Jump to content

John Gooch releases sequel to first book. "Mussolini's War"


SimpleSimon

Recommended Posts

A few years ago I had the pleasure of reading Gooch's book on the emergence and peculiar nature of the Military-Fascist "interdynamic" in Mussolini's Italy and the consequences that pattern of organization had on Italy's war effort. As Gooch admitted at the the time, the book was mostly about the theory and planning phase of Fascist Rearmament of Italy through the 1920s and 30s and terminating just before 1940 when Italy jumped into the Second World War as a major combatant. At the time Gooch stated (ominously lol) that an examination of the "applied" effort of Italy in the World War would require a new, separate book. Good on his threat, Gooch's new book "Mussolini's War" has come out on Amazon Kindle as of December and i've begun to read it. 

Gooch's highly dialectical and sober analysis of Fascist Italy's preparations for war was a book I found both intriguing and enlightening, and gives one a pretty important perspective on how authoritarian and totalitarian states still require a functional state bureaucracy and a degree of popular consent in order to function properly. Even more crucially how a failure to ensure good cooperation and communication between arms of the state from the military to private enterprise can lead to failure and-under abnormally heavy load-catastrophic structural failure, in this case of the Italian state's war effort against the Allied powers. Under Mussolini's leadership however cooperation was a byword for weakness and the Duce-less successfully than Hitler-often attempted to play his Generals and Ministers against each other under the presumption that his own position would be strengthened by the weakening of his competitors within the highly Piedmontese-Monarchist military establishment. This was never the case. Instead Mussolini frequently found himself embroiled in inter-office disputes between the various branches of the military which served only to obfuscate and distort reality as all 3 branches of the military (air, sea, and land) lobbied against eachother to achieve the Dictator's blessing. Their own (incorrect) assumption being that Mussolini's personal backing would result in the release of state funding to secure means to achieve ends. This did not transpire either. 

In reality, Mussolini's fascist reorganization of Italy-although not lacking in brutality and ruthlessness-never achieved the level of coordination the Nazis managed in Germany who effectively turned the entire state into an apparatus of the military-industrial complex. Italy required far more in the way of consent and was especially complicated by Mussolini's decision to retain the monarchy and operate at the consent of a semi-democratic Fascist Council he chaired. This system might not have proven fatal by itself, but under Mussolini's embattled, cynical worldview it certainly proved to be. 

So i've just started the new book, (ie: Mussolini's War) on the Italian War Effort-Applied. I'll be posting my various notes and reactions to events as I go. I've already completed the section on the Abyssinian War which i'll be pointing out some notes and reactions too later on. 

Edited by SimpleSimon
Link to comment
Share on other sites

One of the first campaigns conducted under Fascist administration was the Italian "Pacification" of Libya. This campaign is sort of hard to credit entirely to the Fascist regime however, it really began in 1911 under the monarchy, and the earlier phase of that war is often only brought up in context of being one of the first examples of an aerial bombardment in history. Once the First World War began Italy found it difficult to set aside troops necessary to control the countryside, an issue further complicated by the fact that the Ottomans were supplying the local Senussis with modern weapons. 

In 1921 the Liberal Italian government-which was still in power at the time-decided that Italy should finish its conquest of Libya completely, well before Mussolini's Fascist Regime had appeared on scene, the Italian Government had already decided to grant carte-blanche to Italian forces in Libya. Beginning with the coast Italian forces (consisting of many Eritreans and local levies) expanded control outwards into the countryside. Aerial reconnaissance played a pivotal role in spotting the Senussi rebels of Omar el-Mukhtar, and no small amount of brutal repressive measures-such as forced confiscation of livestock and summary execution-were utilized. 

In 1925 Mussolini became War Minister (he was already Duce by this time) and unleashed Emilio De Bono and the Rodolfo Graziani-the notorious roughneck-upon Libya, with catastrophic results for the inhabitants of the countryside. Graziani and De Bono added further to the misery of the Libyan people by liberally applying the poison gas phosgene in their attacks and harassment of Senussi villages. By 1928 the Italians had mostly finished destroying el Mukhtar's main rebel bodies, but the countryside remained recalcitrant and -somewhat impatient for results- Mussolini dispatched Pietro Badoglio to finish the job. In the words of Gooch Pietro "set about breaking down Libya's entire socio-political order, confiscating Senussi property, disarming the tribes that submitted, and carrying out a series of trials and executions".

The campaign came to a conclusive end when Omar el-Mukhtar was captured near the Egyptian border after becoming trapped by a 270km long barbed-wire line. He was hung in September of 1931 and by the time he was dead the "Pacification" had racked up a horrifying bloody death toll of 50,000 to 60,000 Libyans over the loss a bit less than 3,000 Italian troops. The burgeoning National Socialist movement certainly did not need to look very hard to find the shining example of inhumane tyranny in Europe they would follow the steps of. 

--

On the somewhat more technical side, when Mussolini became War Minister in 1925 the Italian Army was comprised of around 250,000 men, serving out 18 month conscriptions. This force was organized in thirty "triangular" (3x Infantry Regiment configuration) infantry divisions of nine battalions each. At this phase the question of reorganizing into the "binary" two-regiment divisions does not seem to have emerged. 

To please the King Mussolini created a parallel "Supreme Defense Commission" which Badoglio chaired. Both the War Ministry and Defense Commission had numerous overlapping responsibilities, so in practice Mussolini's directives took precedence over Badoglio's and largely rendered the latter's office irrelevant. It seems that Badoglio was largely placed in this office to please the King, who liked him, but Mussolini had no intention of sharing power with him. 

When Italy left World War 1 equipment in the infantry's stocks consisted of the unremarkable but valuable tools of the Great War. The Stokes mortar, rifle grenade, flamethrower, sub machine gun, etc. Surprisingly after the war Army reorganization's stripped the rifle infantry of these important tools and reorganized them along pre-1914 lines consisting of large uniform rifle companies. The Italian Army was actually demodernized during this period over some silly perception that what the troops needed was proper Fascist indoctrination. This was reflected by the tables of equipment and field regulations issued during this era that emphasized the value of strength of the will over technology and it was supported by many of the Army's pro-fascist Generals. 

Next up is the better known Abyssinian War, a conflict which Fascist Italy would stumble over a bit at first but later conduct with an impressive balance of prudence and aggression not to mention even fewer scruples over the criminal use of poison gas and shameless aerial bombing of civilians. 

 

Edited by SimpleSimon
Link to comment
Share on other sites

On to Ethiopia. 

The obvious roots of this conflict extend into Italy' history of defeat and humiliation by the Ethiopians at the Battle of Adwa. A battle for which the memory of was fresh in Mussolini's Generals, and none of them were eager to repeat the mistake although paranoia about such may have led to Emilio De Bono's extreme wavering between bouts of over caution and reckless overextension. Of greater proximity was the growing nervousness of Italian colonial authorities in Eritrea and Somalia of Ethiopia's arms imports, much of which the Italians themselves had been selling to the Ethiopians until Mussolini halted further sales of weapons into Abyssinia. Italian colonial authorities were extremely bigoted, and their exaggerations of perceived insults, slights, and threats from Addis Ababa dovetailed with Rome's condescending rhetoric of Italy's "civilizing mission" in Africa. All in all, Mussolini had little difficulty steering Fascist Italy into this war. His was briefly held up over concern about how France and England might react, and then again by border crisis after the Nazi's assassination of the Austrian Prime Minister that year, but he eventually got soft guarantees from England and France that neither country would intervene in his plot and then the Nazis backed down from further meddling in Austria for the time being. 

