John Gooch releases sequel to first book. "Mussolini's War"

[Sgt.Squarehead]

Screw 'competetive'.....I wanna park my Matildas on their anti-tank guns! 

 

[SimpleSimon]

In Forcyzk's book on the Battle of France it's surprising how many times the Germans lost anti-tank guns to the British when they got run over. In fact they didn't realize that the British were doing this because they lacked HE-frag rounds and bunch of tanks like the Matilda 1 and Vickers lacked a cannon at all. Using tanks to squish stuff was a pretty good way to prevent recapture too and it was done through the whole war but I imagine it does make for a pretty sick victory selfie too. 

The Second World War 

Although the rank and file of the Polish Army had fought hard, Poland's leaders proved meek. Generals preferring to order withdrawals and withhold important assets like tank battalions and air support at high levels wasted these valuable resources by refusing to commit them as much as possible until battles were obviously lost. Many pre-war critics had assumed that motorized warfare was only practical by low troop counts but the Germans revealed coordination of motorized Armies was not only realistic but superior to older means. Divisional Commanders could rapidly intervene in battles in a way hitherto unheard of thanks to motorization, and domination of the theatre by the Luftwaffe led SIM to conclude that there were "sinister consequences" for an Army who's Air Force lost control of their skies.

The Italians noted that German bombing wrought widespread destruction on Polish cities, especially Warsaw, but found that bombing was also surprisingly effective against Forts, batteries, and troop concentrations. The Luftwaffe was now fielding much newer designs then what they had employed in Spain, such as the Heinkel 123, Dornier 17, and Ju 88. Although impressed by these features which undoubtedly saved the Germans many casualties on their end, SIM still fundamentally and accurately concluded that Germany had won this campaign due to its numerical superiority and the Poles' own bad leadership. Polish aircraft turned up at airfields waiting days for gasoline stocks to appear. Goering hoarded credit for "personally directing airstrikes" which did little to highlight how important Richthofen's X Fliegerkorp was when it worked as an attachment to Heer command rather than operate independently and did nothing to convince the Italians that they needed to make sure Regia Aeronautica was prepared to cooperate closely with the other services. 

In spring 1940 the Germans offered to send Colonel Ritter von Thoma to Rome to share his experiences in Poland but Mussolini-in a bad mood-vetoed the visit. The attitude he was fostering among the Generals was one of dismissing the lessons of the Polish campaign, and Roatta was similarly unimpressed believing that fundamentally the Italian Army already knew how to execute such a war. Badoglio however, was becoming less and less convinced that the war would be over quickly and threw out Pariani's plan for an attack on the Suez Canal, he also replaced him as Chief of Army General Staff with Graziani. 

The previous audits of Italy's Armed Forces made for dour reading but the generals ironically highlighted the Navy for praise as the single best prepared service. That Regia Marina was short by some 4,800 anti-aircraft guns to defend its 15 bases (of which there were only 1,250 to split between them all) wasn't made clear. Badoglio ended the meeting with the emphasis that the services collaborate with each other, be realistic, and give the Duce accurate information. 

Mussolini was increasing encouraged by hints of Hitler's long-run plans to invade the Soviet Union where Germany would find its Lebensraum. He anticipated that the rich rewards of conquests East would automatically be shared out with Italy, and he was in no rush to fight the western Allies which Italy was far more exposed to than it was to Russia. He had no doubt that 'the United States would never permit the democracies to suffer total defeat' and so automatically associated war with Britain and France to war with America. In spite of that, Mussolini was determined to enter the war-at some point or another-on Germany's side but he was planning on making a move by early 1941. Pressure began to shift toward an attack on the French border toward the Rhone river, but first there were some more warnings for Mussolini to disregard...

Economics

By the end of 1939 the new situation in Europe and Italy's status as "non-belligerent" required an evaluation of material stocks that might become scarce given the shock of the new war. General Carlo Favagrossa was detailed to conduct research through the General Commissariat for War Production and his reports began to land on Mussolini's desk. 

Coal imports were 60,000 tons a month less than what was necessary and scrap iron was falling short 42,000 tons a month. Monthly steel output fell by 50,000 tons a month in October to a total of 110,000 tons which was 30,000 tons less than what was needed. 9,000,000,000 lire a year in gold, silver, and foreign currency would be necessary to pay for what Italy needed by total reserves only amounted to 4,000,000,000 lire. Favagrossa made projections of readiness for each of the services based on assuming the raw materials became available somehow anyway. The Air Force could be ready to begin fighting by 1940 but it would not have everything it needed until the middle of 1941, the Navy would be ready to fight by the second half of 1941 but the spare stocks of new 381/50 15in guns for the new Littorio class battleships would not exist until late 1942. Until then the ships would have only the guns they were launched with. 

The Army was in the worst position, with full stocks of mortar, small arms, and explosive ammunitions not planned to be met until 1943 and some artillery shell types until 1944. Favagrossa was clear that Italy was in no position to fight until 1945 and it would be wise to wait until 1949. Britain was now directing all flows of raw materials into Europe for its own war needs, so even if Italy had the finances to purchase such quantities they couldn't get any unless Mussolini was prepared to enter the war on the side of the Allies. Paradoxically, Mussolini likely seized upon all of these statistics to conclude that Italy needed to enter the war soon and fight a fast war or be left behind by the pace of events. It didn't help that some of Favagrossa's shortages were indeed exaggerated. The General told Mussolini that Italy had only 25 tons of nickel left at one point, but then a month later 110 tons turned up in a report, a detail which Mussolini was not likely to miss and one among others that probably made him skeptical of such gloomy forecasts. 

