Jagdpanther Temporary Guidelines Heinz Guderian approved

[John Kettler]

Rankorian,

For debate purposes with JasonC, it's necessary to define the date or date bracket, in order to bound the problem. Absent that, all we have is a sweeping assertion.

Turning to the KVs, the KV-2 was specially built to shatter fortifications. Power to weight ratio was awful (11.8 hp/ton), and breakdown rate was enormous.

http://english.battlefield.ru/kv-2.html

http://www.wwiivehicles.com/ussr/tanks-heavy/kv-2.asp

Total KV-2 production was, per below, 255. That source errs, though, in that the KV-2 was not cleared to fire AP. At best, per Valera Potapov at Battlefield.ru (he provided key data for CMBB), the weapon was rated for semi armor piercing or SAP and fired at a reduced charge.

http://www.militaryfactory.com/armor/detail.asp?armor_id=210

The KV-1 wasn't as overloaded, but still suffered serious mechanical problems, being both underpowered and prone to drivetrain failure. It was well protected and heavily gunned when it debuted, but was slow, like a Matilda II. Crew ergonomics were a problem, as was commander's vision, there being no cupola.

http://english.battlefield.ru/kv-1.html

The Sherman debuted in North Africa at Second Alamein with the British and in Operation Torch with the Americans. Protection at the time was very good, but was negated considerably when the Panzer IV/F2 AKA Panzer IV/G appeared in very small quantities as the Mark IV Special. I believe there were 14 with DAK, whereas, there were hundreds of Shermans. By Sicily, the Sherman was the standard medium tank of the Western Allies. By war's end, half the Sherman force sported 76mm guns. Power to weight ratio for the vanilla Sherman was 14hp/ton.

The T-34/76 was available in quantities of under 1000 in the western military districts when the Germans invaded Russia in June of 1941. According to research by Valera Potapov, the T-34 constituted a mere 7.5% of the Russian tanks opposing the Germans.

http://english.battlefield.ru/t-34.html

By the time Kursk arrives, 62% of the Russian tank force in the Central Front and Voronezh Front is T-34/76 (Ibid.) But, this was NOT the case before then. Earlier, most of the force consisted mostly of light tanks, initially, T-26s and BTs; later T-60s and T-70s. The two Fronts had 175 heavy KV-1 in toto, whereas there were 1070 light tanks and 2033 T-34/76s covering the light and medium ends of the Russian tank force at Kursk.

Here are the Sherman production figures, which may be directly compared with those of the T-34, provided you don't count the 76mm tanks and a bunch of specialist stuff.

http://the.shadock.free.fr/sherman_minutia/data/sherman_production.html

Simply put, we outproduced the Russians. Nor did we have to dismantle our tank manufacturing, which cost the Russians two quarters of high rate production, just as the rates had begun to climb.

Also, in 1942 and 1943, Russia received 1386 diesel-powered Lees, equal to the entire second quarter of 1942's T-34/76 production. This slightly dilutes the overall T-34/76 percentage.

In answer to your earlier question, the M3 series was withdrawn by the Western Allies in mid 1942.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M3_Lee

Operation Husky (also mid 1943, as was Kursk) thus saw the Sherman in full cry, amounting to roughly 2/3 of the American tank forces committed. I don't have comparable figures for the CW presently, what with the Churchills to add in (and maybe some Crusader IIIs and similarly armed Valentines).

On balance, at least at the time of Kursk, the Western Allies could dispose of a much higher fraction of 75mm or equivalent firepower tanks than did the Russians.

Am going to post this now, lest a computer glitch wipe out hours of work.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Michael Emrys]

In answer to your earlier question, the M3 series was withdrawn by the Western Allies in mid 1942.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M3_Lee

"1942" must be a typo, since even in the Wiki article you link to it states that the M3 was present in British service through the end of the campaign in North Africa, and the US 1st. Armored Division had a regiment of them in Tunisia.

Furthermore, it states that the British continued to use them in Burma through the end of the war and the US Army used them in the Pacific as late as the battle for Makin in November of 1943.

Michael

[John Kettler]

Michael Emrys,

Agree with your conclusion re date. The problem with looking for information is that I tend to put blinders on while hunting for specific items. Rather like looking at a target through high power, narrow FOV optics!. Thus, I missed the woods by focusing on a tree. The date is wrong, but the Sherman was still the dominant tank by the time Operation Husky occurred in mid 1943. The Grant was a complete overmatch for any Japanese tank, so carrying on with them in Burma was no big deal.

This thread has some great info on the Grant and Lee, to include Russian combat use and a pic of a British one in Burma.

http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?3957-The-M3-Lee-Grant-Tank

Regards,

John Kettler

[winkelried]

According to Albert Ernst* his 1299th Panzerjager Abt was outfitted with Jadgpanther, which were first used operationaly in the Ost, on 11.07.44. with 3rd Panzer Army in an attack from the Barbriskis area. The 1299th(1st Kompanie) was attached to the 25th Pz.Regt & 6th Pz.Gren.Div in an attack on the left flank of the Olita road.

