"SMG Gap" A Proposal

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Big Time Software:

Hi John,

I guess my point was that they did not choose the SMG over the rifle by mistake. The SMG was the optimal choice for this sort of tactical unit for a couple of big reasons. Firepower was one of them.

Steve<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Agreed Steve & it was a factor but from my reading Speed was the key factor, with FP being second concerning the tank rider Co's.

The SMG Co's were tacticly limited by their organization Ie, no integral LMG or hvy wpns supt, unlike Ge Volksgrenadier Co's who had integral Sqd LMG supt etc, & this dicated how & where the SMG Co could be employed, which was another reason they began implementating them into the Rifle Co's in 1943.

Regards, John Waters

[ 07-05-2001: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[Tero]

>OK... Tero asked a lot of questions. He is a

>Finn, so this is to be expected

The word of God is sancrosanct only if it is accompanied with an impressive array of signs and portents. Coupled with bolts of lightning and cryptic omens.

>I'll answer his questions here as a good way

>to wrap this up:

A few follow ups:

>>Care to comment on the US troops tendency

>>of not engageing if no clear targets

>>present themselves and if or how that is

>>modelled into the CM TacAI presently ?

>

>Not sure what you mean. I think you are

>talking about straight forward logic of not

>engaging enemy targets unless you have a

>good chance of doing some damage. That is

>programmed into the TacAI for all unit

>types, although weighted differently

>depending on the type of unit.

I was referring to the remarks by (among others) Gen. Depuy about US troops being predisposed not to returning fire at enemy units unless they could clearly see a target and how that sometimes subjected the US units to become suppressed easier than the enemy units.

Your aswer is plausible but it did not answer the question.

>There certainly isn't anything that makes US

>troops treated differently by the TacAI.

>A US Rifle Squad, a German Pattern 44 Rifle

>Squad, and a Commonwealth Rifle Squad should

>all behave the same. A SMG Squad will

>probably act a little differently, but only

>because of the range of its weapons.

I agree the model works when engageing targets. But what about when being fired on. How, if at all, is the respective "suppressability" of the different nationalities modelled ? Experience level is a factor but I wish Depuy would have explained how the US units went about suppressing enemy units if the tactics and doctrine did not consider the infantry the proper tool for that task. He just said the US troops perfected their method later on.

>There is no such thing as a "historically

>accurate" KG formation.

Agreed. Sorry. The term I was looking for was "historically viable" KG formation. A sort of semiauto-purchase force composition where you get a point pool and some non-tradeable units (infantry ?). You also get to pick some units, like for instance which type of tank you want and wether you wish to trade some of these chooseable assets for, say, more off-map arty or more infantry.

>So yes, if there are three unrelated squads

>in a fireline,

Is that the limit ? I hope not.

>fairly bunched up, then a MG

>(LMG, MMG, or HMG) will have a greater

>chance of affecting all three units more so

>than happens in CMBO. The behavior already

>exists in CMBO but we decided it needed to

>be tweaked upwards a bit more.

So in effect the MG's will become more realistic in area suppression ?

>Anyway, not to worry... SMG troops will, in

>general, be quite inexpensive for the Soviet

>player after about 1942 or so. Before then

>they were much less common to see.

OK

>No, we are not going to do this. Combine a

>Run and Assault move to achieve this if you

>like. The difference in this case between

>Run and Rush is too small to justify a new

>order.

OK. What about more defensive manouvering options, including widrawing to other dircetions than towards your own base line ?

And while on the subject: after having experienced some tedious PBEM widrawals I propose an Early End command to fast forward the remaining turns in case you wish to widraw off the map and your opponent does not wish to pursuit. It could go something like this:

The player who wishes to pull out presses the Early End command button which orders all remaining units to get out of the map under TacAI using the safest route they can find. The opponent is informed "Our radio intel has picked up a general widrawal command being issued in your sector. Do you wish to Consolidate or Pursuit ?" Picking Consolidate will execute the remaining turns consequtively without any player interference, subjecting the widrawing units to normal TacAI targeting and other battle field phenomenon such as minefields. Any ongoing off board arty fire missions will be executed normally. Picking Pursuit will execute the game normally, with each non-widrawing players turn starting with Consolidate/Pursuit option.

>No, there will be no firepower changes to

>rifles. We feel the FP is rated correctly,

>but the lack of flexibility in how ammo

>points are consumed means that we can't have

>such firing use up, for example, 0.50 Ammo

>Points. We had initially thought that this

>wouldn't be a problem, but a year's worth of

>playing has shown us that on average there

>is a need for a fix. So our choice was to

>either increase the FP to account for more

>bullets being fired or increase the ammo.

>Since increasing the intensity of outgoing

>fire at longer ranges would be unrealistic,

>and the ammo usage problem would remain, the

>obvious solution was to increase Rifle heavy

>unit's Ammo counts up a bit.

Have you projected how this increased ammo load is going to reflect on the rifle squads close combat abilities ? It will have obvious more staying power but are there any other implications ?

>Yes, that is the whole basis of Rarity.

Are there any other units that will be affected by Rarity ?