Further reports highlighted the helplessness of Italy's cities against air bombardment. The mass of the population could not afford the 35 lire gas masks on sale, and public shelters had not been constructed since it was assumed that people could simply hide in their cellars. Mussolini picked a number out of thin air that the country needed 4,000 of the new Cannone da 90/53 anti-aircraft guns-not one of which would be available until 1941-and that air raid sirens were unnecessary because enough people with good hearing could warn others. 

The Navy concluded that it would need two million tons of fuel oil by 1942 because the two new Littorio class battleships would "drink rivers of it". The Regia Aeronautica would need 400,000 tons and the Army would need 500,000 tons. The Soviet Union had by now cut off oil exports to Italy but they were still getting deliveries from the United States and Mexico. Mussolini concluded that domestic refineries could probably account for at least a quarter of all needs per year. 

The Navy wanted 20,000 tons of steel, 3000 tons of copper, 1500 tons of lead and the private ship building industry would need much more if it wanted to keep going. The Army was going to need over a million tons of iron,  160,000 tons of copper and 14,000 tons of rubber. Italy would need to produce four million tons of steel a year to meet the total national and armed service requirements. Three quarters  of the machine tools used in aircraft production were imported from the US and Germany. Mussolini had some less-than-encouraging answers as to where all of these was going to come from. 

Why there was enough steel in metal railings, pots, pans, loose metal etc in all of Italy to meet such demands obviously! Without having any sources Mussolini simply claimed that the Dolomites contained hitherto unheard of quantities of magnesium and that a process could be made practical which would convert clay into aluminum. When chairing meetings Mussolini had a tendency to address issues he had answers for and simply ignore those he had nothing on. When confronted by statistics revealing Italy's vulnerability in foodstocks and textiles one time he simply overwhelmed his audience with production statistics for olive oil, meat, fish, and wool and that ten million goats and sheep were available in the countryside. The meat situation was not a problem because in his words "20 million Italians have the wise habit of not eating it and can do very well". 

Despite this Mussolini did not go unquestioned. Balbo made a written submission to one meeting emphasizing that he he was short almost 65,000 troops for war in Egypt. He had few air defenses, modern weapons, Officers were in short supply, and suitable motor vehicles and pack animals were barely available. Tobruk had only 20 anti-aircraft guns for its defense and of 400 aircraft in his command only 240 were fit for action. Badoglio commented that if Balbo were given everything he was asking for 'Italy would be completely emptied out". Mussolini made one concession to him, his command would receive priority for the new Cannone da 47/32 anti-tank gun "the best anti tank gun in Europe" the Duce emphasized. 

An interesting attendee of these meetings was the Minister of Education, Giuseppe Bottai, who commented that he had never seen so much paper and so many plans and forecasts with no firm check on whether or not any of it had been put into effect or acted on. Everyone was signing up for mythical dates of readiness in 1941 and 1942 but 'only if they are given the money'. 

Roatta realized that this circle couldn't be squared. The Army was neither strong enough to fight an offensive war outside Italy and not equipped well enough to fight one inside Italy either. The only defense system within affordable reach would have to be based on concrete fortifications. Mussolini was increasingly becoming attached to a course of action that was based on what Hitler did than what his material reality was, and it was impossible to guess what he'd decide next. The German Generals lamented to the Italians that in fact this was not much different from working under Hitler, who would make decisions and inform his Generals the next day. Mussolini and Badoglio were both conducting strategy that was at odds with one another, with Mussolini increasingly taking unilateral action on decisions and policy that Badoglio wanted to conduct more cautiously and distant from German input. 

If Badoglio and Roatta believed that Mussolini could be dissuaded from further alignment with Germany however, they were soon to be disappointed. In March 1940 Hitler and Mussolini met at the Brenner Pass. Mussolini confirmed that Italy would intervene at some point on Germany's behalf (probably in 3 to 4 months when the two new Littorio class battleships were ready) and the Furher remarked that the destinies of the two nations were "indissolubly linked". Hitler again did not emphasize any need for Italy to enter the war on his command, and even suggested against an attack on the French Alps however. 

Mussolini spent the period of the "Phoney War" in a good mood, remarking to Clara Petacci that the only complication he could see was Russia standing aside while Europe battered itself, potentially making a Soviet invasion easy in the future. Mussolini was still remarkably scant on specifics in his standing orders of what Italy should do in the event of war. He directed the Army to consider war on Yugoslavia, East Africa and Djibouti but didn't mark out any clear political objectives. Just that offensive and defensive action should be taken "according to the fronts and enemy initiatives". 

The Last Days of Caution 

In April 1940 General Jodl stated to General Marras that the war would be decided in France. He was prevented from making specific operational points clear earlier by skepticism within the Wehrmacht that Italy could not keep secrets. Calling a meeting a few days later-while Germany was invading Denmark and Norway-Badoglio told the General Staff that Italy could try offensive action only when her enemies were in a state of total collapse. The military was being told to be ready for anything-except close cooperation with the Germans- and only Francecso Pricolo of the Air Force pointed out that it was hard to draw up operational plans without a clear idea of who they'd be fighting. 

