Attrition

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Jeff said "I guess my point is that the line between "campaign" and "war" as Mr. Cawley appears to be defining it is pretty tenuous at best"

I disagree, I think it has everything to do with the matter at hand. I freely admit that manuever strategies won campaigns, and indeed I myself pointed out every example now cited as a supposed victory in an entire war, exactly as examples of victories in campaigns through manuever. But although France made peace with Germany in 1940, Germany had not won a war, but only a campaign. And although Austria made peace with France in 1805, France had not won a war but only a campaign. In both cases, continuous hostilities remained, ongoing, with Britain not leaving the field, and seeking additional continental allies by subsidy, military support, economic measures, etc.

But when Germany and Japan made peace with the U.S., USSR, and UK in 1945, there was no ongoing war that those sides eventually lost. And when Napoleon was defeated in 1815, for a second time, there was no additional campaign against some other French ally. "Tenuous", a quibble, no connection to the matter at hand, will come the cries. But my point is about the *decisiveness* of manuever and attrition.

Attrition strategies, remember, are aimed at destroying the enemy army in the field, and achieving such a mass of superior armed force that the result of re-opened hostilities is clear to everyone. But manuever prides itself on being able to operationally defeat otherwise equal or superior forces - to do so, sometimes, by means other than such destruction of the enemy military force.

Is it a flat *coincidence* that sides in war that suffer such campaign scale calamitious defeats, do not give up and surrender, and find additional armies and front, while sides that see their army destroyed in the field, and vastly outnumbered by the remaining forces of the enemy, do? This is possible, but it would at least seem to require an argument.

And in addition to having quoted back at me my own examples of successful manuever warfare campaigns, I asked for something else and I still haven't received it. I want manueverists to explain to me how and why the greatest manueverists of all time, lost their wars? Please, if attrition strategy and its ideas are not central to decision in warfare, explain to me why Napoleon didn't win. He didn't, you know. He wrote his memoirs on St Helena, not Paris, as a retired statesman and general, not the Emperor of Europe.

Please tell me why. I have a sneaking suspicion, you see, that you yourselves recognize that the concepts and analysis central to attrition strategies, had everything to do with that outcome. And a dozen others like it.

In addition, I see invading our discussion the same question begging insinuations that I initiated this thread to get away from and to challenge. I will therefore challenge them again. I hear people saying "get sucked into attrition fighting even though one is aware of manuever concepts" and such like, for all the world as though it were already established beyond argument, that attrition equals dumb and to-be-avoided, and manuever equals smart and to-be-done.

They mean no such thing. Using terms under debate in such a fashion is called *begging the question*. Everything that strikes you are clever or smart does not thereby become "manuever". Everything that strikes you as dumb and clumsy does not thereby become "attrition". Nor is "manuever" synonymous with initiative, or delegated control. Nor is attrition synonymous with rigidty, or fixed terrain objectives. (Indeed, manuever emphasizes the importance of positions, while attrition focuses on the enemy force).

In case anyone simply does not know the history, attrition strategies like that attempted by German at Verdun came very close to working, even in that case. The fact that little terrain was changing hands did not in the least make such battles "indecisive". Every army in WW I that lost in cumulative battle deaths a total number of men equal to its front-line rifle strength broke apart in the field, except the Germans, to whom the same thing happened but at a higher total. They had been fed on a steady diet of seemingly important victories in the east, among other things.

The French army *mutinied* within a year of the launch of the German attack at Verdun, and refused to undertake offensive operations. This was contained and practices reformed, but it was a closer run thing than many people imagine, and the French leaned very heavily on their British allies for a period. It is likely that only the losses the Germans took from the British counter at the Somme prevented Verdun from destroying the French army, by drawing off German reserves.

Attrition strategies are not pretty, they are not brilliant, but that does not mean they do not work. It does not mean they are things one just "gets sucked into". War itself is not pretty and it is not elegant, but that does not mean no one uses war to attain their ends, often successfully.

And attrition strategies are actual strategies. They involve thought, means, plans, matching means to ends, intel, adaptation, op-tempos, etc, etc. The fact that they involve all of these things does *not* turn them into "manuever" warfare. Thinking is not a manuever, ok? That is begging the question and pure sophistry.

As for the idea that Iraq was won by manuever, I do not find it to be the case, remotely. That case was overdetermined, in the sense that the Iraqis lost every which way from Sunday. Certainly the 24th Mech conducted a highly successful manuever. But the Marines went right up the coast and broke through everywhere, destroying the enemy directly in front of them, and VII Corps purposefully was directed straight *through* the main Iraqi positions, with the definite goal of destroying the enemy force in place, which they did, and the entire affair occurred after about the longest prep fire in history. I don't claim it for the opposite case file, only that it is "overdetermined".

[The_Capt]

To respond to Steve:

I have just started a thread on CM and Manoeuvre which is headed in that direction.

I will give you the scenario briefings as an exmple of Manoeuvre (I actually forgot about those) in that one is given intent, resources and the ability to execute as we see fit.

From our POV down however, we can exercise the goals of Manoeuvre (tempo=dislocation, disruption, recce pull etc) but it really doesn"t happen. If we "lost" control of our units and the AI was about ten years older we may be able to duplicate this experience. When a commander, in the context of "aufstragtactik" (gotta use at least one German buzzword) or mission command gives his orders and intent he is allowing is subordinates "free reign" within the guilines of his intent to carry out the mission. True Manoeuvrists trust their subordinates to the point of complete hands off, with the exception of the Reserve. That is reality but probably would be a very frustrating game.

CM also excludes the left and right, which is a poorly understood, critical, relationship. There would be a Battalion Commander left and right of you, guys you've trained, drank and whored with. The coordination of these men to cooperate under a commanders intent is a key Manoeuvre experience which is missing.

Manoeuvre is not a Grand Scale device and can be applied to a Platoon attack. It simply stresses allowing subordinates to know more and therefore do more when the opportunity arises.

I guess an idea for CM Manouvre could be played out in an operation where the ability to exploit (or not) between maps could be allowed.

