"SMG GAP" A Proposal...Take 2

[Spook]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

>When the unit operates out of CC. It can

>still move around. But it takes longer to do

>so because the SL is now spending more time

>trying to second-guess the PL's intentions.

>In the abstracted sense.

This is rather the individual initiative aspect I mean. Why is it assumed the SL automatically second quesses the PL's intetions when the squad is out of CC ? In defence the squad is given a task and if the squad falls out of CC the task does not automatically disapear. In attack the SL has been most propably told the grand scheme and what role he plays in that production. If there are mid-game changes in that grand design I fully agree the delay should be imposed. If the scheme goes forth unchanged then the CC should not hinder any squad movements that adhere to that design.

But then again there are no such "grand design" orders present in CM at the moment so this is all academic. The player can plot extended movements but that is not really realistic as it is too constrictive and micromanagement intensive. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What basis do you have in assuming that ALL squad leaders were informed of the "bigger mission" at all times? And how do you define this "bigger picture"? The platoon's objective? Company's? Battalion's? Brigade's?

The fact remains, tero, that YOU are controlling the troops, as a CM gamer, still with MUCH greater flexibility & choices than likely what the average SL of WW2 had. Regardless of whether or not a unit is in C&C or not. Because as a gamer, you have more "view" options. Isn't that enough of a balancing point to create the premise that all of your squads (in C&C or not) have a sense of the "bigger picture"?

(snip)

>On the first point, yes, absolute spotting

>is problematic, and we can only hope in time

>that methods to mollify this in later CM

>versions may come to pass. But that's an

>issue that doesn't lend to simple solutions.

No simple solutions, but when it is perfected the results will be very realistic.

I hope so too. But it could be a LONG wait for "perfection" on this issue. Just make allowance for that possibility.

>On the latter, if you are asking if a

>special "out-of-CC" response applys to

>German sub-unit (squad) leaders across the

>board, you're steering down that

>"nationality" path again.

It was just an example, damn it. It looks silly if we drop all reference to nationalities and start using "insert preferred nationality" markers in examples like this.

Duly noted, then. But your earlier comments had the INFERENCE that you expected for German squads to have quicker "out-of-CC" response on an stock basis.

>And even if briefed down to squad level on a

>"plan," what if the whole plan goes in the

>trash can because the enemy shows up in a

>completely different direction than

>anticipated?

This is a thing that is not really in CM scope.

Actually, it is FULLY in the scope of CM. And the lessons are as before. If you, the tactical commander, deploy your troops to anticipate various contingencies (like keeping a reserve force), you are more likely to be rewarded. And if you deploy your units so that they are in CC, they can respond quicker. Maybe by only a few seconds, but who knows? In holding or capturing a key objective, those few seconds could be all the difference in the world.

It's YOUR responsibility to deploy your troops in such a way that they can respond easier to your "bigger picture." And it's your responsibility to anticipate for the unknowns of the battlefield. You can't expect that each squad leader is going to know how your "intent" will change once the shooting starts, even for a "rehearsed" mission.

Seriously: ut depends what the enemy intentions are. In CM scope battle you pretty much know what kind of a battle you are fighting: ME, Assault, Attack, Probe (curiously enough there are no defensive missions defined for the battle ie assault vs delay or attack vs stand fast etc ) That means you also know what the enemy intentions are. Anticipating local counter attacks SHOULD be a part of the plan. That means that fragmentary orders are drawn accordingly in case that counter attack hits. Ergo: command delays for out-of-CC units should not be as severe in that respect either, unless there is a recall or similar drastic measure involved.

And you have correlating evidence to demonstrate that units presently out-of-CC in CM have "too severe" a penalty imposed? Perhaps instead of 0-2 minutes, the out-of-CC delays could extend to 4-6 minutes? I follow what you're saying here, tero, but you haven't qualified about the "severity" of being out of CC here.

>Then the Germans who "rehearsed" would have

>to go from scratch. But now they have no

>time to rehearse or "drill" the needed

>counter-response.

I know the Red Army rehearsed assaults againts mock ups in comparable terrain. From the German side only Eben-Emael comes to mind. Was rehearsing with detailed plans to attack specific point targets a German SOP ?

I wasn't fixating to say that rehearsals had to be done in comparable terrain. Rather, a rehearsal (whether in attack or defense) could simply be the battlefield commander calling in the tactical subordinates to explain Plan A, Plan B, & Plan C on a map, and probably to note a "rally point" in case of a withdrawl.

