Fictional Seelöwe 1943 or 1944?

[Erwin]

Agreed. Germany as as astonished at their early success as everyone else. Hitler had negotiations with GB royalty and other VIP GB fascist sympathisers and hoped that GB could join the Axis faction, or at least ask for terms. His deputy's (Rudolf Hess) otherwise inexplicable flight to Scotland and capture is rumored to have had something to do with that.

They also discussed with ex-King Edward VIII (another fascist admirer) re putting him back on the throne if the invasion worked. Another reason for the coldness between Liz and her uncle Eddie (and his wife) afterwards. All great soap opera stuff. Hope I live long enuff for the records to be released.

[YankeeDog]

A July 1940 invasion might have succeeded becase of the lack of heavy equipment, but that would have required the Germans to have planned Seelöwe in advance.

If, hypothetically, the Chunnel had existed in July 1940 and the Wehrmacht could have simply marched under The Channel to Britain, it's certainly true they would have had no trouble dealing with the ground forces then available to defend the Home Islands.

But no matter how much advance planning and prescience on the part of the German High Command you assume, a July 1940 invasion was simply impossible. Bear in mind that the fighting around Dunkirk didn't end until about June 4, the Wehrmacht didn't enter Paris until June 14, and the Armistice with France was signed on June 22. By any standard, the Battle of France was a smashing success for the Wehrmacht, but the overall pace of the Operation put a lot of wear and tear on the invading formations, and especially the panzer divisions. The Wehrmacht needed at least some time to rest, refit, and repair. It also needed time to reorganize the invasion divisions, transport them to the Channel ports, get them briefed and trained on the invasion plan, get the men and equipment loaded onto invasion barges, etc. Logistical plans involving hundreds of thousands of men, thousands of vehicles and horses, and hundreds of boats and ships take time to execute. Even absent any interference from the Brits, turnaround time needed for the Wehrmacht between the Fall of France and the initiation of any hypothetical Sea Lion was weeks, not days.

Further, the Germans almost certainly needed execute the initial landings of Sea Lion on or near a spring high tide to make beach landings easier (especially considering the Germans lacked specialized beach landing boats like the Higgins Boat or the LST). The July 1940 spring high tides in SE Britain were on the 8-11th, and even if there were boats available to transport them across the Channel at this time (which there weren't), there was just no way the Wehrmacht was going to be ready to invade Britain just three weeks after the Fall of France. So this pushes the earliest "Perfect German Storm" date range for the invasion to the spring high tides of August 5-9. Practically speaking, even with the Battle of Britain etc. going perfectly for the Germans, etc., I think spring high tide cycle of Sept 2-7 is a much more reasonable "first possible" date range for Sea Lion.

As it was, considering the Wehrmacht had absolutely no institutional experience planning and mounting a large amphibious operation of any kind, I don't see how they even considered doing it in 1940 at all. Much of the Kriegsmarine high command, seems to been aware of this. I think it's pretty clear that Senior German Naval Officer knew a quick invasion of Britain just wasn't possible given what they had to work with in 1940, which is why they only halfheartedly participated in the the Sea Lion planning.

[iMolestCats]

Did someone mention Nazis on the Moon as being unlikely? Have you not watched Iron Sky?

Please no, not that movie :eek:.

[JRMC1879]

If, hypothetically, the Chunnel had existed in July 1940 and the Wehrmacht could have simply marched under The Channel to Britain, it's certainly true they would have had no trouble dealing with the ground forces then available to defend the Home Islands.

But no matter how much advance planning and prescience on the part of the German High Command you assume, a July 1940 invasion was simply impossible. Bear in mind that the fighting around Dunkirk didn't end until about June 4, the Wehrmacht didn't enter Paris until June 14, and the Armistice with France was signed on June 22. By any standard, the Battle of France was a smashing success for the Wehrmacht, but the overall pace of the Operation put a lot of wear and tear on the invading formations, and especially the panzer divisions. The Wehrmacht needed at least some time to rest, refit, and repair. It also needed time to reorganize the invasion divisions, transport them to the Channel ports, get them briefed and trained on the invasion plan, get the men and equipment loaded onto invasion barges, etc. Logistical plans involving hundreds of thousands of men, thousands of vehicles and horses, and hundreds of boats and ships take time to execute. Even absent any interference from the Brits, turnaround time needed for the Wehrmacht between the Fall of France and the initiation of any hypothetical Sea Lion was weeks, not days.

Further, the Germans almost certainly needed execute the initial landings of Sea Lion on or near a spring high tide to make beach landings easier (especially considering the Germans lacked specialized beach landing boats like the Higgins Boat or the LST). The July 1940 spring high tides in SE Britain were on the 8-11th, and even if there were boats available to transport them across the Channel at this time (which there weren't), there was just no way the Wehrmacht was going to be ready to invade Britain just three weeks after the Fall of France. So this pushes the earliest "Perfect German Storm" date range for the invasion to the spring high tides of August 5-9. Practically speaking, even with the Battle of Britain etc. going perfectly for the Germans, etc., I think spring high tide cycle of Sept 2-7 is a much more reasonable "first possible" date range for Sea Lion.

As it was, considering the Wehrmacht had absolutely no institutional experience planning and mounting a large amphibious operation of any kind, I don't see how they even considered doing it in 1940 at all. Much of the Kriegsmarine high command, seems to been aware of this. I think it's pretty clear that Senior German Naval Officer knew a quick invasion of Britain just wasn't possible given what they had to work with in 1940, which is why they only halfheartedly participated in the the Sea Lion planning.

I agree with all this but of course the primary reason the germans never invaded or even attempted one was that Hitler had little to no interest in doing so. Whatever the logistics - had he had that desire it would have happened in one form or another. His decision to invade Russia was a far greater mistake than not invading the UK and cost infinitely more casualties than even a failed german invasion of britain would have yielded.

[c3k]

But, if someone makes it as scenario, I'll gladly play it.

[YankeeDog]

I agree with all this but of course the primary reason the germans never invaded or even attempted one was that Hitler had little to no interest in doing so.

I think we agree more than we disagree, but I'm not sure I would say "little to no interest." Once France was conquered, Hitler definitely wanted to end the war with the U.K. quickly so that he could move on to other things. I think it's probably an accurate assessment that he wasn't interested in putting German boots on the ground in London in the same way he wanted to avenge Germany's defeat in WWI by mounting a German victory parade in Paris. Invasion of Britain was a means to an end, not an end in and of itself.

But when Churchill made it very clear that he was not interested in negotiating for a peace treaty, as far as Hitler could see, the only way to get what he wanted (European hegemony) was an invasion of Britain. I think he was too impatient to wait for an "Anaconda Policy" of economic blockade to force Churchill to the negotiating table (which, IMHO, if properly executed both military and diplomatically, might have worked, eventually).

Of course, as things turned out, the Luftwaffe proved incapable of gaining air superiority over the Channel and the British Isles, which even Hitler could see was an absolute prerequisite for a successful invasion. So in 1941 he ended up falling back on a economic blockade to deal with the U.K. more because of a lack of any other option than a love of the strategy -- Hitler was a romantic about war and I think he would have much preferred victory over England in some sort of quick, conclusive military campaign, rather than a blockade. But by this time, the U.S. was moving out of isolationism, supporting the U.K. economically and even taking a direct role in the Battle of the Atlantic, which made economic strangulation was a much more difficult prospect. As it was, Germany still came remarkably close to succeeding in the Battle of the Atlantic, but it was too little, too late.

Interesting to contemplate how things might have progressed if Hitler had thrown all resources into an economic blockade of England immediately in July of 1940.