In Rome General von Rintelen presented Italy with 3 options, support the German attack on France by invading toward the Rhone, or striking North into the rear of the Maginot Line, or attacking Egypt. Graziani didn't like the sound of any of them but he especially disliked the idea of attacking the British in Egypt without German tanks, the early shipping of which might lead to a pre-emptive offensive against Libya by the British. By now Anglo-French forces in North Africa had grown so large that Cavagnari had to admit to Mussolini that control of the Sicilian Channel was meaningless, the Allies had already positioned all the troops they needed in Africa. His timing was poor, Mussolini had assured Hitler a few days earlier that the Navy was ready and he snapped at the Admiral. "What was the point of building 600,000 tons of warships if Italy did not take the opportunity to to use them against the British and French?!" 

Badoglio discouraged Mussolini from the south strike against the Maginot Line, remarking that Italy would be playing second-fiddle to the Germans. He was more receptive to the idea of an attack though the Alps into southern France. A few days before the assault of France began, General Carl-Heinrich von Stulpnagel suggested that Libya was no longer a priority and that the Italians should consider sending 20 Divisions to Germany's western frontier facing the Maginot Line. Mussolini had started to become concerned about Libya, where it was reported that the French now had 314,000 men to face the 130,000 strong Italian Army there with another 100,000 British troops in Egypt. Badoglio managed to scrounge up another 80,000 men for Libya but when given these men Balbo remarked "it is useless to send me thousands more men if I cannot give them the means to move and fight". 

A few days after the Battle of France began Mussolini nonetheless remarked that he would take Italy to war "within the month". Again the rapid pace of events served to make the Duce's mood uneven and unpredictable. With the Meuse Line collapsing and the British Expeditionary Force retreating in Belgium he became increasingly bellicose, remarking to the American ambassador William Phillips that Italy could not remain absent at a moment when Europe's future was being decided, and made the same remarks in letters to Churchill and Roosevelt. A memorandum came in from Graziani that Italy's two armored Divisions had only seventy medium tanks between them and no heavy vehicles or armored cars. The infantry Divisions had less than 3/5 the number of guns as equivalent French Divisions and the Army was short 8,000 trucks and had 8 months of fuel. Mussolini was exasperated, stating "I would have to wait years to enter the war if I had to wait for the Army to be ready. But I have to enter it now." 

A few days after the Dunkirk evacuation Mussolini called the General Staff together and told them he was going to join the war before June 5th, and wrote to Hitler on the 30th of May informing him of this plan. Stating that he had 70 Divisions ready and that another 70 could be drawn up but that he lacked the equipment for them. Badoglio informed Pricolo to have the airmen ready to challenge incursions by French aircraft through the border, and Pricolo remarked that up until now it had looked like he would be in action against Yugoslavia. Marshall Balbo-visibly frightened-told Mussolini that if Italy entered war now French troops would capture Tripoli in 10 days. His concerns were disregarded by Mussolini's insistence that any losses in Africa could be made up by victory in Europe. 

Favagrossa made one last attempt to bombard his boss with statistics. The Army had enough machine gun and artillery ammunition for 50 days of fighting, only 22 of 71 Divisions were near complete-lacking a third of their assigned trucks. 30 Divisions were "efficient" but lacked their 81mm mortars and 47mm anti-tank guns and another 19 were 'incomplete'. Badoglio believed that this last attempt had dissuaded Mussolini from war.

That misunderstanding lasted 24 hours. 

At the Quirinale Palace, Vittorio Emanuele III mulled over the war decree Mussolini presented him with for war beginning on June 10th. None of the options were palatable. If he refused to sign he feared civil war, but he knew Italy's prospects in a European War were bad. He did not expect the monarchy to survive either way...

Next time, the Italy goes to war.. 

 

Edited December 10, 2020 by SimpleSimon

[Sgt.Squarehead]

51 minutes ago, SimpleSimon said:

In fact they didn't realize that the British were doing this because they lacked HE-frag rounds

Shhhh.....The bloody Eyeties will hear! 

51 minutes ago, SimpleSimon said:

Using tanks to squish stuff was a pretty good way to prevent recapture too and it was done through the whole war but I imagine it does make for a pretty sick victory selfie too.

 It's not too bad as an end of game snapshot either.....The Matlda & KV-1 were always prominent amongst my CM1 screenies for this very reason.  

 

Edited December 10, 2020 by Sgt.Squarehead

[BletchleyGeek]

1 hour ago, SimpleSimon said:

When chairing meetings Mussolini had a tendency to address issues he had answers for and simply ignore those he had nothing on.

This year I have been in SO MANY Zoom meetings where my colleagues were just like this. Sure this approach has a name...

[SimpleSimon]

Mussolini would in the year 2019 classify his approach as "data driven" and proceed along the same course I think. It did not help that the Generals and other politicians of Italy did not speak as one voice ever, but as disjointed and competing service branches busy chasing personal prestige and promotions. One infamous instance was when the Chief of Police Arturo Bocchini presented his report to Mussolini on public opinion. Bocchini was no dissident, he was a card carrying member of the Fascist Party. The report that the clear majority of Italians were opposed to war and frightened of it was too overwhelming to misinterpret, but Mussolini's Fascist lackey Achille Starace just shot down the report by claiming that 40 million Italians were prepared to lay down their lives for the Duce. Such dissonance proved so shocking for Mussolini that he kicked both of them out of his office and not long after the two of them were outside they got into a shouting match that nearly became violent. As Gooch says "Bocchini was prioritizing reality while Starace was prioritizing loyalty". 

Edited December 10, 2020 by SimpleSimon

[Erwin]

3 hours ago, SimpleSimon said:

air raid sirens were unnecessary because enough people with good hearing could warn others. 

