Attrition

[ASL Veteran]

This is certainly my longest post ever … I tried to make it as brief as I could, and in doing so it was necessary to make a few generalizations – many of which are from memory. I also thought about breaking it into multiple posts for ease of reading, but what the heck, here it is all at once.

While the notion of Napoleon, the genius of maneuver, being worn down and eventually defeated by Schwarzenburg and the overwhelming forces of attrition is a seductive conclusion to draw from the Napoleonic Wars, this conclusion is an overly simplistic one. The definition of ‘Attritionist’ put forth by Jason is this one,

“Now, what is this attrition warfare? Attrition warfare is the phrase used by people who disagree with the doctrine, to slight those who believe the fundamental goal and essential process of warfare is destroying the enemy wherever he stands. Specifically, the doctrine is, that the enemy armed forces are the target. Not terrain. Not an "objective". Not a mission. Destroy the enemy, period. And try to lose less men doing it, but above all destroy the enemy.”

I think this sums up Jason Cawley’s definition and this definition can be discovered in his first post on the subject. Let us also examine his ruminations upon Napoleon himself,

“But two facts are overlooked in this first round of quest for manuever and genuis in warfare. The first is that Napoleon's method essentially were systematized, and made into a machine that in practice operated more smoothly than he ever did - the general staff system. And the second is that *he lost*. "Oh well, sure, he faced superior numbers, but his military art was superior in itself (an-sich, you see), and that is why it took superior numbers to..." Napoleon was a national sovereign, not a general. The entire strategy set, including decisions about war or peace, was under his command. Talleyrand said "you cannot make war on everyone". Napoleon did not believe in attrition (above the tactical level, where I contend by the way that he *did*), but in manuever. He fought everyone. He lost.”

This quote can also be discovered in the first post of Jason’s thread on attrition. However, the whole premise of this quote is false and all the conclusions that follow from this premise are of course false also. The premise being that Napoleon was eventually overwhelmed by numbers because he felt that his genius could overcome his numerical deficit.

As to Napoleon’s method of war, Jason goes on in an attempt to differentiate between maneuver and attrition by using some WW2 examples,

“(Attrition) is actually not as common sense as it sounds, and it is not obvious that it is right. It is not a constructed straw man, nor does it set up the other side as a constructed straw man. There are many situatons in which, of course, any commander will focus on destroying the enemy e.g. that is in his way as he manuevers. And no one is disputing that all forms of warfare are attempting to defeat the enemy army overall. That is not the point.”

I suppose that what Jason is explaining is that the overall defeat of the enemy is not the point, but that the method of defeating the enemy is. Jason would argue that the best method, the ‘attrition’ method, is the way wars are won and that the brilliant but doomed ‘maneuver’ method is the way wars are lost.

“The question is - kill the German army in France inside the Falaise pocket, or race for the Rhine? Kill the Russian army inside the Kiev pocket, or race for Moscow? Grind forward through the mud of the Lorraine, or gamble on Operation Market-Garden?”

Placing this question into the context of Napoleon Bonaparte, Jason would have us believe that Napoleon would choose the so called ‘maneuverist’ strategy of racing for Moscow as opposed to the ‘attritionist’ strategy of killing the Russian army inside the Kiev pocket since that, apparently, would be the obvious goal of the ultimate maneuverist, Napoleon Bonaparte. A greater misunderstanding of Napoleon Bonaparte could not be made and I think a review of history and Napoleon will quickly show this to be the case. Even the definition of Napoleon as a ‘maneuverist’ can be muddled by historical facts. To fully understand Napoleon, we must explore warfare before Napoleon.