*See: Kurowski Franz. Panzer Aces. p.252

Regards, John Waters

Jaja Herr Kurowski - not a very reliable source. Better known for his revisionist writing and lax approach to history. But that's another discussion.

Now to the facts to the 1299:

There was no Panzerjäger Abteilung 1299 - there was a Panzerjägerkompanie 1299 (StuG) equipped with StuG and attached to the 299. Infantry Division (e.g. Achim von Britzke as a commander - RK 23.10.44). The unit was then re-named (as were all Panzerjägerkompanie which were equipped with StuG) to become Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 1299 (see OKH/GenStdH/Org.Abt. Nr. I/15710/44 g.Kdos. v. 14.2.1944 and OKH/GenStdH/Org.Abt. Nr. I/15710/44 g.Kdos. II. Ang. v. 25.2.1944), but kept the same KStN (= strength) and remained assigned to 299. ID. After the disaster of summer 1944 in the East the Divisionsgruppe 299 fought closely together with the Divisionsgruppe 337 and the company (or StuG.Abt. 1299) was subordinated to the Panzerjäger Abteilung 337 it seems.

Now regarding the Jagdpanther - there were no deliveries to Pz.Jäg.Kp. or to StuG.Abt. In 1944 the priority was with the schwere Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilungen (s.H.Pz.Jäg.Abt. 654, 655, 519, 560, 559, 563) - only in 1945, when the Panzerdivisions could no longer be equipped with tanks, tank destroyers as the Jagdpanther were delivered to those. Although there were no deliveries to PR 25 (7. PD) or 6 PGD (there was no such thing). JPz V were delivered (in 1945) to the following units (besides the s.H.Pz.Jäg.Abt.) Lehr PD (W), 2. SS PD (E), 4. PD (E), 25. PD (E), Führer-Grenadier (E), Pz.Br. 103 (E), 10. SS PD (E), KG Wiking (W), PD Clausewitz (E) and s.Pz.Abt. 507 (W).

[PzKpfw 1]

Jaja Herr Kurowski - not a very reliable source. Better known for his revisionist writing and lax approach to history. But that's another discussion.

Now to the facts to the 1299:

There was no Panzerjäger Abteilung 1299 - there was a Panzerjägerkompanie 1299 (StuG) equipped with StuG and attached to the 299. Infantry Division (e.g. Achim von Britzke as a commander - RK 23.10.44). The unit was then re-named (as were all Panzerjägerkompanie which were equipped with StuG) to become Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 1299 (see OKH/GenStdH/Org.Abt. Nr. I/15710/44 g.Kdos. v. 14.2.1944 and OKH/GenStdH/Org.Abt. Nr. I/15710/44 g.Kdos. II. Ang. v. 25.2.1944), but kept the same KStN (= strength) and remained assigned to 299. ID. After the disaster of summer 1944 in the East the Divisionsgruppe 299 fought closely together with the Divisionsgruppe 337 and the company (or StuG.Abt. 1299) was subordinated to the Panzerjäger Abteilung 337 it seems.

Now regarding the Jagdpanther - there were no deliveries to Pz.Jäg.Kp. or to StuG.Abt. In 1944 the priority was with the schwere Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilungen (s.H.Pz.Jäg.Abt. 654, 655, 519, 560, 559, 563) - only in 1945, when the Panzerdivisions could no longer be equipped with tanks, tank destroyers as the Jagdpanther were delivered to those. Although there were no deliveries to PR 25 (7. PD) or 6 PGD (there was no such thing). JPz V were delivered (in 1945) to the following units (besides the s.H.Pz.Jäg.Abt.) Lehr PD (W), 2. SS PD (E), 4. PD (E), 25. PD (E), Führer-Grenadier (E), Pz.Br. 103 (E), 10. SS PD (E), KG Wiking (W), PD Clausewitz (E) and s.Pz.Abt. 507 (W).

Winkelreid, the problem is not with Kurowski, per sei, the details on the Jagdpanther deployment, and their role in the attack are from 'Albert Ernst'. Ernst never stated PR.25, nor 6th PzGr. had Jagdpanthers etc. Interstingly 35th PR recieved 8 Jagdpanther in Jan 45 according to Herman Bix. As to the 1299th that bugged me as well, but i put that off as a mistake by Kurowski.

Regards, John Waters

[PzKpfw 1]

A few things, the mass deployment of the T-34 did not occur until late 1943 early 1944, simply put the Soviets lost so many medium tanks in 41-42, production could not keep up. Ie, from December 1941 - April 1942 the Soviets lost 1,386 tanks in the fighting West & Northwest of Moscow alone.