Would all tactical commanders, down to squad leaders, be present at such a meeting? Perhaps yes, perhaps no. Maybe just the company & platoon CO's instead. And how well would a battlefield commander explain his intent to his subordinates? Therein is the big ASSUMPTION here. You are assuming that it was always a default matter. Then again, perhaps some battlefield commanders had a greater tendency to sit on their keisters and let their subordinates fend for themselves. Entirely a possility too.

>Are you assuming that German squads, at all

>experience levels and throughout the entire

>war's course, had backup plans for each &

>every last contingency that could happen on

>a battlefield? If so, then not a good

>assumption.

What they (and everybody else) did have was established battle/combat drills for every major TYPE of battle their pre-war thinkers had come up with. That means that a unit can go from attack to defensive on its own. Any squad out of CC would not be clueless when an unexpected battle field stimulus presented itself that posed a clear and present danger to the squad.

Yep. As it should, in the abstracted sense. Maybe an SL thinks he wants to attempt a different avenue of approach, or wants to pull out sooner from his position than he was given allowance to earlier. So he looks for a visual cue from his immediate commander IF POSSIBLE.

If he doesn't have it, then it comes down to HIS experience level on how quickly to change to a new "plan." An out-of-CC vet squad responds quicker than an out-of-CC conscript squad.

>No. Units in cover aren't spotted

>immediately. They'll only "light up" if they

>open fire.

>

>A leader's "stealth" helps his units stay

>hidden, but isn't the only factor to "hide"

>those units.

Are you sure. What is that PL stealth bonus good for ? Is it just emperors new clothes ?

YES, tero, a "stealth" rating is for just that---to help a unit to stay hidden (or to approach in cover with less chance to be spotted).

>Again, experience levels of platoon leaders

>(& higher) don't transmit to sub-units.

>A green unit in CC is still a green unit.

>Rather, the leader "attributes" >(combat/command/stealth/morale) transmit

>into select bonuses for the units in CC.

I am talking about the other bonuses, not experience. Since the PL holds all the cards concerning them the sub-units do revert to their default settings, which are in turn determined by their experice level.

EXACTLY. As the way it should be.

>You might rather that German (or other)

>squads be more "autonomous," and not have to

>be in CC so much. And if experience level of

>the squad is high enough, perhaps they could

>get by (at least on defense).

I think there is some issues left with the fact that the game engine is attack oriented. The defender does not get any benefits they would have had IRL when it comes to planning ahead for the battle for example.

Untrue. Your defenders will get "benefits" if you, the overall commander, do your job and deploy your forces to be more "responsive."

The CM game engine is "attack oriented" as a "fact"? Confirmed by BTS?

>But it was the same for German squads as it

>was for all others: if events changed on the

>battlefield in an unanticipated way, then

>someone higher up had to give guidance.

I think Prokhorovka is a good example. How much time did the sub-units have to get prepared when they unexpectedly came upon the enemy units ?

None at all. But you're citing one anecdotal example. It's when you try to stretch such anecdotes into "standard SOP's" or across-the-board defaults that you risk making things unrealistic.

>Bottom line repeated---regardless of

>nationality, you have to abide by C&C

>realities to expect your units to operate in

>the most effective way. And units that stay

>out of CC too long have a higher likelihood

>to get into a "stupid" situation.

Is the timeframe incorporated in out-of-CC penalties ? It would be a fair solution to this question. It is easier to project the PL's moves 10 seconds ago that 10 minutes ago.

And how do you think that "out-of-CC" responses should be re-scaled, in terms of scenario length? And where is the compelling argument that out-of-CC units can respond faster in a 30-minute battle than in a 1-hour battle?

Tero, if I may be so bold, you seem to be holding the notion that squads should be more autonomous than they are presently treated in CM. Or to define in another way, you seem to think that the central maneuver element is the squad for ALL higher formations, whether we're talking about platoons or companys or battalions.

Incorrect. Squads are the primary "maneuver elements" only for platoons. Platoons are the ME's for companies, and so forth. When a battalion-level battle is laid out, it isn't the default condition to lay out objectives and contingency plans for each & every squad.

Rather, once the PL knew of the "mission," it was his job to communicate this to the SL's---assuming that the PL did his job and listened, instead of sluffing off the briefing. What if he did the latter instead? Entirely a possibility. And even if getting the plan from an experienced, professional PL, how long did a SL expect that he would have to operate without maintaining contact with his PL? 10 minutes? 20? An hour or two?