Although the first professional army is usually recognized as the Swedish army of Gustavus Adolfus, I am going to begin with the army of King Louis XIV. France was involved in numerous wars during the reign of King Louis – these wars generally stemmed from his belief that the natural border of France was the Rhine River. Of course, the Dutch weren’t big fans of this notion and consequently the French were involved in numerous wars with both the Dutch and the English (along with other nations at various times). The objectives of these wars is not the focus of my ramblings though, but the methods by which these wars were fought is. One clue as to what was felt to be important was the rise to prominance of General Vauban in the French army. Vauban was an engineer – something of a fortifications guru. Under Vauban’s direction, a chain of fortifications was built along the French frontier with the Dutch. The Dutch did the same. War consisted mainly of the reduction of these fortifications and strategy was based upon the control of these fortifications. The primary reason for this mode of thinking was that the army, the ‘King’s army’, was much too valuable to risk in field combat. This risk was great because there were no national reserves. Once the army was destroyed, the army was destroyed and an entirely new army would need to be raised in order to defend the frontiers. The raising of a new army would necessitate the training of all these new recruits etc, and could not be accomplished overnight. Battle was avoided if at all possible and a strategy that concentrated on occupying ‘space’ and lines of fortifications was the rule of the day. Whole years of campaigning went by where opposing armies did not meet in the field of battle, but simply maneuvered amongst the various towns and fortifications.

The Duke of Marlborough was regarded as the ‘military genius’ of the time and his march from Holland to Austria (which ended in the battle of Blenheim …1704) was regarded as quite an accomplishment at the time. A march from Holland to Austria in the space of one month was considered spectacular due to the constraints present upon the armies at that time. An army was basically tied to a chain of depots where supplies were stored in the event of war. “The magazine and depot system of logistics with its many halts for resupply tended to limit a campaign of an entire year’s campaigning season to a distance of 300 miles” (Russell Weigley ‘The Age of Battles’) An army that strayed too far from its depots was asking for trouble since living off the land was not the normal thing to do. What made Marlborough’s march even more spectacular was that he didn’t have any depots on the route of the march. “His new plans were daring to a degree that was extraordinary in light of the logistical difficulties of the era” (Russell Weigley ‘The Age of Battles’) The only reason it could be accomplished at all was because various German allies and minor principalities supplied the Duke with provisions along the way. Naturally this was all planned out beforehand, but if the friendly principalities did not provide the needed supplies, the march would have been rendered impossible. At this point I would pose a question – is avoiding field combat and pursuing a strategy of fortress reduction an ‘attritionist’ strategy or a ‘maneuverist’ strategy?

I would now like to fast forward, briefly, to Frederick the Great. I mention him because of the situation he was in. The Prussia of Frederick the Great was seen as a weak power trying for a land grab of Austrian territory and Russia, Austria, and France (at various times) all wanted to take the Prussians down. Prussia was fighting for its survival and was only saved by Russia making peace after tsarina Elizabeth passed away. The new King of Russia (Tsar Peter III) was an admirer of Frederick the Great and ended Russias involvement – thus ending the conflict. Although this was a form of Total War (because the destruction of Prussia as a sovereign nation was the objective) the old rules of warfare still applied. However, Frederick the Great sought out battles with his enemies since he always felt that if he let them build up strength unchecked it would be impossible to win. The odd part of this would be that the party who would seem to be conducting ‘maneuver’ warfare (Frederick the Great) was doing so because his intent was to engage the enemy in battle – despite the fact that his army was getting smaller and smaller with every engagement. He was attempting to use decisive concentration of force upon the various scattered allied armies that were descending upon his nation in an effort to defeat them in detail. The force with the superior numbers (Russia, Austria, and France) did not seek battle (actively avoiding it on occasion), and attempted to gain victory through the occupation of space (towns and fortifications). If Frederick the Great is considered a ‘maneuverist’ then this would be a victory for maneuver. If Frederick the Great is considered an ‘attritionist’ then this would be a case where the powers with the most toys did not win.

Moving on to the French Revolution, we can still see the old way of thinking at the battle of Valmy. The battle of Valmy basically consisted of the opposing armies lined up ready for battle, but the Prussians decide to pound the French with a cannonade. Once the cannonade is finished, the Prussians decide to go home. Risking battle was too much for a Prussian commander who didn’t really have much enthusiasm for war with France anyway (Duke of Brunswick). The French army was different than past armies though. The French army was created from the Levee En Masse. A people’s army. Armies had been transformed from the army of the King to the army of the nation. This huge reservoir of manpower created a situation where battle did not need to be avoided and the preservation of your force no longer needed to be the essential factor in warfare. The situation was also one of self preservation for France. France was the victim here, not the aggressor. The monarchies of Europe were not going to allow the French Revolution to stand for fear that the same thing could happen to them. Into this maelstrom comes Napoleon.