One must see Manouevre in context with the picture around them. In Last Defence if the enemy hasn't shown up by turn X (and my commanders intent is to counter attack to regain initiative) I have no option to carry out that c-move with my troops till we run out of gas, nor is there a commander with a Reserve to push thru me once I do.

Last point, I am not saying Manoeuvre is "the next Grail", in fact I do not believe it is even going to be relevant in the near future. Attrition and Manoeuvre are two sides of the same coin and a truly masterful commander can switch betwen the two with perfect timing and not miss a beat.

[Henri]

Originally posted by ASL Veteran:

How about if we start with a fairly straight forward example from this thread? One of the posters in this thread called the strategic bombing campaign against Germany in World War 2 maneuver warfare. After reading the Marine Corps definition of maneuver warfare - is that a valid example of maneuver warfare per that definition or is that attrition warfare?

That is really a very good question, because it is both depending on how you look at it, but it is an extremely complex case -too complex to be pigeonholed.

It was attrition warfare in the sense that the purpose was to wear down Germany's war-making capability (at least until the bombing was shifted to civilian targets). It was attrition warfare also if you consider that in total war, the enemy's whole country is the target to be destroyed.

It was maneuver warfare in the sense of the indirect approach because it consisted of attempting to prevent Germany's armies from fighting by means of destroying their source of supplies (factories making the supplies).

Of course if one restricts the definition of maneuver warfare to movement (which IMHO would be wrong), then it was not maneuver warfare, because the targets wer predictable from day to day.OTOH one could argue that it WAS maneuver warfare in teh sense of the Boyd cycle, because the objective was to reduce the ability of the German army to react.

We can see from this example that except where a single battle determined the outcome of the war (such as Cannae), it doesn't make much sense to ask if a war was won or not by maneuver warfare or by attrition warfare.

The difficulty of defining maneuver warfare should not be under-estimated: it is not for nothing that neither Lind nor Leonhard give a definition of maneuver warfare in thier book on the subject. However the Marine Corps manual does give a definition.

Henri

[The_Capt]

The "challenge" as Mr Cawley put it is an usless exercise.

Trying to provide an exmple of a "war" in which Manouvre or Attrition decided the day is an endless loop. I will give Mr Cawley the benifit of the doubt and take it as a trick question.

Wars are won by a combination of the two and how well one uses them will determine a victor.

Do not get too hung up on the past gentlemen. Yes those who fail to learn from it are doomed to repeat it, just as those that fail to recognize that, "that was then this is now and victory is tomorrow".

D-Day was a brilliant Strategic manoeuvre to open up a second Western Front. Hitting Germany on the weak side with clear intent to driving for it's heart. It was also an operation carried out in a classical Attritionist doctrine, bomb, shell, land and secure BLUE line by 1900hrs. In reality it had to be.

The Gulf was the reverse, our intent is to destroy the Republican Guard (a more Attritionist intent you could not have) but we will allow our forces to execute it via a Manoeuverist mentality (exploit, exploit, exploit)

You see, brilliant Manoeuvre at one level can be brutally Attritionist at another so you challenge is impossible to truly answer because the second we try and grab the smoke it blows away.

[ASL Veteran]

Jason,

Austria made peace with France after 1805 ... territory was ceded and terms were signed. Austria did not enter a war with France again until 1809 ... after which, Austria became an Ally of France in the War of 1812. To describe the hostilities of 1805 as just a campaign is not an accurate description of the events of that time - and may be placing a 'modern' interpretation on those events. The more I read (what I can make it through) of your lengthy posts, the more I come away with the impression that what you are attributing to "Attrition Warfare" can be better described as the concept of "Total War".

You cannot separate the campaigns that make up a war from the war itself. There can be no war with no campaigns. There can be no war where all the campaigns that make up that conflict can be described as either 'attrition' or 'maneuver'. Both strategies are used depending upon circumstance and the commander in charge.

Ultimately, I suppose that 'Total War' can be described as the ultimate form of 'Attrition' since no nation will surrender until they have fought to the last ounce of strength. This seems to be your point - that a war is ultimately decided by attrition. However, to describe 'Total War' as 'Attritional War' seems to be placing a 'strategy' or a 'tactic' upon the very way nations approach a war. Something like using a paint roller to create an oil painting.

Your point of attrition warfare being the destruction of the enemy army also rings a bit hollow because the destruction of the enemy army can also be the goal of maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare and Attrition warfare can both have the same goal - destruction of the enemy army - they are just different means of achieving that same ends.

[Guest wwb_99]

Third time I have tried to respond. Lost one to the boss, the second to a system error. So here goes, somehow alot shorter and sweeter than the rest.

First, as The Capt said, it is a trick question for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the war is won by destroying the enemy's will to fight and forces to fight with, which is ultimately decided by attrition. He states how manuver can help this process along much better than I.

Second, modern wars between powerful nations (ie not Israel, Egypt, Syria or Jordan) are fought on fronts far too vast with armies far too large to be destroyed or sidestepped completely by fiat of superior manuver. Even if the army is destroyed, the advance is limited by logistics, such as the Soviet counterattacks of 1943 and 1944. Then the German forces in front of them had largely been destroyed, and the Soviet armies were advancing nearly unopposed until the need for POL and munitions stopped them in their tracks.

Third, I do know of one war that was decided by superior operational manuver: The Austro-Prussian War (15 June- 23 August 1866). Prussia, much weaker in men and material, managed to concentrate all of her forces before Austria could concentrate more than a small propertion of hers. When eight Prussian columns combined to crush the Austrian forces at Sadowa (3 July), manuver prevailed.

WWB

------------------

Before battle, my digital soldiers turn to me and say,

Ave, Caesar! Morituri te salutamus.

[Guest Andrew Hedges]

Germany defeated France and England in 1940 by using "maneuver" warfare. As Jeff, I think, pointed out, it is simply irrelevant that they went on to lose WWII. That loss has nothing to do with maneuver vs. attrition, and everything to do with declaring war on (1) the USSR and (2) the US.

This falls clearly into the manuever victory category, notwithstanding the fact that other countries eventually destroyed Germany.

(Although, as an aside, I wonder if maneuver warfare seems like such a marvelous way of winning wars that it lures countries into fighting more and more wars until they eventually bite off more than they can chew).

