Jagdpanther Temporary Guidelines Heinz Guderian approved

[John Kettler]

It doesn't get more official than this! It's a wartime German classified document vetted by the great Panzer leader Heinz Guderian on the Jagdpanther V. Please note deploying one Jagdpanther by itself is strictly verboten! It's covered in Item 4 under II Employment Guidelines. Take heed, ye QBers!

http://www.geocities.ws/pentagon/5353/jagdp.htm

Regards,

John Kettler

[Michael Emrys]

Please note deploying one Jagdpanther by itself is strictly verboten!

That's more or less what I've been saying for years. Buying single tanks usually turns out to be a waste of points because it will be a magnet for every AT weapon the other side has, and once it's gone you're going to be out of tanks. Think how many light mortar teams you could buy with that many points.

Michael

[Seedorf81]

Ehm, John and Michael, wasn't Guderian on the losing side of ww2?

Maybe the Gerries would have won if only they had deployed them Jagdpanthers by themselves! We'll never know, do we now?

[Broadsword56]

The power of massed tanks, AGs or any AFVs is hard to beat.

Right now, I'm seeing this demonstrated in my tests of a huge North Africa map/scenario in CMFI.

It's a chance to see what 50 or so tanks in a classic rolling combined-arms blitzkrieg can do when they've got open terrain and a full head of steam.

The Americans have some 35 TDs and some fixed AT guns to oppose the armor, plus the usual bazookas.

But, every time a TD fires to kill a Panzer, it reveals its position and 5 other panzers swing their turrets around to obliterate it. Shoot and scoot is the preferred tactic for the Yanks, but it's harder to scoot in the open desert and timing the shoots and scoots is particularly challenging -- it's only working about 30 percent of the time. [The fact that a turretless TD takes much longer to acquire a target and adjust its aim also plays a major part here -- M10s made their first appearance at this battle, arriving like the cavalry to save the day...but since M10s aren't in CMFI yet, I'll be using Shermans as stand-ins. They'll be counted as KIA any time they're hit, with the crew required to bail out. But that still doesn't replicate the power of the M10's gun.]

When AFVs can be mutually supporting like this, they rule.

The only thing that can stop them is air power -- which the US didn't really have here in this particular battle -- or massed heavy artillery. The US has two batteries of Long Tom 155s, but getting the rounds to fall in just the right place and time on continuously moving German columns is a major challenge, too.

One can see why Normandy baffled the armor commanders for a while, since all the lessons learned in NA were the wrong ones for NW Europe.

[MikeyD]

Didn't the Germans have similar tactical guidelines on Tiger I? Guidelines they seemed to have never followed after mid-44. They were forever sending one one and two vehicles to plug holes in the front, operating forward of the infantry, all sorts of stuff the official doctrine said they should never do. Its kind'a hard to field jadgpanthers by the battalion when your part of the front only has six runners.

[JasonC]

Training documents don't ban practices that no one practices. They ban practices that people are practicing that the banners think are misguided.

Read the actual AARs of Jagdpanther use and you will find single guns deployed everywhere. Occasionally 2-4. Practically never large units of them (I can think of one, count 'em one, use of a larger body of Jadgpanthers in a body, tactically, in the west - during the Bulge, Heer sector west of Bastogne. Stripping tactics worked against them on that occasion).

Guderian says "The use of entire battalions is the primary condition for a successful engagement." But in the Bulge e.g. -

519th Panzerjaegers had 9 Jagdpanther, 9 JagdIV-70s, and 19 StuG

521th had 5 Jagdpanther, 8 JgdIVs, and 8 StuG.

560th had 1 company of Jagdpanther and 2 of JadgIV-70

559th had 1 company Jagdpanther, the rest StuG, and acted as one of Lehr's Panzer battalions

654th was the only formation meant to be all Jagdpanther, and it had only 27 of them, 24 operational before the offensive.

In short, they were not used as they were supposed to be used, but as they actually were. As speciality items parceled out to put a superior AFV somewhere or other, in dribs and drabs.

[JasonC]

Extending remarks - they were used by 12SS in the attempt at Elsenborn's left shoulder - that was one company of the 560th, and those attacks were mainly wrecked by US 155mm artillery fire, though a full battalion of Jacksons toward the end of the fighting there certainly came in handy.

The fight west of Bastogne I was thinking of was near Rochefort, and the Jagdpanthers that fought near there were apparently Lehr's, which again had one company worth. Rochefort did fall to 2nd Panzer after it set up a full attack with artillery support, after an initial coup de main attempt failed with loss.