The lesson is repeated again, tero. You have to adapt to C&C constraints in CM, even on the abstracted sense. You can't presume for your TacAI SL's to handle all of the adaptation for you.

If anything, I think that C&C limiters should be even MORE severe in CM, or that PL's have to be "in CC" to a Company CO in some abstracted way. But I live with the C&C abstractions as they presently are. (Because damn few other wargame designs are even willing to try. )

[ 07-12-2001: Message edited by: Spook ]

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Spook:

Well, I gotta grant you, Lewis, you certainly have balls to lecture Steve that you are trying to guide a topic for the "betterment" of CM2. But on the core topic issue (SMG's), given that neither you or I know just exactly HOW SMG's & MG's now perform in CM2 just yet, then what frame of reference do we have to lecture that CM2 can be "further improved" in handling SMG's?

[qb]But, in any case, would it be possible to include a couple of scenarios in the CM2 demo; one that is basically an infantry game and one a mixed arms/and or an armor scenario? I think it will showcase whats in store better than these meandering discourses.

There have been at least a couple of occasions where BTS (Steve) outlined the revisions to CM2 as would impact the "SMG issue." Until as such time as the CM2 demo is posted (whenever that is), perhaps one could suggest instead that these revisions be posted as a "FAQ" response or at various CM support sites.

Perhaps there can be a moderator here when an administrator is posting?

Like I said---balls. Do you have someone in mind already for a moderator?

I will venture to say, Lewis, that this topic is "drifting" as it is because at this point in time, there is very little to add on the SMG issue (beyond speculation) until we see the changes wrought in CM2 for ourselves.[/QB]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

First off, I am addressing Steve and not you.

Second, my point, which is obviously lost, is about the the use of SMG and other firepower at close range. In the game, units that are being fired upon rush at the firer because the firer is usually in cover. I really hope that BTS fixes this. So this little anomaly reduces point blank firepower effectiveness. So thats my frame of reference. I am hoping that many issues are still open to discussion and that BTS fixes them before the release of CM2. Is that OK with you?

Now I would like to see the infantry improvements in CM2 demo. Thats why I am suggesting that BTS put a showcase infantry scenario in the demo. To be honest, I dont play CMBO much anymore. Last hurrah was when I went all out to produce a scenario based on reverse slope defense. Its just obvious that wire, minefields, point blank infantry fire doesnt get modeled well. Firepower (in CMBO) needs to chip away and that requires space and time. This is why I think Steve is bringing up the german doctrine thing. He feels the game was designed that way or something. As another poster has said, the long range HMGs cant bust up anything. Maybe they even sheepdog the attackers into running towards the firepower. But it will be seen in CM2 if this will still be the case.

Lewis

PS I am presently using Steel Beasts to get my fix.

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Big Time Software:

Hi John,

Ask 100 veterans the same question and you are likely to get 110 different answers However, you are unlikely to get a veteran to say "ja, I vas zo scared I pissed my pants and ran avay as fasht az I culdt run!" Too often veteran accounts tend to downplay the levels of fear they felt. This is only natural as it is Human nature to not want others to see yourself as "weak". I've got a few German veteran accounts who rated the Americans as the poorest quality enemy they ever fought, and others that said they were in fact the best troops they faced. Truth is often somewhere inbetween.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Oh agreed that wasn't my point, it was that well we have German interogation reports on the effect of Air power Ie, their was no attempt to disguise fear in the POW interrogations concerning Mortain, & to show we also had anecdotal data that air power was innefective so ppl don't get the wrong impression.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

So, a Green tank crew, with only minimal training and experience, would just sit there and wait it out? Or did only the guys that managed to live long enough figure out the air attacks were all fluff and no substance and stopped bailing out of their vehicles when the **** hit the fan?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Dunno in this instance the man led a Zug & was a vetran of the Eastren front. The only comment was that US aircraft machine guns wern't a threat to his tanks, and the zug moved on after the strafeing was done.

Regards, John Waters

[ 07-12-2001: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[Spook]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Username:

First off, I am addressing Steve and not you.

Second, my point, which is obviously lost, is about the the use of SMG and other firepower at close range. In the game, units that are being fired upon rush at the firer because the firer is usually in cover. I really hope that BTS fixes this. So this little anomaly reduces point blank firepower effectiveness. So thats my frame of reference. I am hoping that many issues are still open to discussion and that BTS fixes them before the release of CM2. Is that OK with you?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Sure it is. I was bemused by your earlier concern, though, about Steve posting comments on a tangent subject, or that you felt Steve needed some disciplining in that regard. And as this is a "public" forum, I'm within rights to provide a response to you, even if you meant to only discuss the matter with Steve. You can just choose to ignore me if you wish.