[Tero]

>John, also don't forget one other advantage

>of a SMG vs. a Rifle -> training. If you

>hand someone a SMG and some basic

>instructions, then get them into a good

>combat position, the chances are that

>soldier will do a lot better than the same

>soldier with a rifle.

I quess that is why the Finnish army gave the SMG's to the BEST soldiers. It was an honour and a privilege to be given a SMG. This does not exactly contradict the point of training but it does raise the question of effectiveness of few SMG's in the hands of the crem-de-la-crem vs a fecesload of SMG's in the hands of average troops.

[Tero]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Big Time Software:

I guess my point was that they did not choose the SMG over the rifle by mistake. The SMG was the optimal choice for this sort of tactical unit for a couple of big reasons. Firepower was one of them.

Soviet doctrine is all about hitting hard as well as fast. Dropping 8 men with bolt action rifles off a tank 250m in front of the enemy gets you speed, but it doesn't get you the hard hitting punch necessary for the tactic to succeed against anything but a weak enemy MLR. Therefore, firepower had to have been a consideration when coming up with this tactic.

Steve<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

One noteworthy consideration was the fact that the tankriders acted also as protection against enemy infantry AT assets. There was little they could do against AT guns firing from 1000 meters but being armed with the SMG did give them enough firepower to suppress and take out infantry AT teams, even when they had suffered 80% casualties.

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

I agree the model works when engageing targets. But what about when being fired on. How, if at all, is the respective "suppressability" of the different nationalities modelled ? Experience level is a factor but I wish Depuy would have explained how the US units went about suppressing enemy units if the tactics and doctrine did not consider the infantry the proper tool for that task. He just said the US troops perfected their method later on.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The 1933 German Cartridge study also found German troops in WW1 would not all fire, leading to the development of the MG-38 to create small team based automatic weapons groups.

This is a universal factor with soldiers. Under fire many do not fire back but seek cover. The speed at which they return fire, and the volume of fire needed to make them duck are factors of experience and training.

US units adopted tactics to counter german automatic weapons based upon rapid calling of artillery (while not fully developed in WW2, the US Army was the only Army in the world that tried to do an "Every Gun in Range" system, using swtiching and routing, allowing the lowliest Lieutenant to be assigned control of the largest artillery barrage. This is superior, when it works, to the FO system since the FO may not be in the right place at the right time. US and Commonwealth had more light mortars closer to the average infantry in the TO and E, and had more ammunition for them. In the 1944-45 period they had access, in good weather, to outstanding levels of fighter / bomber protection (an advantage the Germans had along enjoyed 1939-1942) and the US put 5 gun carrying AFVs in the field for every one the Germans had.

In addition, the US M2HB's long range suppressive power, and the fact that it was mounted on almost everything that could move, allowed US units to pin the enemy in place and deal with them with artillery.

The US tactics for squad level action were faulty, but they used other means to achieve their goals, not all of which are modelled in CM (for example, allowing platoon level CPs to call artillery from the company and battaluon pool.)

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

I was referring to the remarks by (among others) Gen. Depuy about US troops being predisposed not to returning fire at enemy units unless they could clearly see a target and how that sometimes subjected the US units to become suppressed easier than the enemy units.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think the US units not returning fire was in large part a function of the weapons they were using i.e. M1 Garand. As Depuy said, it was a point target weapon, not a suppressor. I suspect this is already factored into the FP rating of the weapon in CM.

And in case you think the Germans were somehow immune to this phenomenon, note that Dupey's comments talk about German units suppressing US units with automatic weapons fire, not bolt action rifle fire The Germans used a lot of K98 rifles.

In short, the superior German ability to suppress with infantry fire is already modeled by giving them a lot more automatic weapons than the Allies. And I doubt all those Germans with bolt action K98s were firing more than US guys with semi-auto M1s, so an across the board bonus to all German infantry (or across the board penalty to all US infantry) is not warranted. Correct modeling of weapons effect will take care of that. Using regular Germans vs. green Americans can compensate for any other discrepancy.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:

US units adopted tactics to counter german automatic weapons based upon rapid calling of artillery (while not fully developed in WW2, the US Army was the only Army in the world that tried to do an "Every Gun in Range" system, using swtiching and routing, allowing the lowliest Lieutenant to be assigned control of the largest artillery barrage. This is superior, when it works, to the FO system since the FO may not be in the right place at the right time<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I don't quite agree with this (no surprises there). From my readings it seems that Commonwealth FOOs did a good amount of 'off-map' firing, where they would direct the artillery without necessarily being present at the location it was needed. There usually was one FOO attached to every battalion, and he would always be where the main effort was undertaken.

The Commonwealth also operated a system whereby all the guns could be brought onto a target, byt firing so-called MIKE (regiment), VICTOR (division) and UNCLE (Corps) targets, depending on the situation. The FOOs were specifically trained while in the UK, and were usually the battery commanders. Once losses set in, they were replaced with less experienced officers. The job was hazardous, but the advantage of having FOOs instead of having Joe Public direct your arty was that they were specialists with a good understanding of the effect of the guns, the constraints on the system, and how to direct the guns.

What kind of system does the US use today? I heard the UK still uses FOOs, I think the Germans do, what about other armies?

[Tero]

>This is a universal factor with soldiers.