As of 01.01.42 the Soviets had 7,700 tanks of which only 1400 were 'modren' designs, ie, 800 T-34-76, 600 KV, 6,300 light tanks. Of course another factor was the forced re-location of the factories that were just gearing up production or were still in rail transit. Ie, below is production totals for Jan - Dec 1942:

Jan - Mar:

KV - 764

T-34 - 1, 605

T-60 - 2,353

T-70 - 322

SU-76 - 0

SU-122 - 0

Apr - Jun:

KV - 879

T-34 - 2,651

T-60 - 1,017

T-70 - 2,066

SU-76 - 0

SU-122 -0

Jul - Sep:

KV - 890

T-34 - 3,946

T-60 - 318

T-70 - 4.020

SU-76 - 0

SU-122 - 0

Oct - Dec:

KV - 0

T-34 - 4,376

T-60 - 0

T-70 - 2,376

SU-76 - 25

SU-122 - 25

As 01.01.43 The Soviets had *22,100 tanks deployed vs the Germans, broken down as:

2000 - KV-1, KV-1S, KV-8.

7,600 - T-34-76, M3 Grant.

8,500 - T-60, T-70, Mk.II/III

*Totals do not include Far east.

The mass deployment of the T-34 in reality did not occur until late 1943, & 1944. Light tanks were still the most numerous Soviet tank well into 1943.

The Sherman according to internal Soviet reports had several areas where it was superior to the T-34-76/85:

- Optics

- Gun power*

- Turret traverse

- Ammo stowage protection

- Mechanichal reliability (Sherman track shoes had a longer life then the T-34-85 engine)

*Soviet reports show 75mm M72 AP had superior penetration then 76mm BR-350A/B eg. Soviet crews reported M72 AP defeated the Tiger E side hull armor where the BR-350 failed at the same ranges. 76mm APCBC consistantly out performed 85mm BR-365 BY 10% In Soviet live fire tests vs the Tiger II etc.

The Soviets recieved 2,007 M4A2 75mm, & 2,095 M4A2 76mm Sherman via Lend Lease. A clue to how highly the Soviets regarded the Sherman was they equipped 3 elite Guards Mechanized Corps entirely with Shermans to the point 2 GMC's traded in their T-34-85 for Shermans. The only negative comments were on the Shermans inferior cross country performance in harsh terrain ie, snow & mud & in overcomeing elevated terrain in the Manchurian operations where Shermans could not keep up in mountianous terrain compared to T-34s.

Regards, John Waters

[PzKpfw 1]

winkelried below is what i have for deliveries to the Eastren & Westren fronts for Jagdpanthers:

Westren Front:

sPzJgAbt. 654:

Apr-44 - 8

Jun-44 - 17

Jul-44 - 9

Aug-44 - 8

Oct-44 - 16

Nov-44 - 6

Dec-44 - 20

Jan-45 - 10

Feb-45 - 6

sPzJgAbt. 559:

May-44 - 5

Aug-44 - 8

Sep-44 - 17

Jan-45 - 6

Mar-45 - 5

Apr-45 - 19

sPzJgAbt. 519:

Sep-44 - 17

Dec-44 - 4

Jan-45 - 6

sPzJgAbt. 560:

Oct-44 - 4

Nov-44 - 5

Dec-44 - 4

Jan-45 - 12

Mar-45 - 11

sPzJgAbt. 655:

Nov-44 - 5

Dec-44 - 9

Jan-45 - 10

Apr-45 - 10

2./sPzAbt. 507:

Mar-45 - 3

PzAbt. 2106

Apr-45 - 5

II./PzRgt. 130:

Feb-45 - 14

Apr-45 - 35

Eastren Front:

PzJgAbt. 563:

Jan-45 - 10

3./PzJgAbt. 616:

Jan-45 - 9

I./PzRgt. 29:

Jan-45 - 14

SS PzJgAbt. 10:

Feb-45 - 10

SS PzJgAbt. 2

Feb-45 - 10

SS PzJgAbt. 9:

Feb-45 - 10

Pz. Abt. F-G:

Feb-45 - 10

PzJgAbt. 49:

Feb-45 - 8

PzJgAbt. 87:

Mar-45 - 4

Wapruef:

Nov-43 - 1 Germany

Dec-43 - 1 Germany

Mielau

Mar-44 - 2 Germany

Versuch

Jan-44 - 5 Germany

Unknown

Mar-45 - 1 Germany

Unknown

The above is what troubled me with Kurowskis Earnst quotes as we see 1299th does not exist in Jadgpanther deliveries nor timeframe. Does anyone know what Panzerjager Abt Earnst commanded in July 1944?. Also note Bixs statement of 8 Jagdpanther recieved in PR 35 in Jan 1945.

Regards, John Waters

[winkelried]

Thanks for the delivery list - resembles mine :-)

Albert Ernst served in s.H.Pz.Jäg.Abt. 519 (correct me if I am wrong) up to get WIA. This Abteilung used 8,8 cm Pak 43 (L/71) auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen III/IV (Sf) aka Nashorn they got they Jagdpanther only late in 1944 after they had transferred to the West.

BTW - Ernst later served with a Jagdtiger outfit it seems.

[PzKpfw 1]

Thanks for the delivery list - resembles mine :-)

Albert Ernst served in s.H.Pz.Jäg.Abt. 519 (correct me if I am wrong) up to get WIA. This Abteilung used 8,8 cm Pak 43 (L/71) auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen III/IV (Sf) aka Nashorn they got they Jagdpanther only late in 1944 after they had transferred to the West.

