Jagdpanther Temporary Guidelines Heinz Guderian approved

[PzKpfw 1]

You have now repeated yourself 3 times without acknowledging the glaring contradiction in your own statements. Which are, that the Russians already had 9600 heavy and medium tanks in the field by the start of 1943 - a figure much higher than the German tank fleet size, all types of the same point in time *or any other* in the war in the east - yet you continue to claim they had only light tanks then.

If I have 3 superior tanks for every heavy or light tank you have, and also have 3 light tanks, having the 3 light tanks in addition doesn't change the fact that my superior tanks already vastly outnumber yours.

The Russian prewar fleet only contained 1400 heavy and medium tanks, superior to the German models. That was already a large number compared to the German mediums (the Germans had no heavies until 1943). It had large numbers of inferior prewar lights. Those were lost in the course of 1941 - most of them in the first 2 months actually.

Russian losses in 1941 greatly exceeded production, so they ended the year with a small fleet of tanks - still as large as the German maximum fleet for the whole war, mind, but a third what they had at the start of the war, or the start of any other year of the war.

But in 1942, production greatly exceeded losses and the fleet size rose back to the 18,000 level, a net increase of over 10000 tanks. And the heavy and medium portion of that fleet was over half of it - 9600 out of 18100 on your own figures, where last I checked the dividing line for your silly "half" test is 9050 - 9600 being larger than 9050 (one has no idea how far the obvious needs to be explicitly stated before any of it will register).

The fleet transitions from less than 10% medium or heavy on the day of the invasion with a large fleet, to a small fleet at the end of the first year. Then in 1942, it transitions back to huge - much larger than the German fleet - and to more than 50% heavy and medium. Making, wait for it, "1942 the transition year" - as stated several times already.

There is a reason the end of 1942 saw the Russians seize the strategic initiative and smash entire German army groups to powder.

From January 1, 1942 - December 31, 1942, the Soviets lost 15,000 tanks broken down as, 1,200 Heavy tanks, 6,600 T-34, 7,200 Lt. tanks 42.13% of the tanks on hand & produced in this time period are lost.

You continue to ignore actual Tank Corps & Brigade composition & returns show their were more light tanks then either T-34 or KV in front line combat formations. Im not disputeing that the T-34 or KV or they wern't superior to German tanks etc, you threw that in for some reason. I'm also not discussing strategic initiative, nor the merits of the increase in the medium or heavy tank % etc.

Nor am i being rude or sarcastic. And please point me to where i claimed they "had only light tanks'. This comment alone begs the question, have you even read any of my posts?.

My point is/was that was apperently lost on you, that the T-34 did not become the workhorse it did till late 1943 Ie, the dominant tank numericly & to the point all TC Tank Brigades were outfitted entirely with T-34s, or the fleets ppl refer to.

The Soviets despite production increase could not in 1942 outfit their entire force with T-34 nor could they until late 1943 due to losses, Ie, the German drive to Stalingrad left a wake of destroyed Tank Corps that for the most part had to retreat on foot & be rebuilt completely which ate production as well.

The lt tanks were used in great numbers to make up for the lack of T-34s in the Tank Corps. After Dec 43 the Lt tanks begin to dissapear from the Tank & Mech Corps replaced by the T-34 & relegated to training establishments as of 01.01.45 their were still 5700 lt tanks in inventory in the training regts.

This is why if you look at Stalingrad you see a Tank Corps during Uranus ie, 1st Tank corps had 96 T-34, 63 T-70 4th TC had 21-23 KV, 60 T-34, 30 MK II, & 60 T-60. 7th TC had 20 KV, 46 T-34, 30 T-70, 69 T-60 & these were TC specialy built up to relive Stalingrad. Yes some Tank Corps did achive the July 1942 Shtat levels Ie, the 17th Tank Corps, 3 Tank Brigades had their allotted 32 T-34, & 21 T-70 per brigade. But this was an exception compared to other TC tank type & numbers.

Either i'm not being clear enough here, for you to understand, the pupose of my posts, or you just dont want to, or you want to arue for arguements sake, either way i'm here all week .

Regards, John Waters

[JasonC]

All tank brigades outfitted entirely with T-34s does not equal was the workhorse.

All powers continued to use their light chassis production lines for the entire war.

They therefore all necessarily had light armor as well as mediums and up for the entire war.

In the second half of the war, most powers transitioned the use made of their light chassis production lines to SPA and SPAT, but all of them continued to use them. (The US kept turreted light tanks longer than most, but relegated them to secondary roles tactically - it is the only except to using light chassis for something else, and that reflects more mediums available than they could ship and man).

The existence of T-70s or SU-76s no more prevents the T-34 from being the core of the Russian mech arm, than the existence of Pz 38s or Marders prevents the Panzer IV from being the core of the German one.