Now, what I've found from earlier test scenarios is that there is a nominal distance that determines whether a unit under fire will rush in or "stay in position" (pinned or otherwise). It's about fifty meters. Greater than fifty, the units under fire USUALLY don't rush in. Less than fifty, they usually do. Do you have an alternate distance in mind for "point of no return" (e.g., thirty meters)?

Now I would like to see the infantry improvements in CM2 demo. Thats why I am suggesting that BTS put a showcase infantry scenario in the demo. To be honest, I dont play CMBO much anymore. Last hurrah was when I went all out to produce a scenario based on reverse slope defense. Its just obvious that wire, minefields, point blank infantry fire doesnt get modeled well. Firepower (in CMBO) needs to chip away and that requires space and time. This is why I think Steve is bringing up the german doctrine thing. He feels the game was designed that way or something.

I don't follow as to where Steve states that CM is trying to recreate some specific national doctrines. And on "feels the game was designed that way," is that presuming that Steve hasn't made any conceptual design calls on this issue, either in CMBO or CMBB? Perhaps some quotes you could provide would explain this view?

As another poster has said, the long range HMGs cant bust up anything. Maybe they even sheepdog the attackers into running towards the firepower. But it will be seen in CM2 if this will still be the case.

That's what I'll await to see also.

PS I am presently using Steel Beasts to get my fix.

A commendable alternate. Have you tried some user-designed scenarios for SB available at support sites? I found "Fulda Gap v2" pretty intense.

[Username]

I feel B29 bombers are important and need immediate discussing. So does Winston Churchills cigars. What type were they and how did he nip off the end before sticking it in his mouth?

Were US cattle cars a battle field expedient or a national doctrine? Inquiring minds want to know! What about water buffaloes or jeep trailers? Who had the best lug nuts? Lets discuss!

And that reminds me, If the CM engine is ever adapted to space combat, will the exoskeletons of aliens be modeled in proper frangibility concerning their susceptibility to combat in near vacuum conditions? Will there be mods I hope?

Lewis

[Tero]

CAS effectiveness revisited - revisited

http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=1&t=014993

[Username]

"Now, what I've found from earlier test scenarios is that there is a nominal distance that determines whether a unit under fire will rush in or "stay in position" (pinned or otherwise). It's about fifty meters. Greater than fifty, the units under fire USUALLY don't rush in. Less than fifty, they usually do. Do you have an alternate distance in mind for "point of no return" (e.g., thirty meters)?"

A varying amount something close to grenade range yes. Varying by unit experience, etc.

The game has units respond (more often than not), when under firepower, by using motion. While this makes for a fun-filled sports-like game, it isnt realistic.

A more realistic response is hitting the dirt (abstracted a temp pin), crawling to nearby cover, running AWAY from the source of firepower, etc.

Lewis

[Spook]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Username:

I feel B29 bombers are important and need immediate discussing. So does Winston Churchills cigars. What type were they and how did he nip off the end before sticking it in his mouth?

Were US cattle cars a battle field expedient or a national doctrine? Inquiring minds want to know! What about water buffaloes or jeep trailers? Who had the best lug nuts? Lets discuss!

And that reminds me, If the CM engine is ever adapted to space combat, will the exoskeletons of aliens be modeled in proper frangibility concerning their susceptibility to combat in near vacuum conditions? Will there be mods I hope?

Lewis<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

At the least, I enjoyed reading this.

But in your follow-up post, Lewis, I think you gave some reasonable suggestions to discuss on how to vary a "bum rush range" due to multiple factors. Maybe you can start a new topic labeled "Bum Rush in CM2" or "Point of No Return" or something similar.

[Username]

How about: The Ambush Bum Rush?

(Say that ten times fast...)

Amrush Rum Bush

Bumbrush Brumbar

Amwush Butt Tush

etc

[Battlefront.com]

Tero,

Sorry, I don't have any more time to debate you. I simply don't agree with the foundation your logic is based on. You have yet to illustrate what differences squads should show based on drill. You have so far only given exmaples that could apply to any unit in the same way (the airplane and the ambush for example) or to tactical use at Platoon or higher levels. If you care to outline tangible differences squads should have, based on drill, then please feel free to do so. But this vague "they should be different" line of argument is going nowhere.