Love it...  

Once again an entertaining read.  Thank you...   I sometimes wish I'd read history at school as it's so fascinating.  But...  I needed to make money...   

[BletchleyGeek]

2 hours ago, SimpleSimon said:

classify his approach as "data driven" and proceed along the same course I think.

Haha, I think you're right. It's all about having the right filter for the data

 

2 hours ago, SimpleSimon said:

It did not help that the Generals and other politicians of Italy did not speak as one voice ever, but as disjointed and competing service branches busy chasing personal prestige and promotions.

This also was an important factor for the Third Reich decision making, but my understanding is that GROFAZ was actively encouraging that competition and division amongst services (and also within a single service!). For instance, I am not sure it make so much sense to have two different "Oberkommandos", most of the time in open competition for resources, assets, recognition and using parallel intelligence services. I always found confusing that there was an OKW (high command of the armed forces), and an OKH (high command of the army), and the former wasn't in hierarchy superior to the other. The logical thing would have been to have an OKW and then theater OK's. 

Was Mussolini also encouraging this kind of "competition"?

[SimpleSimon]

Not to the degree with which Hitler was among his Generals. If anything Mussolini seems to have hoped that Fascist indoctrination would encourage the General Staff and Italian People to cooperate among each other with an unheard of harmony in the complicated nation's history. He still expected to have unquestioned final say however, and even if they had all spoken in one voice they would probably have said some things Mussolini would not have wanted to hear. 

Edited December 11, 2020 by SimpleSimon

[SimpleSimon]

The Other Battle of France.

Despite having spent over 70 years studying the border, Italian Generals and military minds proved remarkably unimaginative over their plans for an invasion of south France. Most plans settled on an attack through the passes through the Corniche and Colle di Tenda and advancing to establish a line on the Rhone river, but few details more specific than those items were considered. Nothing at all was considered after reaching the Rhone. In 1928 the French had begun work on the Ligne Maginot Alpine series of fortifications along the border. These fortifications were much less dense than those on the Maginot Line proper, but were well concealed. The French had guessed the potential invasion routes correctly and consequently much of the defense was oriented at the routes the Italians planned on invading through. 

In March 1940 Graziani posted general order PR 12, which noted the possibility of offensive action through the Alps toward Albertville and Annecy, but mainly emphasized a defensive stance. 4th Army HQ considered but never followed through with a request for the Bersagliari to study an attack through the Piccolo san Bernardino pass. At the end of May Graziani put PR 12 into effect and Mussolini added up his personal command that Army Group West (consisting of 1st and 4th Armies) remain on the defensive and not push the border under any circumstances. Yet Army Commanders were also asked to study potential offensive plans "under favorable circumstances" from increasingly confusing communiques from Rome. 

1st Army HQ produced a plan for an attack Colle della Maddalena which was very conventional in design, but Graziani preferred the plan drawn up by 4th Army HQ for an attack through the San Bernarndino pass north, especially since it emphasized speed and maneuver which was closer to Fascist preference. Wildly optimistic assumptions were made about moving motorized and armored divisions through a cart track and that the Regia Aeronautica would have trouble knocking out the forts at Bourg-en-Bresse that guarded the pass. 

On June 10th Italy declared war on France. While German troops entered Paris a few days later and the Third Republic began to collapse, Italian troops were told to begin conducting small unit-action attacks against French positions on the frontier. General Roatta was instructed to take on deployments necessary for advances through the Colle della Maddalena and Piccolo San Bernardino passes, now fully jettisoning the defensive-elements of PR 12. French patrols were spotted probing the Italian side of the border and in some retaliations some prisoners were taken by the Italians. When Marshall Petain became leader and began agitating for a for an armistice Mussolini interpreted this as the sign of total capitulation he'd been hoping for and pushed Graziani to go on the offensive-which he was enthusiastically agreed to. 

Furious that Germany might agree to cease hostilities with France before he had been able to cleave anything for himself, Mussolini disregarded warnings about the challenges his troops faced attacking through the Alps. On June 23rd, just as the Italian offensive was getting underway-Mussolini was invited by Hitler to attend a conference discussing French surrender terms. Mussolini showed up at Munich with a huge wish list of items Hitler was completely unwilling to grant any of. They included items such as Italian occupation of the French naval base in Oran (Mers-el-Kebir), Casablanca, Corsica, Tunisia, and the handover of the French Fleet.

Hitler was not prepared to entertain any of these demands, worried that putting too much pressure on Marshall Petain would lead to his government fleeing to North Africa. Ciano got the impression that Germany was looking for a peaceful settlement with England, and began to realize that there unlikely to be joint German-Italian negotiations with the French. When informed Mussolini only got more greedy. Now he wanted all of Algeria and Egypt to become Italian client states too. 

As the Offensive against France got underway the Italian's strategy rapidly collapsed into chaos. Roatta received calls from both Army's HQs that neither one of them would be ready to conduct their advances on time, with Guzzoni stating he also needed an armored division and an engineer battalion. Mussolini was informed of this and briefly considered allowing Army Group West to delay, but once he heard the Germans had reach Lyon he changed his mind again and commanded them forward. 

Petain had ordered French troops to stop fighting, but the local French Commanders decided to disobey the Marshall's orders and agreed to stand and fight. The remaining elements of the French Army were enraged by the Italian stab-in-the-back and had no intention of giving up an inch of French territory to Mussolini's vulturine dash for easy conquests. The German force in Lyon delayed its own advance on the French Alpine positions-but failed to notify Badoglio's HQ of this, and he ordered Army Group West forward into the San Bernardino pass after a 39 aircraft bombardment on suspected French positions by Regia Aeronautica.