654th had the strength I indicated at the time of the start of the Bulge, but fought later (in January) in Alsace as a full unit, though again the tactical AARs are reduced company affairs.

FWIW...

[winkelried]

I am not sure if the Jagdpanther was such a superior vehicle. E.g. schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 654 fought with LXIII. Armeekorps had three companies which were fully equipped with JPz V. In West it destroyed 52 Allied tanks between November 20 and 30 at the loss of 18 JPz V - a kill/loss ratio of 2.88 - only three schwere Panzerabteilungen (of 13) had worse kill/loss ratios.

During the fighting the Abteilung 654 was organized in four to five Kampfgruppen of 4 to 10 JPz V each (varying along the fighting - but more or less in line with Guderian's guidelines) usually assigned to infantry regiments or batallions in offensive and defensive missions.

[John Kettler]

winkelried,

How did the Jagdpanther do in the East, where, presumably, LOS was significantly better than in the relatively more constrained ground in the West? Offhand, I'd expect the exchange ratio to be significantly higher.

Regards,

John Kettler

[winkelried]

winkelried,

How did the Jagdpanther do in the East, where, presumably, LOS was significantly better than in the relatively more constrained ground in the West? Offhand, I'd expect the exchange ratio to be significantly higher.

Regards,

John Kettler

I'll have to check. But AFIK most JPz V were deployed in the West.

[winkelried]

OK. What I found:

1944 not a single JPz V was deployed to the East. In January 1945 28 were sent to the East s.H.Pz.Jg.Abt. 563 and s.H.Pz.Jg.Abt. 616 - the deployment was quite a disaster (there were sent more later).

E.g. the s.H.Pz.Jg.Abt. 563 hat just finished its basic training when it was deployed as infantry (!!!!) and lost 55 of its trained tankers. After the rest the Abteilung (mixed JPz V and JPz IV - don't know how many of each) destroyed 58 soviet tanks with a combat loss of 1 JPz V and 4 JPz IV at the end of January 45 - quite a good kill/loss ratio (but in a single short action). On Feb 1 the Abteilung had just 5 JPz V and 3 JPz IV/70 left. So the overall kill/loss ratio looks much worse when you count all the non-combat losses - but we had this discussion with the king tiger already.

i'll dig further.

[YankeeDog]

I'll have to check. But AFIK most JPz V were deployed in the West.

According to Achtung Panzer, the other way around, actually. Though this should probably be footnoted with the fact that probably the largest single concentration of Jagdpanthers an operation was for the Ardennes offensive.

[Edit to add, in light of Winkelreid following post: Hm. Evidently, AP's sources and yours disagree... in any event, the statement below regarding what kind of terrain any Jpz Vs deployed to the East would have been fighting in, stands]

As to JK's inquiry regarding the performance of the Jpz V on the East front, I don't really know, but it is worth remembering that by the time significant numbers of Jpz Vs would have reached the East Front, the front was far enough West that it was out of the open steppe in most areas. The Jagdpanther didn't really enter production until January 1944. The Soviets had pushed the Germans completely across the Dnieper by the end of 1943, and by April 1944, the fighting on the East front was well into Western Ukraine and Belorussia. So even on the East front, it's unlikely Jagdpanthers got much opportunity to deploy into wide open "tank country".

[JasonC]

Also note that the average AFV kill ratio in the east was 2.5 to 1. Even counting Pz 38s and the like. In the west the average was more like 1 to 1.5 to 1, so a 2.88 ratio would actually be outperformance in the west. But claims are not kills, and if the numerator of that 2.88 is claims, they need a 50% haircut to even approximate own-side reporting. Oh, and the reason kill ratios were higher in the east than in the west wasn't LOS, it was the tactical skill of the opponents. The Russians didn't have worse tanks than the western Allies, they had better ones. But they still lost them at much higher rates and ratios, even against comparable opponent forces. There was a huge skill differential against the Russians for the entire war.

[John Kettler]

winkelried,

Committing trained Panzer crews as infantry? Getting 55 killed? The Germans were desperate for infantry, totally insane, or maybe both together!

YankeeDog,

Wiki directly talks about the flatness of Belarus/Belorussia as a result of glacial scarring.

"Glacial scouring accounts for the flatness of Belarusian terrain and for its numerous lakes."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Belarus

Much the same holds true for the Ukraine, again, per Wiki.

