US defending vs. German armor - the case of Salerno

[JasonC]

US experiences defending against German armor at Salerno

The area of the invasion was in the sector of the 16th Panzer division. It was able to commit a battalion of Pz IVs to counterattack on the first day (9 Sept), quite close to the beaches, before many US vehicles were ashore. Some US heavy weapons were available, however, and some lighter cavalry vehicles. By late in the day, all arms were available.

Tactically, the use of the German battalion broke down into 5 seperate actions, 3 of them company strength and the other two half company strength - 8-15 tanks each, 55 all told. These occurred in two waves time-wise, while also being divided by sector of the front, into the five tactical actions. About two companies of US infantry were badly shot up in the course of these fights, and the German attacks did manage to cause delay. But they were everywhere turned back, with a loss of at least 1/3rd of the participating tanks. From the American side, these fights were like "mad minutes" that lasted much longer than a minute. US infantry advanced on tanks shooting into them, throwing everything they could think of back at them. Many German tanks were KO'ed by every manner of weapon, except US tanks - the rest withdrew. Here is a breakdown of the causes of the 19 confirmed kills mentioned in the official history -

105mm howitzers firing direct - 5

tank destroyers - 4

cavalry vehicles (M8HMC, M-8 AC) - 4

light ATG (37mm towed) - 2

naval gunfire (5" to 8") - 2

air strike - 1

infantry close assault - 1

Other weapons mentioned as helping to "drive back" this or that group of tanks, with hits achieved but without confirmed kill claims, include -

40mm AA

81mm mortars

bazookas

rifle grenades

MG, BAR, and SMG fire at exposed TCs

(Note - the "close assault" confirmed kill involved an SMG KOing an exposed TC from cover at nearly point blank range, followed by a hand grenade down the hatch. It doesn't mean "bazooka").

In the period 3 to 5 days after the invasion, the Germans were able to assemble considerable forces for a mobile counterattack. Units of 6 mobile divisions were involved - the Herman Goering Panzer division, 16th Panzer division (depleted somewhat by then), and elements of the 3rd, 15th, 26th, and 29th Panzergrenadier divisions. Some of these units provided only about a battalion (3rd PzGdr), some reinforced regiment KGs, some were present in their entirety. The US force ashore was a corps of 3 US infantry divisions plus one British infantry division. Eight Army supported with an attack up the toe of Italy, but was at this time being delayed by the 1st Fallschirmjaeger division and did not take part in the Salerno area fighting during the counterattack period.

From the US point of view there were preliminaries on the 12th, a crisis on the 13th, and the US line held and defeated the counterattack on the 14th. The Germans then went over to the defensive again. The critical periods divide into about a dozen tactical passages of arms. The usual scale was anywhere from a half-company to a reinforced company of German tanks, supported by a battalion of infantry, hitting this or that US battalion in the line. The critical period saw one battalion overrun, exposing the flank of one other and creating a hole in the US line. The breakthrough was stopped and the line re-aligned by a planned withdrawl later. It then held against everything thrown at it the following day.

On the 12th the US faced an armored probe only in the sector of the line where the local breakthrough was eventually achieved. (There was infantry action elsewhere). This early fight took place as a sort of "dodge" game, in which the Germans relied on aggressive moves by tank-infantry teams, and the US responded "evasively" and with firepower. The initial German objective was held by a company of US infantry, with one US tank company (Shermans) supporting the parent battalion, but not up on the front line when the attack occurred. The Germans came in with a preliminary artillery barrage while 8 tanks probed the front, supporting an infantry attack by a battalion of Panzergrenadiers. The immediate US response was a full artillery battalion firing in support, which initially stalled the German infantry. The US infantry then withdrew. The Germans entered the objective despite the continuing barrage. The US threw in a second battalion of field artillery fires, plus three naval gunfire missions from cruisers and destroyers - 5" to 8" guns. The German attack broke up under this fire and the survivors withdrew. Then two US tank companies led the line infantry battalion back onto the objective. With it secured, the US tanks pulled back into reserve again, and the US infantry left a new company in the objective, putting the rest of the battalion behind them ("1 company up").

