Jump to content

"Top-Down" T.D.'s ... Why??


Recommended Posts

probably the less weight the faster and more manuoeverable it is. which is the only way to avoid being blown away given it's lack of good armor.

------------------

"They had their chance- they have not lead!" - GW Bush

"They had mechanical pencils- they have not...lead?" - Jon Stewart on The Daily Show

Link to comment
Share on other sites

If they did have armor, it would be so weak it wouldn't matter anyway, so why bother? I love M18s though, plenty of punch, and able to move faster than a GI to a bottle of Schlitz.

------------------

Well my skiff's a twenty dollar boat, And I hope to God she stays afloat.

But if somehow my skiff goes down, I'll freeze to death before I drown.

And pray my body will be found, Alaska salmon fishing, boys, Alaska salmon fishing.

-Commercial fishing in Kodiak, Alaska

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Think of U.S. tank destroyers as mobile AT guns, not tanks. In WWII the U.S. needed somthing that would punch through the thick-skinned German armor. The easiest/quickest solution at the time was to strap the biggest AT gun they had onto a Sherman chassis. Forget about encasing the gun in an armored turret. That costs more and takes more time. Later in the war the U.S. would develop and field a 76mm gun in a Sherman tank but in the meantime at least they had somthing to hit the Germans with.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I can see 1 good reason for having ragtop TDs, provided you accept the whole US TD concept as unavoidable.

The US TD doctrine was to use TDs as a defense against enemy tank attacks. Because attackers usually outnumber defenders, to stop the attack the TDs would have to kill more tanks during the battle than the tanks killed TDs. One way of achieving this would be to enable the TDs to spot and engaged tanks quicker than vice versa. So if you had the whole crew poking their heads up looking for targets, you'd have an advantage over tanks with just 1 crewman at most unbuttoned.

This is just a guess. But a piece of thin armor over the turret wouldn't have weighed very much, so I don't think fear of slowing the TDs down was the reason.

Of course, TD crewmen had another idea on this subject. The one I've heard the most is that the open top was required so they could bail out quickly after the inadequate front and side armor had let in an enemy round smile.gif.

------------------

-Bullethead

Visit the brand new Raider Operations message board at www.delphi.com/raiderops

Main site www.historicalgames.bizland.com/index.html

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Basically, a bunch of non-brilliant US Army generals came up with this plan. They figured that the rest of the world was fighting the war all wrong. Despite the fact the the Brits, Germans, and Soviets had been fighting for several years, and all were moving towards the multi-purpose medium battle tank, these particular US Army dolts knew better than everyone else how war should, would, and could be fought.

See, tanks were not meant to fight other tanks. Tanks were meant to support infantry. To support infantry, you had to go get close to them, so yout infantry support tank had better be closed top. But, since your tank will never fight other tanks, it was a waste of resources to put a gun in it that could engage other tanks. Result: the 75mm armed M4 Ronson.

Now, the job of destroying enemy tanks was going to be done by AT guns. Problem is that unless your opponent is dumb enough to always walk into your AT screen, the bad guys tend to be somewhere where your towed AT guns are not. So you had to mount them on a vehicle. Not a tank, mind you, 'cause tanks are only for infantry support and exploitation.

But this mobile AT gun (dubbed the tank-destroyer) certainly would not need heavy armor or even a top, since it would never get itself into a position where it would be attacked by enemy infantry, oh gosh no! All it needed was a decent gun and good mobility.

So we got the M10 TD. Of course, the result of all this was that the US ended up with a tank that got wiped when it had to go up against other tanks, which happened a lot since apparently someone forgot to tell those pesky Germans that you were not supposed to fight tanks with tanks. And we got a TD that was not real effective against other tanks, because it did not have the armor or gun to trade shots with the very vehicles it was designed to destroy. But we biult 'em by the tens of thousands, and the Germans destroyed them by the hundreds, and we won despite the spectacular idiocy of US Army procurement.