"Most of Ukraine consists of fertile plains (or steppes) and plateaus. In terms of land use, 58% of Ukraine is considered arable land; 2% is used for permanent crops, 13% for permanent pastures, 18% is forests and woodland, and 9% is other."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Ukraine

Are we talking about the same countries? The information I've seen certainly doesn't suggest short range engagements as a result of closed terrain. Last I checked, the Landser went somewhat nuts in the steppe, since they weren't used to such endless vistas from much more geographically constricted Germany.

JasonC,

In what time period do the Russians have better tanks than the Allies, of which they were a part?

The Russians' own firing test at the Poligon showed the American 76.2mm gun outperformed their 85mm. The Sherman's 75mm gun is on par with the Russian 76.2mm gun on the T-34. All Shermans had at least a radio receiver, and two per platoon had transceivers. Radio issue in Russia was rather less liberal. The American ammunition is both of better quality and more consistent, and all Shermans have three-man turrets, which the Russians don't have in quantity, thus, no KV-85s, until the T-34/85 really becomes a major player. Even by war's end, there were still lots of T-34/76s in service. ROF advantage and situational awareness advantage goes to the Americans. HSU Loza was blown away by the technical quality and equipage of the M4A2s his Guards Tank unit got. The clinometer fitted for indirect fire was so good Russian artillerymen were thrilled to get them.

The Shermans were taller, thus easier to hit in the steppes and arguably both less mobile, particularly cross country, in mud and such, but far more mechanically reliable and easier to steer. The T-34 also has sloped armor from all sides, whereas the Sherman has it only to the front. I don't recall whether Russian AP was better versus German face hardened or our RHA. I'd say we had much better survivability if hit than did the Russians. Am unaware of any wet storage, unless the Lend-Lease M4A2s had it.

On balance, I believe I'd happily take an American tank battalion against an equivalent Russian one. I'd expect to win, too.

I'd like to see you argue against my position.

Regards,

John Kettler

[winkelried]

According to Achtung Panzer, the other way around, actually. Though this should probably be footnoted with the fact that probably the largest single concentration of Jagdpanthers an operation was for the Ardennes offensive.

[Edit to add, in light of Winkelreid following post: Hm. Evidently, AP's sources and yours disagree... in any event, the statement below regarding what kind of terrain any Jpz Vs deployed to the East would have been fighting in, stands]

The offical delivery reports say that 419 JPz V were delivered. 9 for testing and training, 320 to the West and only 90 to the East so 'Achtung Panzer' seems to have this wrong. Will check the unit deployment - maybe some units were delivered the JPz V in the West and then later deployed to the east, but from the first glance I don't think that this will tilt the relation.

[edit: checked the unit deployment +/- 10 JPz as uncertainty I would say.]

[winkelried]

According to Achtung Panzer, the other way around, actually. Though this should probably be footnoted with the fact that probably the largest single concentration of Jagdpanthers an operation was for the Ardennes offensive.

[Edit to add, in light of Winkelreid following post: Hm. Evidently, AP's sources and yours disagree... in any event, the statement below regarding what kind of terrain any Jpz Vs deployed to the East would have been fighting in, stands]

As to JK's inquiry regarding the performance of the Jpz V on the East front, I don't really know, but it is worth remembering that by the time significant numbers of Jpz Vs would have reached the East Front, the front was far enough West that it was out of the open steppe in most areas. The Jagdpanther didn't really enter production until January 1944. The Soviets had pushed the Germans completely across the Dnieper by the end of 1943, and by April 1944, the fighting on the East front was well into Western Ukraine and Belorussia. So even on the East front, it's unlikely Jagdpanthers got much opportunity to deploy into wide open "tank country".

There was also terrain in the West (like in Holland, Northern Germany etc) where you would find the long enagagement ranges you would also find in the East.

And to make the point clear: the number of JPz V delivered to the East until 31.12.44 was exactly 0 (zero in words)! Up to this moment 162 JPz V were delivered to the West. Just 5 units got delivered 295 (or 70%) of the 419 JPz V from April 1944 til May 1945:

s.H.Pz.Jäg.Abt. 654 - 100 JPz V.

s.H.Pz.Jäg.Abt. 559 - 60 JPz V.

Pz.Div. Lehr - 49 JPz V.

s.H.Pz.Jäg.Abt. 655 - 34 JPz V.

s.H.Pz.Jäg.Abt. 519 - 27 JPz V.

All these units fought almost exclusively in the West - in the last weeks West/East was a bit difficult to separate (e.g. in Austria).