Lewis,

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>A more realistic response is hitting the dirt (abstracted a temp pin), crawling to nearby cover, running AWAY from the source of firepower, etc.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Funny enough, one of our testers (23 year SF Sgt. who has seen combat) specifically stated the opposite. When caught in the open, at a disadvantage, at close range with the enemy, when the enemy was closer than the nearest safe cover... often the only chance for survival was to close the gap and thereby even the odds. That is what we modeled in the game. Is it perfectly modeled? I doubt it. Might we have the % chance based on range wrong? Possible. Or the % chance of different Experienced units rushing instead of breaking/pinning not balanced right? Could be. Might we change this for CMBB? Dunno, but it is entirely possible. We shall see.

Steve

[ 07-13-2001: Message edited by: Big Time Software ]

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Steve Said: Are you serious? Come off it. Where did I ever say that "all 1st person observations are a bunch of BS"? In fact I have consistantly said the opposite. What I have also said is that veteran accounts can not be taken in a vacuum. ESPECIALLY when the discussion is about a highly complex, technical, and even variable element, yet the veteran comments being batted about are about as vauge as can possibly be.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Seems a button got pushed. Jeeze sorry Steve. I was simply trying to clarify when and why you attribute merit to Veterans anecdotes and when you don’t. Nothing more sinister was implied with my question.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Steve Said: I've got veteran statements here that contradict each other all the time. Put 10 vets in a room, ask them the same question, and you will most likely get 10 different answers. Without context personal statements hold little to no value. Period.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I guess this bit was what I was hoping for clarification on. This is from the old SMG thread.

[ 07-13-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

[Triumvir]

Corroboration for Steve: The instant action drill that Commonwealth pattern armies use for being ambushed at close range is to immediately turn to the source of fire and attempt an overrun of the enemy position, guns blazing.

Close range is defined as 20-30 metres.

I've never had a problem with the "run straight at the enemy when ambushed" aspect of CM, as I assumed that it just reflected SOP. I do remember wishing that the ambushed unit's ROF would go up, though.

[Battlefront.com]

Hi Jeff,

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Seems a button got pushed.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Sorry about that. The Optics Thread™ is one of those debates that has happened a few too many times

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Jeeze sorry Steve. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Nah, don't be. I must have posted on one of my "all day/nighters"! Sorry to have jumped on you like that.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I guess this bit was what I was hoping for clarification on.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

OK, assuming that my first quote you put up in your last post didn't give you clarification, I'll try again...

Veteran accounts are VERY tough to deal with when building a simulation. The main reason is that, even when not factually incorrect, biased, flawed by time etc... they are often personal opinions. The opinion might or might not be the same as other vets in similar situations, or it might just be a contextually specific comment which only applied to that particular vet in that particular situation. Often you can find opinions that are 180 degs apart from each other, which further complicates things. Since opinions are subject to all sorts of "error" (for lack of a better term), they should not be used as the sole, primary evidence for technical aspects of a simulation. John's Patton quote is a prime example

This does not mean veteran comments are valueless. Quite the opposite, they are a highly useful source of information. Especially for non-technical aspects of warfare. There is a difference between a veteran saying how much it sucked to fight in a swamp and another veteran commenting that he thought 60mm mortars were a waste of time. The former is rather easy to read into, using other sources including 1st hand experience (I actually own a swamp ), but the latter is much harder to do that with. What aspect of the mortar was the guy talking about, compared to what, in what battlefield context, and with what degree of personal experience? Even if he is correct that the 60mm was not useful, it doesn't do us much good if we can't figure out how to simulate its failings since on paper it looks just fine. (note: I use this example because it is one of many I came across in "The Deadly Brotherhood". Several quotes, some radically different from each other).

More differences. A vet that says "we generally went into combat with 2-5 rifle grenades per squad, but more if we could find 'em" is inherently different than "rifle grenades sucked. We hardly ever used them." Again, the first one is fairly straight forward (although not the final word on anything), while the second one is rather difficult to use without more corroborating information.

So it is very important to keep veteran comments in context with other vet comments, documentation, 3rd party historical studies, logic and common sense, similar trends, etc. All of these are important to keep in mind. Veteran comments are no more valid on their own than a bunch of stats. Prime example...