BTW - Ernst later served with a Jagdtiger outfit it seems.

Yes Earnst gained his fame in the Nashorn. Well you got me digging thru my sureviveing files in your reply concerning Kurowski, havent dusted them off in years LOL. I wish i still had the documents i lost when my HD crashed 8( lost alota irreplaceble data i had collected on the eastren front.

Its my understanding Earnst was given his own Abt he had to return to Germany in early 44 to put it together where he states (according to Kurowski) that the Abt retuned to the East. What i dont get & this maybe because of Kurowski altering Earnts quotes, or something else, Earnst specificly gives dates(July 1944) & what vehichle his Abt was equipped with, yet as our research shows no Jagdpanthers were delivered to the Ost till 45, then we have Bixs quotes on useing the Jagdpanther with PR 35 in fact he related vgetting 8 kills with it on his first outing IIRC.

Anyway i'll keep digging into this maybe with your help we can figure this mess out 8P.

Regards, John Waters

[winkelried]

Albert Ernst was platoon leader in 1./s.H.Pz.Jäg.Abt. 519 and acting commander (not clear) of 1./s.H.Pz.Jäg.Abt. 512 equipped with Jagdtiger in March 45. I am not sure if he ever got promoted further than 1st lieutenant.

[PzKpfw 1]

Albert Ernst was platoon leader in 1./s.H.Pz.Jäg.Abt. 519 and acting commander (not clear) of 1./s.H.Pz.Jäg.Abt. 512 equipped with Jagdtiger in March 45. I am not sure if he ever got promoted further than 1st lieutenant.

Schwere Panzerjäger - Abteilung 519

Activated with three kompanie on 25.08.43 in Wehrkreis III. The Abt moved to the Oldebroek Training Area in September 1943. It received the first Nashorns in October. In January 1944, the Abt was transfered to the Eastern Front (Witebsk), attached to AGC. By July 1944, it had lost all of its Nashorn, the Abt was then rebuilt at Mielau (Wehrkreis I) with one company of 14 Jagdpanther, 2 companies with 14 AG. The Abt HQ had 3 Jagdpanther.

On 10.10.44, the battalion was attached to the 1st SS.Pz.Korps & 116th Pz.Div on 11.7.44 (Kg. Bayer, Hurtgen Forest) In December 1944, the Abt was attached to the 246. VolksGren. Div. As of 12.12.44, it had 19 AG & 9 Jagdpanther. On 15.03.45, the Abt was attached to the 1st. Armee. On 10.04.45 all of the Jagdpanther had been lost.

Earnst was zug leader within the 1./schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 519, & later commanded (or was acting commander depending on authors translations), of 1/s.PzJ.Abt 512 (Jagdtiger). Kurowski is noted for getting units etc wrong, but he is the only author who actualy personaly interviewed the ppl he wrote about in Panzer Aces, Earnst passed away some time ago, so i guess we have to take the good with the bad 8(,

Regards, John Waters

[PzKpfw 1]

The Sherman has been much maligned for its 'inferior' armor/gun & propensity to burn vs the PzKpfw V/VI etc. Yet the T-34-76/85 had exactly the same problems very few Soviet tank crewman survived the penetration of the T-34, in fact the T-34 in all its varients was a coffin for more tank crew, then any other Soviet AFV in the war. It wasnt till the IS-2 that Soviet crews had a 25-30% chance of surviveing their tanks destruction according to Soviet reports.

The Sherman & T-34-76's armor were both designed to frontaly defeat the most common AT gun of the time, the 37mm, both tanks armor was desighned to defeat undermatching projectiles. The T-34 side hull armor could & was defeated by 3.7cm AT fire. The T-34 revolutionised tank desighn when it first appeared, it's sloped armor effects on designs can still be seen today.

Yet the one problem with the T-34-76/85 that was never rectified was due to it's high hardness(BHN) T-34 armor was very brittle & could not stand up to repeated impacts in the same area, the armor would shatter(the KV-1 did not have this problem due to lower BHN, softer armor). Soviet reports tell of T-34 drivers hatches being blown off on lower glacis hits, as well as whole sections cracking on hits etc. The Shermans armor due to its lower BHN stood up to, & held together vs repeated impacts in the same area. Loza etc, commented on this, and the lack of spall effects on impact in the Sherman vs T-34 as well.

T-34 armor was very vulnerable to overmatching projectiles, ie, 7.5cm L/43, L/48, L/70, L/71 etc. In reality the Sherman & T-34 were in the same boat vs Panther & Tiger & the 7.5cm lang PzKpfw IV as well, though both could kill the PzKpfw IV @ standard ranges, both had problems dealing with the PzKpfw V/VI frontaly & both were far more mechanichly reliable then any German tank.