Napoleon felt that wars were won through the destruction of the enemy army, not the occupation of space. This was a fundamental break from the way wars were fought up to that point. There were a lot of logistical innovations introduced by the French during the Napoleonic Wars too, which allowed them to move with greater speed than armies in the past. This resulted in the combining of a General who had the destruction of the enemy army as his primary goal and an army that was much quicker than armies in the past. This combination allowed Napoleon to meet the Marine Corps criteria of maneuver warfare by giving Napoleon a much quicker decision cycle than his opponents. Napoleon’s objective was the destruction of the enemy army though. Napoleon never saw a battle he didn’t like and this is demonstrated again and again in his campaigns. Napoleon actively sought decisive battle with his opponents in an attempt to destroy their army and end the conflict. Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Wagram, Borodino, Leipzig the list of battles goes on and on. The speed with which the French army moved assisted Napoleon in his efforts by allowing him to concentrate force with great rapidity. Is Napoleon an ‘Attritionist’ or a ‘Maneuverist’? According to Jason’s definition, Napoleon’s objective of destruction of the enemy army through battle would be attritionist doctrine. Napoleon, the greatest ‘attritionist’ of all time? His use of speed and maneuver to bring about decisive battle and defeat his enemy would appear to be ‘maneuverist’ according to the Marine Corp definition. Which is it?

Moving on to Napoleon’s defeat, a close examination of the battles of 1813 (the campaign in central Germany culminating at the battle of Leipzig) finds the French actually begin the campaign with a healthy numerical advantage!! Russia and Prussia (and Austria who joined in later) had a big meeting when preparing for the campaigns of 1813. They decided at that time that they were to avoid pitched battle with Napoleon at all costs and to concentrate their efforts against Napoleon’s marshals. Napoleon, for his part, split his army into three parts … which played right into the hands of the coalition. The coalition forces then proceeded to catch each of the two columns under the independent command of Napoleon’s marshals and defeat them in battle. Napoleon tried to engage the coalition armies in battle, but they refused to cooperate and would quickly withdraw whenever Napoleon arrived on the scene. By the end of 1813, the coalition had achieved victory as Napoleon, abandoned by all his minor allies, was forced to retreat back to France. At that point the coalition nearly split apart because Austria didn’t see any need for an invasion into France, while Prussia wanted to go for it. A peace offer was made and rejected by Napoleon who was eventually crushed by weight of numbers in 1814 (when Napoleon was pretty much finished anyway). In light of the strategy of 1813 … was the ultimate ‘attritionist’ defeated by maneuver or was the ultimate ‘maneuverist’ defeated by attrition?

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When we were in the Bocage country we were assaulted by them Tigers ... you know what I mean by assaulted huh? WELL I MEAN ASSAULTED!!!!

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

ASL Vet, that was an exceptionally good post and an exceptionally clear one, and I take its criticisms in good part. I am guilty of the scatter-brained use of terms you have nicely brought out in your history. To me, a large portion of this has to do with the rigidity of the opposition of the two terms (man + att), and the failure to make distinctions between levels of warfare. More on that anon, but first I should clear up my slipshod characterizations of Napoleon, and what I think about or learn from him.

My comments about Napoleon as sovereign and his fighting everyone, were suggesting a somewhat questioning begging linkage between cockiness and worship of command genius. There is no actual, necessary connection between these things and the military doctrines themselves. It is more an insinuation than an argument.

To put it more straightforwardly, I distrust the hero-worship aspect I detect in some manueverist advocates, because I think overconfidence is a deadly military failing, at the diplomatic or war-decision level. I do think Napoleon suffered from such overconfidence. Lord knows he had perfectly adequate reason to believe he outclassed all the rival generals of his age.