Too often people look at weapons and just look at the numbers. x mm of armor here, y mm there, then concluding that Tank A is "better" than B simply because the numbers look superior. If this were the primary source of information the person was using, I know we would all have a field day with such a person here It *could* be that most everybody agrees that Tank A is "better", but just looking at the numbers is not good enough.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Nothing more sinister was implied with my question.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Too often someone tries to trap us in a corner and whack us with the stick of hypocrisy, so I'm sorry for thinking that was what you were trying to do

Steve

[ 07-13-2001: Message edited by: Big Time Software ]

[Tero]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Triumvir:

Corroboration for Steve: The instant action drill that Commonwealth pattern armies use for being ambushed at close range is to immediately turn to the source of fire and attempt an overrun of the enemy position, guns blazing.

Close range is defined as 20-30 metres.

I've never had a problem with the "run straight at the enemy when ambushed" aspect of CM, as I assumed that it just reflected SOP. I do remember wishing that the ambushed unit's ROF would go up, though.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The running towards the enemy aspect is realistic. If the circumstances are right.

The form of movement should propably not be running, it should be rushing (by the half platoon with overwatch if the situation is not really desperate). The way they do not step up firing, or rather the way they do not fire at all while moving towards the enemy position, is the weak link that makes it look more like "run to mamma and get killed" drill than "rush the enemy position to disrupt the ambush" drill.

There are times, like when at the extreme range of low LOS or on a ridge line or other terrain feature that disrupts LOS and LOF, the preferred move would be to step a few steps back to simply disrupt LOS/LOF, not run up to the enemy.

Also, moving laterally to break LOS/LOF or to disrupt the enemy fire concentration can be used to solve the situation. The ambushing unit sees you moving aggressively and is in in the danger of being enveloped and/or rushed when their fire has less effect on the victim....

To mention but a few RL approaches to the problem.

[ 07-13-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Tero]

>Sorry, I don't have any more time to debate

>you.

3 weeks of summer vacation coming up so winding down at this point is not a bad thing. A cease fire in place ?

>I simply don't agree with the foundation

>your logic is based on.

I do agree that there are certain things in military training and doctrine that can be said to be universal. But I do maintain too that the solutions the different armies come up with when dealing with the same or similar tactical problems are far from universal.

When I read the 1935 manual it is as if I was reading the 1985 edition, only with different weapons. The only addition in the 1985 manual is the inclusion about battle against armoured forces. The use of AT weapons and how to suppress the accompanying infantry. But I expect that was already incorporated into the 1940 edition. How have the manuals of the other armies survived the changes in tactics and doctrine ?

I trust you are aware that a number of Finnish LRRP officers enlisted into the US Army after the war and they were used as instructors in the special forces (Green Berets), the most famous being Larry Thorne/Lauri Törni. So in a sense the Finnish small unit tactics have had a fundamental influence in the US special forces tactics.

>You have yet to illustrate what differences

>squads should show based on drill.

I know.

I have the Finnish prewar squad level training manual. I need to obtain more of them but so far I have drawn blank on the net.

>You have so far only given exmaples that

>could apply to any unit in the same way (the

>airplane and the ambush for example)

That was more to display the spotting and how it affects the actions.

>or to tactical use at Platoon or higher

>levels.

I need to obtain data on the default squad dispersals and formations on the other armies and how they were supposed to have been used, according to the training manuals.

The Finnish tactics and doctrine work when used in appropriate terrain. I know for a fact the German and the early Soviet tactics and doctrine were not as effective in the wooded terrain (constricted LOS and inhibited/impaired large formation and motorized movement) as they were in the terrain they were designed for (central Europe). Would it be fair to assume that that would apply to the Commonwealth and the US tactics and doctrine ? Given the fact that there was little or no exchange of troops between PTO and ETO that would have given an influx of relevant combat experience in combat in constricted terrain.

>If you care to outline tangible differences

>squads should have, based on drill, then

>please feel free to do so.

Once I have gotten the relevant sources and compiled enough data.

>But this vague "they should be different"

>line of argument is going nowhere.

I know. I know am right but I can not prove it beyond a reasonable doubt with the data I currently have at hand.

[ 07-13-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Jarmo]

Heh, I've never even thought this "running towards the enemy" is a bad thing. (Except when the crew of a killed vehicle snuffs my zook team).

But on may occasions I've cursed it when my squad runs 50 meters in the open towards a building. But 3 meters before reaching it, decides it's safer to run back into the woods they left from. Just beacause an MG 300 meters away in the side sprays them up a bit.