The Brits had their hardest time on the night of the 12th. The 29 PzGdr hit them with most of its armor - at least 40 tanks - and broke in to the positions of one of their forward brigades. But the Brits were in 2 up, 1 back formation, and their reserve brigade halted the penetration before morning. The Coldstream Guards (one battalion in the relieving brigade on this occasion) did particularly well in the whole counterattack period. But the main focus of this article is about US experiences. I'll let someone else give all the details about the British part in the stand.

On the 13th, the Germans made their main effort in the same portion of the front they had probed on the 12th. This time they had more tanks (probably two companies), some armored cars, and two prongs of infantry. Probably this was the rest of the PzGdr regiment, one battalion of which had attacked the previous day, plus some recce and engineers. Many US weapons were rushed to support the defending US infantry battalion, including a company each of tanks and TDs, cannon company 105s, 37mm ATGs, the fire of 4 artillery battalions plus some 4.2" mortar smoke. They proved too slow, and the Germans broke through the US infantry battalion on the line. One prong then rolled up the flank of the adjoining US battalion, supported by a widdening attack from the front. This second battalion was cut off and mostly destroyed, only one company making it out. This left a large gap in the US line, through which a company of German tanks and half a dozen armored cars threatened to move.

What stopped them was the artillery. Behind the US position, effectively in a reverse slope in that they were situated in the valley behind the US hill position - thus looking up at the Germans that had just taken it but masked from the original German lines - were two battalions of US field artillery with a total of 24 105mm howitzer. The personnel of the battalions, plus any rear area troops and engineers that could be found, manned a scratch line ahead of the firing batteries. This had 6 37mm ATGs and a few dozen machineguns. The batteries fired on the recently captured position - sometimes over open sights at German tanks, sometimes indirect, and very rapidly. They averaged more than 150 rounds per gun, at peak periods reaching 8 rounds per gun per minute. Later in the attack, 7 Priests pulled up to support them and threw in another 300 rounds between them. The German infantry went to ground under this fire and remained ineffective thereafter. The German tanks probed and sometimes dueled with the US guns, but the attack was at a standstill, as more than 4000 shells rained down on a small area. They soon confined themselves to "their" side of the slope.

That night, the US commanders reacted to the danger of the break-in the previous day. They pulled back the line several miles in some places to shorten and straighten it. The Germans had held a string of high ground, and so far had recaptured a few of the bits at the edge of it the Allies had managed to occupy before the German counterattack. So the Americans withdrew across a plain and a small creek, to a modest rise of ground closer to the sea. These positions were dominated by the more serious German hills. But the move meant that between a half mile and three miles of mostly flat, open ground lay between the German positions and the new US ones, on a slight rise. To reach the US positions, the Germans would have to come down from the hills to the valley floor. That was to prove the kill zone.

The next day, US firepower of all types broke the back of the counterattack. An idea of the initial German confusion can be gathered from the opening episode, near the location of their success of the previous day. A half company of German tanks and an infantry battalion moved off in a determined attack - at the position the Americans had held the previous day. There wasn't anybody there. The Germans wound up advancing nearly parallel to the new US front in this sector, presenting their flank at a distance of around 800 yards, obviously with no idea where the Americans were. They were fired at from a wide arc by a company each of tanks and TDs and two battalions of field artillery. 7 of the tanks were KOed within seconds of the US opening fire, and the 8th was immobilized soon after that. The German infantry tried to probe anyway, but was pinned down and punished by artillery fire. They withdrew, and the Germans spent an hour probing back and forth with additional tanks in 1s and 2s to figure out where the US positions were, before trying again. While they were engaged in this, a gathering of 6 German tanks was spotted at long range from a US artillery position; the battalion rapidly KOed 5 of them.

The Germans persisted and directed a "set piece" attack at the newly located US line, coming in in three prongs spread out left to right, each with around a company of tanks (a few assault guns filling out one of them), supported as always by infantry. The infantry met the full artillery firepower of a US corps plus offshore naval support - several hundred guns in all, which fired 10s of thousands of rounds. This drove the German infantry to ground and left the German armor quite vunerable to US antitank weapons, undoubtedly aided by the spotting differential thus set up. One prong of the German tanks was met by a handful of 6 US Shermans, which KO'ed 8 for a loss of only 1. Another prong lost 5 tanks to US TD fire, while a third lost that many to a single well-sited and well-crewed TD, and 2 more to other guns in its company. A few German tanks, buttoned, made it to the American lines here or there. But the infantry had been stripped off them, and the bulk of the US armor was intact well behind the US infantry lines. None of the German tanks that reached the US positions survived.