[YankeeDog]

YankeeDog,

Wiki directly talks about the flatness of Belarus/Belorussia as a result of glacial scarring.

"Glacial scouring accounts for the flatness of Belarusian terrain and for its numerous lakes."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Belarus

Much the same holds true for the Ukraine, again, per Wiki.

"Most of Ukraine consists of fertile plains (or steppes) and plateaus. In terms of land use, 58% of Ukraine is considered arable land; 2% is used for permanent crops, 13% for permanent pastures, 18% is forests and woodland, and 9% is other."

Seriously, John: citing brief, generic Wikipedia descriptions of Belarus and Ukranian terrain as a whole isn't particularly elucidating -- the Ukraine is larger than France, and Belarus is hardly some tiny duchy. Both regions encompass a variety of terrain types. After all, the terrain of large areas of France and other Western European countries owe terrain features to "glacial scouring", just like Belarus. Topographical maps are widely available for free on the interwebs. So are maps that show the historical location of the front lines on the East Front at various dates. Look at the topographical maps, compare them to where the front lines were in the last year or so of the war, and you'll see what kind of terrain was fought over from Mid-1944 on.

Based on production alone, the earliest Jpz Vs could of possibly made it to the East Front in any significant numbers would be about April, 1944 (and I am being generous here; sometime Summer 1944 is much more likely). By this time:

- In the South, the Soviet offensives had pushed the front lines to the very Western part of Ukraine, and in some places, Soviet forces had already crossed into Romania. Note that the border between Ukraine and Romania for the most part runs along or close to the Carpathian mountains - definitely NOT open, "Steppe" terrain. While there were a few regions of more open terrain that were still under German control or contested, most of the fighting in the South had moved West of the Steppe by Mid-1944.

- In the center, by April the front was mostly close to the modern Belarus-Russia border. Note that, while Belarus has no high mountains, it includes significant areas of low hills, heavily wooded areas (more so in 1940s than today), is intercut with many small rivers, and also contains a lot of marshy low ground (including the huge Pripiat Marshes). So it's hardly wide-open, hard ground "tank country". Further, even a cursory reading of the armor engagements during e.g., Bagration reveals the armor vs. armor fighting in this area in 1944 was often at quite close range.

- Finally, in the North, by April 1944 the Soviets had relieved Leningrad, and were pushing West across Lake Peipus and into Estonia. This region certainly isn't mountainous, but neither is it open steppe plains. Low hills, woods and copses of trees, etc. that break up LOS are quite common.

Overall, as far as LOS and combat engagement distances are concerned, the terrain fought over from mid-1944 to the end of the war on the East front wasn't all that different from the terrain on the West Front. There were some more open areas conducive to longer engagement ranges, but this was no longer the dominant terrain type as it had been in the big engagements of 1943 (Kursk, etc.). And, as Winkelreid has already noted, there were areas more open terrain on the West Front, too.

It's a common misconception that the fighting on the East Front was predominantly open country steppe fighting. For certain periods, such as most of 1943, this is a reasonably accurate thing to say. But not overall, 1941-1945.

So overall, if hypothetically JPz Vs were any more successful on the East Front than the West, I don't think this can be explained by more favorable terrain. Some other reason(s), such as JasonC's thesis regarding Soviet armor crew quality, must be a factor.

[sburke]

Seriously, John: citing brief, generic Wikipedia descriptions of Belarus and Ukranian terrain as a whole isn't particularly elucidating -- the Ukraine is larger than France, and Belarus is hardly some tiny duchy. Both regions encompass a variety of terrain types. After all, the terrain of large areas of France and other Western European countries owe terrain features to "glacial scouring", just like Belarus.

LOL Manhattan is an example of glacial scouring. Brooklyn is essentially a sand bar left from that and is why periodically you get sinkholes in the middle of the street. Google it... or better yet don't.

Essentially a good part of the nothern hemisphere in one way or another is a result of Glacial scouring.

[Cogust]

Essentially a good part of the nothern hemisphere in one way or another is a result of Glacial scouring.

Yo Mama is a result of glacial scouring.

Or was that of topic?

Nah, I think the discussion is in a sinkhole already.

[John Kettler]

YankeeDog,

I was looking at the predominant terrain type, but your points are well taken.

sburke,

Good one! Ours, though, was scoured with bigger, pointier rocks!

Regards,

John Kettler

[PzKpfw 1]

=winkelried;1399946]There was also terrain in the West (like in Holland, Northern Germany etc) where you would find the long enagagement ranges you would also find in the East.