Ethiopia was a loosely aligned Kingdom of tribal ras or local fiefdom's barely united under a loosely translated Emperor or Negus who in theory was military supremo of the Empire. In 1928 ras Tafari became Emperor Haile Selassie. The new Emperor was aware of the Italian's plans to invade and motioned for the League of Nations to guarantee Ethiopia's sovereignty but to little avail. Mussolini began referring to Ethiopia as a "looming military menace" endangering Eritrea and Somalia and by August of 1935 he had written British intervention off entirely. Although he, Badoglio and Admiral Cavagnari (head of Regia Marina) were given a brief scare when the Home Fleet redeployed to the Mediterranean, Mussolini was shortly thereafter given reassurances by Dino Grandi from a leaked Admiralty report that war with Italy was to be avoided. Italian leadership was remarkably frightened over the prospect of War with the British, and no moment seems to have come closer to derailing the entire invasion than the prospect of British intervention. 

Six Metropolitan, two Native Divisions, and an additional eight battalions (110,000 men) were earmarked for an invasion under Emilio De Bono that commenced in October 1935. Progress was rapid at first with De Bono's forces advancing in three prongs south toward Addis Ababa. Adigrat and Adwa fell in less than 3 days. However, Haile Selassie had commanded his ras to fight indirectly-ie to fight as guerillas-while he organized a force of three Armies from the center of the country. De Bono's advance faltered and by November had halted well short of the capital. Badoglio was furious, and dropped a report on Mussolini's desk criticizing De Bono's conduct. Although the advance resumed by the middle of the month the weather turned bad and his advance again lost momentum. By around this stage the Halie Selassie had gathered an Army of 150,000 men to oppose the invasion, and De Bono was relieved and replaced by Badoglio. 

Although Badoglio had criticized De Bono for excessive caution once he took control of the invasion he had good reason to keep being cautious. De Bono's force was badly over extended and Haile Selassie was in a good position to punish any mistakes by the Italians. An infamous incident in December occurred in which a platoon of 8 Italian tankettes (I think L3s) were overrun and destroyed by Ethiopian infantry-who were able to cripple the tanks by bending their machine guns and dropping hand grenades in their radiators-only four tank crewmen escaped. Mussolini was enraged by the humiliation of this event but Badoglio was able to calm him afterward by emphasizing it as a small loss and highlighting that he would soon open his grand assault on Selassie's Armies. 

Badoglio redeployed the invasion force to secure its flanks one of which was being threatened by a 40,000 strong Ethiopian Army near Amba Aradam to his west. Regia Aeronautica was unleashed, using both conventional and chemical munitions on Ethiopian positions, at one point Mussolini suggested the use of biological weapons too, but Badoglio vetoed this. Throughout the conflict Badoglio, Mussolini, and the rest of Commando Supremo held no compunctions toward the use of chemical weapons on civilian and military targets, and Addis Ababa was bombed regularly. 

The Italians would isolate Ethiopian Armies and positions from each other and then bomb them with impunity using a mixture of aerial and artillery attacks. In one battle 22,000 shells were fired at Ethiopian positions of which 1,367 were gas, although the Italians felt they had little effect on the mountainous positions. In February the Battle of Enderta-the largest battle of the war- happened. The Italians had over 280 guns fire 23,000 rounds while Regia Aeronautica conducted 44 sorties per day at one point dropping around 29,000lbs of explosives on the Ethiopians. The Ethiopians launched many aggressive counter attacks during the battle but Italian field artillery broke them up every time. Badoglio made few mistakes in his tactical conduct, Italian troops were instructed to advance under the protective umbrella of machine gun and artillery fire focused on Ethiopian positions which the infantry would occupy after they'd been smashed by support fire. Not exactly innovative tactics, but effective as 1918 had shown. 

Up until now the campaign's success had been greatly attributable to the skill with which the Italians managed their logistics. Five Army Corps were kept supplied 400km from the nearest port by over 900 trucks. Aerial supply drops were used and the combined effort of 10,000 pack animals, sent 22,000,000 rounds of ammunition and 200,000 rounds of artillery shells to Italian frontline troops. Italian field kitchens were well stocked with with frozen meat, milk, jam, dried fruit, and biscuits. Even wine, tobacco, and mineral water were in supply. Each Corp had a surgery unit, and two field hospitals for each Division. I can't imagine the Italians were ever this well organized again. 

In March Halie Selassie made a last ditch effort near Mai Ceu to defeat the Italians. Throwing in all of the Ethiopian Army still under his command, plus his Imperial Guard, the Ethiopians conducted an enormous human-wave assault much of which was directed at the Pusteria Division. The Italians were simply too well armed though, and by the end of the battle suffered only around 800-900 casualties while the Ethiopians probably lost around 7,000 men. The situation further worsened when Graziani's 38,000 strong motorized Army in Somalia invaded from the south. He was just outside Addis Ababa in less than two weeks.

In May 1937 Badoglio entered Addis Ababa, an Eritrean column had already been encamped just outside the city before he arrived, but the Italians demanded that the honor of reaching the capital go to Italy's white troops who took all the credit. Badoglio did not remain long after his victory parade. He was eager to return to Rome in order to take on the mantle of Mussolini's conquering General in order to wrongfoot his (many) rivals in the military as the chosen one. Badoglio was something of an odd pick for Military poster child. He was an old man and known for being pro-monarchist not really fitting the Young Revolutionary Zealot image the Fascists were fostering. But he came back to Rome that year a ruthless conqueror played up in the image of a conquering Roman General and for the Fascists and Mussolini a great (if not perfect) icon of their New World Order. 

Halie Selassie fled in early May, advised by the French not to put the 6,000 white residents of Addis Ababa at risk by trying to defend it. He boarded a British cruiser at Djibouti to sail for Haifa and then went into exile in Bath, England. He couldn't have known that in five years he would return to his nation, but for now Ethiopia became another forgotten blunder in the Allies' pre-war appeasement policies toward Fascism before the Second World War. 

--

Some technical details.

By the end of the conflict Italian forces in Abyssinia grew to around 477,000 complete with 1,500 field guns and howitzers, 500 tanks (which do not seem to have played a major role in the fighting), 450 aircraft (which played a decisive role), and were supported by 103,000 pack animals and 19,000 motor vehicles. Casualties for the Italians were light, just under 3,000 white soldiers and 1,457 ascari died while a bit over 11,000 (total) were wounded. 275,000 Ethiopians died. 

In hindsight, there was very little the Ethiopians could have done to avoid catastrophe. The Ethiopians possessed no artillery and vehicles, their heaviest weapons were foreign supplied Oerlikon guns of which there were few and many men had little more than blades and muskets. 