Overall, the US history mentions 52 confirmed kills with the cause known and stated. Real losses were probably higher of course. Of those with known causes, artillery firing direct and tank destroyers are the leading categories, accounting for more than half between them. Tanks, cavalry vehicles, and light ATGs ("other AP guns") are an additional category of about the same magnitude - when combined, that is. Naval gunfire, air, indirect artillery, and infantry weapons got the rest.

Not content with the level of fire support they had already amassed, which probably did more than anything to break the attack, the Allies took two measures to increase the "HE pressure". After the 14th, US air diverted strategic and medium bombers to hit German positions around Salerno. Which they did, with hundreds of bombers and upwards of 700 tons of bombs. And the British sent two battleships to join the offshore fleet, armed with 15" guns. But the counterattack was already over.

This case conforms to a definite pattern German combined arms attacks repeated over and over again when going up against the Americans. The initial US infantry positions could be rapidly penetrated if enough tank strength was brought to bear on a given point. But this did not assure success, it only began the serious engagement and highlighted the problems the Germans faced attacking Americans. Over and over, the basic pattern repeats.

The German forces penetrating the defended zone no longer have neat well defined targets. They are surrounded by observors - leftovers from defenders bypassed, scratch roadblocks or hasty lines, reserve forces from "back" deployments, etc. Someone can always see, and that is all the US artillery needs. An intense rain of HE follows, and seperates the supporting infantry from its armor. The choices then become - (1) stand under the barrage and be decimated (2) retreat and conceed the ground initially taken or (3) push on with armor, alone or weakly supported in infantry terms.

If the attackers choose 3, total destruction of the intruding German armor usually ensues. TDs and tanks rush to the area. Teams of infantry with zooks, light ATGs, or mines act to constrict the movements of the intruders and to keep track of them, directing US armor (especially TDs) against them. Moving within the US defended zone entails having 37mm, 40mm, 57mm, 75mm, 76mm, and 105mm guns on all sides, some of them at close ranges. Just having a thick front plate, or 2km effective range with AP, does not suffice in that situation.

In the rare case of a scale of breakthrough large enough to avoid rapid loss of the tanks, the whole force experiences the same effects, though more slowly. Fuel cannot get forward, nor can supporting arms. The longer intruders remain in the enemy zone, the higher the HE firepower dedicated against them is piled, both artillery and air. With time, more armor gathers around the "wound" as well, pricking from all angles.

These effects are brought about by many aspects of the American force design. Of course the most important of them is the enourmous "surge" power of the American artillery. But also important are the relatively high ratio of "tail to teeth", making a US "rear area" a more "occupied" place than e.g. a Russian one. Also the fact that US armor is widely available even in infantry formations, and that employment of it from all angles or at short ranges or both, negates most of the technical advantages of better German tanks. The overall odds were never good for long, either.

Almost every operational level German armored attack against Americans after Tunisia followed this basic pattern. HG overran a battalion in Sicily; as mentioned two battalions were overrun or flanked at Salerno; Panzer Lehr broke into US positions in Normandy in mid July; the Mortain attack broke through a regiment though it left elements of all three of its battalions still fighting; the Lorraine counterattack near Nancy enjoyed a few days of success; the Bulge attack crushed most of the 106th and 28th infantry divisions, Nordwind initially made headway. But in the first case, naval gunfire, artillery, and infantry stopped the attack while US armor ignored it and attacked on a different part of the front. The second case has been described here. Lehr's July attempt resulted in the loss of most of the tanks committed to it and failed by the afternoon of the first day. Mortain lasted longer, but faced even greater firepower and led to the loss of three quarters of the armor committed. A week after the Lorraine attacks the two Panzer brigades committed to it had lost nearly all their tanks. The Bulge was the largest scale and had the greatest initial success, but Peiper was cut off and destroyed in the manner described, and much the same thing later happened to the 2nd and 116th Panzer near Celles, and the script was rpeated yet again in the fighting around Bastogne in January, e.g. by 12SS. Nordwind had similar eventual results for similar reasons.