The later equipping of Shermans with the 76, and the advent of the 90mm armed M36 and the rather belated appearance of the M26 Pershing Medium tank were all after the fact attempts to fix McNairs stupid error. The scary thing is that even those stop-gap measures may not have happened as quickly as they did if a short bomb drop from an American plane hadn't killed McNair. While American privates were getting blown away at an alarming rate in Normandy because of inadequate armor, McNair was still insisting that the 76mm Sherman and 90mm TD were unecessary. That bombadier should get a medal.

Jeff Heidman

Jeff Heidman

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Bullethead and Cybeq are essentially correct. The TD was seen as an AT gun on tracks -- cheap to make, the crew should be hunters and able to hear and see around them, and ROF was considerably increased. One thing not modelled (that I have seen in limited tests that is) is that the open Top TDs were much for agile and responsive than the enclosed tank. Anyone who has seen a real tank moving in operations (mine was M48A5s when I did a show on the 53rd Infantry Brigade) knows that closed up they look kind of like drunk drivers when moving on patrol. The dramatic pictures of tanks moving at speed only happens when they know no one is around to shoot at them or they are ducking from cover to cover. Otherwise a tank is very blinding.

So people in an open TD were much more in the environment than a closed tank.

It should be noted that post war, while the Jackson remained in service with the Hellcat for a while, it was the closed tank that won out.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Bullethead:

I can see 1 good reason for having ragtop TDs, provided you accept the whole US TD concept as unavoidable.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Hey yeah...a convertible Tank Destroyer. Now that WOULD make the Germans green with envy. Just push a button & your electrically operated steel re-inforced rag top covers your head from all those nasty 81 mm fragments. Now that would be a sight to see!

Regards

Jim R.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Cueball:

Well, one advantage is does provide is greater gun depression. That allows you to sit on a steep reverse slope with only the business end facing the enemy.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

http://www.onwar.com/tanks/usa/fm10.htm

Yes but it was only -10. Good but not great.

Ive seen pics of them with a weld plate on top. The guys inside could see under it towards the front. Think it was italy.

[This message has been edited by :USERNAME: (edited 10-07-2000).]

Link to comment
Share on other sites

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:

So people in an open TD were much more in the environment than a closed tank.

It should be noted that post war, while the Jackson remained in service with the Hellcat for a while, it was the closed tank that won out.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

In strict terms of AT warfare, the concept seemed sound at the time. But there was likely more than one occasion where TD's were the only available "tank" to a local firefight and thus used to reduce a German strongpoint, and in close quarters. Such usage highlighted the TD's vulnerability, as noted by others earlier on.

I would certainly prefer an open-top US TD to a limited-traverse self-propelled gun (SPG) like the Stug III if I can afford to keep the US TD at "standoff" range against various enemy armor/infantry. Otherwise, I would then opt for an enclosed assault gun like the Stug, in lieu of actual German tanks.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Lack of turret top functioned to increase speed and maneuverability by reduction in vehicle weight. More importantly lack of a turret top significantly increased crew visibility. Stealth and ambush, followed by rapid displacement were in theory the method by which SPTD’s were to engage enemy tanks. Going toe to toe with full blown tanks was not in keeping with TD doctrine.

Some top cover expedients were constructed insitu by various ordnance units. Photo and artistic rendering is provided in images below (images from: M10/M36 by Wojciech Gawrych…great pictures, unfortunately for me the text is all in Polish)

Some brief notes on the development of the self-propelled tank destroyer.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

From: Seek, Strike, and Destroy: US Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in WWII, by Chritopher Gabel

“The execution of tank destroyer doctrine obviously placed a great deal of reliance on the ability of men and equipment to outmaneuver and out-shoot enemy tanks. Early in 1942, when FM 18—5 was being written, most tank destroyer battalions possessed towed antitank guns drawn by standard trucks or half-tracks, even though the favored battalion table of organization called for self-propelled weapons. Bruce (who was promoted to brigadier general on 16 February) decided to adopt self-propelled weapons, even though General McNair continued to favor the towed gun. McNair insisted that the self-propelled gun was too large to be readily concealed, that it would be an unstable firing platform, and that it was less dependable and more expensive than the towed antitank gun." Despite McNair's objections. General Marshall favored experiments with self-propelled mounts. McNair acceded, but he was never really reconciled to the self-propelled weapon.

