Units-Creation of and cohesion and experience-lots of questions

[gatsby]

I can'r sem to find an answer to this in the old questions and answers...

Is it possible to create your own units or are the units prefixed?

Its probably easier to say what i want to do or see than ask such an obtuse question...

For example, in the fall of 1944 the germans started to round up teh stragglers and instead of sending them back to their old units they just grabbed a lt. or Captain and sent them back up to the line in command of the stragglers....Obviously these units which became more and more common did not have the unit cohesion of pre 44 units....not to mention that the units the stragglers came from werre weaker...

Also, there were OST units of course, and for the Americans....there was a quite a gap between the bloodied units and the relatively green troops...Unit cohesion broke down because of the the USA replacement system...

So I have number of questions arising from this...

1) Is there a factor for unit cohesion and can it be adjusted by the player...

2) Will there be a way to reflect this decrease in effectiveness?

3)As units gained more and more experience there was a failsafe line in which their combat effectiveness started to decrease quite dramitically...This was especially apparent with the British troops in Normandy who had been fighting for a long time and willingless to take casualities was a lot less than relatively fresh troops...

This whole experience thing is very important and I can understand why troops in a 60 minute firefight would not be helped but...

green troops who had been under fire all day would gain effectiveness...and veteran troops which had been under fire for a prolonged period of time would not take nearly as many chances as they would previously...

Last point for now...Did you look at the Die truppernfurhung when setting up the AI in this game...This was the 1933 manual which governed almost all later tactival and operational doctrine for the Wehrmacht... and did you also look at the US field service manual ...FM-100-5 Operations which was the american verison of Die truppenfuhrung...it was updated and revised in 41 and then again in 44...There was also a circular called "battle experiences" which was practival hints and tactics which was a series of do's and don'ts written by officers who had seen combat...these were collected and edited by SHAEF....

One last questiopn(see I told you) ...Will we be able to simulate the Vosges campaign...ie will there be mountain troops...and an ability to simulate the mountainous terrain of that area..

Thanks

John

[CRourke]

A more in depth treatment of morale/cohesion/training is on my wish list for CM2. I think the green-elite thing is adequate most of the time, but there are units you mentioned and whatnot where it doesn't quite work

Chris

[Guest Big Time Software]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Is it possible to create your own units or are the units prefixed?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The "atomic" (please forgive the use of that word in this context! ) units are fixed. Squads, teams, ordnance, LATWs, etc. are all historically presented and armed. But you can create your own formations from platoon on up using these units.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>For example, in the fall of 1944 the germans started to round up teh stragglers and instead of sending them back to their old units they just grabbed a lt. or Captain and sent them back up to the line in command of the stragglers....Obviously these units which became more and more common did not have the unit cohesion of pre 44 units....not to mention that the units the stragglers came from werre weaker...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You can select "conscript" as a unit characteristic to represent such units. Also, we have units armed as Volkssturm, which can be used in conjunction with this.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Also, there were OST units of course, and for the Americans....there was a quite a gap between the bloodied units and the relatively green troops...Unit cohesion broke down because of the the USA replacement system...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

We also have a "Green" setting which is better than Conscript, but not up to "Regular" standards.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>1) Is there a factor for unit cohesion and can it be adjusted by the player...

2) Will there be a way to reflect this decrease in effectiveness?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes to both.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>3)As units gained more and more experience there was a failsafe line in which their combat effectiveness started to decrease quite dramitically...This was especially apparent with the British troops in Normandy who had been fighting for a long time and willingless to take casualities was a lot less than relatively fresh troops...This whole experience thing is very important and I can understand why troops in a 60 minute firefight would not be helped but...green troops who had been under fire all day would gain effectiveness...and veteran troops which had been under fire for a prolonged period of time would not take nearly as many chances as they would previously...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I disagree that Green troops would gain enough experience in a 60-minute firefight that such gains would manifest themselves in improved capabilities during that very same firefight. Therefore we do not simulate such a thing in Combat Mission.

As for "worn out" experienced troops, you might want to rate them simply as "Regular" in the game, since some may not be willing to put their experience to use (i.e. they've grown cautious). (Note: Ratings above Regular are Veteran, Crack, and Elite).