>Under fire many do not fire back but seek

>cover. The speed at which they return fire,

>and the volume of fire needed to make them

>duck are factors of experience and training.

Indeed ! A CO of a US Army unit said the training of his troops predisposed them to hold fire until they saw the target clearly enough. And from the tone of his voice we can see that he viewed that as a definitive disavantage when compared to the German troops. If the US troops saw no target they did not fire back. Would soldiers of other armies with similar experience but different training remained unresponsive in similar situation ?

>the US Army was the only Army in the world

>that tried to do an "Every Gun in Range"

>system, using swtiching and routing,

>allowing the lowliest Lieutenant to be

>assigned control of the largest artillery

>barrage.

The Finnish army perfected such a "Every Gun in Range" method to a working system during WWII. Only the Finnish army used skilled FO's and a device called korjausmuunnin which facilitated the translation of the fire mission from a single FO to firing solutions in the different batteries in range. With the help of pre-war topological work the Finnish artillery was the most accurate artillery of the entire WWII.

http://www.warlinks.com/memories/hyry.htm

In the focal point of battle the Red Army had in average 130 to 150 artillery pieces plus 59 rocket launcher barrels per front kilometer, that makes 520 to 900 field pieces plus 230 to 350 rocket launcher barrels for the same 4 to 6 km length of front. However, at Tali-Ihantala the Finnish artillery was able to concentrate the fire of all the 250 guns available in any single target within range in matter of minutes.

For your benefit: some gratuitious über-Finn revisionism can be found at

http://www.kaiku.com/notcapitulate.html

http://hkkk.fi/~yrjola/war/finland/intel/

>This is superior, when it works, to the FO

>system since the FO may not be in the right

>place at the right time.

Provided the boot brown bar at the end of the horn can read a map. How did it go again: "When we fired the Germans ducked, when the Germans fired we ducked. When the Americans fire everybody ducked."

>In addition, the US M2HB's long range

>suppressive power, and the fact that it was

>mounted on almost everything that could

>move, allowed US units to pin the enemy in

>place and deal with them with artillery.

That was not quite as effcetive as you would like to think and it did not work quite like that, according to Depuy.

[ 07-06-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Tero]

>I think the US units not returning fire was

>in large part a function of the weapons they

>were using i.e. M1 Garand. As Depuy said, it

>was a point target weapon, not a suppressor.

Not in my opinion. The way I read Depuy it was down to tactics and doctrine. Depuy said that the men were tought, in accordance with prevailing tactics and doctrine, to use it as a point target weapon and not waste ammunition by firing wildly without a clear target UNLESS they were so ordered. To me he comes across as having been turned from that into thinking that the M1 would have been an excellent suppressor if it had been deployed in that manner.

>I suspect this is already factored into the

>FP rating of the weapon in CM.

I suspect it is not. A semi-auto FP rating is better than the bolt action FP. Bullet for bullet.

>And in case you think the Germans were

>somehow immune to this phenomenon, note that

>Dupey's comments talk about German units

>suppressing US units with automatic weapons

>fire, not bolt action rifle fire The

>Germans used a lot of K98 rifles.

Yes. But how did the Germans react in a similar tactical situation ?

"Hey, somebody is firing at us from that direction with a MG ! Sorry, can't see it. Can you see i..argh. **** this ****, lets call in some arty to flush that speck of woods. Yeah, Rock'nRoll !"

No ? I think so too.

>In short, the superior German ability to

>suppress with infantry fire is already

>modeled by giving them a lot more automatic

>weapons than the Allies.

Yes. But is the suppression sustained by various nationalities in step with this ? Picture this: A German squad (9 men) vs an American squad (12 men), both in covered terrain and advancing, distance 75 meters. The Germans open up first when they spot the US squad before it spots them. What happens next ? Which team in your oppinion prevails and why ?

>And I doubt all those Germans with bolt

>action K98s were firing more than US guys

>with semi-auto M1s,

Hmmmmm.... could it be that the MG-42 would keep on suppressing while the other members move closer until they can attack the US position ? That is the way they did it, according to Depuy.

And a single shot from a K98k would drive the entire US platoon to ground and they would look for a sniper for minutes before they dare to move on. Is that now modelled in the game ?

>so an across the board bonus to all German

>infantry (or across the board penalty to all

>US infantry) is not warranted.

I would go for the across the board penalty so as not to inconvenience the Commonwealth troops too much.

I think this is worth a closer look at least, given the weight of evidence.

>Correct modeling of weapons effect will take

>care of that.

Up to a point, yes.

>Using regular Germans vs. green Americans

>can compensate for any other discrepancy.

That would mean that in essence using above average troop quality for the US infantry becomes gamey. How realistic is that ?

[ 07-06-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Tero]

>From my readings it seems that Commonwealth

>FOOs did a good amount of 'off-map' firing,

>where they would direct the artillery

>without necessarily being present at the

>location it was needed. There usually was

>one FOO attached to every battalion, and he

>would always be where the main effort was

>undertaken.