The specifications that Bruce laid down for the ideal tank destroyer weapon were very demanding: simple design, low cost, readily mass-produced, light weight, high mobility, with a three-inch gun to be manned by a crew of five. The efforts of the Tank Destroyer Center to have such a design put into production met with resistance from the Ordnance Department, which pushed its own deigns regardless of Bruce's requirements. A Special Armored Vehicle Board, chaired by Brigadier General W. B. Palmer, attempted to reconcile such disputes. Palmer noted that the representatives from the Tank Destroyer Center were inflexible in their demands, and that they were possibly asking too much in the requirements they put forth.

Late in 1942, Bruce obtained approval from the Palmer Board for a tank destroyer design that met his specifications. The new weapon, designed from the ground up to be a tank destroyer, was orginally called the T-42. After a number of modifications, which included upgunning the original design significantly, the T-42 was eventually redesignated the T-70, and when accepted for full production, the Gun Motor Carriage M-18. The M-18 could achieve speeds of over fifty miles an hour and weighed less than twenty tons. It had a ground pressure of only 11.9 pounds per square inch, less than twice that of a man (seven pounds per square inch), which ensured that the M-18 could traverse most of the ground that a foot soldier could." Armed with a powerful 76-mm high-velocity gun, the M-18 was indeed an impressive weapon by 1942 standards. The one drawback to this, the "ideal" tank destroyer, was that it did not enter production until mid-1943."

In the meantime, the tank destroyer battalions would have to make do with expedient weapons that could be quickly produced and, although far from ideal, would still allow training in tank destroyer doctrine. The first expedient, the M-3 Gun Motor Carriage, was a standard M-3 armored personnel carrier (the half-track) with a World War l-vintage 75-mm field piece mounted on the bed. Of eighty-six M-3s built in 1941, fifty went to the Philippines for use as self-propelled artillery; the remaining thirty-six were used to equip the 93d Antitank Battalion. The M-3 was standard equipment for tank destroyer battalions through 1942-43. Another expedient, the M-6, was a light three-quarter-ton truck with a 37-mm gun mounted in the rear.

Except for a gxm shield, the M-6 had no armor and was intended solely for training parposes. A third expedient, the M-10, is often considered to be the first true tank destroyer (in the sense of the term that denotes a weapons class). The M-10 utilized the chassis of the versatile M-4 medium tank (Sherman), was powered by reliable fcwin-diesel engines, and mounted an obsolete three-inch antiaircraft gun in a folly rotating open-topped turret.

General Bruce disliked the expedient weapons, especially the M-10, which he believed was too heavy and slow to execute tank destroyer doctrine. He also feared that a large-scale M-10 production effort would delay the development of the M-18. AGF overruled Bruce's objections in May 1942, ensuring that in 1943 the M-10 would become the principal tank destroyer Weapon."<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

M10_topcover.jpg

M10_topcover2.jpg

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I seem to recollect that, given the expediency of creating a tank destroyer from currently manufactured parts, the standard M4 Sherman turret wasn't large enough to fit the gun and crew. I think it had something to do with the size of the gun's counterweight, since it was a heavy AA gun retrofitted to a turret.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Initial prototypes of the M10 actually did include a canopy or closed topped rounded turret. The lack of a turret top on the M18 should suggest something, since this vehicle was designed from scratch. Certainly expediance in turret size would not have been a consideration in the design of the open toped Hellcat.

M10prototype.jpg

The following quotes are from: British and American Tanks of WWII, by Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis.