There are any number of other wars that were won by maneuver since 1700 -- the Mexican war in 1848 is a good example, but pretty much all colonial wars were won in this manner.

It seems to me that a prerequisite to a successful attrition strategy it that the party who wants to attrit has to eliminate -- or at least severely curtail -- the enemy's ability to conduct maneuver warfare. This was an important part of Grant's attrition strategy in the Civil War -- he applied constant pressure so that the confederacy did not have the freedom of movement to apply a maneuver-type strategy.

The same was true in WWII; the western Allies employed a broad front attrition type strategy, but the German couldn't concentrate and break through at a weak point because of allied air superiority.

I agree that CM *mostly* models attrition battles, and I think that one key to winning these battles is to interfere with the other side's ability move while, ideally, maintaining your own freedom of movement.

[Guest Big Time Software]

The_Capt wrote:

I have just started a thread on CM and Manoeuvre which is headed in that direction.

I'll check it out.

I will give you the scenario briefings as an exmple of Manoeuvre (I actually forgot about those) in that one is given intent, resources and the ability to execute as we see fit.

Most people, at least on this BBS, tend to focus on Quick Battles. So I thought it was worth mentioning

If we "lost" control of our units and the AI was about ten years older we may be able to duplicate this experience.

I agree, however this is an element that is present no matter what form of warfare that is practiced. In fact, C&C is even MORE important for less flexible command structures (i.e. ones with less inherent initiative). So in this respect, CM doesn't simulate this aspect of warfare any more or less for Maneuver Warfare than any other type.

True Manoeuvrists trust their subordinates to the point of complete hands off, with the exception of the Reserve.

Correct. And since you, the player, acts as the leadership at all levels your units in fact have the ULTIMATE degree of initiative freedom. In other words, when you concentrate on a particular platoon, aren't you commanding it using the theories of Maneuver Warfare? I mean, you don't start restricting your own actions simply because you are clicking on a different set of units?

That is reality but probably would be a very frustrating game.

Well, some people might think that a "command level" game would be fun, but we agree with you completely that it wouldn't be

CM also excludes the left and right, which is a poorly understood, critical, relationship.

I don't think it is really not understood, rather it is just impractical for a game to deal with. We have had this discussion for about 2 years on this BBS alone Do a quick search on "edge hugging" or "hugging" and you will find a few interesting discussions.

Manoeuvre is not a Grand Scale device and can be applied to a Platoon attack. It simply stresses allowing subordinates to know more and therefore do more when the opportunity arises.

Oh, I certainly agree. What I meant by Grand Maneuver is that some things are, at least to some degree, not relevant to the tactical scale. This whole discussion, for starters, was originally brought up on the notion that the tactical level of command should have far more flexibility than CM allows. The counter points raised in that discussion pointed out that the things being put forward as "missing" were not relevant to a CM battle. However, as you state, the leadership aspect of informing and trusting subordinate judgement (initiative) goes all the way down to team level.

One must see Manouevre in context with the picture around them. In Last Defence if the enemy hasn't shown up by turn X (and my commanders intent is to counter attack to regain initiative) I have no option to carry out that c-move with my troops till we run out of gas, nor is there a commander with a Reserve to push thru me once I do.

This is outside of the scope of the battle. What you are talking about is either a battle that does not happen or one that happens instead of another.

This is what we call "scope creep" in gaming. Combat Mission is a tactical wargame. It is not supposed to have anything to do with the Big Picture. You find yourself in a confrontation, either of or not of your choosing. It doesn't matter how you wish to think of it, just understand that it happened BEOFRE turn one. In other words, the decisions you are thinking of have already been made. Either by you (in theory) or your superior. I mean, who is to say that the Germans in Last Defense (prior to Turn 1) didn't divert their drive against another bridge, which was more heavily defended, and instead attack the one actually in that scenario? See what I mean?

Last point, I am not saying Manoeuvre is "the next Grail", in fact I do not believe it is even going to be relevant in the near future. Attrition and Manoeuvre are two sides of the same coin and a truly masterful commander can switch betwen the two with perfect timing and not miss a beat.

Well said! When this discussion started it was all about the two being totally seperate. That a "good" commander, who is practicing Maneuver Warfare, would simply avoid a direct conflict with the enemy. He would either drive around it, fly over it, or simply wait for the enemy to move away on their own. To do otherwise was to be a "bad" commander, one who practiced the naughty Attrition Warfare.

While avoiding direct conflict AND acheiving your gals is the desirable way to conduct war, in some wars (like WWII) it simply isn't possible to do this all the time. To argue otherwise is to ignore the fact that even the BEST examples of Maneuver warfare involve some very bloody and costly acts of warfare.

It is also not up to a junior level commander to do ANYTHING that he can dream up. He has specific operating parameters and standard military doctrine to follow. The more a local commander deviates from the core of his authority, responsibilities, and the needs of the operation as a whole, the more likely he is going to run afowl of the military system that grants him his command. In other words, screw up and you are outta there

Steve

[This message has been edited by Big Time Software (edited 02-01-2001).]

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

No, it is not a trick question. And wb-99 proved it by citing a real example, and a fine one. Superior mobilization speed and use of railroads definitely qualifies; it was an actual war from start to finish; and it was decided by manuever warfare. Very good sir.

Now, since others decline and continue to duck behind the pretense that "all war is both" or something, perhaps you will address the question of how the brilliant manueverists lost so many wars. And the Kursk question. And the Feb. '45 question.

As for another fellow who thinks I am conflating attrition strategies with total war, if so it is certainly not my intention. The latter would seem to apply equally to either party to the conflict, would it not? (One might quibble about things like dates of industrial mobilization of something).

I can show to those who think that it is a "trick" question, or that it is vacuous because "all warfare is both", that it has definite content. If you were to propose to learn all the maxims of manuever warfare from Blucher ("old forward"), from Grant, from Falkenhayn and Petain, from Marshall, Eisenhower, and Zhukov, and from Matthew Ridgeway, then we would not be disagreeing. But if instead you urge the necessity of learning such arts from Napoleon, Lee, Ludendorff and the easterners or Fuller, from Guderian, Manstein, and Patton, or from MacArthur, then my questions remain.