The Finnish artillery would habitually fire at the sound of the guns. This was because the communications were based mostly on phonelines which went dead very easily. They had a host of preselected targets already plotted as part of the fire plan and the friendly positions were either plotted on the artillery fire mission maps (overlays) or they knew them otherwise. If the FO went off the air the battery commander could and would use his best judgement and he would pick targets and deliver fire missions on them based on the sounds of the battle. If the firing suddenly escalated it usually meant that the friendly positions were being overrun so he would direct fire on and in front of friendly positions at the direction of the heaviest firing.

>I heard the UK still uses FOOs, I think the

>Germans do, what about other armies?

To the best of my knowledge FOO's are used in the Finnish army. So are towed artillery pieces BTW.

[Battlefront.com]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>And a single shot from a K98k would drive the entire US platoon to ground and they would look for a sniper for minutes before they dare to move on. Is that now modelled in the game ?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No, because this is an utterly ridiculous statement. If this was even 1/100th of a percent true then the US forces would never have gotten off the beach. Next you will be asking us if CM correctly models British units suddenly stopping in the middle of a battle to have tea.

I don't know how many times I have to repeat this, there are no national modifiers in CM. There never have been and never will be. It amounts to "racisim" in a way, or "ignorance", "nationalism", or any other negative bias against a particular group based on sterotyping, selective reasoning, etc. Like all biases that are based on selective reasoning and examiniation of facts, it can only lead to a poor excuse for a simulation. There might be a grain of truth in a sterotype, but only a grain. And if you look hard enough at any group you will most likely see the same grains.

For every claim of x national trait there are any number of examples that either disprove such gross assumptions or examples of the other side exhibiting the same attributes. To single out behaviors and to assign them to one side or another is simply wrong. I don't know how many ways I can say it.

As for troops exhibiting different behaviors, they do. Experience, "Fitness" (new factor in CMBB), and weapons often produce radically different behaviors depending on the circumstances. These behaviors explain, to a large extent, what is seen in reports like Dupy (who, like any historian, is not always correct, BTW).

Instead of just making "all US units afraid to return fire because they were born and trained in the US" a matchup like this better explains why some historian or another might have observed the same behavior:

A 12 man US Rifle Squad with only Green experience runs into a Veteran 9 man German Rifle Squad which is in good cover. The US platoon CO has never seen combat, the German platoon CO has been on the Eastern Front for 2 years. All other factors are equal. Gee... which unit do you think will go to ground and stay there until it runs away?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I think this is worth a closer look at least, given the weight of evidence.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What "evidence"? Selective reasoning abstracted from a few words from one author? Sorry, the "evidence" you have presented in this discussion, and others, is simply a relrection of your own personal biases. At least when you attempt to apply such statements as rule instead of something which is situationally dependent (eg. US 1942 performance in NA compared to US performance in 1945 Germany).

There is no need for national modifiers, other than to make up for weaknesses in the realism of the simulation (ie. not simulating the factors which produce differnt national behaviors, like ASL's system). And even if one could make a case for such a modifier, it would be all too easy to make a case against it. Have I mentioned that national modifiers are bad and that CM will never employ such factors?

Steve

[ 07-06-2001: Message edited by: Big Time Software ]

[Battlefront.com]

Tero:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>>Using regular Germans vs. green Americans

>can compensate for any other discrepancy.

That would mean that in essence using above average troop quality for the US infantry becomes gamey. How realistic is that ?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Very realistic, provided the correct experience choices were made. If you want to simulate the poorer side of a force, any force, you drop the Experience rating. Check out the descriptions of a battle that exhibits the kind of behavior you are thinking of and you will most likely find lower levels of experience. For example, the US forces in North Africa were poorly trained and inadequately armed (in many ways). They were on the attack and were facing some of the best troops the Germans ever fielded. No wonder why they got their heads handed to them on a platter. But fast forward to some of the battles in the Ardennes for example. There is more than one case of a smaller US force defeating a much larger German force during that battle. The Germans didn't just decide to let the Americans win in such situations -> they were beat.

Experience is the key element to simulating troop quality. There are others, but many are inherent (headcount, weapons, mix of formation weapons, etc.) and unique to that nationality. So when you combine the correct Experience setting, with historically correct troops, in a historically realistic battle situation you should (and do!) get historically correct results all else being equal.

Steve

[Vanir Ausf B]

I keep telling myself this is pointless, but I keep posting anyway. I can't explain it.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

To me he comes across as having been turned from that into thinking that the M1 would have been an excellent suppressor if it had been deployed in that manner.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

He never said anything of the sort, or even suggested it.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I suspect it is not. A semi-auto FP rating is better than the bolt action FP. Bullet for bullet. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Check the FP rating for the M1 and K98 sometime.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Yes. But how did the Germans react in a similar tactical situation ?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You tell me. You're the one wanting to give them extra bonuses.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>"Hey, somebody is firing at us from that direction with a MG ! Sorry, can't see it. Can you see i..argh. **** this ****, lets call in some arty to flush that speck of woods. Yeah, Rock'nRoll !"<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The thing that bothers me so much about your nationality modifier crusade is that it's based upon stereotypes like the one above. The use of stereotypes, even ones with some basis in fact, in modeling human behavior is wrongheaded

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>A German squad (9 men) vs an American squad (12 men), both in covered terrain and advancing, distance 75 meters. The Germans open up first. What happens next ? Which team in your oppinion prevails and why ?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Result would hinge entirely upon what the 2 squads had eaten for breakfast.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>And a single shot from a K98k would drive the entire US platoon to ground and they would look for a sniper for minutes before they dare to move on. Is that now modelled in the game ?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Now you're just making things up. And another stereotype to boot. "US soldiers were so jittery a single shot would suppress them for minutes. German soldiers, however, would bravely push forward, unbothered by the small annoyance."