In the words of Gooch "success gave rise to dangerous illusions". Badoglio became convinced that the three regiment Infantry Divisions were too heavy and hard to maneuver, and he began to back the idea of binary two-regiment infantry divisions which would be implemented a few years later. This organization would leave Italian troops at a major local-manpower disadvantage against much larger British, French, and American formations began to turn up in the World War. 

Regia Aeronautica flew 50,000 hours and dropped 1,800 tons of bombs. Eight aircraft were lost to ground fire, 131 aircrew were lost in total, the overwhelming majority to accidents. The RA achieved remarkable success supporting troop movements and providing aerial reconnaissance and supply to ground forces, gas bombing had proven not terribly effective and in the future less of it would be done while the RA remained convinced that terror bombing of cities was an effective strategy for breaking resistance. The next conflict would have consequences for that kind of disregard. 

Regia Marina for the first time played a major role in an Italian war. The Navy carried a bit under 600,000 men and 630,000 tons of supplies to the Horn of Africa enabling the construction of "six major bases, eighteen airports with 84 satellite strips" for the prosecution of the invasion. Over 950,000,000 lire was spent on hiring ships and paying Suez Canal tolls. 

The Army experienced an enlistment boom, with 17,000 reserve officers putting in requests to serve. Growth in manpower reserves was unmatched since the First World War although much of it went into the Metropolitan Divisions which had been stripped of their equipment to feed the Invasion force. Mussolini was greatly encouraged by the success of Italian forces in the war, with Badoglio quoted "with soldiers like these, Italy can dare all". Although not right around the corner, humiliation was not much further away. 

Although successful the war proved expensive. 12,111,000,000 lire and one third of Italy's gold reserves were expended. Despite Fascist posturing and claims of the rich rewards that would come from an African conquest, the Italian people did not benefit in any way from the war. Between 1935 and 1936 the cost of living in Italy actually rose more than 7%, reaching 9.5% by 1937 while domestic prices increased by one-third. In hindsight, almost nothing was gained by the conquest except arrogance and prestige both of which the Fascist regime-and only the Fascist Regime-valued. 

The war was a humanitarian catastrophe aggravated by Fascist cruelty none of which was necessary and likely all of which was counter-productive to Italian victory. Halie Selassie was not well liked by his ras but faced by Italian terrors attacks on civilians his fiefdoms rallied behind him until-ground down by Italy's superior firepower-they simply lacked the strength to do so anymore. By engaging in this sort of pointless torture the Italians likely increased the difficulties they faced in the war and drew out the fighting plus all of the expense. By itself Italy's finances might've been able to walk it off but the next conflict Mussolini planned on embroiling his country in would serve as the 2nd part of a ruinous one-two punch that would leave Italy totally unready for the World War. 

Next up in the Mediterranean Misadventures of Mussolini, Spain. 

Edited by SimpleSimon
Link to comment
Share on other sites

3 hours ago, SimpleSimon said:

Next up in the Mediterranean Misadventures of Mussolini, Spain. 

Looking forward to that. The Fascist Italian army got a bloody nose at the battle of Guadalajara in March 1937... delivered in part by the Italians fighting for the XII International Brigade "Garibaldi".

Link to comment
Share on other sites

11 hours ago, Erwin said:

That's interesting.  What did they have available at that time?

It sounds like anthrax. I can find very little on bacterial agents Italy had in stock. Germany planned on using anthrax in World War 1 and I have a hunch that's the one although perhaps Mussolini had something more medieval in mind like poisoned animal carcasses or something. 

Also my notes have an error. Badoglio entered Addis Ababa in May of 1936 not 1937. 

11 hours ago, Sgt.Squarehead said:

I still haven't entirely forgiven Italy for this.  :mellow:

Its made exceptionally difficult by the degree to which the non-explicitly Fascist parts of the government, the monarchy, went along with such crimes but it seems to have been widely known that the Army was using gas in Africa and bombing cities. The worst collaborators by far were military senior staff, who ironically Mussolini had initially been very skeptical towards. He was against for instance, the requirement for Generals to become members of the Fascist Party until the Generals themselves suggested it. 

The key point to me aside from the moral repugnance of such acts was how blatantly counter-productive they proved to the war and how they probably served to draw out the fighting. Italy was not served in any way by a prolongation of the war, the fighting was having a ruinous affect on Italy's financial reserves and stocks of equipment. The Metropolitan Divisions were stripped of much of their hardware to feed the war and this would translate directly into disaster in 1943 when many of these same units would have literally nothing heavier than small arms to fight the Allies with when they landed. 

 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

5 minutes ago, SimpleSimon said:

The Metropolitan Divisions were stripped of much of their hardware to feed the war and this would translate directly into disaster in 1943 when many of these same units would have literally nothing heavier than small arms to fight the Allies with when they landed. 

I wonder if the book will go at length into looking the decision making process of Mussolini and his inner circle to join World War II. I am vaguely aware of it being entirely opportunistic, as in "since the Germans will surely win the war then better we join before is over". If the assumption was that World War II would draw to a quick conclusion, and with the collapse of France, barely anyone was thinking otherwise, then leaving the home army divisions bereft of any heavy equipment was quite rational. The problem was that the assumption proved to be completely wrong, and Italy just didn't have the strategic depth (both in the economical and operational dimensions) to absorb the shock of the tide turning in 1943, as Germany did.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

It is about 75% opportunism, but with some degree of respect for strategic reality compromised by the Piedmontese General Staff implying that they could achieve much more if *their* service was given priority in funding. Then reality was even further distorted by the Allies apparent meekness over Ethiopia and Munich, which misled Mussolini into the belief that they were much weaker than they appeared. Hitler would fall for that too. 

There was certainly far less of a concrete "vision" in Mussolini's mind of his New World Order. It resembled something vaguely along the lines of the Roman Empire's territorial outline, but it was never anywhere near as specific as the Nazis plans for a Neo-Germania Superior which was clearly laid out in Generalplan Ost. The chapter after Spain goes into something of an interlude covering just those questions though Bletchley, Gooch's narrative this time is just more focused on the application of Mussolini's aims than the thinking although there's still plenty on that. For now it seems that Gooch wanted to get out a narrative of the distinctly pre-World War fighting that Italy engaged in before 1939. 

Arriba Espana 

I read Beevor's single volume account of the Spanish Civil War ie: The Battle for Spain some years ago so this is a conflict i'm already pretty familiar with the backstory on. The narrative featured quite a bit about Italy's conduct during the war but for obvious reasons Beevor had to leave some things out owing to scope. 

Mussolini had his first hint that trouble was brewing in Spain in June of 1936, only a month before the Coup attempt. The Italian military attache in Tangiers warned that Spanish Generals were planning an uprising and its execution was imminent. At first, Italian military intelligence advised against involvement, the coup looked like it had failed. The Nationalists held only 3 major cities in Spain after the first days of the uprising. 

Although Gooch highlights that Franco was a major personality among the Nationalists from the start, he does not bring up that it wasn't until somewhat after the start of the conflict that he had achieved his Caudillo status as Dictator. He was in fact sharing power within the military-junta with Emilio Mola and Jose Sanjurjo, both of whom would perish sometime later. Mussolini certainly came to favor Franco however, and once he attached the notion of a Fascist-Prestige victory to Spain he was certainly bound to commit something.