Talleyrand was always trying to keep him from relying on that too much, and to limit the number of France's enemies - without much success. "If you give advice to a prince, and it not being taken disaster follows, you will reap great glory" - Machiavelli. LOL. I was recording my agreement with Talleyrand in these respects.

The connection of all of that to the actual military doctrine controversies, is dubious and uncertain at best. And those advocating the importance of manuever in warfare, do not really deserve to be painted as the origin of overconfidence, as I painted them.

Second, I entirely agree with you that Napoleon made the destruction of the main body of the enemy army the primary object of his campaigns. I have quoted him on the subject myself, on these boards and recently, to that effect. I stated my understanding of that as the proper goal of strategy, and in doing so I am aware that I am agreeing with that outlook of Napoleon. I think he got that right, and that it remains true in WW II and today.

Part of the confusion that I caused here, which is certainly my own fault and which you pointed out well, is that I am really arguing against "manueverist ownership" of Napoleon, or against a version of the cause of his successes that I do not think is historically true, of the man and the events.

I also agree and have stated, that to me Napoleon is the master of operational manuever. This fact is the basis of the presumptive manueverist "ownership" of the man. The position I am arguing *for*, rather than against, is for #1 a goal of *strategy* focused on destruction of the enemy army plus #2 a view of *operational* manuever as an important "force multiplier". I consider those opinions of my own, to be in substantial agreement with Napoleon's teachings. I am following him. You are quite right that my own statements did not say this, and made it appear the opposite, and that is my fault.

But him rather than those who have interpreted him as a manueverist through and through, in their own sense of it. Not Napoleon blended with Sun Tsu, but Napoleon, to put it as a formula of authorities.

I also mentioned in passing that I considered Napoleon's tactics to be attritionist. By that I mean such things as the decision by the last reserve, or "le moment juste". I think this was not just a matter of him as opposed to others in his time, but in the nature of the weapons of the age. Frontages were more nearly packed at all times, making local odds impossible to achieve but outlasting an enemy through "depth tactics" (ranks and reliefs, etc) a feasible alternative.

In my opinion, the room for manuever on the tactical level has increased since then. To me this is a (somewhat paradoxical, perhaps) consequence of the increase in firepower, especially indirect artillery firepower. Increased ranges for direct fire weapons are also part of the change. Those force and allow units to spread out, reducing the effectiveness or "packed frontages" and all around deployments. When units are more spread out, the ratio of force to space can vary over a much wider range. It is a tactical danger, not a physical inability, that is setting the upper limit on concentration of force.

Well, widely varying degrees of concentration of force favor manuever ideas, because they make it possible, under the right conditions, for a more compact body to fight thinner enemies at high local odds, then to repeat that in sequence, and thus to fight an equal number of enemies at always-higher local odds. This simply can't be done against packed all around deployments when all weapons have limited range, and powerful "area effect" indirect fire weapons do not (yet) exist.

So the room for manuever to matter tactically has increased since Napoleon's time. I think that both manuever ideas and reserve/rank/le moment juste ideas can matter in WW II and modern tactical combat. It is perhaps a stretch to call the latter "attrition" ideas. "Depth tactics" are probably a better term.

I can then unpack my reading of Napoleon to four levels. Diplomatically he was overconfident, or believed his superior generalship could outweigh numerous enemies. Strategically, he targeted the main body of the enemy armed forces and sought to destroy them. Operationally, he was a master of manuever. Tactically, he employed the depth tactics that were practically required by the weapons and force sizes of his day.

My own beliefs on the same levels are, first at the diplomatic level, that superior generalship may indeed help win wars against roughly equal opponents, but that it is nearly always an error to rely on superior generalship to justify risking war with more than equal enemies. It make work for a while, but it is a bad bet that it will work long enough.

Second, I agree entirely that the goal of strategy is destruction of the enemy force, and third, that operational manuever is an important aid in bringing this about. I probably disagree with many manueverists about the scale and conditions that importance, however.

Last, I think that both manuever ideas (or many-on-one through force placement or concentration) and depth ideas (or outlasting, reserves, moment juste, etc) can apply at the tactical level in WW II and modern combat. They lead to different recommendations.