Why is it that all the brilliant generals lost or failed, and all the stupid, boring, dull, stodgy, unimaginative, vanilla, stick in the mud generals won? I exaggerate for the purpose of clarity, of course.

I have a whole bucketful of theories about why that is, here in my wooden noggin'. But what I want, is for a manueverist to tell me *his* version of why.

It is possible, for instance, that strategic adversity is correlated with military innovation for any of a host of reasons, or directions of connections, some of which would and some of which would not, council going to school at the feet of the losers. But please try to bear in mind, that the mere citizens of a republic prefer to win under the generalship of unimportant nobodies, rather than losing under the generalship of brilliant historical personages, so brilliant and historical personhood alone, is not regarded as much of a recommendation.

I point out immediately that I in no way mean to suggest, that we do not have many important things to learn from brilliant generals who lost. We certainly do, and that is not my point. My point is, I still want a manueverist to tell me how brilliance and losing become so compatible, according to his own views about what is decisive in warfare.

Myself, I have all kinds of explanations for how it is that brilliant commanders lose; that is easy for me to explain. I just want to know how those who worship the brilliance of brilliant generals, explain the same stubborn fact. *How* do military geniuses lose to the likes of Blucher and Grant? How do they *manage* to? Why isn't that sort of thing *impossible*?

[Brian Rock]

There is still some semantic confusion here about exactly what we mean by manuever & attrition. It seems to me there are two camps: one sees them as philosophies:

Attrition = eg winning by direct means, firepower, grinding the enemy down, exploiting superior resources, etc

Manuever = eg winning by indirect means, exploiting holes and gaps, eliminating the enemy's centre-of-gravity, superior application of resources, etc

The other sees as them as systems:

Attrition = eg centralised command, "command push", adherence to doctrine to make the plan work

Manuever = eg initiative, "recon pull", innovation and adaptationto achieve CO's intent

(Apologies to everybody for overly simplifying the various points-of-view)

Part of the problem is that there is support for both points-of-view in the literature. It's hard to clearly discuss something when the parties aren't using the same words to mean the same thing.

As for the question about a post-1700 war won by manuever - I'd think Frederick the Great and the Seven Years War would qualify on both definitions.

[Guest Big Time Software]

I have a pretty good theory as to why nations with the most "brilliant" Maneuver Warfare generals ultimately wind up on the losing side.

Nations at war have to play up their strengths. If your strength is NOT more men, greater industrial capacity, more friends than enemies, etc. you have to be MORE creative than your enemy if it has those sorts of advantages. Otherwise, your side will lose. Period. Punto. No point in even starting war.

So look at some of our historical examples. Napoleonic France, The Confederate States of America, Germany in WWI, and Germany in WWII. In each case these nation states produced "better" quality leadership than their enemies. They had better sense and use of Maneuver Warfare as The_Capt so aptly described. But they all lost because they initially, or at least eventually, took on an oponant that, while perhaps not as "good" in the sense of Maneuver Warfare, was good enough and had significant material advantages of some sort.

In the case of Napoleon it was primarily weight of numbers and the inability to keep his forces coherent in Russia. So all the forces allied against him were able to peck away over time and in far too many locations.

In the US Civil War it was the North's far superior man and industrial power that swamped the South. Plus, contrary to some people's opinion, they did have some outstanding commanders. Sherman, for example, could be looked at as having made a great contribution to the modern concept of Maneuver Warfare. Scorched Earth was nothing new, but took it to a level of ferocity and success that makes it stand out even today.

World War 1 saw the Germans beat the Russians, with a lot of help from the Russians themselves (i.e. Civil War), and almost win in the West. But the Russians lasted just long enough and the US entered just soon enough that Germany lost the war.

World War 2 saw Germany repeat its mistakes. It took on too many enemies in too short a space of time, underestimating its foes when it really mattered (i.e. when they were all riled up and mobilized).

Coupled with this, the enemies in each case did produce some notable military leaders. One might think that the Soviet Marshalls weren't that great, but they held their front together and beat the crap out of the largest and most experienced Army and Air Force to ever set foot on this planet. So they couldn't have been total boobs Same in the West. Patton, Hodges, Bradly, etc. were fine commanders. Maybe not the best of the best of the best, but they were not idiots who won by luck.

So to recap... nations with the worst odds of winning a particular war need to somehow figure out a way of improving their chances of winning. Being more daring is one of the ways. But it looks like daring, and even lucky, isn't enough to win beyond a certain point. Some would argue that if Germany had not invaded the Soviet Union that there would have been peace with the Third Reich intact. Perhaps

After WWI was over Germany prepared itself to take on France again. That was its primary mission, along with regaining its lost territory. Under Hitler's leadership Germany did that. And far more successfully than anybody, even the Germans, could have imagined. So the irony here is that Germany won the "war" it was designed for 20 some odd years to fight, but because Hitler and others thought victory was so easy they over extended what Germany was capable of doing. And so in the end, Germany lost the war it initially won by fighting a war it was not suited for.

Steve

[This message has been edited by Big Time Software (edited 02-01-2001).]

[Guest Mr. Johnson-<THC>-]

Bravo Steve!

Grant, Marshall, Eisenhower, and Zhukov? Try giving the resources that those Generals had to the "Manuever" specialist your talking about. I differ here, I thought the Mauever methoud was putting you men on the ground of your choosing and forcing the enemy to attack you at a disadvantage. And of course following up their failure with an attack of your own, while not starting a war where you did not have means to achive that. If you don't follow the means of "Tatical defense", "Strategric offense" you are wasting your men's lives like all of the Generals you sited Jason.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Resources? Numbers? Material advantages? Generals who were just "good enough", just "not total boobs"? Good Lord, belief in the essentials of attrition doctrine are breaking out all over!

But, I thought if brilliance in manuever was decisive, that numbers didn't matter. No? Numbers... *do* matter? There is some ratio of numbers, such that beyond that point, brilliance is *useless*? At least against "good enough", not "complete boobs".