Not to say they didnt have problems Ie, the T-34 engine had problems in the 85 especialy, on any long distance travel the prefrered mode was rail as T-34-85s suffered high ammounts of engine failures on extended road marches or deployments. Same with the T-34-76 their is an account of a T-34-76 Brigada that made a 300km road march then got chewed out for not useing rail transport & risking loseing tanks to mechanichal breakdowns & track life wear before they were deployed to battle.

Regards, John Waters

[PzKpfw 1]

Yes they had T-34-76 & KV-1, but only in small numbers ie, as of 01.06.41 The Soviets had the below authorised strength numbers in ()'s:

T-34-76 - 1,085 (12,810)

KV-1 - 263 (3,843)

KV-II - 70

The Soviets were in the midst of of forming 61 Tank Divisions. The production plan initiated on 15.03.41 authorised production of 290 T-34-76, & 110 KV per month. To get enough material to even begin produceing these levels, the Soviets had to scrap 2 battleships, 2 battlecruisers, & several Lt cruisers. The plan called for 61 Tank Divs by September 1944.

Out of 23,106 tanks in inventory on 22.06.41 only 2,611 were 'new tanks'(BT-7M, T-40) of the 20,495 remaining over 11,000 were T-26, & the rest were a mix of T-28, BT-2, BT-5, T-35 Light tank & tankettes. Of which Allied tanks of the time were on par or superior in areas.

While the Soviets followed the same path they first added towed 85mm AA guns to the Tank Corps & formed seprate Anti tank Bns in 1943 directly in response to the Tiger tank because their standard AT guns 45mm, 57mm, & 76mm could not reliably penetrate the Tigers armor except at close ranges on rear shots. This was a stop gap until the KV-85, T-34-85 could be introduced. The SU-85 was also introduced to replace the towed 85mm guns, but some tank corps & SABs retained their towed 85s much longer. The SU-85 could only defeat the Tiger & Panther at short ranges, so the Soviets began replaceing the SU-85 in the Medium SU Regts in October 1944 with the SU-100.

The Heavy SU Regts were originly formed in 1943 with the SU-122 then replaced due to poor AT performance with the SU-85. until the SU-152 could be deployed. The first 25 were rushed to Kursk dureing Zitadelle, where they earned the nickname 'Zvierboi' (Big game hunter). 670 SU-152 were produced in 1943. Production was stopped & the ISU-152, & ISU-122 entered production in 1944. The ISU-122 was cosidered the ultimate Zvierboi as it could penetrate the Panther turret front out to 2000m & it outranged the 8.8cm L/56.

BY 1945 the smallest gun in the Tank corps was the 76mm on the SU-76. All of this was a response to the Tiger & Panther. The US followed a similar convulted route hampered by Macnair & ordinace finaly culminateing in the 90mm on the Pershing, & Jackson which was superior to the Soviet 122mm in penetration. I dont have Jackson numbers on hand vs the 2400 ISU-122 produced in 1944/45. Concerning the match up with the T-34-85 the M4A3E8 was superior in some areas to the T-34-85 all & all crew skill would have been a factor in all cases. I dont see any signifigant technichal advanteges concerning the Soviet or Allied AFVs other than minor armor thickness and docturnial levels, 76mm APCBC & APCR-T could defeat the SU-100/122 frontaly, just as the SU-100/122 could defeat the Sherman/M-10 frontaly. Despite impressive drives into Germany the Soviets never matched the Allies operationaly. Either way the doctrines were difrent, and the Allies were much better equipped & supplied then the German forces the Soviets faced in 44/45. All & all this just leads to the big what if clash between the Allies & Soviets in 1945 8).

Regards, John Waters

[JasonC]

Your own figures completely contradict your statements.

1942 is the transition year, in which they build 12000 T-34s and the fleet ends the year with 8000 still on strength. Not 1943.

8000 T-34s is larger than the entire German tank fleet in the east, much of which is still in Panzer 38s, short 50L42 model IIIs, and short 75L24 model IVs. Those types are still up to a third of the German fleet mix in mid 1943.

The Russian fleet mix is heavy and larger than the Germans by the time of Operation Uranus, not late 1943. German heavies have not arrived at all.

In 1943, the Germans field 75L48 and 80mm front Panzer IVs and transition the III chassis to StuGs with the same, plus fielding handfuls of heavies (handfuls by Russian tank numbers). That is the transition year on quality - before it the Russians are ahead on that score.

[JasonC]

"Simply put, we outproduced the Russians"

This is also nonsense, the Russians produced 102,500 AFVs during WW II (as well as entering it with a fleet of 22,000 AFVs, most of them obsolete to be sure). And fielded fleets of over 20000 AFVs year after year. The US never had that many in action.

As for pretending that 1400 heavy and medium tanks in 1941 is a small number, the Germans had all of 3300 tanks of all kinds for the invasion. Half of them Panzer IIs and Panzer 38s - only half being IIIs or IVs, and those with the short guns. The German quality mix was certainly better than T-26s, but the high end of it was outclassed by and did not significantly outnumber the modern portion of the Russian fleet.