Where have I put the stock "manueverists" I pretend I am arguing against? And which of these assigned positionings do I, upon reflection, think are fair or real positions of at least some of them?

I painted them as teachers of overconfidence through faith in the power of genius in warfare. But I acknowledge that charge is overblown and tendentious.

I think at least some of them, say the Sun Tsu variety, disagree that the purpose of strategy is the destruction of the enemy armed force. They have reasons for that, but I do not find them convincing. When some of them point to the possibility of manuever being decisive, then do not mean "decisive in bringing about the destruction of the enemy force", but capable of being decisive on its own. As in the maxim, the highest perfection of the military art is to attain the objective without fighting.

But I acknowledge that not all who accept the "manueverist" label, are of this Sun Tsu opinion. Some of them see the decisiveness of manuever precisely in its ability to bring about the destruction of the enemy force, or to aid in accomplishing that. I am not actually disagreeing with these people on this point alone (but see the next), but I have not made that apparent, I recognize.

On the importance of operational manuever, I do regard it as important. But I regard its importance as occurring within limits set by the ratio of forces actually obtaining. That is, I think the force multipliers operational manuever can be expected to generate, are bounded. And I think they are especially tightly bounded, when the opponent has a mostly modern doctrine, a mobile force, reserves, and is not making a few specific mistakes. I think force multipliers from manuever still exist even in that case, and I think proper doctrinal use of mobile combined arms is particularly important both in reaping them, and in avoiding them falling to the enemy.

My Kursk example was meant to show, that against a properly deployed and mobile enemy, there are definite limits to the scale of multiplier one can expect from operational use of the available forces. In case anyone doesn't understand my contentions, I think the German attack at Kursk was a mistake and should not have been tried, and I do not think an altered scheme of manuever could have made it succeed. I think a better use of mobile and armor assets available to the Germans then, would have been to conduct a mobile defense, in which there would have been room for manuever "multipliers", but also defender's advantages.

Next, I must address your fine direct questions, one going back to the age of fortress warfare. First, I think that the age of fortress warfare is sometimes made too much of by military historians drawing a constrast between the Napoleonic period and the prior ones. I agree a change occurs. But I find decisive battle important in the 30 years war, English civil war, in the time of Marlborough, and in the time of Frederick the Great. Which is every 50 years from 1600 to the time of Napoleon, effectively. But yes, the intensity of warfare increased and the size of armies increased enourmously.

To the extent that the actual history fits the contrast drawn by the historians, what I find in the age of Turenne is in large part the principles of Sun Tsu, but with some provisos. He inveighs against the seige of walled cities; it is artless to him (and perhaps it was "attrition"). But there is the same focus on achieving the objective by manipulating the contraints on the enemy commander, besides his srrength in battle - where he can be supplied for example, or whether he can afford to remain in the field for three seasons.

Then there is the idea that the defeat of Napoleon was brought about by the "advance on the marshals, retire from Napoleon" plan. It is certainly true in some respects, but I think it underrates the effect of the Battle of Leipzig. They did not avoid Napoleon there, they just hit him with 300,000 men. In particular, Blucher recommended battle with Napoleon himself - "a simultaneous attack, against the point where the enemy has concentrated its forces, might be undertaken". It was definitely a case of "hit 'em where he *is*".

In the later 1814 campaign in France, the idea of avoiding Napoleon and pressing his marshals was renewed. This had nastier attrition effects on the men with Napoleon than some might imagine, because it cast them in the role of "fire brigade" running hither and yon and fighting numerous battles in quick succession. This is the "blitzkrieg" engagement in sequence idea, certainly, and the campaign is a masterpiece of operational manuever. But the battles and the forces marches it involved took quite a toll. These were not tanks. Napoleon said "unfortunately the Young Guard is melting like snow".

And then there is the fact that he came back, and had to be defeated again in pitched battle. The capitulation of Paris by the marshals was not quite his last straw. All in all, while I recognize nuances in the piece, I am comfortable with the statement that Napoleon was eventually defeated by the effects of attrition strategies (including earlier, Spain and the Russian campaign), and not by manuever.