Then, say I have no idea if I am the "brilliant" one or he is. If I can plan my military operations to bring about that ratio of existing forces or better - then I win - right? Brilliant be darned, right? Because all the brilliant guys lost, if they faced odds of such-n-so. So if I can plan on bringing about odds ratio such-n-so, then brilliance is gravy, 'cause the win is in the bag.

That it was attrition strategies are geared toward, it is the assumption upon which they rest. That brilliance in manuever is *not* decisive in the way that a large enough advantage in odds, *is* decisive. Because, you know, it is possible to gear military operations toward changing the odds ratio, and to make that the primary focus.

How? Well, you look at your force stock and his force stock. You look at your rate of flow of new forces and his rate of flow of new forces. On these flow rates, you raise yours, prevent him from lowering yours, lower his, prevent him from raising his. How? Bombing, submarine warfare, personnel policies, diplomacy, blockade, disruption of transport links, occupation of transport links, propaganda, etc, etc.

Then there are the stocks, his existing forces and your existing forces. Obviously you try to destroy his and to preserve yours, but there are particular matters involved in this, in practice. For example, it is often found that you can increase the loss rate on both sides, at some "cost" in the loss ratio moving somewhat against you. Do you? Depends on the entire force ratio and flow-rate situation. Even loss ratios that have you losing more than him can be better than lower ones the other way, if the existing odds ratio isin your favor.

E.g. He has 100, I have 150, I lose 100 and he loses 80. I lost more, but retain 50. He lost less, but now has only 20. The odds ratio moved from 3:2 to 5:2, even though I lost more, because the loss rate (at 5:4) was below the pre-existing odds ratio (at 3:2), so driving the loss rate to the moon clobbers him. Once he faces 5:2, likely his "brilliance" factor ain't worth diddly no more.

As for the historical cases, Napoleon's problem in Russian was not keeping his force "cohesive" it was keeping it *alive*. He never managed to feed the poor buggers adequately, worked the horses to death, etc. 2/3rds of the losses were taken by the French and their allies not in the winter nor in battle, but in the approach march, in summer.

Napoleon was not the only great commander to run his logistics operation out of his hip pocket and blunder away an entire army in consequence. A similar thing happened to an army of Alexander the Great in Baluchistan. He at least had the excuse of bad weather keeping a fleet from reaching him.

As for the idea that the sides without the material advantages have all the brilliance because they need it, there are some casual links missing in that chain of reasoning. Just how does the genuis magically appear on the side without enough material advantages? Or does it spring up naturally everywhere, but get weeded away by the mere existence of material advantages?

Here is another explanation. People who invent effective new forms of warfare think those effective new forms of warfare will prove decisive. They think they are brilliant and being brilliant will win them wars, just like manueverists say it will.

So they take on all comers, get cocky, ignore material force ratios, have pride and success go to their heads, fight everybody, and then discover that lo, their brilliance is not decisive against odds, and then they lose. In other words, because pride is a weakness (like putting your own eyes out), you regularly find people with something to be proud of, on the losing side.

And here is another - military innovators do not understand the actual implications of their own doctrines. They do not know the limits of its effects, how rapidly their innovations will be duplicated by others, or how alarming others will see their new methods or initial successes as being. They then drawn down a grand coalition on their heads out of miscalculation, either because they overestimate the power of their improvements, or because *others* do so and "balance" against the threat that represents.

Here is another - because the military innovations of military geniuses include large portion that are lucky hits in sheer guesswork, which they can't reproduce themselves except by repeating the same formula they did the last time, like an empiric medicine man. So much others can learn to imitate pretty rapidly.

The actual benefit of military genius is therefore really a random walk, misinterpreted by the potentates involved as their own brilliance. Its effects therefore do not last very long, and scatter in terms of who benefits from them over the course of any long war.

In addition, the swelled head phenomenon can prove a drawback and swing the balance almost as far against the innovator as his discovery swung it in his favor. But in the meantime, he will have collected extra enemies that are easier to pick up than to shed. Therefore, brilliant leaders lose.

Here is another - many of the supposedly brilliant commanders worshipped as such by manueverists are not brilliant commanders at all, but rash gamblers who led their countries to destruction through entirely foreseeable human folly. And many of the bland, boring, straight ahead stick-n-the-muds that manueverists love to deride are not only "not complete boobs" but capable professionals applying sound military doctrine, in many cases more intelligent doctrine than the manueverist's favorites ever possessed. In fact, it is possible that "stick n the mud" is a synonym for a tenacious bulldog of a fighter, and brilliant manueverist is a synonym for well-bred and refined upper cruster who didn't get my son killed, only lost the war.

I did mention that I've got a bucketful of theories about why "smart" generals lose wars, didn't I? The mystery was always why manueverists can't explain it, without admitting that attrition doctrine makes sense - not any difficulty in finding a dozen reasons for it to be so.

[Brian Rock]

Good Lord, belief in the essentials of attrition doctrine are breaking out all over!

I've never said attrition wouldn't work - just that it may not always be the best way to go.

I think everyone here would agree attrition WWI style was pretty poor generalship. I also think you'd be a bit daft if you thought the Israelis should have relied on attrition in 1967.

As for the advantage of numbers - wasn't it Napolean who said "God is on the side of the big battalions"?

I tend to favour a manuever-warfare approach, but don't think it's a magical panacea.

It does seem to me that opposing manuever warfare on principle because some generals who practice it ultimately lost doesn't make sense. There are cases where well-equipped forces have managed to lose to badly equipped forces. So do we ditch the SP arty and assault rifles and give everybody rocks and spears?

Manuever principles can provide a combat multiplier. Sometimes attrition is the best (or only feasible) way to go. It depends. Complex questions rarely have simple answers.

[von Lucke]

"Luck favors the large battalions".

--- N. Bonaparte

"Brevity is the soul of wit".

--- W. Shakespeare

[Guest Mr. Johnson-<THC>-]

here is what I said in response to Jason in the Brit/Rommel thread.