M10 Wolverine

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>FOLLOWING the successful fitting of a 105mm howitzer on the medium tank chassis, plans were made in April 1942 to mount a high velocity gun on the medium chassis to provide a complementary SP vehicle for the Tank Destroyer Command. Designated T35 this vehicle utilized an early production M4A2 tank chassis, then just available, with an open-topped low-sloped turret adapted from the turret design for the Tl Heavy Tank, and the 3in gun projected for the same vehicle. However, the Tank Destroyer Board asked for a lower silhouette and angled hull superstructure, so an improved design T35EI was drawn up, again on the M4A2 chassis, and incorporating these features. The T35EI was modified with thinner armour than the T35 and the circular turret was subsequently abandoned in favor of a five-sided welded turret. As finalized, the design was standardized in June 1942 and designated M10 GMC. In order to increase production, use of the M4A3 chassis was also authorized and vehicles built on this chassis were designated M10A1 GMC. Most of these were retained in America for training or converted to prime movers, M35. Others were allocated to Lend-Lease shipments to Britain (see below). Grand Blanc Arsenal built 4,993 M10s between September 1942 and December 1943. Ford built 1,038 M10A1 between October 1942 and September 1943, and Grand Blanc built 675 M10A1, September-November 1943. 300 of the latter batch, however, were completed with new turrets as M36 (T71) GMC.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

M36 Jackson

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>IN October 1942 it was decided to investigate the possibility of adapting the 90mm AA gun as a high velocity anti-tank gun for mounting in American tanks and SP vehicles. In early 1943 a trial installation of a 90mm gun was made in the turret of the M10, but the gun proved too long and heavy for the turret which was, in any case, not entirely adequate for the 3in gun. In March 1943, therefore, work began on designing a new large turret to fit the MIO and take the 90mm gun. Tested at APG, the modified vehicle was very satisfactory and an initial "limited procurement" order of 500 vehicles was placed under the designation T71 GMC. In June 1944, the vehicle was standardized as the M36 GMC and entered service in NW Europe in late 1944 where it proved a most successful type able to knock out the heavy German Panther and Tiger tanks at long range. Some tank destroyer battalions notched up impressive scores with little loss to themselves using the M36. A priority programmed to provide more M36 type vehicles to replace the less satisfactory M1O led to the following variants:<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-08-2000).]

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Guest machineman

The photos and specs I have show very little difference between the M36 Tank Destroyer and the M4A3 Sherman other than the 76 vs 90 gun. The M36 is a little lighter, is a little less well armoured, and has the same max speed. From what I can see it has similar armament to a Firefly but is extremely vulnerable to shrapnel of all kinds. Artillery barrages, mortar fire, etc must have been hell.

Here's something else interesting:

"there was an expedient model, the M36B2, which involved placing the M36 turret directly on the chassis of unconverted M4A3 (ie Sherman) medium tanks"

In other words the 90mm turret was a 'drop in' conversion.

Something else, the illustration I have shows the M36 with what looks like a add-on turret roof, so I'm assuming as mentioned before the open turret was not necessary for fitting the gun.

So I'm guessing they could have put a roof on this turret and dropped in at the assembly line when they were building Shermans, so instead of building 75mm and 76mm Shermans they could have build 90mm ones.

Makes you think, doesn't it.

Those Sherman tankers who survived Normandy with the 75 and 76 must have done a lot of 'what if's' in their heads when this little puppy came out in late '44...

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Nice post Machineman.

Just to go a little off topic...the development of WWII American tanks and self-propelled tank destroyers is rather fascinating. Aside from US ARMY Armored Force Doctrine dictating that tanks are not intended to fight tanks, the Sherman and M10 were more than a match for 1941 thorough mid 1943ish German Armour. Coincidently this is the time period in which American tank design, which would see, combat in 1944ish battles in ETO was being finalized. The Panther and Tiger were unprecedented relative to the type of combat being seen in Europe during the formative years of American WWII tanks and Armored Force Doctrine. In addition, development of the Sherman and M10 was not based on the fore knowledge of beasts such as the Panther and Tiger existing. So to imply – as another poster above has done --that American tank design and tank destroyer design was flawed is missing the point.

Had the US ARMY gone into Europe in 1943-44 and fought against German tanks it had presumed it would be fighting (i.e. MkIII’s and MkIV’s), the Sherman and M10 would have been more than a match in Tank vs. Tank encounters. In fact the M10 with its 3inch gun would have been somewhat of a god on European battlefields.

Ultimately the inadequacy of American tanks in ETO can be blamed on the Soviets wink.gif. Those commie basterds! If the Germans had not been thrust into a situation in which there primary MBT’s (i.e. MKIII’s) were forced to combat T34’s and KVI’s, there would not have been the urgency on the part of the Germans to develop the likes of the Tiger and Panther.

By my reckoning the tank that most impacted WWII tank combat was the T34. The American Army’s experience in having to combat superior tanks in 1944 is analogous to, and really no different from the German experience in Russia from 41 to mid 43 (with the exception that German Army the Americans were facing in 1944 possessed far more tactical savvy and certainly had superior crew training, than what German Army was up against in Soviet Armored forces in 41 –43).

[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-08-2000).]

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Guest Michael emrys

Right on, Jeff! You have articulated exactly the thoughts I've had in mind throughout this debate, but much more convincingly.

When the Sherman was first committed to battle (Second Alamein, October 1942), it was clearly superior to the German main battle tank, the Mk. III, and arguably enjoyed a slight edge to its nearest rival, the Mk. IVf2. It continued to enjoy at least parity with the Mk. IV (which after all comprised about half the total German tank strength) throughout the war.

The next question is whether the Pershing development and production could have been accelerated after the Western Allies encountered the Panther in the autumn of 1943, and was it? Or was it assumed that the Jackson could handle that threat all by itself?

Michael

Link to comment
Share on other sites

In fact Jeff is right on target. The Germans became involved in an arms race on the Eastern Front. Expediency pressed them into the rapid development of heavier and heavier armor. One might add that the Germans confronted the T-34 in June 1941 and the first actions fought by Tigers were in, I beleve, August 1942. All things considered, the U.S. did not do poorly in getting the Pershing out onto the battlefield in the time that they did.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Guest machineman

I dunno, when the Germans encountered the T-34 and the KV-1 in Russia, these came as a complete surprise. There was no inkling that the Russians (or anyone) had anything like this. Whereas the US and British encountered Tigers in North Africa and Panthers in Italy, and had as much time to upgun the Sherman or develop the Pershing to face the Germans before the Normandy invasion as the Germans had to develop the Panther and Tiger to face the Russians. Instead the Allies sat on their hands, which I don't really understand. Heck, the British even captured a fully working Tiger in North Africa and took it home to study! And it sure seems like at least upgunning the Sherman wasn't particularly a big deal.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Guest Rex_Bellator

If you have doubts about US tank destroyer design, try playing a game as the Brits and gaze in wonder at our Archer TD.

At least you guys had the sense to bolt the gun on the right way around! rolleyes.gif

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I am very glad for two things:

1. That the people who designed the Essex class fleet carrier, the Iowa class battleship, the M1 Garand, the P51/P36/F4U/P47 fighters, the B17/B24/B29 bomber, and, penultimately the A-Bomb, were not so happy creating weapons that were "on par" with their enemies or "good enough".

2. That the US today no longer has the attitude that creating weapons that are ok by the standards of our potential enemies. Would the US have been better off in Iraq with twice as many T-72's instead of those big, extremely heavy, and outrageously expensive M1's?

My point is simple. The US had the unique opportunity in WW2 to sit back, see what was happening in weapons development, and react accordingly. Sure, the Sherman would have been a decent tank in 1942. So?

In 1942 it should have been obvious that tanks were (duh!) getting more armored and more powerfully armed. The US had several years to watch what was happening on the Eastern Front, and learn something from that. Instead, we strolled into France with tanks that would have been pretty good had we invaded two years earlier!

Two and a half years

In two years the Soviets went from the T-34/76 with no radio and a two man turret to the T-34/85, possibly one of the finest medium tanks of the war.

In two and a half years the Brits went from 2lb armed tin cans to Churchills and 17lb armed Shermans, and they were constricted by serious shortages in materials. We could have had the Firefly, but those very same brilliant generals decided we did not need any, thank you very much.

In 2.5 years the Germans went from the PzIII with a 50mm gun and the PzIV with a short barrelled 75mm gun to the Tiger, Panther, Elefant, etc., etc.

In 2.5 years the US, while not engaged a fraction of the amount of the Soviets or Germans, managed to come up with the 75mm armed Sherman. Actually, they came up with that in less than a year, and then sat around bickering for the rest of the time.

American AT doctrine development in WW2 is not fascinating, it is a travesty. Fundamnetally, the problem is that the US had the means, the resources, the expertise, and the knowledge to build a medium tank that could stand up to the Panther, and to build them in numbers the Germans could only dream about in Hitler's wildest fantasies. Why didn't we? Because some pinhead just decided it was not needed. The country that built some of the finest weapons of the war, and built them in unprecedented numbers, could have done the same in the arena of armored warfare, if it was not for the ignorance, arrogance, and self interest of a few men who could not accept the idea that they could learn something from opening their eyes and seeing what was happening directly under their noses.

Jeff Heidman

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Machineman:

Although the Allies first encountered the Tiger in Tunisia and again in Sicily, the numbers present were relatively small. There was never much more than an under strength company of operational “big machines” present in German OoB’s in either of these Campaigns. Allies again encountered very limited numbers of Tigers around Salerno as well. With respect to Panthers in Italy…there was a single battalion present in Northern Italy at the time of the Salerno landing. If memory serves me (and now that senility has set in…my memory probably doesn’t serve me wink.gif ) but that lone Panther Battalion did not participate in the German Counter attacks against the Allied lodgment at Salerno.

Armed with the knowledge of a very limited number of encounters by Allied tanks with German Heavies in 1943, perhaps an individual with a great deal of insight, forethought, initiative, influence, and power that would have been required in overcoming the inertia of industrial retooling, and by passing a well entrenched tactical doctrine, could have taken the bull by the horns and succeeded in putting significant numbers of the M26 in the field by June of 1944 (wow! is that really a sentence?).

The differences we’re talking about are the relative numbers of tanks involved and their ability to influence the battlefield beyond token tactical encounters. The Germans were not facing an under-strength company of T34’s here and one or two KV’s there. They were literally facing thousands of T34’s and KV’s between Jun 41 up until the first few Tigers began trickling onto the Eastern Front in the Winter of 42-43. In spite of this overwhelming superiority the Soviets possessed in both tank design and relative numbers, when do we begin seeing the first appearance of the MKIVF2 with its 75mmL48 on the Eastern Front? And even the appearance of the MKIVF2 is really a stopgap measure (ala the Sherman 76mm or Firefly). When the going gets tough, the tough get going…yet we are looking at a design and test time lag of perhaps a year and half to two years before Panthers and Tigers begin to appear on the Eastern Front.

Yes you are right regarding the T34 and KV being a strategic level surprise in June and July of 1941. But by August of 1941 the cats were out of the bag and the clock for design and retooling should have started ticking. Many German tank crews and numerous high ranking German officers were well acquainted with the decisive advantage T34’s and KV’s possessed over their own equipment within one to two months of the onset of Barbarrossa.

Relative to the Allied experience in Europe and Africa, the cats were still only trickling out of the bag in 1943. Few Allied tank crews and even fewer individuals in places of authority would have had direct experience\knowledge in encounters involving Heavy German Armor in 43. The most common armor engagements in Tunisia, Sicily and Italy would still have been encounters between M10’s\Shermans and MkIII’s\MkIV’s and STUG’s.

I think only after several weeks in Normandy did the realization set in regarding how overmatched Shermans\M10’s were by German Panthers and Tigers. The Allies after all, did not have three years of Eastern Front hard knocks to rely upon in honing optimal tank development\design. And although the Commonwealth was certainly battle hardened from numerous years of fighting in the Desert, German equipment trickling into North Africa was not always top notch. The Brits, after all, considered the Stuart and Grant-Lee to be first-rate tanks for fighting the Hun in Africa, and at El Alemain the Sherman was a relative godsend.

I think it is perhaps easy for us to come to the conclusion --- given 20/20 hindsight --- that the Americans and British should have somehow anticipated the looming superiority of German tanks in 1943. I also think it is easy to ignore the tremendous amount of time required in not only the design of a tank, but also the time and materials required in design and construction of manufacturing facilities for a new tank. Tack onto to the above the time required to manufacture significant numbers of a new tank.

Rex_Bellator:

But you have to like the Achilles and Fireflys and their 17 pounder.

[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-09-2000).]

Link to comment
Share on other sites

 Share

×
×
  • Create New...