And to make the point clear: the number of JPz V delivered to the East until 31.12.44 was exactly 0 (zero in words)! Up to this moment 162 JPz V were delivered to the West. Just 5 units got delivered 295 (or 70%) of the 419 JPz V from April 1944 til May 1945:

s.H.Pz.Jäg.Abt. 654 - 100 JPz V.

s.H.Pz.Jäg.Abt. 559 - 60 JPz V.

Pz.Div. Lehr - 49 JPz V.

s.H.Pz.Jäg.Abt. 655 - 34 JPz V.

s.H.Pz.Jäg.Abt. 519 - 27 JPz V.

All these units fought almost exclusively in the West - in the last weeks West/East was a bit difficult to separate (e.g. in Austria).

According to Albert Ernst* his 1299th Panzerjager Abt was outfitted with Jadgpanther, which were first used operationaly in the Ost, on 11.07.44. with 3rd Panzer Army in an attack from the Barbriskis area. The 1299th(1st Kompanie) was attached to the 25th Pz.Regt & 6th Pz.Gren.Div in an attack on the left flank of the Olita road.

*See: Kurowski Franz. Panzer Aces. p.252

Regards, John Waters

[Michael Emrys]

Ours, though, was scoured with bigger, pointier rocks!

Not in my area. I live on ground that was pushed down out of Canada and deposited by retreating glaciers. It consists largely of rocks of about bread loaf size and quite rounded. Clearly they had been tumbled and abraded a lot in their journey. On the other hand, I have no experience with glacial till in other parts of the continent, and make no claims about their characteristics in, say, Illinois.

Michael

[sburke]

Yo Mama is a result of glacial scouring.

Or was that of topic?

Nah, I think the discussion is in a sinkhole already.

lol I'm telling my mama, she is gonna come over and beat your a** ... as we descend even further into the sinkhole

[DavidFields]

JK: In what time period do the Russians have better tanks than the Allies, of which they were a part?

I am not going to answer for JasonC, but Shermans? What did the Western Allies have to match the KV-1 or KV-2 during that time period?

And tell me (I actually don't know) when large numbers of Shermans where engaged in WW2, as opposed to Grants or Stuarts, compared to when the T-34 was deployed in mass.

And are we going to put in the SU monsters--forget the T-34-85, an upgrade on a tank which was spectacular, despite crew and optics issue, but becoming obsolete in the rapid tech surge during he war--in a dual with the Shermans?

[JasonC]

"In what time period do the Russians have better tanks than the Allies?"

The Russians have KV-1s and T-34/76s in 1941. The western Allies had - Matildas and Crusaders in the same roles. The Russian fleet was half T-34/76 by 1942 - the Brits got their first Shermans at El Alamein in November of that year. In 1943, the Allies added some M-10s to the fleet, but Sherman with short 75 and Stuarts were their main battle tanks, at medium and light respectively. The Russians added SU-152s, SU-122s, SU-85 (second half) to their fleet, but overall I'd call that the only period of approximate parity between the western Allies and the Russians in gun and armor specs of their AFVs.

Then it shifts more and more pro Russian. In 1944, the Allies field upgunned Shermans for the first time, but only the Brits have a modest portion of them by mid 1944, the Americans don't start getting 76s in numbers until the second half of the year. They rely instead on TDs for upgunned weapons, most of them still M-10s. In the same period, the Russians field thousands of T-34/85s and their first IS-2, plus ISU-122s and ISU-152s. The western Allies never have anything comparable. Late in the year the Russians add SU-100s, while the Americans get a modest number of Jackson TDs with better gun than their old 76s - but with nothing like the frontal protection of the SU-100.

At the end of the war, the top of the line western Allied tank is an Easy Eight Sherman with 76mm gun, which is a solid if vanilla main battle tank. But it isn't in any marked way superior to the numerous T-34/85, and the Russians have a high end of heavy tanks in their IS chassis fleet, both turreted IS-2s and the ISUs. The Russian TDs are better protected as well - the US gets turrets instead, but that is a dubious trade at best.

So I'd say the Russian AFV fleet is technically superior to the western Allies throughout.

It still underperformed the western Allies by a long way, about half the exchange rate against German armor at the most charitable estimate. The reason being how it was used - the western Allies more successfully meshed armor operations with their long suits in the firepower arms (air and arty). The Russians were much more given to overly expensive and ineffective tank tactics - though the Brits at their worst sometimes matched them for fearsome foulups (Knightsbridge and Goodwood come to mind).

Fair question but not a hard one...