The bombardments missed the French mostly and with minimal knowledge of where French emplacements were Italian columns rapidly became pinned down by French battery fire. It began to snow heavily and Italian columns were ambushed on their flanks by French Ski and Alpine troops. The bad weather crippled Regia Aeronautica, and in the confusion some Italian troops were bombed and attacked by their own airplanes. A few days after the initial advance began a 2nd advance bogged down for all the same reasons-unchallenged French artillery fire, unknown French bunker positions, and bad weather. Only now the Italian's artillery participated in bombardments of their own troops. By the 23rd Mussolini phoned Badoglio and admitted that he wasn't interested in any territorial occupation of France tating that "Hitler might accuse me of having upset the armistice". 

Fortunately for the Italians, by June 24th French General Charles Huntziger had agreed to an armistice and the four day Franco-Italian war came to an end. The Italians lost 642 men KIA, 2631 wounded, and 616 missing. Over 2,100 got frostbite. The binaria Divisions had done awfully, with their two Regiments frequently becoming exhausted and pinned down along parallel but isolated routs of advance. Without a 3rd Regiment Italian commanders did not have sufficient manpower to rotate exhausted units into reserve, and their men had to stand and fight without respite. Mussolini personally visited the scene of the action at the Piccolo San Bernardino, but convinced himself the episode was a a triumph, boasting to Clara Petacci that "our soldiers overcame very strong resistance". 

Next time, Graziani goes on (a very slow) one-time-only tour in Africa! Italo Balbo meets an unfortunate fate, and a pair of palm trees are confused for a battleship. Find out next time on Mussolini's Mediterranean Misadventures...

Edited December 12, 2020 by SimpleSimon

[BletchleyGeek]

3 hours ago, SimpleSimon said:

The Italians lost 642 men KIA, 2631 wounded, and 616 missing. Over 2,100 got frostbite.

Those look like pretty serious losses, how many forces took part in this disaster? 6 or 8 binaria divisions?

BTW, sounds a lot like the performance at the invasion of Greece. I highly recommend the Italo-Greek scenarios in Command Ops 2 to study that campaign.

Edited December 12, 2020 by BletchleyGeek

[Erwin]

16 hours ago, SimpleSimon said:

616 missing

That's a lot.  Deserted or captured?

[SimpleSimon]

Deserted, captures were probably returned, and I imagine quite a few were lost in the Alpine forests and hillsides in the snowdrifts, dying from exposure. 

20 hours ago, BletchleyGeek said:

Those look like pretty serious losses, how many forces took part in this disaster? 6 or 8 binaria divisions?

BTW, sounds a lot like the performance at the invasion of Greece. I highly recommend the Italo-Greek scenarios in Command Ops 2 to study that campaign.

Here's a map from Wikipedia's extremely detailed page on the invasion. The Piccolo San Bernardino (Little Saint Bernard) is the pass 4th Army is facing into. And as you can see, it happened to be one of the most heavily defended routes. Italian "Divisions" as we know, are being referred to as Divisions on this map but in fact they're more like Brigade groups. While the French look completely screwed, as we read appearances can be deceiving. The French Divisions are full strength, and the Alpine troops were crack formations. Forts overlook all of the favorable routes and the Bernard pass was guarded by the infamous Fort de la Redoute, which was in fact several forts built in the vicinity of an old Napoleonic fort. 

Bourg St Maurice (savoie-fortifications.com)

Map of the full position (website is in French). The Italians never knew about most of the sites, and bad weather thwarted reconnaissance. 

Edited December 12, 2020 by SimpleSimon

[SimpleSimon]

Fumbling Outwards in Every Possible Direction 

While Italian troops were awkwardly stumbling their way through French defenses of the Alps, Mussolini considered more theatres for Italy to go on the offensive in while characteristically failing to decide on priority of any kind. In the near future campaigns were considered against Yugoslavia, Greece, British North Africa, and even Switzerland, although this last one would mercifully be dropped. 

Yugoslavia and Greece were special to Mussolini, as he considered both nations to be British outposts, but Egypt held considerable prestige value if it could be taken. Turning the Suez Canal into an Italian holding would not only secure Italian East Africa but enable Regia Marina to achieve a long held dream of establishing bases in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Now that the French weren't a problem, Comando Supremo could concentrate on an Eastward thrust with no danger of being attacked from behind ie: from Tunisia. Mussolini envisioned air assaults against Gibraltar and Malta both of which would be "sterilized" (Gooch notes Mussolini really liked to use that word).

Italo Balbo however, had serious reservations and told the German military attaché that Libya was "practically hopeless", lacking supplies, fortifications, and modern tanks and airplanes. He asked the Germans for 50 tanks but Mussolini offered him 70 M tanks. He would also require a thousand trucks, more anti-aircraft guns, and newer anti-tank guns. The British had the Matilda II which couldn't be stopped by anything smaller than a large field howitzer or aerial bombs-also in short supply. Italian airfields in Africa were not well defended, but they were well defended enough to shoot down their own Governor-General and chief advocate. Italo Balbo's SM 79 was shot down by Italian anti-aircraft gunners at Tobruk on June 28th 1940-having mistaken the airplane for a British bomber, the airfield had been attacked by British aircraft just prior to Balbo's arrival. 