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I think this is worth a closer look at least, given the weight of evidence.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

All your weighty evidence amounts to words you've put into Depuy's mouth combined with stuff you've pulled out of thin air.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>That would mean that in essence using above average troop quality for the US infantry becomes gamey. How realistic is that ?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Are you suggesting there were no above average US troops in the ETO. How logical is that?

EDIT: DOH! Steve posted stuff while I was typing. I need to learn to type faster...

[ 07-06-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]

[Tero]

>What "evidence"? Selective reasoning

>abstracted from a few words from one author?

One author ?

You obviously did not read my post through or follow up the links I posted

The first was an interview of General Depuy (NOT Dupuy the mathematician, he was present during the previous encounter).

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=104

Changing an Army, 1986 (Interview with General William E. Depuy, 1979)

Recapping the highlights

INTERVIEWER: Did the training programs include live fire?

GEN DEPUY: ..... However, the M-l rifle, coupled with the rifle marksmanship program, worked to discourage active firing in combat by the average soldier. He was trained to shoot at and hit a target, but in combat, in the attack, he rarely ever saw a target. So, he was indisposed to shoot. The Germans, on the other hand, used machine pistols which were area weapons. That is, they sprayed the area ahead of them and achieved fire superiority which we now call suppression.

INTERVIEWER: Could you overwatch from your hedgerow?

GEN DEPUY: We didn’t do that very well. You see, one of our training deficiencies was that almost all suppression was done by indirect fire weapons. Very little suppression was done by small arms. Occasionally, we would use our heavy machine guns. People thought first about mortars and artillery, then heavy machine guns, and finally, light machine guns. Really, they didn’t think much about using riflemen for suppression. They just thought of using riflemen for maneuvering and sharpshooting. The M-l rifle was a precision weapon but there were no precision targets. This problem was not confined to the 90th Division. You have read SLAM Marshall and know that even in the IOlst only 25 percent of the troopers fired.* And, we only had eight heavy machine guns in a battalion. So, it didn’t work very well. We didn’t do direct fire suppression very well in my outfit until the latter part of the war.

INTERVIEWER: Was there anything about their tactics, good or bad, that impressed you?

GEN DEPUY: Yes, the infantry tactics of the Germans involved a lot of direct fire suppression that our tactics didn’t. They didn’t have as much indirect fire suppression, as much artillery, as we did, but they had mortars, and direct fire suppression, coupled with a lot of movement.

The other source at

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=143

is

Combat Lessons No.3, War Department Pamphlet, 1944

From page p26 (p35 in the Acrobat document)

"Use Your Rifle Colonel Harry B. Sherman,

Commanding Officer -th Infantry, ITALY: “We have a hard time getting riflemen to use their rifles; they depend on the artillery and other supporting weapons too much. In most cases it would be better if they fired even if there is no visible target. A group of riflemen may be stopped by a German machine gun which they can’t locate, but if they will open fire in the general direction of the machine gun the Germans will usually pull out. I believe that we have placed too much emphasis on fire orders and fire control by unit leaders. Men must be taught to open fire at once in the general direction of any target that is holding them up, without waiting for any squad leader or other individual to tell them to open fire.”

------

Which part of the text above am I misunderstanding ? Gen. DEpuys personal recollections are one thing. If it reaches a War Department publication I'd say the problem is real, compounded and widespread enough to warrant measures to talk the troops out of it.

>Sorry, the "evidence" you have presented in

>this discussion, and others, is simply a

>relrection of your own personal biases.

It is not.

Who is not being openminded now ? I hate it too when the Finnish army gets belittled and badmouthed. But instead of the denial you seem to show I try to find evidence to counter the claims I feel are unjustified. That is not what I am seeing you doing here.

>Have I mentioned that national modifiers

>are bad and that CM will never employ such

>factors?

I think we have discussed it a few times.

But this case at hand is the first I have been able to find that is a recorded instance of quantifiable and above all programmable national specific combat behaviour pattern. Too bad it happened to be about US infantry but the tread was about Allied vs German SMG's.

[Tero]

>Very realistic, provided the correct

>experience choices were made.

Who desides what is correct ?

>If you want to simulate the poorer side of a

>force, any force, you drop the Experience

>rating.

But that will affect the superior sides of that side as well. And there is where I feel the unrealism lies. The player can not affect only one aspect of the troop combat behaviour.

>The Germans didn't just decide to let the

>Americans win in such situations -> they

>were beat.

Even if some members like to think I disagree with that I do not. And the US troops did get better while the Germans got worse. But that does not make the fact that there were inherent differences in tactics and doctrine that affected the behaviour of the troops in team A so that they would respond differently to battlefield stimuli.

