Life as a T-34 driver

[Guest machineman]

Interview from Semion Aria on his Red Army career driving T-34:

http://history.vif2.ru/atwar/aria/ariainter.htm

And how it ended him up in a penal battalion:

http://history.vif2.ru/atwar/aria/ariastory.htm

[Abbott]

From the article.

They say that tanks fight along roads, is that true?

I've never really thought about that, but in general, of course, tanks avoid impassable terrain. All this talk of how tanks drive through walls, knock down trees -- all that is rubbish. Apparently, it does correspond to reality -- tanks do fight along roads. Because a tank can overturn in a ravine or get stuck in a swamp. There is no driving in the woods for a tank, it can mow down sparse vegetation, of course, but I've never seen a tank push through brick walls like they show in the movies.

[Freak]

I have, in wwI and wwII footage. Just not huge walls like the "berlin wall". Something a bit smaller then that.

[Guest ckoharik]

I think the main reason a tank would not try to go through buildings would be the danger of become immobilized while buried under tons of debris. Small walls would pose little or no problem to and experienced driver.

[Grisha]

I have an account by a Soviet tank commander who was usually assigned to forward detachment commands, and he says during a breakthrough he typically drove in every ravine he could locate, and nearly always avoided roads.

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Best regards,

Greg Leon Guerrero

[Guest ckoharik]

Different units, different tactics. I would definitely be using every bit of cover I could to close with the Germans but also would stay away from those "little" ravines or washouts that would be perilous for a tank.

[Olle Petersson]

Not having read the article (yet) I'd say that tanks fight along roads in the sense close to roads.

Even if tracked AFVs can pass harsh terrain, it will be slow, and most important, leave the supply train behind...

Most operational movement would be on roads, and then shorter detours off road would be done during battles with the enemy.

Off road movement is limited by how long the vehicle can operate without being refueled or reloaded...

Cheers

Olle

[Olle Petersson]

Now I've read the article, and there are a couple of points I find noteworthy:

1) T34 had good technical reliability.

2) Their triplex (vision prismas) were crappy, so they always had the hatches at least partially open.

3) About lend lease tanks;

- The gasoline make them burn like torches.

- They're too narrow to be stable when moving in side-slopes.

4) The coax MG wasn't. It was independant from the main gun, and had some field of fire.

5) Soviet tank crews didn't have any sidearms, but could remove the MGs to use in foot combat.

6) In four months of tank combat, he never encountered enemy tanks, TDs or assault guns!

7) When asked about the most important characteristics of a tank in a combat environment, he answer: "Well, everything is important, maneuvrerability, speed, ... First of all, of course, survivability, impenetrability, protection."

Note that of the three regular firepower, mobility, protection, he puts protection first, mobility second, and doesn't mention firepower at all...

8) German use of AT mines; visible (on roads).

9) KV tanks; few and too heavy to be successful.

10) They almost always had infantry riding on the tank.

11) Combat speed was very high, but they always made short stops to shoot.

Then there were some issues about the artillery, but that's for some other thread.

Cheers

Olle

[BK6583]

Yes, different tank employment tactics abound. IIRC from the 'Panzertaktik' book I purchased months ago, the Germans stressed to their tank commanders to move their tanks "like the water flows". The risk of moving down a road was apparently viewed as a much greater evil than the risk of bogging in a ravine.

[Skipper]

> he puts protection first, mobility second,

> and doesn't mention firepower at all...

That's a typical perspective of an individual tanker. Essentially, it is wrong.

[gunnergoz]

Originally posted by Skipper:

> he puts protection first, mobility second,

> and doesn't mention firepower at all...

That's a typical perspective of an individual tanker. Essentially, it is wrong.

Wrong or not, he survived the war so he must have gotten something "right."

An "academic theory" vs "gritty reality" debate, anyone?

[This message has been edited by gunnergoz (edited 03-28-2001).]

[Guest machineman]

When asked about the most important characteristics of a tank in a combat environment, he answer: "Well, everything is important, maneuvrerability, speed, ... First of all, of course, survivability, impenetrability, protection."

It seems to be the way that all tanks have gone. Eg the Abrams fine record in the Gulf War was due to a large extent to the fact they simply could not be penetrated. Often the Iraqui tankers got their shots in first, but it didn't do them any good. Israelis have also gone to great lengths to ensure crew survival in their Merkavas.

Given the choice, all PZIV tankers would have been in a King Tiger, all T-34 tankers in an IS-2. With the light tanks your first mistake is your last.

[Grisha]

Okay, this quote is from Charles C. Sharp's Soviet Armor Tactics in World War II. It also goes against the consensus of this thread. However, Mr. Sharp stated in his preview that "Combat is a life and death matter; once a method is found to work, regardless of what the regulation says, the survivors are going to be loath to abandon it for another technique. Most of the following examples from the Soviet tank unit commanders are from the 1944-45 period, because by then the men and leaders had survived long enough to develop a well-honed feeling for 'what works'." Below, is one of those examples.

