASL Veteran said: