Montgomery/Rommel/Patton?

[Guest kevi]

Tom -

The majority of Soviet weapons

were developed and produced without western

help ... the majority. Sicily had a few Allied Corps involved at the time of Kursk. After Kursk, the Soviets had a free run to Berlin. The allied strategic bommber has been shown to be far less effective than

imagined at the time. If you like to give some credit to the allies for merger diversions in the Mediterrian and elswhere ...ok .. but the war was militarily won/lost on the east front. The west could have lost all of germany if the germans failed to delay the soviets in winter spring 43-44. It was that close.

- Kevin

[Berlichtingen]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>the German move on Kiev was a mistake that was forced by Soviet pressure Army Grp Center's South flank. This is well documented.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Possibly a threat in Hitler's mind, but not supported by his generals.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Stalin's elastic defence moved operational reserves from the Ukriane to the upper Dniper as planned.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I have never heard the Russian rout of '41 refered to as an "elastic defence."

The Russians could have traded real estate for time, but the cost in lives was avoidable. This fact in and of itself is enough to convince me that Stalin was no great stratagist. Crafty and cold blooded yes... stratagist no.

[Knaust]

Kursk Offensive??????....hey guys do you know that Stalin knew of the German plans about Kursk since January?

Then, and due to the fact that this plan was known only to few people in Germany, there was a traitor in the German High Command?

[Sergeant Huang]

Hi, Knaust :

As I know, the Allies can decode the German and Japan coding, so that's why German lost the Kurst and the Japanese lost the Midway.

Oh, the Allies informed the Russian, too.

Sergeant H.

[tss]

Someone asked about Soviet casualties in the Far East campaign of '45. According to "Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses" the Red Army lost 12031 KIA and 24425 WIA out of total strength of 1669500 men during the Manchurian strategic offensive. In addition, Mongolian forces lost some 200 men in the operation.

The figures are compiled from Soviet unit casualty reports and I believe that they are reasonably accurate. I don't know whether the number of KIA includes those who died of their wounds after 2 September 1945.

The same book gives Soviet casualties at Khalkhin Gol as 6831 KIA, 1142 missing, and 15952 wounded or sick out of total strength of 69101 men. So in effect, the Soviets lost 1/3 of their troops there.

The "Combat Losses" states that Japanese had 75000 men, a slight superiority. However, I have noticed errors in the book's estimates for enemy strengths before and I don't consider this number particularly reliable. The book claims that Japanese lost 61000 men with 25000 KIA.

During Lake Khasan fighting on August '38 Soviets lost 717 KIA, 75 MIA, and 3279 WIA out of 17872 men (about 23%).

-Tommi

[Knaust]

nah..seargent huang no coding....hehe...Stalin knew that just when Hitler discussed of the offensive with the High Command..only 15 ppl knew it...no coding to the Armies at the Front!

[Major Tom]

I don't think that I ever claimed that the West Armed Russia to the teeth. Russia easily Mechanized itself, but, the West Made it mobile. Russia produced too many AFV's while neglecting their motor transport. You can only move as fast as your supplies allow you. Britian, America, and Canada produced vast numbers of Trucks and Jeeps for the Russians which enabled them to advance on Berlin as fast as they did. Indeed, it took them 2 years to traverse the same distance that the Germans did in 6 months! Imagine the difficulty in the Russian advance if they didn't have those thousands vehicles from the Western allies. A slower Russian advance would have given the Germans more time to solidify their defences, therefore draw out the war even longer.

The Allies just didn't sit on their asses until 1944. Numerous high quality units had to be positioned outside of the Eastern Front to fight the Allies in the West. Most of the 20 or so Divisions fighting in Sicily and Italy were crack forces. There were always at least 4 Panzer divisions, let alone 40+ Infantry Divisions in France alone. There had to be a strong army in Norway which saw absolutely no contact with the Russians in case of an Allied invasion. Greece took up the Strength of a Corps in case of British invasion. I would estimate 1/3 of all German forces were tied up due to the Western Allied operations. Russia could focus all of their attention against one enemy, unlike Germany and the Western Allies.

The German losses in North Africa tend to be under rated. They lost 3 Panzer Divisions and 3 Mechanized divisions, let alone independent Regiments and HQ troops. This doesn't include replacements and casualties sustained in 2 years of bitter fighting. I could probably safely estimate at Germany's total casualties in North Africa to rival the losses at Stalingrad. And virtually all of the troops lost were of high quality.

During the War in the West 1944, two entire Panzer Armee's were severely devestated, along with two other Infantry Armies. And this was during the opening phases of the battle. These tank formations could not be easily replaced in equipment of manpower.

The Air war over England, France and Germany was devestating to the Luftwaffe and the German war machine. During Operation Barbarossa the Germans fielded less aircraft then they did against France in 1940. This was due to the losses sustained from 1939-41 purely by the Western Allies and Poland. The quality was also down from it's early war height. Without the Allied bombing of factories the German's production would have been much higher than it was during wartime. In 1941 England was producing more war material than Germany!

I agree that the War In Russia was the most important aspect of the entire conflict. If Russia was defeated, I would assume that the war would probably still be going on, or, a negotiated peace would have occured. But, the success of the Russians depended on the success and help of their allies.

[PanzerLeader]

Quite far back in this thread I've heard somebody say that Guderian was the best tactician in the war.

I have to disagree here. Guderian did invent the concept of BlitzKrieg but throughout the war he never commanded anything less than a Corps. That's operational level, not tactical level.

For the best tactician you have to look further down the chain of command...Guys like Peiper.

[Spook]

"...A slower Russian advance would have given the Germans more time to solidify their defences, therefore draw out the war even longer."

Pretty much agree with you here, Major.

"..I could probably safely estimate at Germany's total casualties in North Africa to rival the losses at Stalingrad. And virtually all of the troops lost were of high quality."

I would appreciate seeing the attrition numbers here, Major, because up to mid-'42, DAK still was formed mainly of only three full divisions---15th/21st Pz & 90th Lt. Definitely not the same level of manpower & armor as thrown against the East Front. I do recall that a lot of troops were captured in the final surrender in Tunisia, but the back-and-forth of the NA campaigns of '41 & '42 don't quite strike me to have the same "attrition level" as the major East Front battles.

"During the War in the West 1944, two entire Panzer Armee's were severely devestated, along with two other Infantry Armies. And this was during the opening phases of the battle. These tank formations could not be easily replaced in equipment of manpower."

Agreed, and what significantly aided this to come about was the air superiority established on the NW Europe campaign for its full timeframe. The air superiority of D-Day wasn't achieved overnight, it took years in the making and the corner wasn't turned until early-'44. The primary catalyst for this in turn was the strategic bombing of the Reich industies.

"The Air war over England, France and Germany was devestating to the Luftwaffe and the German war machine. During Operation Barbarossa the Germans fielded less aircraft then they did against France in 1940. This was due to the losses sustained from 1939-41 purely by the Western Allies and Poland. The quality was also down from it's early war height. Without the Allied bombing of factories the German's production would have been much higher than it was during wartime. In 1941 England was producing more war material than Germany!"

Agreed (as noted priorhand) except on two points. The quality of the Luftwaffe could hardly be regarded as significantly "lower" in '41, and may instead had been higher on the average. At least four German fighter wings would achieve the 1000-kill mark in Russia before the year was out. And only two fighter wings remained to watch the RAF over the Channel, losing about 400 while destroying 1600 RAF fighters in two years of operations ('41-'42). I don't think that Luftwaffe fighter pilot really started to dip until in '43. As to German industry in '41, that wasn't so much a fault of the industries rather than the fact that the Nazi government still hadn't realized that it was in for a very long war of attrition and hadn't yet set more strident production goals. The accomplishments of German industry in '44 seemed miraculous considering the pressure applied by the bombers, but by then, it was too late.

"I agree that the War In Russia was the most important aspect of the entire conflict. If Russia was defeated, I would assume that the war would probably still be going on, or, a negotiated peace would have occured. But, the success of the Russians depended on the success and help of their allies."

Agreed. In terms of raw attrition, the Soviets did the most, and must be allowed their historical due. But the Allied contribution---ground, air, & naval---and on several fronts----wasn't a noise factor either.

[Guest kevi]

Since so many great tacticians below Division level were killed during the war or never became names in history, I choose to slide the scale tactical - operational - strategic up from what we typically consider.

The best tactician maybe some Pole

killed by the last bullet shot before

Poland surrendered. Its hard to tell

at that level who was the "best" when an

unlucky round takes out the Gari Kasparov

of WW2 and we nver hear of their exploits.

Guderian did not concern himself so much

with supply matters, but taught how best

to employ modern equipment to maximize

the potential of each and every weapon system

in a unit on a fast moving battlefield.

He was a Corps commander who lead from out front where he could smell the action. As his

Career progressed he moved into senior command, but his teachings where part of every mechanized leader on the German side.

I have "Achtung-Panzer: The development of Armoured Forces their tactics and Operational potential" in my personal library. Perhaps he lies somewhere between tactical and operational. It is interesting that after Hilter sacked Guderian, he returned to service as Inspector of Armoured Forces. In this role, he was very involved in the development and specifications

of new Panzer production. A position well suited to highly "tactical" general of great stature.

It is instructive and fair to divide the search for great captains of WW2 into the three levels of warfare. My choice of Stalin and Guderian is different. My definition of the levels of warfare is different.

I selected them also to spur debate.

Thanks to this BBS, I have great fun discussing the history behind our hobby.

- Kevin

[Major Tom]

Actually, the birth of mobile/armoured warfare was independently developed by practically every European nation before the war. It was a matter of simply using these theories. Actually, the British were the most forward looking force, being the first all mechanized army in Europe, from Combat formations to supply. Their experimental Mobile Division (Became 1st Armoured) had the best collection of AFV's in the mid 1930's than any other nation. The Armoured division was thought up during the Great War, but was never implemented due to the Armistice. The Allies had a great plan of Tank and Aircraft coordination breaking through the enemy lines. However, they neglected these plans 20 years later because they figured that they were obsolete. There were many great future looking Generals on all sides, however only the German ones were given enough leeway. Indeed, I do think Rundstedt is my most favorite General.

I would have to say the most successful Axis commander would have to be Mannerheim. The military commander of all Finnish forces managed to severely defeat the Soviets twice, defying all odds. However, he was also smart enough to quit while the going was still good. His nation was the only one not taken over by the Soviets after the war, something which can be attributed to his skill as a commander. The Finn's never suffered a critical defeat and had their army almost totally intact when they switched sides. Many other Axis sattelite countries were not as lucky, nor did not have skilled enough leaders to evade domination either by Russia or Germany.

[Sergeant Huang]

Hi,Knaust:

Can you start this topic as a new one.

Since this topic is not the same as the

original one.

Oh, allow me to ask you a question.

Do you know when was the kurst bugle formed ?

Sgt. H

p.s. Absolutely no hard feelings between us,

even neither of us is right !! ???? We are

just seeking the truth, not arguing about

this. Don't you agree with me ??

[Guest kevi]

Hi Berlichtingen

If you ever get a chance, read "Thunder on the Dnepr: Zhukov-Stalin and the defeat of

Hitler's Blitzkrieg" by Fugate and Dvoretsky

It will give you an idea of the contribution of Stalin. And this book ignores the political and ecomonic levels of warfare pretty much. The elastic defense is described in great detail however. Perhaps

the authors are wrong, there is so much mystery to the early war in the east.

But they present a good argument.

(BTW I recommend this book to all wargamers

even just for the discussion of the Soviet wargames first disclosed

in the book from declassified Soviet docs.)

The huge pressure on Army group Center is documented in every source I have on the east

front. Check out the map 11 in "Panzer Leader" by Guderian. If the threat was in Hitler's mind, then the Stalin’s objective was realized. Hitler called the shots, and diverted force away form the Moscow axis.

As long as Hitler was distracted to the south little less mattered.

Crafty and cold blooded are two characteristics you assign to Stalin.

They are musts on the resume of any strategist that expects to win

at war.

- Kevin

[Berlichtingen]

kevi,

Perhaps we use a different criteria for "Greatness." When I judge generalship, I compare to Mareshal Davout (ex: how would Manstein compare to Davout?). For Stratagy, I compare with Friedrich der Grosse... in my mind, Stalin just doesn't rate.

I will check out the books you mentioned. Are they recent works? In the past, I have found Soviet sources to be a bit suspisious. I haven't read any of the newer Russian works.

[Guest kevi]

Berlichtingen -

Panzer Leader was published in the 50's

and is a German source. (Im sure you know this, but just in case)

Thunder on the Dnepr is a must read.

Fugate is American and Dvoretsky is

retired Russain military (Col.) now

a historian. The book is published by Presidio Press in California. Copyright

1997 Dvoretsky had access to the

once closed Russian archives.

Barnes and Nobel has it. Try Amazon.com too

BTW ... I was selecting the #1 strategist

from WW2, not across all generations. I also

defined strategy more in terms of Grand strategy - not just military - but political and economic factors were thus important.

So the list drops to a select few. In WW2,

generals did not generally get involved

in politics (maybe IKE to a point) and

economics. Stalin controlled the whole show.

I think I got away from the original intent

of this thread's focus on combat commanders.

But thanks for the discusion. Its a get way to wait for CM.

- Kevin (not kevi)

[MarkEzra]

George Catlin Marshall is the General of the 20th centuary. He took an Army rated 17th behind Bulgaria and Built a War machine that fought all over the world, not just Euorpe. Supplied the material that allowed Monty to win, Zukov to move (the real secret weapon of WW2 the 21/2 ton GMC truck). His brilliance is in selection of men and focus on the final goal. His efforts in the postwar years pointed the way for all todays generals..that of the soldier/statesmen.

[Berlichtingen]

Kevin,

Sorry, I was using your Username rather than real.

I've read Panzer Leader a couple of times.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Thunder on the Dnepr is a must read.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I'll track this one down.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>BTW ... I was selecting the #1 strategist from WW2, not across all generations. I also defined strategy more in terms of Grand strategy - not just military - but political and economic factors were thus important.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Methinks you misunderstood me. I just use Davout and Friedrich as "a measuring stick," as I consider them the best at tactics (Davout) and strategy (Friedrich). I view strategy in the same light as you. Most people miss that there was more to Friedrich than just fighting battles... he lost more than he won, but when the smoke settled, Prussia was the power in Europe to be recond with rather than Austria. Also, he was the first leader to instill a sense of nationalism in his army and instituted a slew of economic reforms. A Grand Stratigist of the first order.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>But thanks for the discusion. Its a get way to wait for CM.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I agree completely. A friend of mine at the office likened CM to a drug... gotta get our fix

------------------

Dan Brown dbrown@owc.net

[PanzerLeader]

I agree Kevin. It's true that most excellent tacticians are unheard of or were killed quickly. However for the best tactician(I know of) I suggest a few names(they are all on the German side 'cos I don't know the Allied Army enough): Hans von Luck, Kurt "Panzer" Meyer, maybe Jochen(sp?) Peiper.

[Guest kevi]

Hi MarkEzra

You got to remember the war in the east

was strategically lost by the Germans prior

to Dec 7 1941. Just how many US trucks

did they have at that point? US material

help to the Russians was a political factor

with little military effect other than speeding up the outcome determined in the Summer-Fall of 1941. Thank god Normandy

succeeded because those trucks would have come back to bite us as Stalin sweeped into western Europe.

- Kevin

PS: Marshall is on by short list too

[tss]

Major Tom wrote:

I would have to say the most successful Axis commander would have to be Mannerheim.

I would like to elaborate the situation about Mannerheim a little. While he was undoubtedly a great commander he was not a great general in the sense that has been used in this thread as his real strenghts were elsewhere.

By far Mannerheim's strongest quality was that he understood politics very well, a trait that is quite rare in a military officer. In addition, he knew the Russian psyche as well as the strenghts and weaknesses of Russian soldiers very well. After all, he had served in the Russian army longer than most of the Soviet high commanders (Mannerheim served full 30 years in Russian army before the Revolution. He commanded a cavalry batallion (IIRC) in the Russo-Japanese war and a cavalry division in WWI).

His second most important trait was that he had the full trust of the Finnish troops. They knew that if anybody could bring victory it was Mannerheim. As a result, the morale remained at high levels even though the enemy was vastly superior in terms of men and materiel. An old Finnish joke describes the situation well: "Two old-guard Finnish communists sit in a bar just after the Winter War has broken out. The first says: 'I heard that the Great Butcher is waging war once again'. 'Yeah. It is good that he is on our side this time'. "

Mannerheim's major achievement was that he managed to keep Finnish army independent of German command and to have a long and quiet period of trench war while battles raged over all other parts of East Front. I think he was just about the only high officer in the Axis side (though, technically Finland was not an Axis country as officially we fought our own private war against SU which "just happened" to happen at the same time when Germans fought against them) who could say "no" to Hitler. Hitler proposed two times that Finnish forces should be incorporated into German command structure with Mannerheim commanding whole Northern part of East Front (from the Baltic countries to the Arctic sea) as a Generalissimus, but Mannerheim refused the offer both times. When Himmler wanted to discuss about the "Jewish Problem" in Finland Mannerheim bluntly stated that there was no Jewish problem in Finland and that the Finnish army would be used against anybody who thought that there were. As a result, the Finnish Jews were as safe as anybody can be in a country that is waging war.

As a military commander Mannerheim did make mistakes and in fact he made quite many of them (insistence of quick capture of Tampere in 1918 Civil War, troop deployment in June '44, etc.) and sometimes he gambled heavily (the final days of Winter War, if the peace had not been made Finnish defence would probably have crumbled in a few days) but he made more correct decisions and none of his mistakes were fatal.

-Tommi

[dumbo]

Nice post, I have nothing to add about Mannerheim but I will say you Finns are bloody nice people. When I went backpacking up there I had a blast.

Thanks for all the beer (which was amazingly expensive) your countrymen gave a poor and dry English boy back in the 80's

Uuuuuuuuuuurah!

_dumbo

[Guest Zigster]

In fairness to the "slows" Montgomery has been labeled with, it's only fair to examine the strategic situation he was in. In the advance after Normandy, the left flank of the Allied armies in Europe had to advance through the most brutal defensive terrain imaginable, sans mountains. Dykes, canals, rivers (big-ass rivers), sodden polder land, a meandering road net easily choked off at the few intact bridges... Frankly, I'm amazed he kept up.

Earlier, in Normandy (after Ike took command), Monty was faced against a strong river line defended by a recently refitted SS Panzerkorps and anchored by a major urban centre and the sea. Not exactly a recipe for breakthrough and exploitation. It took hard slogging and stupendous casualties (statistically greater even than the most fearsome bloodbaths of WW1) to finally break through.

In Africa, he is oft criticized for passively building up an overwhelming force before attacking out of Alamein. while Rommel banged his head in frustration as his supply crisis approached critical. Well, anyone who really holds to that criticism is welcome to play me PBEM any time

Also, little is written on the subject, but I doubt there is much coincidence in the fact that the Alamein battles were more or less contemporaneous with the Torch landings. There was higher strategy at work here than Monty's slows.

All of this is not to suggest that I think Montgomery was the "best", but many of the criticisms levelled at him go wide of the mark. He, like Patton, Rommel, MacArthur, Zhukov, Manstein and others, had something that few other generals had, though all eventually need to be remembered among the greats: The cult of personality.

------------------

Der Zig

[Guest Kettle Black]

Hello everyone, thot I'd pop in here and say hi. I'm rather a newbie with CM (had it for 3 weeks) and love it (how novel;).

Wondering a bit regarding Zhukov, has anyone read his self biography? In there he tells matter of factly of his great idea to attack with infantry during and into artillery barrages, "attacking" across minefields (treat minefields as troops), not regrouping into battle formation when encountering resistance but rather just overwhelm with sheer numbers asf. A brilliant strategist? Not in my book. Effective? Yes.

I would without any hesitation name Erich von Manstein for most brilliant ETO commander.

Kettle Black

[Guest kevi]

My thinking on Zhukov was

in terms of grand strategist

not as a battle manager.

[Spook]

Originally posted by Zigster:

In fairness to the "slows" Montgomery has been labeled with, it's only fair to examine the strategic situation he was in. In the advance after Normandy, the left flank of the Allied armies in Europe had to advance through the most brutal defensive terrain imaginable, sans mountains. Dykes, canals, rivers (big-ass rivers), sodden polder land, a meandering road net easily choked off at the few intact bridges... Frankly, I'm amazed he kept up.

Some very good "perspective" points that you've made here, Zigster. One could also add that the British 2nd Army had their share of bocage to slog through in the Villers sector. But I can't quite qualify the British sector as the most formidable defensive terrain ever faced---certainly not to that faced by Allied troops on the Italian Gustav Line of '43-'44. And despite your noted obstacles, armor was still better able to operate in the British sector than in the heavier bocage faced by the US troops just to the west. Rather, it was the stacking-up of German panzer reserves mainly into the British sector that helped perpetuate the attritional battle, when added to your noted terrain. Pretty much the whole Allied command saw that coming before the invasion anyway, though. The British sector was a greater threat to German lines of communication, so that's where the greater amount of reserves would go.

Earlier, in Normandy (after Ike took command), Monty was faced against a strong river line defended by a recently refitted SS Panzerkorps and anchored by a major urban centre and the sea. Not exactly a recipe for breakthrough and exploitation. It took hard slogging and stupendous casualties (statistically greater even than the most fearsome bloodbaths of WW1) to finally break through.

Nope, it wasn't indeed an ideallic zone of operation, but the Allies also had some tremendous assets which made the German's job tough too---naval support, air superiority & interdiction, and prodigious artillery. It was pre-plotted artillery that shattered the 9th SS Panzer in Jun '44 before it attempted to launch a breakthrough attack. The Orne River wasn't a creek, but I think that the more formidable obstacles were the Carpiquet fortifications, Caen, hills like Hill 112, and of course the bocage.

In Africa, he is oft criticized for passively building up an overwhelming force before attacking out of Alamein. while Rommel banged his head in frustration as his supply crisis approached critical. Well, anyone who really holds to that criticism is welcome to play me PBEM any time

CM or TOAW? The latter would be a better barometer to use for critiques of military operations, in all truth. But I tend to pay attention to Monty debates because my mindset approaches that of Monty----I prefer "tidy" battles, even with the attendant disadvantages. I don't really critique Monty for his handling of the latter two El Alamein battles. In the last battle, he lost 23,000 men to 9,000 Axis, but persisted and prevailed anyway. He knew that he had all of the major trumps---logistics, naval control of the Med, greater air, armor, & artillery assets. Monty did a good job there. Rather, as often shown in later campaigns, Monty never knew well how to exploit a success, and more critique has been leveled at his pursuit of Rommel after El Alamein. At the Falaise Gap, there was blame to go all around for many German cadres (HQ's & such) escaping as they did. But still as overall ground commander at that time, Monty was ultimately responsible to the results of that battle.

All of this is not to suggest that I think Montgomery was the "best", but many of the criticisms levelled at him go wide of the mark. He, like Patton, Rommel, MacArthur, Zhukov, Manstein and others, had something that few other generals had, though all eventually need to be remembered among the greats: The cult of personality.

Indeed, many barbs at Monty are wide of the mark. I personally think that Monty's worst error was not in North Africa, or in Sicily, or even Market Garden (too much of that battle was simply out of his control), but instead failing to cut off the 15th Army in the Scheldt Estuary and failing to get that estuary cleared sooner so that Antwerp could be used sooner. Monty was patently dishonest in his assurances to Ike that he was paying attention to the estuary as a joint objective with Market Garden, and this would play against him for the rest of the war. As to "cult of personality", that was probably more due to Monty's ability to know how to stroke the media (something that MacArthur and Patton put too much effort into also, IMHO). It wasn't quite the same "cult" of bonding with the troops as achieved by other leaders like Washington, Nelson, Lee, Wellington, Alexander, & Napoleon. Those are the leaders that Monty has to be held up against when making "great captain" or "cult" comparisons.

Personally, I think I will indeed make more effort in the future to learn of Gen. Slim's Burma operations, as someone else earlier suggested. All the same, Zig, some very good points.

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[This message has been edited by Spook (edited 01-12-2000).]