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Last point for now...Did you look at the Die truppernfurhung when setting up the AI in this game...This was the 1933 manual which governed almost all later tactival and operational doctrine for the Wehrmacht... and did you also look at the US field service manual ...FM-100-5 Operations which was the american verison of Die truppenfuhrung...it was updated and revised in 41 and then again in 44...There was also a circular called "battle experiences" which was practival hints and tactics which was a series of do's and don'ts written by officers who had seen combat...these were collected and edited by SHAEF....<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Not directly. But remember that computer game AI - even the stuff we write and we think we're pretty good at it if we do say so ourselves - is not up to the level of play of a good human commander. It would be quite bold of us to state that we could make a computer opponent that would literally stick "to the book" and be a worthy opponent at the same time. We'll certainly try, but we don't want to raise any false hopes that today's computers are capable of perfectly simulating textbook maneuvers each and every time. They aren't.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>One last questiopn(see I told you) ...Will we be able to simulate the Vosges campaign...ie will there be mountain troops...and an ability to simulate the mountainous terrain of that area..<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

CM can already do the terrain. We're looking into the TO&Es of mountain units right now.

Charles

[This message has been edited by Big Time Software (edited 06-24-99).]

[gatsby]

Thanks for the reply as always it was timely and informative..

One small point...I think you must have misread my post.. I agreed that green troops would not gain experience from a 60 minute firefight...I said I think that a whole day undefire would give them that combat numbness which would enable them to perform better the next day...

This obviously would have more affect on the campaign game...

John

[Herr Oberst]

I can't remember which German general to attribute this quote about US soldiers, but it went something like this...

"I have never seen troops who performed so poorly in their first battle, nor who learned so much by their second."

Kinda makes the US troops fall into three groups, Green, Saavy, Dead.

hehe

[Rhet]

Herr Oberst, this was Rommel's quote. He was referring to the Amis in North Africa. The only two exceptions I would venture would be the breakout from Normandy and the Italian campaign. It seems the Amis never really learned how to effectivly overcome a structured defence in unfavorable terrain. Atleast not without plowing up some serious real estate!

------------------

Rhet

[Guest Big Time Software]

The best book I have read that details how the US Army learned over time, at all levels (especially low level), is "Closing with the Enemy" by Michael Doubler. Great stuff in there about fighting in hedgerows, TAC air coordination, forest fighting, etc.

Doubler paints an overall good picture of US combat troops, but he is quick to point out failings in detail (and there were MANY). Unlike some rosey images created by other authors, this book is backed up by lots of study and facts. There are some great battle descriptions in there as well.

I am usually pretty tough on US authors when they say the US Army was better than the Germans (and vice versa), but I think this book is very balanced and I can't reacall having a major beef with anything in there. That is rare for me!

Steve

[This message has been edited by Big Time Software (edited 06-25-99).]

[Herr Oberst2]

Rhet, have to agree with you on that one. While the US came up with numerous gadgets (weld-on plow teeth, etc) for dealing with hedgerows, there were some serious problems as well.

Like Operation Goodwood. Saturation bombardment of the exact terrain you intend to drive through with armor just doesn't make sense. Turned the terrain into a hellhole of shell holes, slowing armored advance to a crawl.

Sheesh.

[Guest Big Time Software]

Speaking of armor, the U.S. Army really had a confused relationship with the notion of the medium tank. Half the army wanted to use them cavalry-style (e.g. George Patton) but it's impossible to run rampant in the enemy's rear without first creating a breakthrough. So somehow the Sherman ended up being used as a battering ram against stubborn German positions to create the necessary breakthrough (whether after saturation bombing or not).

Problem was, the Sherman wasn't designed for that. A medium tank just doesn't have that kind of armor. And yet the U.S. Army didn't have a heavy tank to use. So the Sherman got subtituted, and forced into a role it just wasn't built for.

I'm one to believe that the Sherman was a pretty decent medium tank. Not without problems, but reasonably sufficient as a medium tank. When comparing it to German armor, the correct analog is the Pz IV, not the Panther or Tiger series. And here the Sherman compares favorably in many respects.

But the Sherman is definitely not a heavy tank. It gets a bad rep because it was used improperly. The Americans should have had a heavy tank but didn't. (Well, they did have the Sherman Jumbo which was actually a pretty good tank, but not nearly enough of them were built - only about 250).