A more material reason was that the economic hardship inflicted on Italy by the war in Ethiopia, which Fascist authorities wanted to distract people from. No small amount of calculation played a role here though. The Spanish Civil War might offer a good opportunity to play France and Britain against one another, and at the time Mussolini's relationship with Nazi Germany was uncertain, and he did not necessarily want a pro-Berlin government in Madrid while he was still waging something of a 3 way game on the continent. One concrete factor did unify the Fascist states at this stage, mutual commitment to destroying Communism in Spain. 

Unfortunately the Vatican played a hitherto unheard of role in a 20th century war this time around, and it was not one Catholicism could be proud of in hindsight although support for the Fascists was far from uniform among the Church's supporters. Catholic Press drove home a message that Rome was completely behind Franco's Nationalists, helped by the violence in Spain against clergy resulting from many centuries of pent-up fear of judgement (a feature of Spain which Antony Beevor referred to as the "trauma" of a deeply superstitious culture) and no small amount of corruption on the part of diocese. Pope Pius XI published an encyclical in 1937 lambasting Communism as "a pseudo ideal of justice, equality, fraternity in labor", but he refused to condemn the bombing of Guernica that year by the Nationalists, Germans and Italians despite pleas from Basque priests and clergy to do so.  

Mussolini's first specter to appear in Spain was General Mario Roatta, who would later go on to command the Italian Expeditionary Force sent there the "Corpo Truppe Volontarie" or CTV. Roatta was deeply pessimistic on the Nationalists' position, he was particularly critical of Franco (a move which would lead to his removal later on) and accused Spanish Generals of fighting as they had in the Rif War with outdated methods and thinking. He made it clear however, that Nationalist Victory could be ensured if Franco received support from Italy, and around the same time a report landed in Rome that Germany was planning on making commitments to Spain as well. 

In December 1936 the first Blackshirt Milita volunteers arrived at Cadiz and over the next two months the CTV reached its average size of 48,000-50,000 troops with 488 guns, 1,211 machine guns, 46 light tanks, and 706 mortars. Goering began to meet with Mussolin in Rome, and both of them agreed that Franco's conduct was too slow. It seems neither of them realized that Franco was fighting deliberately slow. He had no interest in sharing the prestige of victories with other personalities in the Nationalist movement. 

The CTV had its first action around Malaga in February 1937. Franco hoped the CTV would draw Republican defenders out of Madrid. Three Italian columns headed by tanks and personnel carriers and covered by German and Italian aircraft drove south west to capture the hills near the city. They were supported by another 5 Spanish columns. Malaga's defenders had only a single anti-aircraft gun and three machine guns, so even though they outnumbered the Italians considerably (2 to 1) and despite some valiant resistance by some of their milita bands the CTV captured Malaga a bit less than a week after the offensive began. After this attack Mussolini wanted Roatta to push on to Madrid but Franco demanded the CTV attack at Guadalajara which Roatta preferred. He didn't want the mechanized CTV to get caught up city fighting and Guadalajara looked much more preferable. 

During March the weather turned foul and neither the Condor Legion or Regia Aeronautica were able to provide much support. Roatta decided to push ahead, and attacked Republican positions with 30,000 troops, 160 guns, 81 light tanks, and 2,400 trucks. They were faced by around 10,000 Republicans at the start of the battle, but the Republicans would rapidly reinforce their defense to around 30,000 by the end of the battle. 

Foul weather turned into abysmal weather as rain gave way to blinding sleet and mud roads. The International Brigades began to appear, conducting vicious counter-attacks on CTV columns. Roatta decided to call the offensive off, which Mussolini agreed to but Franco vetoed. Retreat would be humiliating but in the middle of March a huge attack on Italian frontline positions was made by Republican bombers with fighter escorts. Panic broke among the 1st Blackshirt Division and the whole CTV had to redeploy to a 2nd line of defense to prevent a rout from breaking out where they managed to hold out. A humiliating battle in which the CTV's modern equipment and heavy firepower did little to protect it from defeat, the Italians lost around 600 men and 2,000 wounded at the Guadalajara against which the Republicans lost many more men owing to their own lack of such arms. Probably around 2,200 dead and 6,000 wounded. Ernest Hemingway mocked the Nationalists in the press and eulogized the Republican defense. Franco stated that from now on the CTV would fight only under parent Spanish formations under the command of Spanish Generals. 

German observers however, highlighted that the main reason the attack had failed was that the Italians had not pressed forward, and too easily became content or "stuck" raiding villages and towns for "Communists" to shoot and then loot. At Gooch highlights, many of Roatta's troops were a "motley crew". A quarter of them had criminal records, fifteen percent were over forty, many were suffering from hernias, appendicitis, and syphilis. As both Gooch and Beevor point out, the battle if anything made Mussolini more determined to destroy Republican Spain and he increased aid. 

Roatta was replaced by General Bastico, who reorganized the CTV. The Littorio Division was untouched but two of the three Blackshirt Divisions were dissolved and 3,700 of their men sent home. A hundred Officers and two Blackshirt Division commanders were fired as well as one regular Army General. Around this time Franco decided to reorient the Nationalist war effort against the Basques and to crush their sector before attacking Madrid again. The next time the CTV would be used was around Santander. Despite the unfavorable, mountainous ground the CTV was able to open the main road to the city in only two days against an 80,000 strong Republican force that had 180 guns, 70 airplanes, and months without pressure to construct a defense. The CTV reached the city's outskirts by the end of August, only around a week after their offensive began and-with good planning and skillfull execution-undermined and destroyed isolated Republican defensive positions outside of the city. Bastico received a delegation from the Republican defenders before the month ended presenting the city's surrender and he entered the city. 

Unlike Guadalajara, the fighting around Santander was a major success. Bastico glowed about his troops in his reports afterwards, and highlighted that the light Italian tanks and artillery worked well in the mountainous climate. He did however, issue the first warning that the Binaria Divisions of two regiments were not strong enough to conduct attacks on their own and that Commando Supremo should consider returning to triangular Divisions. Bastico however, later fell afoul of Franco over a dispute on prisoners -all of whom Franco wanted to shoot- and he was recalled in September and replaced by Mario Berti. 

During the first half of 1937 Italian submarines and warships sank nine ships supplying the Republicans, six of which were Spanish, one was Russian, and one was British, the last one's flag isn't mentioned. Although the material effect of this blockade was limited, it reinforced a view that the Italian Navy was serious about punishing transgressors so even though in September Mussolini called off further Naval attacks on merchant shipping, supplies to the Republicans began to dwindle anyway. Regia Aeronautica fought for air supremacy over Madrid during this period and the Republicans were eventually down to less than half of their irreplaceable 158 airplanes they had at their highest readiness. 