The Russian mech arm of 1941 failed completely for reasons having precious little to do with the technical quality of their tanks, and everything to do with their unreadiness for war and inability to manage the formations. As in non-existent combat service and support and wretched tactics without any combined arms to speak of. Which was mostly corrected by mid 1942, leaving technically superior tanks balanced by continued tactical hamfistedness.

The Germans won during the periods in which their tanks were worse, and lost in the periods in which their tanks were better - because tank spec quality doesn't determine the outcome of operations. Larger operational factors plus the tactical skill with which the weapons are used, do.

And a similar differential was present between the US armor and Russian mech forces, in the performance each turned in fighting the Germans. The Russians had more tanks in the field and better ones, sooner. But they didn't fight them as well, and lost much more heavily for the damage inflicted on the Germans, than the US armored forces did. US combined arms coordination was superior and its firepower arms (air and arty) were superior - to the Russians, mind. (Their firepower arms were superior to the Germans as well - it was their longest suit and they knew it, and ran with it).

[John Kettler]

PzKpfw1,

Impressive research! Given a choice between going to war in a Sherman 75 and a T-34/76, from a survival standpoint, I'll take the Sherman. Ditto for a Sherman 76 and a T-34/85. Fast turret vs. Slow, better ammunition, more consistent ammunition, better penetration, better optics, perhaps more resilient armor, ROF advantage as well.

In answer to your M36 question, the Wiki indicates

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M36_tank_destroyer

"It was not until September 1944 that the vehicle first began to appear in the European Theater of Operations. About 1,400 M36s were produced during the war. The need for 90 mm gunned tank destroyers was so urgent that, during October–December 1944, 187 conversions of standard Medium Tank M4A3 hulls were produced by Grand Blanc Arsenal. These vehicles, designated M36B1, were rushed to the European Theater of Operations and used in combat alongside standard M36s. The M36 was well liked by its crews, being one of the few armored fighting vehicles available to US forces that could destroy heavy German tanks from a distance."

Weirdly, the Wiki is flatly contradicted by one of its own references (Fair Use)

http://www.wwiivehicles.com/usa/tank-destroyers/m36.asp

Under "Production" the total is 1949, with 1525 M36, 187 36B1 and 237 M36B2

The link lists the what, the where and from when to when.

What I think is also important to factor in, throughout this discussion, is crew training. The Russian's own accounts talk bluntly of how little training the crews got, often, a few hours. Contrast that with our armored divisions which trained for two years. American losses eventually led to short crewing and sometimes, pressing infantry into service as tankers (with disastrous results, as attested by Belton Cooper in interviews and his book DEATH TRAPS).

Let's talk about gunnery training. No comparison here, either. If you read the accounts, our 90mm TDs got kills on heavy German armor from 3000 yards, maybe even 4000. By contrast, even the T-62 Cold War tank company trained for individual tank gunnery out to 1500 meters, and from there to 2000 meters, it was platoon volley against a single target. So, not only is there a penetration advantage, even at the Sherman 76mm level vs the T-34/85, as attested by the Russian official tests at the Poligon (16% better, I believe), but a whopping gunnery range advantage.

To further the discussion, I provide the official U.S. manual on 90mm Armor-Piercing Ammunition, both so-called APC and the HVAP. Thus, it should now be feasible to compare 90mm performance with other guns being considered here.

http://www.lonesentry.com/manuals/90-mm-ammunition/index.html

Here are the official penetration charts for U.S. tank guns, including 75mm, 76mm and 90mm. Taken from the 1944 edition of FM 17-12 TANK GUNNERY.

http://www.lonesentry.com/blog/tag/armor-penetration

Per several citations in this thread, a Nashorn TD got an IS-2 kill from as much as 4600 meters. Another IS-2 got clobbered by Jagdtiger, which hit it from 4 km. These, I think, show that the kind of American gunnery I'm talking about would permit shots out to 3000 yards. Indeed the FM 17-12 AP charts go out to 3000 yards.

Moving from the theoretical to the actual, Gabel's "Seek, Strike & Destroy" reports two M36 engagements, one rivaling the Nashorn in range.

The M-36 would not arrive in Europe until September 1944, but once it reached the front, it proved to be the only American armored vehicle that could match the heavier German tanks in firepower. One M-36 destroyed a Panther with one round at a range of 3,200 yards,35 and another fired five rounds at a tank 4,600 yards distant, scored two hits, and disabled the tank.36 The M-36 was equally impressive in the secondary missions. In the direct-fire role, a 90-mm armor-piercing shell could penetrate 4.5 feet of non- reinforced concrete,37 while in the indirect-fire mission, the M-36 could throw a projectile 19,000 yards.38

35. U. S. Army, 1st Army, "Artillery Information Service," December 1944, 82.

36. U.S. Army, 814th Tank Destroyer Battalion, After-Action Report, December 1944, CARL.

Filling out the American production picture, we have 2212 T26/M26 Pershing tanks.

Regards,

John Kettler

[TrailApe]

Given a choice between going to war in a Sherman 75 and a T-34/76, from a survival standpoint, I'll take the Sherman.

I'll call your Sherman and raise you a Churchill.