Noticably absent in any of the above is any offensive operational success traceable to superior armor. The edge that Panthers (etc) had over Shermans was certainly real and it mattered on the operational defensive, in Normandy in particular, but also in the later stages of the Lorraine campaign and the Bulge after the turn of the tide. But nowhere is any serious edge from them in evidence when attacking. The reasons ought to be obvious. Defenders can choose to present only narrow frontages and can pick terrain to ensure long lines of sight, increasing the importance of front armor and ranged AT ability. Attackers simply don't have those luxuries. Nor can angled plates substitute for weight of artillery metal.

[PeterNZer]

Speaking of the Westfront:

Total air superiority also helps.

Tanks without fuel are worthless.

[edgars]

Thanks, Jason, interesting and detailed read as allways.

I have one question though: what about German artillery (in Salerno case)? Was there any?

[JasonC]

Yes, the Germans had artillery of course. And their attacks were typically preceeded by a short, sharp bombardment on the forward US positions. But that was about it. Nothing beyond that is mentioned in the histories of the attacks. To understand why, you have to consider the logistical preparations of the two sides.

All of this fighting happened within a week of the invasion. The invasion was planned by the Allies for months in advance, with extensive build up of troops and supplies needed for the operation, a big naval force to put them ashore, etc. The Allies knew exactly when and where the fight would take place - where they invaded. They had a large "thruput" in the form of naval transport ability dedicated to the whole shebang.

The Germans by constrast have just taken over all positions in the country upon the defection of Italy from the war. On the day of the invasion, the units involved were spread out from around Rome down to the toe of Italy. The division in the immediate sector - 16th Panzer - is immediately and heavily engaged. All the others are moving as rapidly as possible to the battle area, in time to launch a major counterattack on the 4th day of the whole fight, counting the day of the invasion. Some of the units have been fighting since the moment they arrived to contain the beachhead.

So, naturally, the Germans at best have a basic load of ammunition for the artillery battalions they've sent with the kampgruppen meant for the attack - except perhaps those in the 16th Panzer, who may well be low already. Whereas the Allies can fire shells as fast as they can be carried over the beach, there are strict limits on how many shells the Germans can expend.

The moral is that the dominant factor in artillery firepower is the supply state of the fighting units. It was typically abundant supply state of the western Allies, and the US forces in particular, that made their artillery such a factor on the WW II battlefield. Obviously this was at a peak in the case of long prepared major operations like amphibious attacks; it had to be to make them work.

Doctrine and technique were good, too. And logistical doctrine supplimented modern artillery techniques. Ample transportation assets allowed concentrated fire to be delivered when and where needed, even in the face of an overall shortage, by stinting other areas. Thus many individual US artillery battalions fired 6000 rounds per day in the Bulge, despite the "shell shortage". They could because everything went rapidly by truck to the shooters near the point of attack.

If you'd every played the "V for Victory" series of operational games, the Germans would be in "general" supply, the US in "attack" supply, at the time of this German counterattack attempt. If you don't know the genre, that won't help; if you have, it will make sense.

[jwxspoon]

A very interesting and informative piece Jason. Thanks!

[coe]

the interesting match would be a more even terms battle - of course this is a battle

that commanders seek to avoid.

How can we analyze the success of Allied

attacks or the failure of. If you remember

operation Goodwood, the allied attack encountered a rather deeply layered defense (if not heavily manned)

But for instance suppose this:

No one has air superiority, artillery is in

ample supply to both sides (lets just say

that the U-boats sent all the battleships and cruisers scurrying for cover). Even at Salerno there was already an unbalance of material and manpower it seems - in favor of the Allies.

[Enoch]

coe,

for an interesting look at US vs German engagements with relative parity between the sides you should examine the US offensive in the Vosges Mountains between October and December 1944. Keith Bonn wrote a book on the subject and it is a good fairly quick read. It looks at many factors as to why the US offensive succeeded in an area that historically favored the defender.

[Username]

The germans didnt seem to learn much about invasions from Italy. Rommel wanted to have armor and troops massed at the shore in France. He would have been slaughtered in much the same way as in Italy.

The germans would also strip russian troops from tanks in the east. massed arty/mortar/HMG fires would pin down the tank riders off the tanks. This would make the T34 hordes push on alone and enter the pak zones to be KO'd.