Although Mussolini desired victory he also desired a fast end to the war, as the situation was now changing rapidly in Europe. Germany was making moves on Austria again, and Italian Generals were infuriated at the slow pace with which Franco preferred to conduct his operations. Franco was by now head of the Nationalists, and determined to crush resistance in rear areas before finishing off Republican cities. After a Nationalist offensive on Madrid failed in November and the Aragon Offensive was cancelled, Berti began to feel the whole CTV should be pulled out. Mussolini agreed, but compromised with Franco by advising him that from now on the CTV would remain in reserve and only allowed to participate in attacks which the Italians considered prestigious. This caused them to miss the decisive fighting at Teruel later on which Franco was able to wield and had billed to the Italians as an unimportant objective, but world media was closely focused on it. 

Franco asked the CTV be used against Alcaniz instead, another rather unfavorable mountain town overlooking fortified high ground. Despite the unfavorable conditions for mechanized troops the CTV did well in this battle. There was "one truck for every fourteen to sixteen men" and Berti could call upon 236 guns for his attacks. Italian troops used the tried and true methods of smashing Republican positions with artillery fire and then advancing in uncomplicated frontal attacks to seize ground. Alcaniz fell in March 1938. 

Mussolini, encouraged by Hitler's shock triumph with Anschluss in Austria  and learning that the French were stepping up resupply efforts to the Republicans ordered General Valle to bomb Barcelona. Over three days Italian bombers dropped 44 tons of high explosive on the city killing 600 and maiming 990. The final planned stroke of the CTV's time in Spain came in the offensive against Valencia. Berti personally assessed the strength of Republican defenses at around 100,000 men supported by 1,300 machine guns, 130-150 guns, 70 tanks, and 200 aircraft. Once again an offensive was initiated into a scorched, hilly rock country (if you've watched Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade, the tank scene was filmed around this area giving you a picture of how it looked.) and although casualties were light there appear to have been a number of friendly-fire incidents this time as Italian artillery and aircraft struck own-troop positions at points. Despite that heavy air and artillery bombardments again broke defensive positions on these areas and the CTV had defeated and bypassed most of the frontline positions in a week and a half when word came of a major Republican offensive in the south. 

The CTV was northwest of Valencia when the Republicans launched their great last-ditch offensive of the war on the Ebro river and was quickly redeployed to contain that assault. The Republicans were fighting hard not to lose their bridgehead over the Ebro and a counter thrust by the CTV toward Gandesa and Tortosa proceeded slowly. By early April of 1938 the CTV captured the mountain pass around the Sierra del Montenegrelo which had a commanding view of the Ebro river. Italian engineers spent a day converting a mule track into a road for artillery positions by mid April the Republicans had to blow the bridges over the Ebro. Tortosa fell not long after. Regia Aeronautica flew 4000 sorties and dropped 1,000 tons of bombs many of which came from the new Breda Ba.65 ground attack airplane. 

This defensive campaign cost the CTV 530 dead and 2,482 wounded. Only half as many losses as the Nationalists had suffered. By this time however the CTV was beginning to see the consequences of chronic losses, with some companies down to only around 100 men. By the end of July around 5,500 replacements made their way into Spain-some of whom concealed in civilian clothing-but this wasn't quite enough to fully reinforce the CTV up to authorized strength. The CTV's role in the battle was a controversial one for the Nationalist side. By the time the Italians arrived the Republican offensive had already stalled well short of its planned objectives, but it was CTV that put in the killing blow, completely reversing all of the captures made by the Republicans and denying the Republicans even a salvageable moral victory. By November operations around the Ebro were over. 

Mussolini remained however, disproportionately worried by reports reaching him that the French were still supplying the Republicans and their will to fight had not been broken. He even believed that Franco might yet be defeated, but he was in fact completely unaware that foreign military observers and neutrals had entirely the opposite conclusion. The American naval attache was reporting Washington that Republican collapse was imminent. Mussolini's attention was becoming increasingly diverted by the burgeoning crisis over Czechoslovakia, and his mood became uneven. He went back and forth with Franco for a time on everything from withdrawing the CTV, to reinforcing it, to reducing it to a single division, or to adding another division, before finally settling on reducing the CTV to a single division. 

The CTV was reduced from 39,000 men to 19,300 along with 9,000 Fascist "militiamen". Berti was relieved, not for being a bad commander, but because Mussolini was frustrated that he was still a bachelor and that it looked bad in the bizarre reality of the Fascist world not to be fathering children and spreading genes. He was replaced by Gastone Gambarra, a total convert to the ideas of mechanized warfare. Mussolini and Franco agreed that the CTV would strike Catalonia this time, and in December 1938 the assault began. Conducted entirely in the manner of a skillful Blitzkrieg, Taragona fell quickly and the Italians were rapidly outpacing Nationalist infantry on their flanks. Resistance quickly collapsed and before the month was up the Nationalists were in Barcelona and the CTV had captured Gerona and closed the border. Republican leadership collapsed and fled in March and Franco entered Madrid that month. 

--

The Italians committed 42,715 soldiers and 32,216 Blackshirt militamen and lost 3,318 dead and 11,763 wounded. 1,604 guns fired 10,000,000 rounds and the CTV took 108,000 prisoners, destroyed 65 tanks, and shot down 544 aircraft. Moods and morale turned foul in the CTV again after the Aragon Offensive-which they were the star of-was cancelled. This offensive was being conducted in open ground that favored mechanized forces (George Orwell was wounded fighting in the area at the time) and Italian leadership was deeply displeased when Franco called it off. Clearly at no point was it understood by Mussolini that all Franco wanted was equipment from the Italians, and that he would prefer to do without the Italians themselves. Even when "cooperating", the Fascist states were far from cooperative with each other. 

Regia Aeronautica calculated that it had sent 213 bombers, 414 fighters, and 132 other airplanes with 372,261 bombs. 517 airplanes had been given to the Nationalists, and 350 were left behind when the RA disbanded its wings in Spain. The RA's bill amounted to 1,000,506,000 lire. 

Regia Marina tabulated that it had used 87 transports to make 193 trips, 10 ships, mostly submarines, were handed over to the Nationalists, and decryption/signal interception services were provided. Direct costs amounted to 6,086,003,680 lire, with all potential costs being in the realm of around 66.9 billion lire, leaving a deficit of 40.4 billion. 

Yet again Italy stripped its forces of enormous stocks of hardware and tools leaving 442 artillery guns and 7,500 motor vehicles to the Nationalists. This equipment would be sorely missed in 1940 just when Graziani would've needed it to oppose the British in Africa next year. 

The Italians were somewhat more sober about the lessons they pulled from this conflict, and concluded correctly that the Spanish Civil War had been a somewhat amateur conflict fought between relative lightweights. It would not much resemble the looming major war which was by now on the horizon. There was still quite a bit of excessive optimism however. The Regia Aeronautica was convinced by the performance of its biplane fighter, the CR.32, and by the encouragement of individualist pilots engaging in fancy aerobatics that they were right to continue with a standing doctrine of aerial warfare that resembled something much closer to the Red Baron's days. Even though there had been occasional setbacks over Madrid when the Republicans started fielding newer airplanes like the I-16 and Chato. Formations had learned to practice flights of 5 airplanes in 3 groups organized vertically over top of each other, so that that the highest group could cover the one beneath it. Close air support was conducted with great success by airplanes specially designed for the task, but the Douhetist thinking of Regia Aeronautica emphasized strategic bombing and air superiority and so not much was considered further in the school of battlefield-support which would bless Italy's peers with superb support craft like the Stuka, Douglass A-20 and IL-2 Sturmovik.