Charles

p.s. Sorry if this is off-topic, but I wince whenever I think of the short-sightedness that sent Shermans head-on against prepared positions with heavy antitank weapons.

p.p.s. I find it ironic that George Patton was one of the chief proponents of the armor kit upgrade for the Sherman. He was one of the main reasons that the 76mm gun was not built in greater numbers (or fielded sooner) and that the M26 Pershing was not given priority production status. Prior to D-Day at least, he was of the opinion that the 75mm Sherman was up to the task of cavalry-style armor operations and that was all that was needed.

[Rhet]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Prior to D-Day at least, he was of the opinion that the 75mm Sherman was up to the task of cavalry-style armor operations and that was all that was needed.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Charles, this is just speculation on my part here but if he based this opinion on the German tanks he went up against in N. Africa he would have been correct. It seems that he should have had reports from the Eastern Front stating that the Gerries had much more nasty stuff in store for him though.

------------------

Rhet

[Guest Big Time Software]

Well, the Allies had better than that. They captured Tigers in Tunisia when the forces there surrendered. Hitler was a fool and sent an early batch down to "turn the tide". All they did was cause some trouble and then act as an intelligence source for the Allies. In fact, Bovington Camp (the tank museum in England) still has the first Tiger brought back for envaluation.

So yes, Patton and others DID know that the Germans had bigger stuff. But I am sure he thought that they would be in small numbers and could be overwhelmed, or bypassed, by the masses of faster moving Shermans. While this basically worked, it didn't work all the time at the tactical level.

Steve

[Guest Big Time Software]

Rhet,

Except that the British captured a Tiger (in Tunis?), took it home, shot the hell out of it, watched everything bounce off harmlessly, and then... ignored it. And so did the Americans.

Further, we encountered Panthers in Italy in 1943, though not in great numbers. Ignored them too.

But I digress, because the real issue is that Patton and those who agreed with him were not even considering tank-versus-tank capability. Shocking, isn't it? The logic stems from US doctrine of the day which called for:

Tanks: To exploit breakthroughs, destroy enemy rear areas, screen battlefields from enemy reinforcement. Generally attack soft targets using surprise. Essentially to act as an armored cavalry, J. E. B. Stuart-style. Allow enemy tanks to be handled by the...

Tank Destroyers (both towed A-T guns and the open-top vehicles like the M10, M18, and M36): Engage enemy tanks and other armor. And pretty much just that.

In hindsight (and to some people at the time) it's obvious that one cannot neatly organize a battlefield into a rock-paper-scissors game and ensure that one's tank destroyers will always be there to meet the enemy tanks, and that no enemy tanks will block the path of one's own tanks.

And of course that's just the way it happened. Shermans were not designed to take on enemy tanks, although in 1942-3 they were able to do a reasonable job of it, and even to handle any medium tank (like the Pz IV) up until the end of the war on equal terms, so in that sense the Sherman has an undeservedly bad reputation.

But did you know that the Sherman's 75mm gun was purposely kept short, with a low muzzle velocity, in order to reduce muzzle wear at the request of the Ordnance branch, so that the gun barrel would last long enough to fire (I think this is the right number) three thousand shells? That's right, the Ordnance branch saw the Sherman as a self-propelled howitzer of sorts. In the event, how many Shermans survived long enough even to fire three hundred shells, much less three thousand?

No wonder the 75mm Sherman couldn't handle Tigers and Panthers.

But lots of people, Patton included, dismissed this and said "They won't have to. That's what the tank destroyers are for." And so the 75mm gun was kept. Even worse, when presented with the chance to bring 76mm Shermans to Normandy, Patton (and others) declined because he didn't want to retrain the crews and - get this! - thought that the extra armor-piercing power of the 76mm would encourage his tankers to go hunting enemy armor! And he didn't want that! Adding further agony for any historian was the British offer to supply the Americans with their excellent 17-pounder gun, which they used to make the Sherman "Firefly". Being proud Americans, we - typically - said "no thanks" and marched into battle with our inadequate guns. In Normandy, the Firefly was the only Allied vehicle that gave German heavy panzer crews pause, because it could tear a hole through their frontal armor and they knew it. Standing orders were to attack and destroy Fireflies before anything else.