Combined arms cooperation had to be maintained throughout a battle. Attacks SHOULD stall if the infantry/armor/arty coordination gets disrupted. Major losses will be taken by an attacker if attacks are allowed to go on to objectives without concern for cost.

The US advantage of ship and airpower, added to the lack of german arty and disruption of combined arms coordination, doomed attacks like Salerno. The germans attacking/defending in normandy under the umbrella of naval guns and airfleets was a repeat mistake.

Lewis

[ 08-23-2001: Message edited by: Username ]

[Gen-x87H]

The germans didnt seem to learn much about invasions from Italy. Rommel wanted to have armor and troops massed at the shore in France. He would have been slaughtered in much the same way as in Italy."

I beg to disagree. I am actually reading a book on the Italian campaign. If anything this was the hardest capaign of the war for the Allies. With the terrain the way it is, and the Germans having Kesserling as the commander the Allies had a very very hard time of it.

Salerno was a close call. Here are some low lights

First day- 10-15 PZIVs make thier way close to the beach head shooting up Allied positions. Eventually pushed back by some heroic infantry vs tank fighting.

Sept 10th- Royal Fusilers pushed out of Battipaglia. Heavy losses, 1500 POWs captured by germans.

Spet 12th- After taking heavy losses the day before for Eboli and Altavilla + hill 424 the American 143rd Regiment is overran and destroyed as a fighting unit.

Sept 13th- A rag tag line of defense is hoping to stop the german onslaught. Kessrling probably could have thrown them into the see if hitler would have released 2 divisions from Rommels command in the north.

Clark even started to get everything ready for a run into the sea. For some reason the drop of an american parachute battalion from the 82nd on the night of the 13th seemed to lift the spirits of the troops on the ground.

I am only now getting into the attack to take Rome. So far it looks even more ugly from the allied side than Salerno.

Gen

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Gen-x87H:

"The germans didnt seem to learn much about invasions from Italy. Rommel wanted to have armor and troops massed at the shore in France. He would have been slaughtered in much the same way as in Italy."

-I beg to disagree. I am actually reading a book on the Italian campaign. If anything this was the hardest capaign of the war for the Allies. With the terrain the way it is, and the Germans having Kesserling as the commander the Allies had a very very hard time of it.

Gen<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The point was that they could not stop an invasion force. Not that it wasnt a hard campaign. The germans should have learned that an attacker can choose where to land and dominate with local superiority.

Since the terrain in france was not as difficult along the shore, there was no way the germans could have stopped the invasion of france. They should have realized this and started a fighting withdrawl away from the ships guns once it started. Instead they dug in their heels and got ground to pieces.

They had no anti-shipping capability. They couldnt fight the ships or stop supplies from pouring in.

Lewis

[Darwin]

Thank you Jason, a good thought provoking read as allways.

[coe]

Ok so you do have naval gunfire and airpower at Normandy. Perhaps there was a belief (a false promise) that the Luftwaffe would be able to put a dent into the air umbrella.

Even so, I think the German strategy might

have had a chance at Normandy, assuming that

they could attack en masse on the first day or on DAy 2 (if there was bad weather too?).

What if they managed to eliminate one of the beachheads?

[JasonC]

"The germans would also strip russian troops from tanks in the east"

Correct. It was sound tactics. The Germans made more use of direct fire heavy weapons - small PAK, FLAK, mortars, HMGs - to do some of the things the US accomplished by a greater expenditure of shells from the tube artillery. That was favored by open steppe terrain, by too armor-heavy Russian force mixes at mid war, and sometimes headlong Russian tactics (compared to vs. Germans in the US case, with indirect fire easier to use). It also required less economically speaking, in the way of high explosive. Which was scarce enough (from nitrate bottlenecks) that the Germans used amatol to stretch the TNT.

To counter this sort of tactic, what the Germans would have needed was heavier artillery fire of their own to neutralize US positions in the defended zone (this one has a wrinkle I'll talk about below, too), and also more infantry numbers at the points of attack. The Germans succeeded in the Bulge fighting where they had 2 or 3 to 1 infantry odds, in addition to an armor edge. They failed wherever the infantry odds were only about even.