Worst of all was the conclusion by high ranking members of the Fascist state, such as Galeazzo Ciano, that constructing raid shelters and anti-aircraft defenses were useless, and that the only means of protection for the inhabitants of cities was air supremacy and evacuation. When the Allies began bombing Italian cities in 1942 and with nothing like a Kammhuber line, public air raid shelters, or sophisticated air defense network Italian cities would disgorge themselves of hundreds of thousands of refugees at a time clogging roads and overburdening rural infrastructure. 

Bastico made efforts while back in Italy to convince Army leadership that the binaria Divisions were a failed experiment and the Army should reorganized divisions into triangular formations again. Gambara backed the binary division though, and so did General Pariani now Chief of the General Staff. Bastico lost the argument. This formation left Italian Infantry Divisions without an organic artillery component-which in theory would be provided by a Corp HQ-and almost totally reliant on their small arms and mortars for firepower projection. Italian troops would suffer greatly under avalanches of 25pdr and 105mm howitzer fire in the big war. 

Surprisingly not much mentioned in this chapter is the bombing of Guernica and the international condemnation that came with it. Beevor's book goes over that event in much greater detail. 

Next time, the interlude. Dabbling and haggling in the realm of politics and military reorganization, and the increasing influence of Hitler and the Nazis over Mussolini. 

Edited by SimpleSimon
Link to comment
Share on other sites

2 hours ago, SimpleSimon said:

Italy stripped its forces of enormous stocks of hardware and tools leaving 442 artillery guns and 7,500 motor vehicles to the Nationalists. This equipment would be sorely missed in 1940 just when Graziani would've needed it to oppose the British in Africa next year. 

Strange that after Franco won the war Italians gave him all this.  Was it all crap equipment?

Enjoyed your summary of the situations.  Thanks SS.

Edited by Erwin
Link to comment
Share on other sites

 

The Italians seem to be credited with some good aircraft:

Reggiane Re-2005 Sagittario

Reggiane Re.2005 SagittarioEditorial TeamReggiane Re.2005 Sagittario

The Reggiane Re-2005 was described by the British as a superb, potent aeroplane. This was not a development of the Re-2002, but rather an entirely new design. The Re-2005 was designed for the Daimler-Benz 605 engine.

In addition to being considered on of the finest axis fighter planes of ww2, it was also considered one of the best looking fighter planes of that time. 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

8 hours ago, SimpleSimon said:

There was certainly far less of a concrete "vision" in Mussolini's mind of his New World Order. It resembled something vaguely along the lines of the Roman Empire's territorial outline, but it was never anywhere near as specific as the Nazis plans for a Neo-Germania Superior which was clearly laid out in Generalplan Ost. The chapter after Spain goes into something of an interlude covering just those questions though Bletchley, Gooch's narrative this time is just more focused on the application of Mussolini's aims than the thinking although there's still plenty on that. For now it seems that Gooch wanted to get out a narrative of the distinctly pre-World War fighting that Italy engaged in before 1939. 

Cheers Simon, that's was very useful.

I am not a big fan of Beevor but he did a good job summarising the main political and military aspects of the Spanish Civil War. Hugh Thomas' "The Spanish Civil War" work is still the to-go reference (the revised 2001 edition remains a standard mandatory text across all History degrees in Spain, as it is remarkable balanced and non-partisan while going to describe the gory details of a very messy war).

 

8 hours ago, SimpleSimon said:

The Italians were somewhat more sober about the lessons they pulled from this conflict, and concluded correctly that the Spanish Civil War had been a somewhat amateur conflict fought between relative lightweights. It would not much resemble the looming major war which was by now on the horizon.

While it is correct that the sides were relative lightweights, materially speaking, the chiefs of staff (and their staffs) were all trained officers. So in terms of the planning and execution, leaving aside the political dimension of military operations and some colourful personalities whose importance was greatly amplified by propaganda, it was pretty much what you could expect from the practices of the German General Staff as set by von Schlieffen (as the Spanish Army was rebuilt in the early 1900s after the Spanish-American War of 1898 pretty much in the image of the Prussian Army). There was a gap indeed in the means, e.g. relying on barely trained militias early in the war and abysmal logistics throughout the conflict, not in the technical knowledge.

What I find surprising of the Italian experience of the CTV is that they didn't realise that actually worked like a charm were combined arms operations based on maneuver and dislocation that exploited a tactical breakthrough had become now possible. For real and not like in 1918 by sheer luck, thanks to improved signal communications and more reliable, longer range, armored vehicles. As you point out, the CTV was very successful when they abandoned the set-piece battle and went for maneuver (enabled by breaching enemy lines of defence).

In contrast, the Condor Legion - the German contingent in Spain - did collect critical experience on what it worked and what did not work from an organisational perspective. Looks like the Italians, and the Soviets, became fixated on the utility of particular pieces of equipment, or how to best employ those pieces of equipment, rather than in the realisation that speed and agility were awesome force multipliers.

I am thinking of the invasion of Egypt in 1940, for instance. While there were plenty of mechanised forces capable of fast attacks and maneuver, the Italian Army preferred to dig in and fortify as if it was 1918, waiting for the unavoidable counterattack. Which came, but certainly not in the way and direction they expected: they basically put their heads in a silver platter for O'Connor to chop it up. Perhaps the problem was that they hadn't figured the logistics at all, and there weren't the means to keep those mechanised forces operating away from the stockpiles in Tobruk or Bardia... but then, why start the offensive at all? What was the rationale?

Edited by BletchleyGeek
Link to comment
Share on other sites

On 12/7/2020 at 2:24 PM, Erwin said:

Strange that after Franco won the war Italians gave him all this.  Was it all crap equipment?

Transport capacity was both limited, and expensive. Additionally the Italian Generals felt their equipment was outdated, so might as well leave it to Franco, who  often had nothing comparable. Tankettes are goofy things and yeah one time the Ethiopians destroyed a few when they made the mistake of giving chase without allowing their infantry support to keep up. They are ultimately better than nothing especially since proper anti-tank weapons were few and far between for the time. Although the L3 was certainly the bottom tier of the class it was the only tank Italy could make lots of for a time. Besides, the public can't tell what it's problems are from photos and parades. 

It was based very closely on the British Carden Loyd tankette which later went on to serve as the basis for many other light tanks and carriers (including the Universal "Bren" Carrier"). Only the L3 did not ride very smooth and its enclosed crew compartment tended to trap exhaust fumes and make crews sick. Early models used rivet construction with meant that when hit directly the rivets could spall into the crew compartment. The Italians had already decided by the Spanish Civil War that it would need to replaced but the planned replacement -itself based on the Vickers 6 ton- was obsolete by the time it hit the drawing board. The chief shortage facing Italian mobile units from here on out would be shortages of crucial trucks.

On 12/7/2020 at 3:13 PM, Sgt.Squarehead said:

Most of the equipment sent to Spain was pretty poor:

The SM.79 is an interesting exception for the most part, however it was a 3 engine airplane in a country with many difficulties mass producing powerful airplane engines. So production was doomed to be limited. It did remain in some nation's inventories until 1953 though. 