Now, no one would ever accuse George Patton of unaggressiveness, so surely that is not the reason for his actions. But he clearly did not understand that the U.S. arsenal was almost completely unprepared to handle the German heavy armor which we (and the British and the Russians!) had encountered as early as late 1942. To his credit, he changed his mind by late '44 and was a chief proponent of the Sherman up-armoring program which appears to have been reasonably successful.

There is a certain logic to the quantity over quality argument. Despite what I've said, I actually think the Sherman was a decent tank. But I think the Americans made two major mistakes:

1. We did not "grow" the Sherman into its full potential as an effective tank until much later than we should have. Variants like the Firefly and the Jumbo show that the Sherman was essentially a good idea. And even the basic Sherman was a good tank in 1942. But we allowed the platform to stagnate, so in 1944, the basic 1942 model was no longer up to the task. We improved it within six months, but we should have done so prior to D-Day.

2. We used the Sherman in the heavy tank role - as a battering ram against entrenched opposition. It wasn't designed for this and suffered commensurately. We should have had a heavy tank for this. The Sherman Jumbo actually did a pretty good job in this role but we didn't build enough of them (only 250 or so). In the absence of a heavy tank, we should have built more Jumbos. They're only marginally bigger and heavier than a regular Sherman so it would not have impacted manufacturing or shipping significantly.

Some people say we should have had the M26 Pershing in action by D-Day. There is some truth to this, but I think it would have meant a pretty significant reduction in the size of our overall armored force, and on balance this would have been detrimental. After all, the Sherman encountered "soft" targets much more often than it encountered Tigers, and against such forces it did quite well, was reliable, and suppliable in large quantity. That's a good thing.

The Americans just overlooked the need for a heavy assault tank, and pressed the Sherman into that job. And that was a mistake.

Charles

[dano6]

Hi Charles,

It looks as if you have read Belton Cooper's "Death Traps" if you have not, this book is a must read and would recommend it to everyone on this board.

I would have to agree with you that the M4 was a good medium tank that was better than germany's medium tank, the Pz.IV, once the sherman was armed with the 76mm gun. With the added armor kits the M4 became even better at dealing with the germans' medium tanks and support guns. But there was always the need for heavy tank support in all operations that was completely ignored except for the 256 M4A3E2 "jumbos" that were produced for this role. The "jumbo" proved to be very good in this role except for its lack of firepower due to the 75mm pea-shooter it was armed with. Many of the jumbos were field converted to the 76mm gun due to the fact that the jumbo's turret was the exact same as the 76mm turret with added armor thickness. This conversion started well before the conversion was ordered in march 1945.

NOW FOR ONE OF THE MAJOR MISTAKES OF THE WAR: Patton's decision to mass produce only the M4, instead of producing both M4 and the M26. Patton in his infinite wisdom and intelligence decided to put all production resources to the M4 because of its medium tank designation for the exploitation of breakthroughs. The M4 was chosen because of its superior speed and reliability. Patton with his attitude of "I know everything and you know nothing, even though I know s**t" totally diregarded and ignored testing results and films that showed the M26 was faster than the M4 on all surface conditions. While the M26 would have used more gas to move, it was not significantly more than the M4 and its operating range was only a little bit less than the M4.

What a moronic, uninformed, and even criminal decision by a man who is thought to be a hero. The M4 was used in all situations because there was no heavy tank support available to the armor divisions. The only tank available was the M4A3E2 "Jumbo" of which only 256 were made. This tank worked very well in the role but not enough were ever made and its firepower was very lacking due to the 75mm pea-shooter. At least many jumbos were field refitted with the 76mm gun before the ordered refitting in march 1945. The refitting was easy due to the fact that the jumbo had a thicker armored 76mm turret already.

The question now: why the M26 pershing with the M4. The M26 would have been able to provide heavy tank support in the areas it was needed and many times it was desperately needed. Two armored divisions recieved 12 each(Sorry if the number is wrong I am at work and I dont have my resources) M26's for combat testing. They proved to be very reliable and survivable in combat. While almost every one was knocked out, all but one was repaired and put back into action. This is an enormous equipment survival percentage. Plus the crew deaths in these vehicles was very low. Could you imagine how good the US tank crews would have been at the end of the war if they were not dying and in droves due to overmatched armor battles.