"I think maybe you generalizations are getting a little too broad there Jason. I don't think its fair to catorgrize these countrys in this way you are. I think there were commanders that thought along the lines of combined arms not matter which army branch they were in or which country they worked for. Sometimes these commanders were underneath say a Infantry commander who cared about his infantry and thought Tanks should just drive up and win the battle, and order the tanker to do so, so his infantry could move up unmolseted, often too disasterous results for the tankers. Some commanders for all sides in WW2 got their jobs just because they were higher in the social ladder, not great, innovative thinkers."

thought it would work here too.

Who said numbers don't matter? I and many other taticians (that don't limit ourselves on just manuvouer or slugfest with the most numbers) agree with the statement "quantity has a quality of its own." And nobody thinks that a Heavyweight Boxer cannot hit harder then a lightweight. But could Bruce Lee beat someone bigger then him? Yes. If Bruce Lee was the size of the Incredible Hulk and fought Bruce Lee, the Hulk/Bruce would win. hehehe. When you talk about reducing the numerical odds against you, how do you achive it? Do you run up to the enemy and get in a slugging match? No, you put him in a disadvantageous postion and gain the tatical advantage, leading to a strategic advantage overall. Jason you our advoctating manuever warfare+Attrition for us.

[GriffinCheng+]

Or in short:

War won by numerically inferior armies are so outstanding since most wars are won by numeric superiority.

As put in a Japanese novel "Legend of Galactic Heroes" or "Heldensagen vom Kosmosinsel".

Griffin.

------------------

"When you find your PBEM opportents too hard to beat, there is always the AI."

"Can't get enough Tank?"

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

No, I would not recommend fighting with stones and spears. What is it with straw men? They are so appealing I suppose, and sure I do it too sometimes.

What I would conclude is that good equipment is not in itself decisive, so, for instance, I would not plan the Vietnam war around the propostion "as long as they don't have tanks and helicopters in any numbers, we are sitting pretty". 'Cause if I did, I'd lose.

Similarly, noticing that supposedly brilliant generalship is not in itself decisive, I wouldn't form judgments like "these sub-humans and Commissars cannot possibly resist the our brilliant blitzkrieger ubermenschen - the whole structure is rotten, just kick in the door and the whole will fall down". 'Cause if I did, you see, I'd lose.

You say that effective manuever is a force multiplier, and I quite agree. What are the forces to which multipliers apply? Odds ratios, the stuff of attrition planning. Good effects should indeed be sought from manuever, but they belong inside an overarching strategy for a war that is itself cast in attrition terms. I can give some examples of the differences between this, and manueverist ideas.

But first I should state frankly, that I know many of you are more reasonable than some disciples of manuever warfare. My previous petulance and challenging tone were occasioned by a distinct lack of such reasonableness and such obvious concessions - that odds matter, that manuever at best is a force multiplier, etc. It is no exaggeration that I have had people on the other side saying that all is manuever, or that manuever equals thinking, or using attrition as a synonym for dumb, or wasteful. I myself have been quite careful to allow the operational importance of manuever, to agree we have much to learn from smart generals who were good at it, etc.

But my examples. If someone used an overarching strategic analysis based on attrition ideas, while allowing the operational importance of manuever as a force multiplier, then it would effect certain decisions.

Like, for instance, if you are going to attack a country the size of 1/6th of the earth's surface with an army of 3 million men, you should not go to a war footing economy 18 months *after* the invasion, when you decided on that invasion 6 months before it occurred.

This is rather obvious from an attritionist point of view. Since the whole point is to achieve a fielded odds ratio that you know will prove decisive in itself, it is obviously of the first importance to drive the flow-rate of your own new forces to the ceiling. Indeed, you are making progress on the odds ratio before a shot is fired that way, presuming that you are more geared up for the attack than a target that knows nothing about it yet, or discounts what it hears.

Second, if you have a choice between going to Moscow and closing the Kiev pocket, the attritionist's overarching frame provides a very definite answer - close the Kiev pocket. An attritionist expects nothing decisive from possession of Moscow, and something much more solid in the elimination of an enemy force of nearly a million men.

These are two of the critical choices Germany actually faced in 1941. It decided the first one differently, out of a faith in manuever warfare and the decisiveness of superior generalship compared to odds, which was in restrospect almost certainly misplaced. It decided the second of them in the way any attritionist would have, but in a way many manueverists criticized then and which later ones still criticize now.

So much so, that some of them maintain that the second decision, which I happen to think was entirely correct, lost the war - while many of them make no mention of the other or do not regard it as decisive.

I am sure some people, somewhere, will oppose the decisions actually made on both, and obviously those who made them agreed to both. So we've boxed the compass on the possibilities.

But there is a certain doctrinal consistency to those who take no notice of the war-economy decision, but stake all on the Moscow not Kiev alternative. They really are saying that manuever is decisive in warfare. I just don't believe them, I don't believe it is true.

And when they teach the history of that campaign and say "see, here, the tanks are turned aside to close a pocket around enemy forces, instead of pursuing a deep objective in the open enemy rear. Doctrinal error! Mistake! Not manuever! The war was lost *here*.", I think they are teaching errant nonsense.

If I were to mimic them I would say, "see, here, invasion planned for six months ahead, and war-economy mobilization not ordered for two full years. Doctrinal error! Mistake! Not attrition thinking! The war was lost *here*", I do not think it would be such errant or so nonsensical - although it might still be overstated if I imitated them that way. But the tanks being turned to Kiev? No problem, the right decision, enemy forces minus 1 million, existing odds ratio way up, good move.

I *subordinate* manuever to a strategic picture that is based on attrition warfare concepts, because I know that sufficient odds will defeat such differences in manuever multipliers as are likely to be encountered, and that putting the armed forces of one's country in that odds position is the end state that is to be sought.

Manuever has its place as a force multiplier, yes. And sound doctrine is important in ensuring that such effects can be sought after by the officers in command in the field. But their manuevers are for a strategic purpose, which is set by the attrition-thinking strategy (I won't call it an actual attrition strategy because it is not, really).

That is, operational manuever is to bring about odds ratios of remaining forces that make defeat impossible. And to do so, the proper target of those operational manuevers, is the destruction of the enemy armed forces.