The transition that matters is when do the Russians have so many T-34s and upward that they have their full operational impact, which arrives as soon as they have way more T-34s and upward than the Germans even have tanks, let alone tanks that can match T-34s in gun and armor terms.

And that occurs in 1942, because Russian production of mediums and up greatly exceeds their losses of mediums and up. Just the increment of mediums and up, over losses, in calendar 1942, exceeds the entire German tank fleet.

The Germans are still driving around in Panzer IIIs with 50L42 guns at Kursk, for a sixth of their fleet. Or lighter. But it is still correct to say by that time the Panzer IV long was the workhorse of the German AFV fleet. They weren't a higher portion of the German fleet than T-34s were of the Russian, at that point. But the existence of lighter vehicles on both sides doesn't change that at all.

And the reason I cite the change in initiative is it actually critically depended on this process - that the transition to the Russians having the superior armored force in numbers and quality, had already occurred by November 1942. Pretending it only happened a year later is just flat wrong, and it gets the whole history of the armor war in Russia, wrong. It does not explain what actually happened during 1942, or how the initiative switched.

[dieseltaylor]

I am confused. In an earlier post Jason you say:

The Russian fleet was half T-34/76 by 1942

The figures provided conclusively prove this was not the case. If your use of English means that you think seeing someone by 8p.m. means by 8:59 p.m. then that might explain some of the confusion.

[PzKpfw 1]

All tank brigades outfitted entirely with T-34s does not equal was the workhorse.

Jason i'm not saying it does per sey, what i am getting at with workhorse is the T-34 did not achieve what the Soviets refered to as "strategic mobility" prior to late 1943. Ie, a point Rotmistrov makes concerning this subject about mixed Tank Brigades, the KV-, T-60/70 could not keep up with T-34-76 in operations, so T-34s left their componet light tank elements in the dust, which made the attacks less cordinated & with less firepower etc. & their was no fix for this until such time as T-34s were available in sufficent numbers, to outfit all TB'S With T-34 & remove the light tank componets. Until then the mixed brigades hindered Soviet mobile operations, to an extent, yes they were successful despite of this, but not soley because of the T-34.

And to comment on your earlier post, their were not 8,000 T-34 in inventory on 31.12.42 their was only 7,600 T-34, M3 Grant in inventory faceing the Germans as of January 1943. at the most 5,953 T-34s survived 1942.

All powers continued to use their light chassis production lines for the entire war.

They therefore all necessarily had light armor as well as mediums and up for the entire war.

Agreed,but i'm not sure for the same reasons, the Soviets continued to use Light tanks out of neccessity they had no choice, their were not enough T-34 available to soley equip all tank brigades till late 43. & here is where the full production finaly kicks in as 61% of all T-34 on hand, & produced were lost in 1943.

The transition that matters is when do the Russians have so many T-34s and upward that they have their full operational impact, which arrives as soon as they have way more T-34s and upward than the Germans even have tanks, let alone tanks that can match T-34s in gun and armor terms.

& here is where we disagree, in opinion to me i see the transition occur in Bagration & after this to me was the T-34s strategic mobility realised.

And the reason I cite the change in initiative is it actually critically depended on this process - that the transition to the Russians having the superior armored force in numbers and quality, had already occurred by November 1942. Pretending it only happened a year later is just flat wrong, and it gets the whole history of the armor war in Russia, wrong. It does not explain what actually happened during 1942, or how the initiative switched.

I dont agree that the Soviets had superior quality in November 42, the T-34 was not the dominant tank, their were more T-60/T-70 in the Tank Corps tank Brigades then T-34. T-34s worked with light tanks used as medium tanks a role they were forced into by neccessity. & one can not dismiss the contribution of the light tanks to Soviet successes. Nor can one atribute operational succecess soley to tanks their was a combined arms componet as well. Also one cannot dissmiss STAVKA planning & logistics effects on operations. Ie, Uranus was carefully planned & executed & unlike previous Soviet operation to date it worked because they struck the weakest link in the German defences, the satalite forces, and the Germans had no mobile reserves to use to halt it.

Also to use November 1942 as an example of superiority one cannot dismiss the defeat that occured in Zhukovs oft forgotten Operation Mars, which was as important as Uranus,& more in some ways, where unlike Uranus, the Germans had mobile reserves that smashed Zhukovs forces, despite the initial commitment of 668,000 men, & 2000 tanks to the main assault. Mars losses were 100,000 KIA/MIA with 235,000 WIA, as well as the loss of 1,600 tanks. Mars stands as one of the worst Soviet operational defeats of the war in terms of cost in men & material, at a time of suposed Soviet force superiority. And one cant pretend or wish MARs away as the Soviets tried to do.

Regards, John Waters

[PzKpfw 1]

Jason, Tiger were operateing on the Eastren front in 1942 ie, s.H.Pz.Abt.502(511), their first loss of a Tiger in combat was 25.11.42 To state their were no heavies on the Eastren front till 1943, is rather misleading.