Now for the production comparison: Lets say that theoretically, 2 M4's could be produced to very 1 M26(I think this ratio is a little high but what the hell). lets say that 4000 M4s would have been produced but only 2000 m26s would have been produced.

Now for the combat results: 2/3 of the M4s would have been destroyed by brewing up with 90% having been knocked out. With 1 death and 1 injury per knock out that would leave 3600 US tanker dead and 3600 injured. There would be only 1588 of the M4s running.

Now for the M26: considering 100% knocked out eventually due to their very hazardous missions. Historic results showed .75 men killed per knock out and .75 men injured. This would result in 1500 US tanker killed 1500 US tankers injured. While the survival rate of the vehicle was very high you would still have 1916 of the M26s running.

In the end you still wind up with more M26s than you have M4s with far less casualties. Also the m26 would have probably prevented many of the M4s from being destroyed by destroying some of the heavy oppostion that would have otherwise faced M4s by themselves.

The m26 was easily integrated into the 2 armored divisions that were lucky enough to recieve them. They were recieved with great enthusiasm and performed well in combat. I believe that every division in the US Army could have benefitted greatly with the integration of m26s into their existing platoon structures of M4s. Maybe 1 M26 per platoon for all tank platoons. None of the tankers or support staff would have complained one bit.

I do not believe that production or supply of the M4 would have been hindered in any way with a smaller production of M26s in the 4000 total range. Remember that many M4s were sitting waiting for replacement crews to be trained(2 days training before you probably died, if you made it you were gold)

Another thing: the retraining of crews for the M26 would have taken too much time. This is complete crap. What about the retraining of complete M4 crews that were killed. Completely moronic if you agree with that one.

Anyways the decision by Patton to use only the M4 instead of both the M4 and the M26 is criminal and cost many lives and maybe even monthes of the war. If Patton would have pulled his head out of his ass and even looked at the testing results and movies of the M26 he might have made the correct decision. But in his complete arrogance and absolute lack of knowledge he made one of the worst decisions during WWII only comparable to moronic decisions made by Hitler.

Sorry for the RANT, but this subject pisses me off more than anything.

dano6

[Moon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Many of the jumbos were field converted to the 76mm gun due to the fact that the jumbo's turret was the exact same as the 76mm turret with added armor thickness.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That reminds me (somewhat off-topic, sorry) that I have read some time ago that the so-called 76mm main gun in fact had exactly the same caliber as the 75mm gun (which is... ahm... 75mm), but was simply modified to fire with higher velocity. Unfortunately, I really can't remember the source anymore... does anybody know more about this?

[Guest Big Time Software]

Dano,

You're right, I have read Belton Cooper's "Death Traps". It's an excellent book. The part about working on the "Super Pershing" was fascinating. Imagine if we'd had a few hundred of those!

When I recounted the book's narrative to my girlfriend's father, who was in the 3rd Armored Division (which was also Cooper's unit), he got angry just remembering how quickly Shermans got knocked out and the crews killed. Incidentally, he said the nickname they had for the M5 Stuart was the "bicycle smasher". It was not intended as a compliment.

I basically agree with what you said. I think, though, that your casualty figures for Sherman crews, while correct (I think) may be misleading. They appear to be the figures for all Shermans, and do not make a distinction between the early models (which had a grave tendency to brew up), and later models with "wet" ammo stowage and better escape hatches, which improved crew survivability significantly. To be fair, one should compare M26 survivability rates to those of the later "wet stowage" Shermans like the M4A3(76)W.

You also mentioned that you don't think production would have been hindered by building up to 4000 M26s. While the decrease might not have been severe enough to warrant attention, I think it's fair to say that factory retooling is not an overnight task. It would have had some impact. Precisely how much is open for debate. Also, there was the issue of shipping. It's been said that an M26 occupies twice the cargo space/weight/whatever of a Sherman. I don't know how accurate that ratio is, however.

Were M4s really sitting around waiting for crews in Europe? Were they the most modern models of M4? I was not aware of that. I knew there was a crew shortage at times, but I thought there was an equal shortage of tanks at the front.

As for who deserves the blame, Patton surely earned his share. But I think that most of the American brass shares some blame for being so ignorant of their own army's weaponry and tactical capabilities. Fer chrissakes, it's their job to understand minutiae like muzzle velocities and armor slopes, at least at a layman's level. I'm not saying that a Lieutenant General should know how to design a tank by himself, but he should be able to evaluate major differences in design and make intelligent decisions about them.