>Experience is the key element to simulating

>troop quality. There are others, but many

>are inherent (headcount, weapons, mix of

>formation weapons, etc.) and unique to that

>nationality. So when you combine the

>correct Experience setting, with

>historically correct troops, in a

>historically realistic battle situation you

>should (and do!) get historically correct

>results all else being equal.

Assuming all things ARE equal. Which I think are not. Not at least in such a degree that would warrant wholesale bunching of nationalities to act under the same manner, only with diffent equipment and different colour uniforms.

[ 07-06-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

I don't quite agree with this (no surprises there). From my readings it seems that Commonwealth FOOs did a good amount of 'off-map' firing, where they would direct the artillery without necessarily being present at the location it was needed. There usually was one FOO attached to every battalion, and he would always be where the main effort was undertaken.

The Commonwealth also operated a system whereby all the guns could be brought onto a target, byt firing so-called MIKE (regiment), VICTOR (division) and UNCLE (Corps) targets, depending on the situation. The FOOs were specifically trained while in the UK, and were usually the battery commanders. Once losses set in, they were replaced with less experienced officers. The job was hazardous, but the advantage of having FOOs instead of having Joe Public direct your arty was that they were specialists with a good understanding of the effect of the guns, the constraints on the system, and how to direct the guns.

What kind of system does the US use today? I heard the UK still uses FOOs, I think the Germans do, what about other armies?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

First off: The Finnish did not use a system of radio switching to allow platoon level access to artillery. This Teroism is of course nonsense. They used FOs, while the Russians loved programmed shoots.

Part of the US system is still the "every gun in range" system. That means any infantry officer can call in artillery from any artillery weapon up to and including a theater level weapon. An artillery shoot is requested, and a central director will reply with what artillery is around and how long it will take for the fire. This system was started in WW2, and really came into its own in Vietnam.

An officer can start out a mission knowing that no artillery is available, or he can be assigned artillery assets, but calling in artillery is considered a basic skill by the US Army, and it is expected that every infantry officer can do it from junior lieutenant on up. Now maybe it often falls on the manuever element's commander to do it )at least a company commander) and rarely a lieutenant.

FOs are stilled used, espeically for assets from other service branches, but if you read the books Roll Me Over, Company Commander, Soldier, etc you will run into several instances of young officers calling down their own artillery, and only rare use of FOs until you get to the brigade level.

[Tero]

>I keep telling myself this is pointless, but

>I keep posting anyway. I can't explain it.

Perhaps you find the excercise in logics as refreshing as I do. What I find intriquing is the fact that the only facts for or against are being presented by me. Come on, lads. GOGOGO !!!

>He never said anything of the sort, or even

>suggested it.

Really ?

GEN DEPUY: We didn’t do that very well. You see, one of our training deficiencies was that almost all suppression was done by indirect fire weapons. Very little suppression was done by small arms. Occasionally, we would use our heavy machine guns. People thought first about mortars and artillery, then heavy machine guns, and finally, light machine guns. Really, they didn’t think much about using riflemen for suppression..... We didn’t do direct fire suppression very well in my outfit until the latter part of the war.

>Check the FP rating for the M1 and K98

>sometime.

I will.

>You tell me. You're the one wanting to give

>them extra bonuses.

Actually I am wanting the US troops to act in accordance with the historical tactics and doctrine. Which was different from the way (at least) the Germans acted, if that can be extrapolated from Gen. Depuys text.

>The thing that bothers me so much about your

>nationality modifier crusade is that it's

>based upon stereotypes like the one above.

The only steroetype in the example was "Rock'nRoll!" bit. The rest was in accordance with the narrative of both Gen. Depuy and the Pamphlet.

>The use of stereotypes, even ones with some

>basis in fact, in modeling human behavior is

>wrongheaded

So it is OK for BTS to use Cheerios as a metaphore but I can not use examples that are closer to real life ?

>Result would hinge entirely upon what the 2

>squads had eaten for breakfast.

That is entirely possible. But lets talk about a CM scope scenario.

>Now you're just making things up. And

>another stereotype to boot. "US soldiers

>were so jittery a single shot would suppress

>them for minutes. German soldiers, however,

>would bravely push forward, unbothered by

>the small annoyance."

You read too much into my text. Do you Americans see the boogie man every time the effectiveness of your army gets questioned ?

It has been establieshed that US troops would be predisposed not to open fire on unseen targets UNLESS ordered to do so.

A single rifle shot is fired.

Instead of opening up towards direction the sound indicats the US troops would do what ? Troops from any army would hit the deck, that goes without saying. Would it be too much to surmise that soldiers from some other army would open on their own, without waiting for a NCO or officer to give them orders to fire and give them a target.

>All your weighty evidence amounts to words

>you've put into Depuy's mouth combined with

>stuff you've pulled out of thin air.

What words have I put into Gen. Depuys mouth, exactly.

That thin air I use has been provided by the US department of defence pamphlet.

>Are you suggesting there were no above

>average US troops in the ETO. How logical is

>that?

Why do you think I think there should be some changed made to the game engine ? Even BTS says "use lower quality troops to simulate this" and I say it is not realistic.

[ 07-06-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Tero]

>First off: The Finnish did not use a system

>of radio switching to allow platoon level

>access to artillery.