Regards, John Waters

[PzKpfw 1]

To provide more examples on my previous posts, concerning mixed Tank Tank Brigada, for the failed Soviet offensive at Kharkov in 1942 the main strike force was Pushkin's Tank Group, with 4 Tank Korps, consisting of 4th TC, 13th TC, 23rd TC, & 24th TC. Pushkin's forces had a total of 568 tanks in 12 Brigada broken down by type:

T-34-76 - 127

KV - 82

T-60 - 206

T-70 -14

MK III(Valantine) - 30

Stuart, M3 - 76

Grant, M3 - 33

As we see above 40% of the tanks were Lt tanks, the Soviets were forced to use Lt tanks in place of mediums & heavies in the formations as they could not produce enough T-34 & KV to outfit their TC to Shtat levels. Pushkin's Group was encircled and destroyed at Izyum in May 1942.

This example highlights Rotmistrovs remarks i used earlier. A Soviet study after Kharkov on problems with mixed brigades described the problem as being that T-34s left the KV-1 & Lt tanks to far behind during operations for them to contribute to the inital breakthru phase & splintering the force. Ie, T-34s entered German anti tank gun defence ranges before the KV-1 could move ahead to breakthru the German defenseive positions. KV's also caused problems in that they often broke thru bridges, which delayed follow up forces from advanceing, it didnt help that Soviet bridgeing material was only rated for 30 tons, so special bridgeing had to be made for the KV that wasnt usualy available in operations till later.

Same with the Lt tanks they to were left behind & could not contribute in time to the initial phase. Also poor coordination & tactics were cited as well as lack of radios. Ie, the solution was to let the KV advance, breakthru the German inital German defensive line then send in the T-34 & Lt tanks to exploit it. These experiences led to the formation of the Soviet Independant Heavy Tank Regiments.

Another problem encountered increaseingly in 1942 was the appearence in greater numbers of the PAK 50, with PzGr.40 APCR ammunition or 'arrowhead' as it could penetrate the KV-1 armor. As well as the introduction of the PAK 40. Prior to this the KV had earned the nick name 'white mammoth' with its crews, when single KVs were able to sit outside German defensive positions with impunity & fire away on those positions, after the appearence of the PAK 40/50 this was no longer practicle.

Regards, John Waters

[newlife]

I think part of your disagreement here is that one side is talking total numbers, and the other is talking percentage of force of declared brigades.

JK, does it matter if a force has only 50% of its intended amount of tanks if that force is still big enough to get the job done? Essentially the Russians are saying they have more brigades than they actually do, and instead of consolidating forces they leave them at reduced strength. Probably cause no one wants to tell Stalin they don't have as many brigades as Stalin thinks they have. But those brigades still outnumber the Germans.

[JasonC]

A dozen or so Tigers before the close of calendar 1942 means the Germans had heavies already in 1942. Any T-70 remaining in the fleet means the Russians didn't have T-34s until 1944. Yeah, we get it, German physics has become German accounting, it has gone beyond parody, and is no longer worthy of continued discussion.

[PzKpfw 1]

A dozen or so Tigers before the close of calendar 1942 means the Germans had heavies already in 1942.

Oh c'mon Jason, you stated their were no German heavies, until 43, the plain fact is the Germans had Tigers operateing from Sept 42 on. and it makes no difrence at all to your statement, if their were 12 or 100, or if they showed up the last day of the calendar for 1942.

Any T-70 remaining in the fleet means the Russians didn't have T-34s until 1944. Yeah, we get it, German physics has become German accounting, it has gone beyond parody, and is no longer worthy of continued discussion.

Please show me where i said any of the above.

Ahh doesn't this just bring back memories of the good ol evil 'Tiger lobby' conspiracy days, Jason to bad Jeff, Claus, or Lorrin arn't here we could have a meeting.

Regards, John Waters

[PzKpfw 1]

8000 T-34s is larger than the entire German tank fleet in the east, much of which is still in Panzer 38s, short 50L42 model IIIs, and short 75L24 model IVs. Those types are still up to a third of the German fleet mix in mid 1943.

As of 01.07.43 the Germans had 1,397 tanks deployed prior to Zitadelle broken down as*:

PzKpfw III 5.cm L/60 - 538

PzKpfw III 5.cm L/42 - 117

PzKpfw III 7.5cm L/24 - 170

PzKpfw IV 7.5cm L/43/48 - 859

PzKpfw IV 7.5cm L/24 - 54

PzKpfw 38t - 12

Total:

1,750 tanks. 1,397 lang 5.cm. 7.5cm & 341 Kurtz 5cm 7.5cm

*See Jentz Thomas L. Panzer Truppen vol.2 pp. 78 - 82.

Regards, John Waters

[PzKpfw 1]

Oops that should read 1,750 tanks prior to Zitadelle excludeing PzKpfw V/VI totals.

Regards, John Waters