I've got a few questions I hope you can answer.

1. When did the 75mm Jumbo enter combat service?

2. Do you know when the field modification of fitting the 76mm to the Jumbo began? Immediately upon the Jumbo's arrival or did some time pass?

3. You mentioned that there was an order to fit all Jumbos with 76mm guns in March 1945. I didn't know this. Any idea if the change over happened rapidly or were 75mm Jumbos still in existence for a few more months?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Patton with his attitude of "I know everything and you know nothing, even though I know s**t" <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I'm proud to say that here at Big Time Software we strictly adhere to this kind of thinking. It makes our jobs a lot easier. "What? You want tanks? In a World War Two game? That's just silly. There were no tanks in World War Two. We know everything!"

Charles

[dano6]

Charles,

I loved the part about the Super Pershing. I wish they determined what type of tank was destroyed with the long range shot. Would have been nice to know. That was a tank that could have took out anything the germans' had.

As far as the casualties, I believe that those are for the entire war.(my mistake) The wet storage equipped shermans were much more survivable than the older models. Yet I still don't think that they compared to the pershing for survivablilty. The figures for the pershing are an average because I can only find record of 4 of the kills on those vehicles and the deaths resulting. I do know that all but one or two of the pershings were knocked out and repaired. Only one of them brewed up.

As for the retooling time and production of the pershing I think that the slight loss of production due to the pershing would have been offset with the addition of a heavy tank that could effectively take on german heavy armor. I feel that the lull in production of the sherman by tanking one factory and making it produce only pershings would have been more than worth the loss in production of M4s. While it took 5 shermans to knock out a panther(from averages that I think are a crock), it only took one M26 to do the job. In reality I think it was probably 2 or 3 to 1 for the sherman. Any insight into that one?

As for the 75mm pea-shooter being designed for the 3000? round life, man what kind of crap is that. Damn you talk about moronic, who would actually believe that a normal tank would survive long enough to fire 3000 rounds(I actually believe that it was more but I will check) The only one I know of possibly using that many rounds would be a tank commanded by Creighton Abrams.

Anyways I will dig for the answers to your questions later tonight as I will have to go through over 20+ books on the sherman to get the info.

dano6

[Doug Beman]

BTS said:

"Were M4s really sitting around waiting for crews in Europe? I knew there was a crew shortage at times, but I thought there was an equal shortage of tanks at the front."

In SquadronSignal's "Sherman in Action" I'm pretty sure there are a few pictures of armor depots full of Shermans, lined up bumper-bumper and track to track, waiting for crews.

I don't have the book right here, but that's what my memory says.

DjB

------------------

A fool takes no pleasure in understanding, but only in expressing personal opinion.

remove the caps letters in my address to email me

[dano6]

Answers to questions from earlier posts:

1. When did the M3A3E2 "jumbo" enter combat service?

The Jumbo, according to Stephen Zaloga and George Forty, entered combat in early autumn which I take to be in September of 1944. Final acceptance of all jumbos were in July 1944(Hunnincutt). Shipping to the ETO would put them there in September with training and such, combat would start late September maybe early October 1944. Sorry I can't find an exact date.

2. The 76mm modification of the jumbo started at least by dec. 1944, as I have seen a picture of a jumbo dated dec. 1944 with the 76mm gun. I believe that this modification started to occur probably late October or early November as the 75mm gun was deemed useless against the german heavy tanks. Zaloga seems to believe that almost all of the surviving jumbos were field refitted with the 76mm gun before the US army field order to replace all of the 75s with 76s in March 1945.

3. I think that the refitting of the remaining jumbos, after the order, went probably slow as I have a picture of a 75mm jumbo dated April 1945. Caption says it was one of the last 75mm jumbos left.

Answer from another from another link.

The M4A1 76mm(W) tank field modified with a 2" flat plate armor on welded braces can be viewed on page 43 of the "Sherman in Action" from squadron/signal publications. This modification can also be viewed on the chronos video "From Remagen to the Rhine". Almost all 3rd armored shermans are modified in this way. As for stand off of the armor it looks as if in places there would be a gap of at least 8-10 inches.