19 hours ago, BletchleyGeek said:

What I find surprising of the Italian experience of the CTV is that they didn't realise that actually worked like a charm were combined arms operations based on maneuver and dislocation that exploited a tactical breakthrough had become now possible. For real and not like in 1918 by sheer luck, thanks to improved signal communications and more reliable, longer range, armored vehicles. As you point out, the CTV was very successful when they abandoned the set-piece battle and went for maneuver (enabled by breaching enemy lines of defence).

Well it seems that there's a bit of a yes and no to this based on what im gathering. The Generals fully appreciated the consequences of the tank, airplane, and truck...but in their fixation on the new gee-whiz gimmicks of the age they seem to have thought very little of the more conventional tools of soldiering like small arms and artillery. Much was expected to be made up for by highly abstract notions romanticized by Fascism like Strength of the Will  and racial superiority and such. Dash and daring certainly played a role in the field, but too often they were expected to substitute for military science and Italy seems to have avoided serious punishment for that due to the feeble nature of the enemies it had faced thus far. 

19 hours ago, BletchleyGeek said:

I am thinking of the invasion of Egypt in 1940, for instance. While there were plenty of mechanised forces capable of fast attacks and maneuver, the Italian Army preferred to dig in and fortify as if it was 1918, waiting for the unavoidable counterattack. Which came, but certainly not in the way and direction they expected: they basically put their heads in a silver platter for O'Connor to chop it up. Perhaps the problem was that they hadn't figured the logistics at all, and there weren't the means to keep those mechanised forces operating away from the stockpiles in Tobruk or Bardia... but then, why start the offensive at all? What was the rationale?

The next chapters provide answers to this but to give you a glimpse on the last part because "Hitler is going to destroy England, so we we can only lose if we wait". 

Edited by SimpleSimon
Link to comment
Share on other sites

20 minutes ago, SimpleSimon said:

Much was expected to be made up for by highly abstract notions romanticized by Fascism like Strength of the Will  and racial superiority and such. Dash and daring certainly played a role in the field, but too often they were expected to substitute for military science and Italy seems to have avoided serious punishment for that due to the feeble nature of the enemies it had faced thus far. 

That's a very interesting observation, thanks for sharing. 

The disasters in Western Egypt and Greece were quite a double whammy, looking forward to next installments!

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Intermission

The Italian military was struck by an influx of young and assertive applications for the General Staff during the 1920s. The First World War's bloody setbacks at Caporetto had traumatized a generation and a nation, and it seemed as if huge Armies of semi-trained conscripts would in the future be swept aside by small, professional, well-armed groups of elite shock troopers. Materially, it was felt that Italy could not afford long grinding wars of attrition, which would wear the nation away against a world full of such large enemies. Italy's new super soldiers would be virile young men raised in a harsh world of Barracks-Lifestyle overthrowing a world of-in their view- pathetic Liberal compromise, empathy, and weakness.  Age and crusty conservativism were automatically associated with one another, and when Mussolini became Duce he set about a process of shaking up the military establishment by sacking and retiring many of its older staff members. 

In 1933 Mussolini fired the previous War Minister, took the job for himself, and awarded his under-secretary General Federico Baistrocchi with the task of modernizing the Army. Biastrocchi had his work cut out for him. Mussolini demanded a force of 15 motorized Divisions ready by 1947, the first of many over ambitious figures that would simply never be met. For tactics however, Baistrocchi designed a system of field regulations and procedures that in most ways mixed the more classical mechanics of the older wars with the dynamic mobility of the new age. Airplanes, Cavalry Divisions, and tanks would break the frontline open with fast shock assaults while the artillery would pummel fixed or resistant enemy positions while the infantry advanced under protective umbrellas of fire support. Infantry were still seen as the chief instrument of combat, and much investment was placed in a system of indoctrination of Fascist values. War was a spiritual, abstract reality where individual willpower and willingness to sacrifice were the chief means by which Armies obtained victory. 

Baistroochi was ahead of his time in many ways, but he made the mistake of cautioning Mussolini against the Ethiopian War in 1934 and was sacked not long after. He was replaced by General Alberto Pariani. Pariani was a major advocate of light formations fighting a fast war of maneuver, and it was he who came up with the binaria Division. Lacking organic artillery larger than mortars and dependent on trucks for movement which were authorized but never appeared, these organizations would suffer harshly in the World War.

Badoglio had remarked in print that he preferred the binaria Division, but in private he had major doubts about the formations. Pariani was a good showman however, and used maneuvers and training events-highly publicized ones-to wrongfoot his critics in the military. Crucially he had the Duce's backing, and eventually the General Staff fell in line. 

In 1937 Pariani was invited to attend maneuvers of the German Wehrmacht at Mecklenburg and his opposite, Werner von Blomberg visited Italy in turn. The two future Axis powers started to size up each other's forces for the first time. Blomberg was impressed by Mussolini and Pariani but was lukewarm on his inspections of Italian troops. Pariani for his part was far more impressed by what he witnessed. German Officer training "stressed character and decision-making, training was all practical- very little place is given to theory". He was however letdown by what he saw of Germany's equipment, much of which he rated as definitely no better than Italy's and some of which perhaps even inferior. At this time, Italy's practical experience in combat was greater than Germany's, and the Germans consequently viewed the Italians with some esteem. 

After the rump Czechoslovakian state was finished off, Hitler decided to give the OKW permission to discuss war with the Italians but for now not to imply or hint at any operational goals. Escalating international tensions in early 1939 led to a meeting between Pariani and Wilhelm Keitel in April at Innsbruck. Pariani declared to Keitel that in recent years Italy's primary enemy had shifted from England to France, and he presented a plan of attack to Keitel aimed at France's African colonies which Keitel was unimpressed by. The meeting was a somewhat awkward affair in which the Italians revealed much and Keitel almost nothing except that both of them expected war with the Western powers was imminent. Both men left the meeting with misleading impressions of the other side, with Keitel believing that Italy was expecting a short war which would not require material aid while Pariani left the meeting believing he had conveyed the need for material support to Keitel in the event of a long war. 

Pariani drew up a wishlist of equipment needed by Italy to join Germany in a war against the Allies. 570,220 rifles and sub machine guns, 3,420 mortars, 2,490 infantry and other small caliber guns. 51,830,000 rounds of ammunition, 6,700 trucks, and 460 tanks. If the war went longer than a year Italy would need another 1,103,000 rifles and machine guns, 9100 mortars, 2,200 field guns, and 2,612,534 rounds of ammunition. With these material figures Pariani planned on raising 41 brand new Divisions. 

In April Britain guaranteed the independence of Greece and Romania and this put Greece under Mussolini's crosshairs that month. Mussolini believed that Greece was a British "outpost" in the Mediterranean and had wanted to invade it much earlier in the 1930s. Deciding to attack obliquely, Mussolini invaded Albania instead although probably much of this was inspired by the need to match Hitler's destruction of Czechoslovakia. Given only a week of warning the commander of the invasion force- General Guzzoni-was only able to meet mobilization figures for 22,000 men of his force, the other 78,000 lacking any kind of transport. The fact that this force was facing a 60,000 strong Albanian Army might've proven disastrous but in any case,  King Zog folded right away, he fled and no national defense was mounted. Gooch states "Perhaps for this reason the notion that such ventures needed training and preparation failed to take root in the Duce's mind". 