[John Kettler]

JasonC,

I was talking about aggregate Sherman production vs aggregate T-34/76 and T-34/85 production. Remember, the U.S. equipped not only itself, but the British, the Canadians, the Free French; it supplied Russia with 4102 M4AA2s (per Wiki on LL Shermans), in both flavors, and a bunch of others I don't recall. Per here

http://www.wwiivehicles.com/usa/tanks-medium/m4-production.asp

the lower bound of Sherman production was 49,230 and the upper 53,362.

Contrast this with 25,522 T-34/76 per Table 3 here

http://english.battlefield.ru/t-34.html

From Table 1 here, total T-34/85 production was 23,214, with a lot of play in that figure, starting with the fact that only the first three quarters of 1945 should properly be counted.

http://english.battlefield.ru/t-34-85.html

Further, the Russian account of T-34/85 introduction into Guards Tank Brigades indicates the scale of issue was 2-3 per brigade and that crew training amounted to a whole two hours! Speaking of them, how many fewer tanks would've been produced had America not supplied Shermans to Russia? And what would've been the impact on the Russian war effort absent what Lend-Lease allowed the Russians to not take the hit for: scout cars,halftracks, aircraft, trucks, jeeps, radios, commo wire, locomotives, rolling stock, industrial materials and hundreds more? What would the absence of the trucks alone have done to Russian offensive capabilities?

I haven't even begun to tally the CW production figures for tanks, either.

The total figures are moot, given the real debate is whether, given equivalent tanks (T-34/76 against Sherman 75mm contemporary or T-34/85 vs. Sherman 76mm) and tank count, a given side would be likely to prevail. Given our technology, fully proliferated radio, superb extended training, platoon level or lower maneuver elements vs. a company operating en bloc, tank reliability, higher ammo capacity,WP, greatly superior gunnery, higher ROF, faster traverse, considerably better depression, indirect fire capability and training therein, I fully expect that, even given identical tank count, else our tank battalion would dwarf theirs by nearly a factor of two (54 vs. 31), we would not only prevail, but would win by a large margin. This is premised upon combat actions in good tank terrain, good weather and dry ground. In other words, both sides would be able to take full advantage of speed and maneuverability. Further, I won't make each side conduct a substantial road march, since this would greatly deplete the Russian force via various breakdowns while barely affecting the Americans.

Regards,

John Kettler

[PzKpfw 1]

Soviet Tank & SU Production numbers June 22 1941 -10 May 1945:

T-40:

1941 - 14

1942 - 181

Total T-40 production = 195.

T-50:

1941 - 48

1942 - 15

Total T-50 production = 63.

T-60:

1941 - 1,548

1942 - 4,474

Total T-60 production = 6,022.

T-70:

1942 - 4,883

1943 - 3,343

Total T-70 production = 8,226.

T-80:

1943 - 120

Total T-80 production = 120.

T-34-76:

1941 - 1,886

1942 - 12,553

1943 - 15,712

1944 - 3,723

Total T-34-76 production = 33,874.

T-34-85:

1943 - 100

1944 - 11,000

1945 - 8,330

Total T-34-85 production = 19,430.

Total combined T-34 production = 53,304.

T-44:

1945 - 200

Total T-44 production = 200.

KV-1:

1941 - 812

1942 - 1,753

Total KV-1 production = 2,565.

KV-1S:

1942 - 780

1943 - 452

Total KV-1S production = 1,232.

KV-85:

1943 - 130

Total KV-85 Production = 130.

IS-2:

1943 - 102

1944 - 2,252

1945 - 1.500

Total IS-2 production = 3,854.

SU-76:

1942 - 26

1943 - 1,928

1944 - 7,127

1945 - 3,562

Total SU-76 production = 12,643.

SU-122:

1942 - 25

1943 - 635

Total SU-122 production = 660.

SU-85:

1943 - 750

1944 - 1,900

Total SU-85 production = 2,650.

SU-100:

1944 - 500

1945 - 800

Total SU-100 production = 1,300.

SU-152:

1943 - 670

Total SU-152 production = 670.

ISU-122:

1944 - 1,600

1945 - 800

Total SU-122 production = 2,400

ISU-152:

1943 - 35

1944 - 900

1945 - 400

Total ISU-152 production = 1,335.

Regards, John Waters

[PzKpfw 1]

Your own figures completely contradict your statements.

1942 is the transition year, in which they build 12000 T-34s and the fleet ends the year with 8000 still on strength. Not 1943.

The Soviets produced 12,520 T-34-76 in 1942, of this total over 6,000 were irreversible losses. As of 31.12.42 the Soviets had less then 6,000 T-34-76 in inventory. In 1943 their were still more light tanks in frontline combat formations then T-34. Once again as of Jan 1943 the Soviets had the following tank strength delpoyed vs the Germans:

7,600 - T-34, M3 Grant

2.000 - KV-1, KV-1S, KV-8

8,500 - Light tanks - T-60, T-70, MK II/III

In 1942 the Soviets had 6,300 light tanks in inventory. 1942 production of light tanks was 10,612 light tanks, & the Soviets recieved another 2,553 light tanks via Lend Lease. Out of a total of over 18,000 Lt.tanks the Soviets lost 7,200(40%) fom Jan 1 - Dec 31 1942. Late 1943 into early 1944, is the first time in the war, that T-34s outnumber Lt. tanks in frontline combat formations, & where the T-34 finaly becomes the 'workhorse of the eastren front'. 61% of T-34 in inventory & produced in 1943 were lost from Jan 1, - Dec 31 1943.