Ultimately, the labels "attritionist" and "manueverist" are still too broad to capture the nuances of doctrine and changes in the art of war, and especially distinctions among levels or scale. Not because they are the same thing. But because there are more differences involved than just that one distinction, and more types or doctrines hiding inside each label than just one each.

I want to again thank ASL vet for a most enjoyable and thoughtful post, and for his fair criticisms of my previous efforts.

[Guest Andrew Hedges]

I like how this thread is moving to define terms more specifically. In that spirit, it occurs to me that all attrition is not the same. Typically, when I think of attrition, I think of a broad front strategy that involves applying steady pressure and wearing the other side down. What I consider to be typical examples of attrition warfare would be the ACW, WWI, and most of the fighting on the Russian Front.

What these three wars/campaigns have in common is that the numerically superior side (the North/Allies/Soviets, respectively) used their superior manpower to grind down their opponents, because they believed that they could win that way, even if they suffered more casualties than the enemy. And, in fact, the victorious sides in these wars/campaigns did suffer greater losses than their opponents.

The Western Allies strategy in France '44, and the US strategy throughout the war, was attrition-like in that it was a broad-front strategy that relied on superior manpower. But neither the US nor Britain were willing to accept greater -- or anything close to -- the casualties they inflicted on the Germans. In fact, the American losses were much smaller than the losses of its opponents -- total US KIA in WWII was about 250k, with about half (somewhat less than half) of those deaths being in the Pacific theatre.

So is this really attritionist fighting? Or is there a different name for this (firepowerist?). Perhaps we are really talking about broad front vs. maneuverist (or narrow-front?) strategies.

Maybe maneuverists made up the

"attritionist" name for their opposite numbers because it has a musty WWI aura to it.

[Captain Hook]

Most interesting discussion. A couple of examples of military brilliance and never losing a battle despite commanding smaller armies comes to mind: Alexander the Great and "Stonewall" Jackson. I am a humble truck driver, not a military historian so I may be way off but if memory serves Alexander is considered the greatest military genius of all time. Generally, his armies(at least at the beginning of his career) were far smaller than the "superpowers" of the day. Specifically, Alexander faced an army six times larger than his own. I believe the opposing commanders' name was Darius. I don't recall the battles' name but certainly Alexander crushed an army outrageously larger than his own though manuever and his own personal genius. No possibility of attrition here. Of course, the stomping of Darius' army was only a warmup and Alexander went on to conquer everything he set his sights on.

Briefly, about General Jackson. Jackson was a humble, strictly religious man whose military genius was unquestioned even in his brief lifetime. After his famous victories, he became well known throughout the world. As I recall, Jackson never lost a battle and was constantly badly outnumbered by Union armies. He was a master of manuever and surprise, always appearing where the enemy least expected him and in greater numbers than they. The following is pure speculation but if Jackson had not been killed by friendly fire, he and Lee might very well have been able to reinvade the North with unknown consequences to the outcome of the war. I think Jackson is the only military genius who did not publicly display cockiness or smugness with his own ability. Indeed, he humbly thanked his Creator for his victories and, I think, refused to take credit. Perhaps this is one brilliant maneuverist(who never lost a battle) that Jason could like. My two cents.

[Brian Rock]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

No, I would not recommend fighting with stones and spears. What is it with straw men? They are so appealing I suppose, and sure I do it too sometimes.

Not intended as a straw man argument. More reductio ad absurdum.

I wasn't implying that I thought you'd argue for stones and spears. On the contrary I'd think you'd be one of the first to seek a firepower solution.

(And that's not a barbed comment either. I'm a firm believer in "send a bullet, not a man" where possible.)

What I would conclude is that good equipment is not in itself decisive, so, for instance, I would not plan the Vietnam war around the propostion "as long as they don't have tanks and helicopters in any numbers, we are sitting pretty". 'Cause if I did, I'd lose.

Agreed.

Manuever has its place as a force multiplier, yes. And sound doctrine is important in ensuring that such effects can be sought after by the officers in command in the field. But their manuevers are for a strategic purpose...