That was not the SOP. What makes the US system so superior to other systems ? That fact that is an US system ?

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

>First off: The Finnish did not use a system

>of radio switching to allow platoon level

>access to artillery.

That was not the SOP. What makes the US system so superior to other systems ? That fact that is an US system ?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Tero, many years ago I was in a debate as an undergraduate with two members of the Ayran Brotherhood, a cult like group here in the states that proclaim the innate superiority of one race over another. My side of this debate (along with others in my group from my undergraduate university) was to debate the facts between IQ differences and race.

We quickly discovered that the other side was adept at using stereotyping and pulling a single statement by a single scientist (such as Darwin) from the wood work, while dismissing all other scientific evidence. While we won the debat (by vote of a panel of judges who were as biased as you claim everyone else on the board is to the Germans and Finns, ie. not biased at all) we could not even dent the armor of the Aryan Brotherhood. They were correct not because of a string of facts, but because they knew they were right. We were wrong despite having a string of facts on our side because we were wrong.

Now I could mention the use of telephone field switching systems (as opposed to the simple line to line can on a string system used earlier) and devotion of a far larger signals corp to the problem of artillery calls, the use of computers back in the United States to generate detailed firing cards, lavish use of radios, development of a priority system for assigning artillery to various threats, the larger number of batteries per front line unit than other armies, the larger amount of ammo carried as a unit of fire, and the like, but that would be futile. It still would not be Finnish, thus it would not be superior.

Rather than wasting time laying out the complexities of the US system of artillery which, when fully perfected in the 1960s allowed artillery assets to reach young 2nd Lieutenants minutes after being fired on in Vietnam, I will just conceed that the Finnish Artillery system of World War Two, capable as it was of launching orbital nuclear rockets to hit distant cities with a CEP of less than a foot, with its ability to allow each Finnish soldier the ability to lay in and track the battleship guns of any battleship in service from any location in the world, was superior to all other systems in the world, and with it the Finns were able to take over Europe and eventually the world in a way that Carl Gustav could have only dreamed.

I will allow you, by quoting a single line from a Gomer Pyle television show, to define the complexities of the US artillery system during Wiorld War Two to your own fufillment, while I will just languish away with my US Army "Artillery Systems of the Second World War", "Field Manual for Artilley Soldiers", Brassy's "Artillery of the World Volume 2 (WWII)", and other technical discussions of artillery that are worthless in the face of set beliefs.

[ 07-06-2001: Message edited by: Slapdragon ]

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Tero:

What words have I put into Gen. Depuys mouth, exactly.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

One blatant example:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Really ?

GEN DEPUY: We didn’t do that very well. You see, one of our training deficiencies was that almost all suppression was done by indirect fire weapons. Very little suppression was done by small arms. Occasionally, we would use our heavy machine guns. People thought first about mortars and artillery, then heavy machine guns, and finally, light machine guns. Really, they didn’t think much about using riflemen for suppression..... We didn’t do direct fire suppression very well in my outfit until the latter part of the war.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You quote this to support your contention that Dupey thought the M1 Garand would be a good suppression weapon if they had tried to use it as such. This despite the fact that he makes no mention of the M1 anywhere in that quote.

In fact another Depuy quote that you posted earlier (but seem to have somehow forgotten now) pretty much discredits your point:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>DEPUY: However, the M-l rifle, coupled with the rifle marksmanship program, worked to discourage active firing in combat by the average soldier.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

And again later:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>DEPUY: Really, they didn’t think much about using riflemen for suppression. They just thought of using riflemen for maneuvering and sharpshooting. The M-l rifle was a precision weapon but there were no precision targets<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I find these statements very hard to reconcile with your contention that Depuy thought the M1 was an "excellent suppressor" (your exact words).

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Do you Americans see the boogie man every time the effectiveness of your army gets questioned ?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yet another stereotype.

[ 07-06-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]

[Tero]

>It still would not be Finnish, thus it would

>not be superior.

No, you condescending sore loser of debates. Those sour grapes must have tasted really good since you keep coming for seconds.

Does it really hurt so bad when I was able to trash your set of facts about Finnish history in a honest and fair debate that you have to resort to sniping, underhanded sneering and womanlike badmouthing in every turn ? When you can not overturn my facts with other facts you attack me. Some scholar you are.

All I have seen from you are opinions supposedly based on facts (which you keep hidden away). I at least try to present my sources whenever possible. I am not even expecting you to take my word for it. I try to seek them on the net so that they can be read and judged without spending and arm and a leg on the bookstore.

On the subject:

What makes you think that a system conceived by you is better than the conceived by others ?

I know for a fact the US system WWII was good. All the major players used their own tactics and doctrine and all had their strong points and weaknesses. I also know that the Finnish artillery doctrine conceived and developed before the war and perfected during it through practical experiences. In combat it was at least equal to the US system, perhaps even better. Just like the British, the Soviet and the German systems were in some respects. There are no absolutes in this field so I see no reason how you could monopolize it by a blanket statement. You say your system was the best, I say ours was the best. And we are both right.

The next time you have some free time do a search on the net check out

http://foto.hut.fi/seura/members/lofstrom.html.

It is an obituary about a man who worked on the special camera that was instrumental in developing our artillery arm and its accuracy.