Balbo's loss was a major morale shock, he had been a worldwide celebrity in the aviation industry, and was seen by some as potential rival to the Duce. Knowing this was probably why Mussolini dispatched him to Libya in the first place. Graziani was sent to replace him, being told that the 100,000 strong force there would soon be augmented to 170,000 men and was probably facing a 110,000 strong British Army in Egypt. When Graziani arrived in Libya two days after Balbo's death, he was surprised to find that zero-plans had been made to invade Egypt. Three days later Mussolini advised him to be ready to move by the middle of next month into Egypt to coincide with Germany's invasion plan for England-Operation SEA LION-. 

Graziani had only 3,500 trucks and little fuel however, and operational planning against Egypt got off to a slow start. He advised Rome that he would be able to capture Sollum in mid-August, but Mussolini was expecting Alexandria and Graziani's modest plans didn't go down well with the Duce. Attack planning on Alexandria looked far from promising however. There was only one avenue for advancing on the city along the coast line-exposed to British naval and air attack its entire length-and the total lack of baggage trains for his divisions meant that there was no room for tactical maneuver off of the local infrastructure. Mussolini would have none of it, he was determined to assist Hitler and scatter his limited forces worldwide. 

The naval situation was not promising either. Originally scheduled to be ready by August, Admiral Campioni admitted to Mussolini at the end of July that neither one of the new Littorio class battleships were ready for combat. Vittorio Veneto's guns were deficient, not reaching anywhere near projected accuracy figures in shooting trials. This left the RM with its three First World War battleships, facing four British battleships at Alexandria which would be much closer to their own base in operations and would benefit from air cover. 

At the beginning of August Graziani and Mussolini met, and Graziani attempted to talk the Duce down from an invasion of Egypt. With an attack on England looking imminent though Mussolini demanded action of some kind in Africa. Both men talked past each other for the most part, and left the meeting with cross impressions. Mussolini thought Graziani would begin his assault in a few days and Graziani believed he had impressed upon the Duce that this could not happen. Graziani assessed that he would need 9 motorized divisions, more 149mm guns, 5,200 trucks and other movers to face the 7 British divisions in Egypt and project force across 250km of desert from Tripoli. Nothing was said about the air support problem, Graziani had only 108 fighters for all of Libya. 

With disappointment streaming out of Tripoli Mussolini turned his attention back on the Balkans. The day after Mussolini's useless conference with Graziani the Duce began to speak of an Italian attack on Yugoslavia by the end of September. Then he changed his mind at the end of the month when a report came out that a British battleship had been spotted in Navarino Bay in Greece-although it turned out later that this was just an island with two thin palm trees. This did not stop Ciano from fusillading the Greek minister in Rome with accusations that Greece was aligning with Britain and planning on betraying Italy. Athens fired back that the only violations of neutrality so far had been overflights of the Greek border by Italian reconnaissance airplanes. 

In mid July Hitler implied that he would back the Italians in any effort they made against the Greeks, not wanting the Ionian Islands to become a British base, and the Italians opened their hostilities (but still shied away from an outright war declaration) with Greece by bombing the Greek destroyer Hydra and an auxiliary ship. Fascist press whipped itself up into a frenzy, claiming an impending Greek invasion of Albania and incursions across the border by Greek troops. Mussolini himself, still sore over the incident with Greece over Corfu in the 1920s, told his son in law that "the Greeks were deceiving themselves if they thought he had forgotten". 

Once it became clear to the OKW that Italy was planning a simultaneous invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece Hitler became nervous. Ribbentrop was dispatched to highlight that Germany wanted a coordinated strategy against Britain-not necessarily the Balkans-and Italian action against Greece had become unwelcome. With this Mussolini shifted his attention back to North Africa for the time, and allowed invasions against Yugoslavia to be delayed until October and against Greece to be delayed until the end of September. Graziani instead was commanded to begin offensive operations against Egypt before August ended to coincide with Operation Sea Lion. 

But by early September and after a meeting at Berchtesgaden where Hitler complained that bad weather was delaying operations, it had become clear to Ciano that the invasion of England had been postponed. This had little effect on Mussolini, who now wanted Egypt regardless of whether Germany would put troops ashore in England or not. Then a note arrived from Germany at Badoglio's HQ that the Germans were prepared to send an armored division to Africa if the Italian's requested it-deeply annoying Badoglio as he had not asked for their help. For Mussolini this became the last straw. The idea that the Germans were considering operations in Italy's sphere of interest, the Mediterranean, led Mussolini to command Graziani to begin his assault into Egypt in two days time. No further delays would be tolerated. 

Something like an Invasion.

Graziani got his assault going on Egypt on September 13th. Only a day in the pace became agonizingly slow. Royal Air Force planes destroyed roads and bridges, and when tanks and vehicles attempted to move off of them they sank in the deep sands. Yet by the 16th Italian troops had reached Sidi-el-Barani. Advancing 50 miles in three days casualties had been modest, only 120 dead and 410 wounded. The reason soon became evident, rather than make a stand at the border, the British had withdrawn to fortify at Mersa Matruh. 

Italian Generals were not pleased with the execution of the invasion, with General Annibale Begonzoli complaining that the troops of 23 Marzo division "knew only how to climb on and off lorries". Graziani became interested in the German offer for 150 tanks in North Africa, but he preferred dive bombers highlighting that they'd be able to attack the naval base at Alexandria after he captured Mersa Matruh. Attitudes further improved at the end of September in Rome when Ribbentrop announced that Japan had agreed to sign the upcoming Tripartite Pact. 