The German panzer division only had 4 battalions of infantry, plus 1 engineer (some always needed for other duties) and about half a battalion of infantry in the recee battalion. This was still a better mix than the US 3-3 structure, but tasking sometimes rendered this advantage null. Thus, Peiper had the entire tank regiment of his division, but less than half of its infantry (1 battalion, plus engineers and recce about equal to another) and only a single tube artillery battalion, but was expected to fight with this spearhead against combined arms defenders. The rest of the infantry of the division was supposed to keep open the roads forward, which it failed to do (lacking tanks). He was quickly out of range of the rest of the division's guns. In the end he faced almost corps worth of artillery and two divisions of infantry ringed around him, with one battalion of the former and 2 battalions of the latter.

This brings up another difficulty with German artillery on the attack. Because the infantry portion of the army was not motorized, it had little ability to displace its guns forward through the previous enemy defended zone in the event of a breakthrough. In a set piece attack, therefore, the ratio of armor to artillery and infantry support was good only at the start line. Once into the enemy defended zone, the ratio of the arms to each other rapidly became armor heavy as the infantry formations were "distanced", as a whole.

There is also a bit of catch-22 here if facing a deep combined arms defense. Close to the start line, the ratios of armor to artillery and infantry may be good. But that is where there are anti-tank weapons at all angles and the artillery fire is very heavy. If a force manages to go deep enough to get out of the area where this is true, it has outrun most of its infantry and artillery support.

Notice how this played out around Bastogne. The corps that reached the area, having cleared the initial defended zone, had only 1 infantry division, on the left and somewhat behind. While the two panzer divisions had only 8 infantry battalions between them. The 12-battalion 101 airborne, plus 1 armored combat command, a few survivors of the 28th division and engineers, easily reduced the infantry odds to between 3:2 and 1:1. And that is if the whole German corps had attacked the Bastogne area, which it did not. By the time all of the VG were up and engaged on the German left, one of the Panzer divisions had already been ordered around the position on the right. Leaving the infantry odds only about 1:1. And the VG division's artillery (horse drawn) was not all forward even then.

The panzer division structure was meant to overcome this tendency. But it could only do so if all of its elements were brought along - not trailed behind the armor to hold open routes, reduce holdouts, and widden the flanks of an advance. The depth of the defended zones the Germans encountered in their later armor attack attempts, prevented this from happening "by the book", in practice.

The division structure was meant to attack on a frontage of about one defending regiment, so as to overpower it quickly. The two PzGdr regiments were meant to allow an echeloned attack, or one fixing and the other hitting a flank. But often Panzer divisions were committed on longer frontages that infantry divisions, and expected to be able to fight along them because of their better equipment overall.

This meant 4-6 (the second if SS) panzergrenadier battalions covered more area than 6-9 infantry ones. They could not possibly get infantry superiority at a point of attack that way. In practice they made up for the lighter infantry component of the division via a shallower deployment, all "up" instead of 2 up 1 back. Then they counted on shifting tanks, artillery fires, or divisional "extras" like AT, FLAK, recce, and engineers, to act as reserves and close gaps, etc.

Note that the US armored divisions had a similar problem with infantry "wind", having only three infantry battalions organic. This was dealt with in practice by many expedients. One, surge artillery substituted for understrength foot-pounders. Armored field artillery battalions often fired more than 5000 rounds per day in heavy action - and of course the entire artillery of an AD was self-propelled. Two, single combat teams from infantry divisions were often attached, to move the armor-infantry ratio to 1:2 instead of 1:1. And three, the armor divisions were kept behind the front as much as possible during ordinary operations, then committed to stem attacks or exploit overloaded defenders. Thus for example, although they fought in the Caretan somewhat and backstopped the infantry divisions (lending teams, stopping intrusions), not a single US AD was assigned frontage in Normandy until the Cobra breakout in late July. Fourth, when they were in the line directly, the frontages stayed low, especially on the attack. A combat command often fought along a single road. A US AD generally kept a frontage of only 4 battalion-sized task forces, thus staying as narrow as a defending infantry division, often narrower. In the Bulge on defense, they were sometimes scattered more widely, but in that case usually worked with "local" infantry divisions in each combat command's area.

The infantry to armor ratio was somewhat better in the SS divisions, and their tendency to be closer to TOE and get heavier weapons for the infantry regiments, mitigated against some of these combined arms weaknesses. In the Ardennes the road net restricted the amount this helped, though, as did deviations from doctrine obviously meant to cope with these road net limits (not enough infantry or artillery with Peiper, etc).