If you have been listening, you must know there are plenty of people using the term "manuever" to mean something quite different from the above. They conceive the role of manuever not as a force multiplier, but as decisive in itself. The goal of manuever, to them, need not be the destruction of enemy forces in the field. One of their great predecessors in teaching the art of war, teaches as a settled maxim, that the highest perfection of the military art is to achieve the objective set for the general without fighting.

There is a definite nobility, an elegance, to this conception. It originates from a courtly time. It was actual practicable in important respects under older conditions of logistics, society, mobilization of forces, and a dozen other variables. Its adherents believe that the conception instead stems from eternal truths about the nature of war and the military art. From their perspective, the destructiveness of modern wars from the time of Napoleon on, are evidence of great stupidity among its practitioners.

They are, emphatically, not just talking about "force multipliers" useful in destroying the enemy army. To them, that is a reduction of manuever from its grand and elegant strategic role in the hands of the military genius, into a handmaiden of sordid and stupid attrition thinking. If you are not of that ilk, fine by me.

But does anyone still think, after this much fleshing out of debate, that it is still a "vacuous" discussion of "all the same thing"? Or will anyone still equate "manuever" with "thoughtful" and "attrition" with mindless robotic and dumb? I certainly hope not.

[The_Capt]

To Steve, the problem with a computer game is that our units do not have a human brain which can actually process a situation within the context of Manoeuvre doctrine. So loss of control actually becomes a "mob rush" which is really all I see in those games. In reality C&C and Age of Empires are far more attritionist than CM in that it really comes down to who has the most.

The left and the right is poorly understood in gaming and the real military, boundary lines have caused more grief than could be believed by people who haven't lived it. The cooperative relationship which is vital in Manoeuvre Warfare really need to be developed, we still rely too heavily on report lines and "pieces of terrain" belonging to someone or the other.

This is outside of the scope of the battle. What you are talking about is either a battle that does not happen or one that happens instead of another.

This is what we call "scope creep" in gaming. Combat Mission is a tactical wargame. It is not supposed to have anything to do with the Big Picture. You find yourself in a confrontation, either of or not of your choosing. It doesn't matter how you wish to think of it, just understand that it happened BEOFRE turn one. In other words, the decisions you are thinking of have already been made. Either by you (in theory) or your superior. I mean, who is to say that the Germans in Last Defense (prior to Turn 1) didn't divert their drive against another bridge, which was more heavily defended, and instead attack the one actually in that scenario? See what I mean?

quote:

I understand and agree but you must understand that for actual Manoeuvre Warfare to happen we need to allow for this to happen and then the freedom of action must be allowed. This is well beyong the scope of a tactical wargame. I believe the CMHQ "Meta-Campaign" or a large multi-player campaign "pack" released by BTS could be made to provide this "dynamic" environment. The question remains though, would anybody buy it, except us "Army geeks".

For Mr. Rock,

You are correct in both sets of definitions and in fact both sets support the other. Ths systems as you call them support the philosophies and are each applicable to certain conditions. WWI was not attritionist because the generals were inept or rich-idiot-third-sons. The art of manoeuvre and Manoeuvre were well known and well employed at all levels. WWI was Attritionist because technology had outstripped any freedom of movement, the mentality or system did not work. So instead they kept trying for the break-through using Attritionist control.

The system supports the philosophy and the philosophy depends on the system. A better term would be "objectives" and "means". The system provides the "means" and the philosophy provides the "objectives". Although I would say that Attritionist method can still strike at weakness, look for gaps etc, it is more a question of control and who holds it.

Lastly for Mr Cawley, I think I now understand the real aim of your discussion. However, the way you are trying to prove it is weak. First of all define "won" and "lost". These two conditions happened a thousand times a day in any given conflict at a myriad of different levels. You have overgeneralized the employment of the two schools of thought to the extreme. You have further "muddied" the waters by dragging in personalities to try and prove your point. Gen So-and-So was an attritionist on the winning side but Gen Whats-his-Name wasn't so attrition is better. This is not logical nor does it provide proof of your original position.

One does not supercede the other. They are TOOLS gentlemen, each with inherent strengths and weakness to be employed equally and at the right time is a true sign of mastery. Proof of that is in every historical example given. It was all a question of timing. If you don't believe me take any battle in the last 1000 years and show that the "objectives" of each school did not exist at some level. The "means" and formalization thereof is a different matter and is in fact something we are still coming to grips with.

[ASL Veteran]

I think I have finally been able to grasp what Jason is trying to say. It took me a long time because what he is saying is a gross simplification of events.

To make sure I have it right I will pose a premise - call it the Jason premise. Napoleon, the brilliant operational 'maneuverist' was eventually defeated by the the practitioners of 'attrition' who eventually wore him down and defeated him in 1814. I will even consider the various different wars that occurred between 1805 and 1815 as one long and continuous war (false as it is). There is no need to include the campaign of 1815 since that was over in a few months anyway. Napoleon's real defeat occurred in 1814 (which came about from the campaigns of 1813).

Okay Jason, please flesh out this premise for me (make any clarifications or corrections as needed) while I prepare a response. I will try to post this response later this evening. I choose Napoleon because ... well, I am well read in the Napoleonic Wars, and because the period from King Louis XIV to Napoleon are a critical time in military development and would serve well to show the blurred lines between attrition and maneuver.

[Henri]

Just a comment in passing here. Much has been made by proponents of attrition warfare of Sun Tzu's statement to the effect that the ideal military victory is one that is won without having to engage the enemy. This and other statements by maneuverists has been used to give the impression that proponents of maneuver warfare claim that concentration of force against the enemy should always be avoided.

One could go on and on about this misconception, but let me only point out that the bulk of Sun Tzu's book deals with how to use one's army in combat in such a way as to bring about victory.

What modern military theory has added to Sun Tzu's ideas are refinements such as recon-pull and mission-oriented orders.

Maneuverists and attritionists both believe in pitting strength against weakness, so there is no difference there.

As for Napoleon, his losing "the war" had little to do with maneuver warfare versus attrition: he lost the Battle of Waterloo because Grouchy elected to follow the letter of Napoleon's orders instead of doing the obvious which was to go to where the cannon sounds were, and he lost the war in Russia because the Russians outmaneuvered him by retreating behind Moscow and leaving his army nothing to conquer.How this is supposed to prove that attrition warfare is superior to maneuver warfare is beyond me.