How to Keep an Advance Going

Colonel(later Colonel-General) David Abramovich Dragunskiy was one of the premier armor commanders and tacticians in the Soviet Army. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union by the end of the war, during the Vistula-Oder Operation in January 1945 he was commander of the 55th Guards Tank Brigade, 7th Guards Tank Corps. In an interview conducted in Moscow June 1989 by Colonel David M. Glantz and Colonel Paul Adair he had this to say about how to advance deep into the enemy rear:

"First, we refused to travel the highways. We decided to move only by ravines, there where they didn't expect us ... Second, we placed two tank battalions in the first echelon, we put a motorized rifle battalion, infantry, on the tanks and we still had a tank battalion in the rear for development of the success. Moreover, we already had self-propelled units (Dragunskiy's brigade had a self-propelled artillery regiment added). They were attached to (the rear) tank battalion. Thus, each battalion had its own infantry company along with the tanks, it had self-propelled artillery, had antiaircraft assets, and we provided it the capability of operating independently. So, each battalion operated independently but towards one goal. We told them that we must take that city. We wait for you there... And that is how they acted, just like an open fan, but toward one goal..."

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Best regards,

Greg Leon Guerrero

[Olle Petersson]

Originally posted by Skipper:

> he puts protection first, mobility second,

> and doesn't mention firepower at all...

That's a typical perspective of an individual tanker. Essentially, it is wrong.

I think that in his case it was right, if you consider my point #6; They never encountered enemy armour.

Just about any weapon is good against soft targets...

Machineman's reference to Desert storm becomes a bit cobbled if you imagine the same actions, but remove the main gun on all coalition tanks (increasing the MG ammo load instead).

Then the Iraqis would score the 1st hit, and 2nd, and 3rd, and ...

But I also think it's interesting to see that although mr Aria stresses protection, he rule out the KV tanks, in preference of the T34, even though the heavy tanks have much better armour. (Their weight make strategic mobility close to nil.)

Cheers

Olle

[Gyrene]

"Machineman's reference to Desert storm becomes a bit cobbled if you imagine the same actions, but remove the main gun on all coalition tanks (increasing the MG ammo load instead).

Then the Iraqis would score the 1st hit, and 2nd, and 3rd, and ..."

The M1's biggest advantage was the fact that it could pop the Iraqi tanks from ranges far great than any of them could hope to shoot, and yes chobham armor doesn't hurt either.

On the same token, the Marines took their old M60's into Kwait City and in fact the USMC's biggest tank battle (Not saying much, really, since tank battles is not what the Corps is made for.) was during Desert Storm and the M60's held their own. Roving bands of LAV's with TOW's helped.

[Guest machineman]

When asked about the most important characteristics of a tank in a combat environment, he answer: "Well, everything is important, maneuvrerability, speed, ... First of all, of course, survivability, impenetrability, protection."

Note the 'everything is important' part. He wasn't trying to say the main gun doesn't matter, or the speed either(notice he travelled pretty fast when not actually shooting). Just 'first of all' impenetrability.

My point was that modern day tanks look a lot more like Tigers and IS-2's then they do Hellcats. The weights of the Abrams, Leopard II, LeClerc are almost exactly the same as that of the Tiger I (57,000 kg), while the Challenger II and the Merkava are heavier yet, about Kingtiger weight. To get manuverability back they used modern powertrains to more than double the horsepower of the Tigers, that's all.

And as far as the gulf war goes there were reports of Abrams with Iraqi 125mm shell darts stuck in the DU armor like arrows. I'm sure the American tankers that served there loved the all around capabilities of the Abrams but would have given 'impenetrability' the highest importance when Iraqi shells were hitting the hull.

[This message has been edited by machineman (edited 03-29-2001).]

[Skipper]

> Wrong or not, he survived the war so he

> must have gotten something "right."

I've seen dozens of merchant marine shipmasters who go to sea for 20+ years and still have no slightest idea how the money is made and lost in commercial shipping. All of them surely were outstanding navigators.

> Just about any weapon is

> good against soft targets...

To cary the above analogy further, just about any ship can carry grain from USA to Europe. And yet, only certain (narrow) range of size/speed/consumption makes good money in that trade at any given economic environment.

> Eg the Abrams fine record in the Gulf War

> was due to a large extent to the fact they

> simply could not be penetrated.

About the only logical lesson of Gulf War on the armored warfare is that when you pit tanks of different generation and weight category against each other on a flat table, the younger and heavier one wins hands down (or should I say the older and lighter one loses pants down?). But we knew that all along, right?

WWII was different exercise. I mean, totally different, from whatever angle you look at it.