[Tero]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jarmo:

Heh, I've never even thought this "running towards the enemy" is a bad thing. (Except when the crew of a killed vehicle snuffs my zook team).

But on may occasions I've cursed it when my squad runs 50 meters in the open towards a building. But 3 meters before reaching it, decides it's safer to run back into the woods they left from. Just beacause an MG 300 meters away in the side sprays them up a bit.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

In a recent night/heavy fog ~20meter LOS PBEM game my Allied scouting units repeatedly ran to the enemy instead of taking a few steps back to break LOS. They were supposed to take the enemy position but not by scaring the enemy by dying at their feet. I was able to obtain a minor victory. Of course.

[Tero]

>Not to mention the Army GJ in northern

>Finland.

Uuuups. The SS bit was an editorial typo. Sorry.

>What!???! No 163. and 169. ID's in central

>Finland? You jest surely?

From:

http://personal.inet.fi/private/hovi.pages/sa-int/saks.html

German Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS units under Armeeoberkommando Norwegen (later 20. Gebirgsarmee) in Finland during WWII:

163rd Div

Tolvajärvi, Svir, Vermajoki

Meant to complete encirclement of Leningrad from north, 1942 transferred to Lapland

169th Div

Salla, Vermajoki

Was in Salla sector all the time

210th Div

Arctic Sea coast

Weak coastal defense formation from 1942 on

2nd GebDiv River Litsa

Gebirgstruppen (Mountain troops)

3rd GebDiv

River Litsa

'Narvik'-division, transferred to Germany Oct 1941

6th GebDiv

River Litsa

Arrived in Sep 1941 to reinforce Mountain Corps in River Litsa

7th GebDiv

Kiestinki, Uhtua

Arrived in summer 1942 for attack against Murmansk railroad (that never took place)

6th SS-GebDiv 'Nord'

Salla, Kiestinki

Originally motorized infantry division, but changed as mountain division, because terrain wasn't suitable for motorized troops

DivisionGruppe Kräutler

Kiestinki

Formed in 1944 from GebBrigade 139

DivisionGruppe Rossi

Arctic Sea coast

Weak coastal defense formation

MGSkiBrigade 'Finnland'

reserve

Only motorized unit in 1944

PanzerAbteilung (z.b.V.) 40

Salla, Uhtua

Equipped with Pzkw-I, Pzkw-II and Pzkw-III's. Withdrawn 1942.

PanzerAbteilung 211

Uhtua, Kestenga (Kiestinki)

Poor equipment, French tanks S-35 and H-38

The ONLY German formation cleearly in the Finnish area of operations was the 163rd ID. The rest of them were in the German area of operations.

[Triumvir]

Should not be running? Should be rushing? Preferred move? Those are value judgements that depend on the context you're in.

As for rushing by half-platoon in overwatch... at 20 metres? After being ambushed? After being ambushed at that close range, you'll be lucky if half your platoon is alive to rush at all. In a WW II context, it makes even more sense because firepower was comparatively much lower.

As for breaking LOS, even when moving through jungle, when ambushed how can you tell whether an opponent has or doesn't have LOS to you? That moment of hesitation while you decide where to go can be fatal. It applies even more to

That's why IA drills exist, at least in Commonwealth armies: to try and remove that moment of hesitation by making men _move_ instantly.

Now, if you're caught at 50 to 100m in the open, and you know that you can break cover, that's different. But that's also a different discussion.

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Triumvir:

Should not be running? Should be rushing? Preferred move? Those are value judgements that depend on the context you're in.

As for rushing by half-platoon in overwatch... at 20 metres? After being ambushed? After being ambushed at that close range, you'll be lucky if half your platoon is alive to rush at all. In a WW II context, it makes even more sense because firepower was comparatively much lower.

.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

In MILES training using a classic L ambush against a similarly sized force (squad ambushes squad), it hardly matters what the chumps do. With the M60 at the bottom of the L and M16s along the side (using semi-auto BTW), the attacker gets lit up and even IF a few dont get out-right zapped at first and even IF the drill-response kicks in and they charge into the ambush, they hardly ever got one of our guys. The belt-fed usually opens up first, sometimes with enemy about 30-40 meters away, anyone not zapped either charges into the LMG (parrallel to the L of M16, into the L so as to get cover or run away they way they came). The shock of firepower coming from two directions at close range is devastating.

I personally think its a sinister plot by higher ups to reduce intel in the form of live-talkers being taken prisoner. They would rather the patrol just die.