In May 1939 Galeazzo Ciano met with Joachim von Ribbentrop in Berlin to sign the Pact of Steel, guaranteeing one nation would come to the other's aid in a war regardless of circumstances. Mussolini suggested to Ribbentrop a few weeks later that Italy would not be ready to fight until 1943, but Ethiopia would yield an Army of six million men, and six new battleships would be finished. Since they'd be unable to access world markets, Mussolini said it would be necessary to seize the entire Danube basin and Balkans in order to mobilize enough resources to sustain each nation's war economy. 

At this stage, Mussolini was confronted by several warnings and a pace of events which moved much faster than he was prepared to digest. In early July the British ambassador to Rome Sir Percy Loraine warned that Britain was not going to tolerate pressure on Poland to yield the Danzig corridor and that if Italy persisted with Germany over Poland there would be war. Mussolini fired back that Italy would back Germany with force if this were to happen, but behind the scenes he flinched. Mussolini ordered Ciano to meet with Ribbentrop in Salzburg and persuade him to avoid war.  The meeting was a fiasco though, Ribbentrop disregarded the Italian's concerns about war with Britain. Later on Hitler cut some slack in the affair by stating that in the event of war he would not ask Italy to intervene under the terms of the Pact of Steel. 

The forecast for war got worse with each passing month. Badoglio presented Mussolini with some hard facts about the Army's state of readiness. 52 of the 72 Divisions available were needed for defense of Italy's colonies at the country itself. Only twenty would be available for operations in Africa and the Balkans. Italy's gold reserves were depleted and preparations for rearmament were far from complete, with less than half of the available 72 Divisions anywhere near their authorized equipment stocks and only around 20 near it. Articles in the Italian press advancing Fascist territorial aspirations in Greece and Egypt were met with strong public hostility, and a report from the Chief of Police landed on Mussolini's desk showing the overwhelming majority of Italians feared war and did not want it. Roatta suggested that perhaps none of this was necessary, believing that Poland would prove much tougher than Germany expected it to be and that their invasion might even fail. By the end of August Mussolini had to accept he could not go to war yet no matter how much he wanted to. 

The day after Hitler's invasion of Poland began Pariani decided to make further mobilizations of manpower regardless of the shortages of equipment. During September and October eight Divisions, 4 regular Army and 4 Blackshirt, were dispatched to Libya where they joined four Metropolitan and two Libyan Divisions achieving a combined force of around 130,000 deployed troops North Africa. The Governor-General of Libya, Italo Balbo, found that little to no equipment had been sent with these men and remarked that if war had broken out in September the consequences would've been frightful. Material shortages all across Italian mobilization were humiliatingly bad. Reports landed on Mussolini's desk speaking of one ration being shared between 10 men and soldiers showing up for roll call in civilian clothes owing to lack of uniforms. Many men went home or slept in public buildings for lack of barracks. 

Pariani and Badoglio began weaving two different stories of mobilization. Pariani claimed that by November 38 Divisions would be complete and by next year there'd be another 26. Badoglio's report on the other hand, laid reality out. Only 10 of the 72 Divisions in the Army were full manned, and 22 didn't exist at all. Enough fuel was on hand for 4 and a half months. All of Italy's anti-aircraft guns were from the First World War and the Air Force had enough fuel to fly its 1,769 airplanes for two months. But hey, the Navy is probably ready to go at least right? 

About that...

The Naval Situation

Naval priorities as laid about Admiral Cavagnari made it clear that the chief objective of Regia Marina would be protection of Italy's sea lanes. It was clear during the First World War that Italy was dependent on foreign inputs of raw materials to sustain warship construction. There were strong feelings both ways that Italy's position in the Mediterranean was either very good for her or very bad for her providing the country with either a commanding position over the entire Mediterranean or total vulnerability to attack from any direction in the Mediterranean. 

The first priority was thus protection of the nation's vital supply lines. The second objective was to attack the enemy's supply lines and coasts. Studies done in the 1930s were as Gooch states "gloomy reading". Britain and France could put at least 3 battleships on both ends of the Mediterranean right away and would probably deploy more. This ruled force-projection against either spoke of the sea be it toward Gibraltar or the Suez. Thus the Navy settled into a defensive role planned around escorting convoys to Libya and protecting the coastline. 

The simple fact was Cavagnari's Navy looked impressive but materially had little else going for it. 100,000 men were necessary to achieve war-time crew counts of 170,000 men. Specialists were in short supply, with radio operators and mechanics expected to be 25% undermanned. There were not enough vessels in the entire national fishing fleet to provide 870 auxiliary minesweepers the navy studies believed it would need. 

For today that's what i'm doing. This is a big chapter with little excitement and the next half won't be much different but bear with me here because things are going to get moving fast. 

 

 

 

Edited by SimpleSimon
Link to comment
Share on other sites

4 hours ago, SimpleSimon said:

Only 10 of the 72 Divisions in the Army were full manned, and 22 didn't exist at all. Enough fuel was on hand for 4 and a half months. All of Italy's anti-aircraft guns were from the First World War and the Air Force had enough fuel to fly its 1,769 airplanes for two months. But hey, the Navy is probably ready to go at least right?

That pretty much answers my question regarding the offensive in Western Egypt...

Link to comment
Share on other sites

lol thank you but it wont be necessary. I encourage others to buy the book. For Kindle it's only 18.99 usd. 

7 hours ago, BletchleyGeek said:

That pretty much answers my question regarding the offensive in Western Egypt...

O'Connor is about to have his magnum opus, against which Graziani will be firing back with a bassoon section that has no bassoons and a percussion section with a pair of rusty old snare drums and a bass drum with a hole in it. 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

If you wanted to make competitive scenarios in a new CMAK I think a considerable degree of "what if" would be necessary to assume the Italians didn't give up all of their equipment to Spain and retained much of it anticipating a tough European war by 1940 instead of 1947 like they were expecting. There's a degree to which after all, Italy had way more agency than it appears in all of this and Gooch himself says at one point that counter-factual history goes on endlessly but Graziani having the 6,000 or so trucks he needed could have enabled a very different story in Africa. The binaria Divisions too would've made way more sense if the Italians actually had the trucks for them but the lack of organic firepower was damning. Tbh in many ways modern US Army Brigade-Combat-Teams resemble them, but feature the necessary organic fire support, engineers, recon and motorization levels necessary for it to actually work. The Italian version was literally just a pair of infantry regiments.

What a lot of this points to is the Italians frequently making correct assessments about configuration, but just timing them poorly. Problems were then furthered by poor self-assessment which assumed a granted or base level of readiness among their troops that was just total fantasy. Italian Generals foresaw "Blitzkrieg" years before the Wehrmacht did, but then pretended they had achieved it. 

Edited by SimpleSimon
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Unfortunately, your content contains terms that we do not allow. Please edit your content to remove the highlighted words below.
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

×
×
  • Create New...