A good example of this was 29th Tank Corps, which operated with 5th Guards Tank Army. As of 01.07.43 the 29th had:

25th Tank Brigade - T-34/T-70

31st Tank Brigade - T-34/T-70

32nd Tank Brigade - T-34

A typical Tank Brigade composition in 1943 was 20, T-34 & 40/45 T-60/T-70 with a few exceptions. on 12.07.43 the 29th lost 60% of its tanks. The 29th was refitted after Zitadelle & was involved in heavy fighting from August - Dec 1943 where it suffered very heavy losses. The 29ths 3 Tank Brigades were finaly refitted in late Dec 43 with all T-34 (65 per Brigade) & was one of the 1st to do so. The truth of the matter was the Germans were faceing alot more light tanks then T-34s, until late 43 early 44 with the exception a few Corps given special priority refit of T-34s for Kursk.

Regards, John Waters

[dieseltaylor]

Those figures from the Army tests provided by JK show the sort of dissonance of view that exists between someone saying how wonderful the weapon is to what is actually of importance on the front line.

To provide that data without giving practical information as to the probability of hitting is bizarre. Howeer it is nice to see that the US could produce a very effective gun though it is easy to forget that without the advances in shell design a lot of this would be wasted.

[PzKpfw 1]

Thx for the M36 numbers John.

Regards, John Waters

[PzKpfw 1]

Correction on T-34 tank losses 1942 total T-34 irreversible losses was 6,600 T-34-76

Regards, John Waters

[JasonC]

You have now repeated yourself 3 times without acknowledging the glaring contradiction in your own statements. Which are, that the Russians already had 9600 heavy and medium tanks in the field by the start of 1943 - a figure much higher than the German tank fleet size, all types of the same point in time *or any other* in the war in the east - yet you continue to claim they had only light tanks then.

If I have 3 superior tanks for every heavy or light tank you have, and also have 3 light tanks, having the 3 light tanks in addition doesn't change the fact that my superior tanks already vastly outnumber yours.

The Russian prewar fleet only contained 1400 heavy and medium tanks, superior to the German models. That was already a large number compared to the German mediums (the Germans had no heavies until 1943). It had large numbers of inferior prewar lights. Those were lost in the course of 1941 - most of them in the first 2 months actually.

Russian losses in 1941 greatly exceeded production, so they ended the year with a small fleet of tanks - still as large as the German maximum fleet for the whole war, mind, but a third what they had at the start of the war, or the start of any other year of the war.

But in 1942, production greatly exceeded losses and the fleet size rose back to the 18,000 level, a net increase of over 10000 tanks. And the heavy and medium portion of that fleet was over half of it - 9600 out of 18100 on your own figures, where last I checked the dividing line for your silly "half" test is 9050 - 9600 being larger than 9050 (one has no idea how far the obvious needs to be explicitly stated before any of it will register).

The fleet transitions from less than 10% medium or heavy on the day of the invasion with a large fleet, to a small fleet at the end of the first year. Then in 1942, it transitions back to huge - much larger than the German fleet - and to more than 50% heavy and medium. Making, wait for it, "1942 the transition year" - as stated several times already.

There is a reason the end of 1942 saw the Russians seize the strategic initiative and smash entire German army groups to powder.

[PzKpfw 1]

"Simply put, we outproduced the Russians"

As for pretending that 1400 heavy and medium tanks in 1941 is a small number, the Germans had all of 3300 tanks of all kinds for the invasion. Half of them Panzer IIs and Panzer 38s - only half being IIIs or IVs, and those with the short guns. The German quality mix was certainly better than T-26s, but the high end of it was outclassed by and did not significantly outnumber the modern portion of the Russian fleet.

Where did you get the Germans started Barbarossa with 3,300 tanks?. As of June 22 1941 the Germans had 5,264* tanks faceing east:

PzKpfw Bef. - 330

PzKpfw 1 - 877

PzKpfw II - 1,074

PzKpfw III 1,440: 350 3,7cm, 1,090 5cm

PzKpfw IV - 517

PzKpfw 35t - 187

PzKpfw 38t - 754

Flammpanzer - 85

if we exclude the 877 PzKpfw 1, & PzKpfw 35t not assigned to combat units, that still leaves 4,200 German tanks & 377 AG's vs 15,000** Soviet tanks in the Westren Military Districts.

*See: Jentz Thomas L. Panzer Truppen. vol 1. p.186.

**See: Dunn Walter S. Hitler's Nemesis. p.117.

Regards, John Waters