Now if its a platoon patrol advancing in bounding squad over watch, then you might not let the force get AS close. Perhaps open up on them at 50 meters (no one is going to banzai into your position at 50 meters!!), draw blood and quickly withdraw. The goal being to inflict casualties, report a larger force and break contact so as to get to the MLR.

I forget the op (grenada?), but US forces were closing in on a hanger across a tarmac and came under fire (close). These were "beret" types (rangers?) and what did they do? They just bellied down and returned fire! I guess they were green elite. It didnt go so well as they do not like taking casualties.

I think the game is confusing two things also. Theres a drill and theres the response to get under cover. Unfortunately, the fleeing to cover becomes the drill behaviour. If the game made this motion dependant, perhaps it would be more realistic. Example:Unit that is sneaking is more apt to perform some drill type behaviour (revert to an assault move into the enemy letes say), another unit that runs into ambush (the new run) is more apt to just fly to pieces. It could also depend greatly on unit experience, CC, etc.

But I want to return to a point. Close range firepower, given an enemy that does not have overwatching heavy weapons or nearby tanks, is very devastating. Those of you that dont get out of the house much should go to a football field. Go to the middle. Thats 50 yards. Think you can close that distance in a few seconds? Every second is another one in a kill zone.

I really believe that if BTS fixes the MGs, rates of fire, etc and addresses this issue; the game is going to be an order of magnitude better in the infantry spectrum.

Lewis

[PzKpfw 1]

Damn Steve thats just paranoid , were not here to 'whack' you etc, were here to make your game a better game, & if we feel you screwed the pooch on somethine etc, we will tell you, but it's never personal.

Regards, John Waters

[Triumvir]

Lewis, I actually quite agree with you. When you're ambushed squad on squad, it doesn't matter what you do because all of you should be dead in the first volley. And like you said, even if you aren't, when you charge into the ambush the raking fire will kill you.

But most ambushes are hit and run affairs, where a squad may ambush a platoon, or a platoon a company, and then immediately clear the area.

I like your idea about motion dependency affecting behaviour. But then we get back into the problem of what squads should use what drill...

[Battlefront.com]

Tero,

Let us know what you find when you find it I am not aware of any squad manuals (from WWII at least) that I can point you to.

John,

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Damn Steve thats just paranoid <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Not quite There are a few people out there who take great pleasure in trying to knock us down a peg for a variety of reasons. You should see some of the emails we get BTW! This has always been the case with gamers and game designers, regardless of genre. Just something that comes with the territory, but that doesn't mean we like it

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> were not here to 'whack' you etc, were here to make your game a better game, & if we feel you screwed the pooch on somethine etc, we will tell you, but it's never personal. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Many thanks and we know this. It will take more than 1 in a 1000 axe grinders to get us to forget that this BBS is a critical source for improving CM. Again, I'm sorry I jumped on Jeff like that. My bad

Lewis and Triumvir, points well taken. We'll see if we can tweak this a bit.

Steve

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Triumvir:

But most ambushes are hit and run affairs, where a squad may ambush a platoon, or a platoon a company, and then immediately clear the area.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Its a great way of denying the enemy info about your MLR. If the MLR (main line of resistance) gets compromised, then it can be a matter of semantics. Especially when the enemy has loads of arty.

German units also ambushed on the battalion level. It takes great fire discipline but to unleash a battalions firepower onto an attacker is a force multiplier. The best is a large U ambush and an attacker stupid enough to put the majority of his forces into it. Theres something about the simultanity of many weapons at once. It denies proper response and spotting. The germans would even fire smoke between the attackers echelons to completely confuse them and deny follow on forces info about what was going on.

That gives me an idea. What about 'losing spotting'. The spotting ability of a unit would depend on the number of enemy firers in relation to the friendly firers.

Cant wait for the CM2 demo..

Lewis

[Username]

I dont know if its available or possible but I think it would be great if BTS put together a field trip to some kind of MILES school. Take along the employees and actually see the amount of baffling confusion and mayhem that 'real as it gets' training demonstrates.

Miles is great stuff. Of course you cant throw grenades and all but you get a real feel of infantry firepower..

Another spotting thing I want to bring up. Would it be possible to severely limit spotting by units that are firing? Especially beyond the range of their targets? Believe me. When in a firefight, you have little cares beyond what you are firing at. Especially when it is firing back at you.

Another spotting tweak could be a limit on the number of units you can spot/ID. Perhaps the IDing could get poorer with each additional one?

Lewis