As it happens I know all the ins and outs of calling up and directing arty fire using the WWII Finnish system, having been inside the system as a signals NCO in a Finnish coastal artillery fort. We had to learn rigging the old system up just in case we get EMP'd. How much hands on experience do you have on the subject ?

>while I will just languish away

>with my US Army "Artillery Systems of the

>Second World War", "Field Manual for

>Artilley Soldiers", Brassy's "Artillery of

>the World Volume 2 (WWII)", and other

>technical discussions of artillery that are

>worthless in the face of set beliefs.

And these impressive volumes are 100% accurate and there is nothing in the world of artillery they have not overlooked.

If I am a zelot then you are a blind zelot if you do not acknowledge that there might be some things out of your field of view.

Please take a quick test for me: how many pages on US (or British, or Soviet or German) artillery and how many on Finnish artillery ?

[rune]

Lets look at some of the story behind the evidence that tero states.

1. It made a war time publication. Hmmm, the Dupray article is from 1986 and is an oral rememborance.

2. I have a war time publication that tells me how the Sherman was superior to the Panther. Take these with a grain of salt.

3. Dupray own article tells of how they didn't do well in the hedgerows. That place him in the 90th Infantry Division when the unit was suffering under mismangement. I quote:

"The 90th Division entered W.W.II combat in Normandy on D-Day and fought across Europe continuously until V-E Day. During these eleven months, it served under six different division commanders; the first two swiftly proved themselves inept and were deservedly relieved; the next two were great combat leaders who were rapidly promoted to higher ranks as corps commanders; the last two were able, competent leaders who did well by the division."

4. In your own quote, Dupray claims by the end of the war the unit didn't have that problem. So, between July of 44 and Apr 45 it has been fixed. Perhaps it was more of a bad training, bad leadership, heavy casualty thing then one of a national failure? When would this national doctrine change during the 11 months of combat?

5. Quoting the 101st commander doesn't prove a thing either. That 25% only fired their rifles has always been debated. HOTLY i may add.

Sorry, in my eyes you have proved nothing. I require more proof then this to sway me to your side of the arguement.

Rune

[Tero]

>One blatant example:

>

>You quote this to support your contention

>that Dupey thought the M1 Garand would be a

>good suppression weapon if they had tried to

>use it as such. This despite the fact that

>he makes no mention of the M1 anywhere in

>that quote.

Well DUH ! What was their primary infantry fire arm at the time ?

>I find these statements very hard to

>reconcile with your contention that Depuy

>thought the M1 was an "excellent suppressor"

>(your exact words).

Why is that ? I used to think that the Garand WAS an excellent suppressor, being rifle caliber, high MV, semiauto, multiple shot weapon. Silly me.

Then I found out the US Army doctrine predisposed the troops not to use it as one because they had been tought to fire at clearly presented point targets.

In my view Depuy is blaming faulty tactics and doctrine more than the troops and the weapon.

>>Americans see the boogie man every time the

>>effectiveness of your army gets questioned

>>?

>

>Yet another stereotype.

It was a question, not a statement. Are you grasping at straws ?

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

Well DUH ! What was their primary infantry fire arm at the time ?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Depuy doesn't say anything about any weapons that would have been good suppressors if they had only been used as such, there or anywhere else.

However, the M-l rifle, coupled with the rifle marksmanship program, worked to discourage active firing in combat by the average soldier.

The M-l rifle was a precision weapon but there were no precision targets

What parts of these sentences do you not understand?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Why is that ? I used to think that the Garand WAS an excellent suppressor, being rifle caliber, high MV, semiauto, multiple shot weapon. Silly me. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes, silly you. I thought we were talking about Depuy's opinion of the M1, not yours.

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

>It still would not be Finnish, thus it would

>not be superior.

No, you condescending sore loser of debates. Those sour grapes must have tasted really good since you keep coming for seconds.

Does it really hurt so bad when I was able to trash your set of facts about Finnish history in a honest and fair debate that you have to resort to sniping, underhanded sneering and womanlike badmouthing in every turn ? When you can not overturn my facts with other facts you attack me. Some scholar you are.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No sour grape Tero, I am merely pointing out that debate is impossible in a situation where evidence is not the issue. This has nothing to do with the Finland debate, the other Finns on this board did not go left field about all this.

All I am pointing out to my colleagues (not really to you at all) is that this is better debated elseware in a situation where nationalism is not an issue. Steve, Vanir, Rune, John, and the rest can present fact until they are blue in the face, and nothing will pass through the veil of nationalism.

Nationalism is a disease, just as racism and sexism, and the people who suffer from it will not get better. The above worthies are wasting their time. Witness your comment "womanlike badmouthing". This is a train wreck of narrow opinions, I am glad Kitty is not on the board right now or she would give you both barrels.

My point of the above is that nationalism cannot be debated using facts. Nationalism causes backwards thinking, such as: "I know Finland was the best, now lets find some facts to prove it."

I only seem to attack you because this element of blind nationalism (and sexism) is distasteful, and counterproductive. My compatriots are presenting facts to a stone wall, and I am only pointing this out.

[ 07-06-2001: Message edited by: Slapdragon ]