Henri

[Guest Big Time Software]

Jason:

Resources? Numbers? Material advantages? Generals who were just "good enough", just "not total boobs"? Good Lord, belief in the essentials of attrition doctrine are breaking out all over!

It isn't as B&W as all that, but it does appear that we basically agree.

The key to the Allies ultimate success in WWII was a combination of elements. One of which was the adoption of strategies and tactics similar to those that the Germans were using (i.e. Maneuver Warfare). Perhaps not as good early on as they were later (Normandy and Bagration were brilliantly conceived and executed), but successfull none the less. And in some cases far more successfull (Allied airpower for example). Combined with generally good leadership and training, superior industrial capacity, vastly superior manpower reserves, and better strategic planning... Germany was doomed to fail the day after they declared war on the USA.

Could Germany have done a better job of combating its enemies? Certainly. Many of the big mistakes it made were "easily" correctable had the Nazi leadership (more than just Hitler) and military leadership done far better strategic planning than they did. German strategic planning was measured in months, not years. Bad idea when trying to take on the rest of the world.

The_Capt wrote:

One does not supercede the other. They are TOOLS gentlemen, each with inherent strengths and weakness to be employed equally and at the right time is a true sign of mastery.

So very true.

To Steve, the problem with a computer game is that our units do not have a human brain which can actually process a situation within the context of Manoeuvre doctrine.[/quote[

Actually, your units DO have "human brains" to process the situation within the conext of Maneuver Warfare. Since you control each of your units, they are acting in the same spirit as the commander (i.e. you). When you move a Platoon you do so to their best advantage in context with the larger goals you, as Company Commander, have set forth in accordance with those of you, as Battalion Commander, asked to be carried out. No, you don't see the computer do this FOR you (obviously this is beyond the capabilities of AI programming), but the end result is even better than any real world Manuever Warfare concept could be carried out.

We call it the Borg Concept. It is the ULTIMATE form of Manuever Warfare because every single element under your control understands, perfectly at any given point in the game, exactly what is expected of them. For example...

You have conceived (as Company Commander) of encircling an enemy force through a patch of woods on the enemy's left flank. You move one platoon in that direction. When they get there they realize that they are in the rear of a different, as yet unidentified, enemy force. In real life the flanking platoon would have had to make a tough choice - shoot up the rear of a different force, using personal initiative, or pass up a great opportunity so as to make sure the larger plan (i.e. coordination of 3 platoons for a common goal) can succeed. In Combat Mission you can "allow" the platoon to act on its "initiative" and instead cancel the orders of the other two platoons (as Company Commander) for the time being. This is the ultimate form of Maneuver Warfare, is it not?

Thank you This is what I have been saying since this topic was first raised. Certain aspects of Maneuver Warfare are outside of CM's scope. Not because CM is defective in its design, but because it is true to the realities of its simulated scale and scope of operations. To expect that "Grand Maneuvers" can, or indeed should, be simulated in a tactical wargame is complete folly. It isn't realistic in the sense of the real world battlefield, and it is just asking for a muddled and confused wargame design. Scope Creep will kill a promising wargame design faster than anything else.

Steve

[Guest Big Time Software]

Henri:

How this is supposed to prove that attrition warfare is superior to maneuver warfare is beyond me.

I for one am certainly not saying one is "superior" to the other. Like the Capt here, I am saying that they are two sides of the same coin. The degree on side uses Maneuver more than straight Attrition is the key factor. But at the top most strategic level, the winner will most likely be the one with the better odds. This is a rather simple concept. Maneuver, better equipment, better training, better planning, better sense of timing, better etc. can help the side with the lower odds win *IF* it can do so to a degree greater than the odds against it.

This is the concept of Blitzkrieg. Act fast and strike hard with a SPECIFIC strategic goal in mind. Numbers and other such things do not matter if you can crush the other side before they get the chance to use them against you. The problem with Germany in WWII is that they forgot this concept in the strategic sense. The got themselves stuck in a war of Attrition. And Germany could not win such a war. All the fancy maneuvering couldn't alter this after a certain point, and therefore the point -> Maneuver Warfare can not, in and of itself, acheive victory in any and all circumstances. It is therefore not the be all end all element of warfare.

Steve

[The_Capt]

Bang on Steve, I would direct you to my thread on CM and Manoeuvre. I have asked the question "is CM the future of warfare" and how will it change our doctrine.

You have echoed my own hypothesis which is that:

"In the future a commander will use Attritionist doctrine to obtain Manoeuvrist goals" We do it right now in CM. We exercise initiative, dislocation, disruption, striking at weakness and the general "joi du guerre" associated with the Grand Spirit of Manoeuvre but we do it within a totally Attritionist methedology. We tell our troop exactly what to do and when. They exercise no initiative on their own but instead react "near-instantly" to our instruction. If the real world is heading towards CM then our approach to the whole thing is going to have to change.

[Spook]

We do it right now in CM. We exercise initiative, dislocation, disruption, striking at weakness and the general "joi du guerre" associated with the Grand Spirit of Manoeuvre but we do it within a totally Attritionist methedology. We tell our troop exactly what to do and when. They exercise no initiative on their own but instead react "near-instantly" to our instruction. If the real world is heading towards CM then our approach to the whole thing is going to have to change.

There is the key qualifier in your last statement, Capt----"IF". The way it's all done in CM as you describe is done for a reason: it's a game where each side is controlled by ONE player. What if you could have multiple players per side?

The statement above also seems to presume that everything on one side in a CM game is directly controlled by a single WW2-era commander. I personally don't make this assumption, and assume instead that I wear multiple "command hats" not only of the top CO but also of lower-formation (company/platoon) commanders too.

Neither presumption is a realistic premise of actual C3I anyway. In WW2, rarely could even a company commander see what was happening to all of his platoons at one time anyway (which we as players can do). Nor were WW2 platoon leaders able to "shift around" with the kind of flexibility that we the gamers have.

So it remains to be proven to me that modern-day tactical & operational commanders (whichever the nation) apply command in the exact same way as a CM orders phase, as being a matter of DOCTRINE.