That is, operational manuever is to bring about odds ratios of remaining forces that make defeat impossible. And to do so, the proper target of those operational manuevers, is the destruction of the enemy armed forces.

But what about battles/wars that have been won without the destruction of the enemy's armed forces? Is this a bad thing?

If you have been listening, you must know there are plenty of people using the term "manuever" to mean something quite different from the above. They conceive the role of manuever not as a force multiplier, but as decisive in itself. The goal of manuever, to them, need not be the destruction of enemy forces in the field.

If we take the occasionally quasi-religious fervor out of the argument, I'd agree with them. The goal of manueverneed not be the destruction of enemy forces in the field.

That's not to say it never is - but if you can achieve your objectives without getting into a slugging match I don't see a problem.

I am not arguing that a manuever solution is always the way to go. But it does seem odd to me to argue that an attritional point of view is intrinsically superior.

But does anyone still think, after this much fleshing out of debate, that it is still a "vacuous" discussion of "all the same thing"? Or will anyone still equate "manuever" with "thoughtful" and "attrition" with mindless robotic and dumb? I certainly hope not.

Sometimes it is mindless, robotic and dumb.

Attrition can be an effective strategy. It is sometimes the only viable one for a range of reasons (time, terrain, training, etc).

My problem with attrition is that it can be a wasteful strategy, and often an ineffective one.

[Jasper]

Actually I've been having a hard time following some of the things on this thread. But I do agree with Jason 100% on his idea, but being a contrarian by nature, I was going to accept his challenge just for fun. But then I realized that the playing field was slightly tilted in his favor. Myself, I'd float out a flawed argument just to see if others would catch me on it, and I'm not sure Jason didn't do the same thing.

Example: He mentions Korea but not Viet Nam. Is he sitting back waiting for someone to propose that as a war won with "maneuver"? Or are other sensitivities in play?

(Tilt 1) I should say now, the only clear distinction that I can draw between 'attrition' and 'maneuver' seems to be intent. And if the idea that "We'll win this war by destroying the enemies armed forces" goes into the 'attrition' side. Then that doesn't leave a lot of attractive options for the other guy. There might be some limited instances of winning based on occupying some holy ground or the like!

(Tilt 2) In looking for an answer to the challenge - what wars do we use? Start with the case of one side being much larger than the other. It doesn't matter the strategy of the larger side - because anything based on the performance of the larger side would hardly be convincing. Example: The Finno-Russian war of 1939. Ok. So if the sides are uneven then it has to be a case were the small side wins - rare enough indeed! That leaves the cases of wars in which the antagonists are equal in side - not a lot of material there either. WWI?

(Tilt 3) What is 'winning' and 'losing'? I would've thought that France 1940 should be an example of 'maneuver' winning a war. As far as the nation-state of France was concerned - the war was over. Other nation-states continued the fight but for France, and her colonies, the war was over.

It occurs to me that one trait of a(successful) 'maneuver' war is that it must be quick. A long and drawn out 'maneuver' war will begin to look like an 'attrition' war before too long.

The Franco-Prussian war comes to mind.

But I'm not sure what the conclusion would be. "Attrition works if you're bigger than him". Duh. "Maneuver sometimes works". Double duh.

I also agree with Jason about how to determine 'size'. The side with the most infantry is the 'big' side and the side with the lesser infantry is the 'small' side. Making yourself small by purchasing lots of fancy toys is not the path to victory - I can personally attest to that!

[Slapdragon]

bump

[Pak_43]

Oh wow! Huge stuff here!!

I actually agree with the post about a tilted argument, and to that end I suspect that I'm due to cop some flak...

But to that end. I'm going to bite hard on Jason's tempting morsel of a challenge..

I offer up to the experts the British emergency (war) against the MCP in Malaya.

The British were slightly outnumbered but used any number of strategies, none of which were directly aim at reducing the enemies combat capability ("Hearts and minds","Own the jungle" and "Buy them off" all of which involved reducing the enemies will to fight rather than were aimed at eliminating the enemy combat capability. I submit that under the very tight definitions of maneuvre warfare posted by Jason this one probably qualifies. The defence rests M'lud.