Visiting Pricolo in mid-September the Luftwaffe liaison complained that Graziani's assault was being conducted at the pace of Kitchener's 19th century Army in the Sudan. Gooch states "if anything, this comment was unfair to Kitchener - Graziani's soldiers had in fact moved into Egypt at the same daily pace as Napoleon's Armies". Graziani did face major difficulties however, facing chronic supply bottlenecks from the limited port facilities available in North Africa. Between Tripoli, Benghazi, and Tobruk Libyan ports landed just 50,000 tons of supplies a month, and 200 of 1,000 trucks shipped were lost through enemy air raids on the ports. 

In early October Mussolini met with Hitler at the Brenner Pass again, and Hitler pointed out that he was planning on  meeting with Franco soon but that early talks of partnership with Spain were not looking good. Franco had been extremely demanding. Mussolini was nonetheless made nervous by the hint of an alliance between Madrid and Berlin, and sent a wire down to Graziani on October 5th. Attack Mersa Matruh now. 

Graziani pointed out that he was short of water. The Duce simply shrugged this off by saying that men needed less water in October as the weather in Africa cooled. Again help from the Regia Marina was not forthcoming. Only five submarines were cosigned to operate in the waters outside of Alexandria, and the heavy cruisers being used for coastal bombardments of Egypt were withdrawn entirely. Then on October 12th Mussolini got word that the Germans had sent a military mission to Romania, and Graziani sent a note that day pointing out that Mersa Matruh was heavily fortified and he would not be ready to attack the position until November. Worse was still to come...

Badoglio's HQ was notified at the end of the day that Operation Sea Lion was postponed until 1941. With that the normally stoic General flew into a rage. Without the threat of invasion England would now be able to spare forces for the Mediterranean and African theatres. Italian East Africa-the General's proudest conquest-was doomed...

Next time, hostilities with Greece graduate into war with Greece. A play is rudely interrupted, and the two Royal Navies cross paths and guns for the first time...

Edited December 15, 2020 by SimpleSimon

[SimpleSimon]

Mare Nostrum

The Navy's end of the war kicked off on the 11th of June when French warships bombarded the Ligurian coast and British warships hit Cyrenaica. Despite these raids Admiral Cavagnari would detach no ships to coastal defense. The Admiral felt that the Navy's primary responsibility was protection of Italian supply lines to Libya. The fraught dangers of the Mediterranean sea that year led the Navy to attempt resupply efforts via torpedo boats, submarines, and destroyers at first. These ships could not carry much cargo though and eventually it became clear that Graziani would need convoys if he was to receive proper resupply. 

The first convoy sent to North Africa would be escorted by the entire surface fleet, but was offset by poor coordination with the Regia Aeronautica. A painful system of communication was in place between naval and air liasons that involved 

A. A senior naval officer had to place a request with the nearest shore-based naval command

B. Naval command local passed the support request to the regional RA HQ-or sometimes even through General HQ in Rome. 

C. Order dissemination to nearest airfield.

Unsurprisingly, orders were frequently lost or delayed owing to misinterpretations or misunderstandings. General Pricolo complained that the Navy would make requests for reconnaissance aircraft to cover airspace naval aviation was already observing, thus wasting his aircrews time. 

On July 6th a convoy of 5 steam ships set out from Naples to Benghazi. A close escort screen of destroyers and light cruisers would give close protection to the convoy while a squadron of heavy cruisers screened the route from Malta and the main battle fleet with Cavour and Giulio Cesare  remained nearby. Admiral Campioni's order of the day emphasized an aggressive stance, and he informed Rome that he planned on engaging any British forces he crossed paths with. 

He wish would be granted. The same morning the convoy set out Campioni was sent a wire from Rome. Admiral Sommerville's Force H had left Gibraltar and later that day that Admiral Cunningham's Mediterranean Fleet with 3 battleships had also sortied. Misleading intelligence from the Germans implied that at least one of these forces was heading to bombard Sicily. In fact Force H would return to Gibraltar without ever engaging Campioni citing threats from Italian coastal air cover. The Royal Navy however, had little doubt as to Campioni's intentions...at the end of June they had obtained a code book from an Italian submarine and while not a complete source of information on Italian naval code-it enabled Cunningham to infer what the Italians were doing and where they were to a degree.

Regia Aeronautica failed to establish a corridor of sweeps south-east of Sicily and a gap opened up in the area toward Navarino Bay in Greece. Cunningham was able to move his fleet through this unobserved region, Italian seaplanes only managed to spot his force at 10am on July 8th. For the rest of the day Regia Aeronautica would make attacks on Cunningham's fleet dropping 531 bombs and scoring one hit on Gloucester. Matching a pre-war fear held by the Royal Navy, Italian seaplanes proved very good at shadowing naval forces, sending real time updates of Cunningham's position back to their superiors for further strikes.

Yet Rome proved remarkably meek. While Campioni was steaming toward an engagement he recieved a communique from Rome ordering him to avoid engagement with Cunningham's battleships. The order coming directly from the Duce himself. A few minutes later Italian aircraft attacked his fleet-mistaking it for the British-although they did no damage. 

Although Campioni was prepared to fight, he was concerned the British might move between his force and Taranto, cutting off his escape route. Admiral Carlo Bergamini requested to send out the new battleships Littorio and Vittorio Veneto but this was refused. Their crews were not fully trained and damage from an accidental fire on board Littorio still required repairs. They would've done well to meet with Campioni anyway though. When Campioni's fleet crossed paths with Cunningham's at 3:08pm his forces were out of position. The cruiser destroyer screen he had established ended up behind the fleet's battleships and so were the heavy cruisers most of whom were lagging behind the rest of the fleet when they should've been ahead of the fleets battleships. 

Both sides cruisers began firing at each other at the same time. Giulio Cesare scored a straddle on Warspite, but a minor course change by Warspite threw off the  Italian battleship's fire for the rest of the battle.  Four minutes after fighting began Cesare was hit by HMS Warspite, the warship's 15inch shell blew a 6.1 meter hole in the rear smoke stack of Cesare knocking out 4 of her 8 boilers and lowering her speed to 18 knots. A few minutes afterwards Campioni decided to disengage south west into a zone covered by Italian submarines. Cunningham, aware that Campioni was trying to lead him into a trap, decided not to follow. Italian aircraft continued to bombard both fleets for the rest of the day inflicting no damage on either. 

The Battle of Punta Stilo revealed a number of major deficiencies with the Navy's operations. Gunfire was awful, with salvos suffering from wide dispersment and destroyers launching torpedoes from too far away. The Italian Air Force clearly had a major ship-recognition problem, with Italian airmen only failing to inflict more damage on Cunningham's ships and their own because they bombed from too high up-12,000 feet usually. The Navy had no torpedo bombers because experiments with them in 1939 had been cancelled. 

Most painful of all was the realization that the Navy desperately needed aircraft carriers. Having to coordinate through multiple liaisons for air support from Regia Aeronautica proved an unreliable process under regular load. Once a battle broke out it inevitably collapsed under the strain and communication between Naval and Air Forces broke down entirely. 

In September Italian naval intelligence suggested that the British force in Alexandria had been reinforced to 4 battleships and an aircraft carrier. With the odds now against them, Mussolini forbade any further search and destroy operations designed to draw British forces out into battle. The greatest problem was that limited supplies of fuel-oil meant that the current pace the Navy had only enough fuel for 13 months of operations, and he ordered convoy escorts be cut down to the bare minimum or sometimes none at all. At the same time Mussolini had been prioritizing and goading his Generals into offensive in Africa he was sabotaging Italy's ability to do so...

Greece 

Ever since Munich the Greek Dictator and burgeoning fascist, Ioannis Metaxas, had gone to great lengths to assure Mussolini that Greece had no desire for an alliance with the British. Fascist press and Mussolini were constantly attacking Greece as a British outpost in the Mediterranean and an Allied co-belligerent. As early as July Italian aircraft had been bombing Greek warships and auxiliaries and that month, an Italian submarine sank the cruiser Helli in Tinos harbor. Although the Italians blamed the British, Greek authorities discovered fragments of an Italian made torpedo. They were ordered by Athens nonetheless to cover this up and an announcement of the attack was not made until October-after the Italian invasion had begun. 

On October 25th while attending the play Madame Butterfly Emanuele Grazzi-the Italian Ambassador- was handed an ultimatum and strict instructions to present it personally to General Metaxas. Presenting the note to Metaxas on October 27th, it accused Greece of allowing the Royal Navy to use its waters and coasts for operations, and of terrorism in Albania. Greece was given 3 hours to reply to a demand that Italian forces be allowed to occupy unspecified "strategic points" in his country. Although not mentioned by Gooch, Metaxas reply to this message was a one word 

"No". 

On October 28th Italian troops crossed the Greek frontier. Visconti Prasca'a Army advanced into a region of the Balkans which drastically multiplied the challenges it faced. Only four roads connected Albania to Greece and there was only a single two lane highway from Durazzo to Tirana. Not one railway line existed between the fronts. Most of the available paths were little more than mule tracks and mountain footpaths. With winter weather imminent much of the Balkans was about to slammed by blizzards and blinding winter storms. Between them the ports of Durazzo and Valona could only land 50 trucks and a bit over 1,000 tons of supplies a day. The Italians could not have picked a worse time to invade. 

Things went wrong right away. Bridges blown up by the Greeks forced Italian troops to cross at creeks which turned into rivers in the bad weather. Greek defensive positions were much stronger than expected, backed by 105mm guns which outranged Italian artillery. Italian troops, caught up huge traffic jams and road blocks going on for miles were sitting ducks to bombardments. An Albanian battalion was broken by a Greek counter attack and fled into the Carabinieri unit behind them that had been setup to prevent them from routing. Rather than reform the Albanians got into firefights with the military police blocking detachments. 

After only 10 days all progress had halted. Rome was shocked back into reality. Serious resistance at all points had stifled the invasion. Mussolini wanted a landing of 5,100 men at Prevesa in 48 hours which his Generals universally objected to. Ships in Prevesa would be exposed to attack, and the troops would be landing on an open beach vulnerable to attack from local high ground. The Royal Navy was close and was unlikely to ignore a golden opportunity to easily punish an invasion force. 

Roatta made it clear to Mussolini that defeating Greece would require at least 20 divisions, and they now needed two and half months to prepare for a new offensive. Revealing a staggering disregard for the suffering of his own men Mussolini simply excused the whole endeavor as a genius move of his strategy to influence peace negotiations saying that "when it comes to making peace we'll have more sacrifices and therefore more rights". 

Next time, further humiliation in Greece, the Navy's safe anchorage at Taranto turns out not to be so safe, and Sir Richard O'Connor inflicts his magnum opus upon Graziani's troops...

Edited December 21, 2020 by SimpleSimon