Tigers from HELL

[Praetori]

Make sure to use 155 mm artillery against tanks. Don't buy 105 mm. 155's have a good chance of immobilizing a tank. 105's aren't big enough and Anything bigger than 155 is too slow.

Well the shermans with 105's seemed more apt at getting the Tiger crews to bail than did the 75mm which just went ping.

I for one can't wait for the commonwealth module and the Firefly.

Payback is coming.

[jurpo]

Typo (unless Hitler had a love regiment).

Of course he did, it was headed by Ernst Röhm

[Cuirassier]

Don't forget, that only 17% of German tanks were lost due to allied tanks in France.

Therefore if you want a statistically more accurate result of a won allied battle, give the Alliies 200% - 300% more purchasing power, buy less tanks but buy air support until the sky is dark and then try again...

There is no way that is correct. Otherwise the Germans would have won the Normandy campaign. Allied armor was the chief German tank killer (TD's included). What else would be?

As for attacking numerous Tiger's on open ground, you don't. Nor is that what the allies did. If such a position was found, the allies would immediately switch to the defensive on that sector and probe elsewhere. In the meantime, specialist AT weapons would shift to that sector (mainly 76 TD's).

Attacking Tiger's with 75 Shermans over open ground is the tanker's equivalent of sending a regiment of infantry against entrenched MG's supported by a battalion of 150mm+ TRP'd artillery. It is just something you don't do unless your goal is to murder your own command as efficiently as possible.

[Cuirassier]

it seems that there were even less lost to direct airpower - somewhere in the 10%. most of the tanks were either abandoned or destroyed by the crew. which in return can be caused by missing spare parts, missing time to retrieve a vehicle or indirect effect of airpower (interdiction). so to buy airpower shouldn't help either ...

Yes, air power hardly accounted for any losses. Even less than 10% I think. Zetterling does a good analysis on the subject.

Tanks aren't destroyed when abandoned or blown up by the crews. Yes, the Germans loved to write off their tanks many months late by citing such causes. But assuming that that is how the afv's were actually lost is incorrect. What really happened is that German tanks were knocked out of running status by allied weaponry (AFV fired AP rounds the dominant killer) and then moved into the long term repair category on German accounting sheets. Most of these tanks never became operational again, however, and were either abandoned or blown up by the Germans and then officially written off. But in reality, it was allied weapons that killed these vehicles.

[winkelried]

Yes, air power hardly accounted for any losses. Even less than 10% I think. Zetterling does a good analysis on the subject.

Tanks aren't destroyed when abandoned or blown up by the crews. Yes, the Germans loved to write off their tanks many months late by citing such causes. But assuming that that is how the afv's were actually lost is incorrect. What really happened is that German tanks were knocked out of running status by allied weaponry (AFV fired AP rounds the dominant killer) and then moved into the long term repair category on German accounting sheets. Most of these tanks never became operational again, however, and were either abandoned or blown up by the Germans and then officially written off. But in reality, it was allied weapons that killed these vehicles.

The figures are not from German sources, but from Allied ones (Operations Research Section reports) and depend heavily on the time period in Normandy. Up to 1 August it seems that AP (ATG and Tanks) was the main cause for losses. After this date (Cobra & Falaise) the losses due to abandonment and destruction by crew started to mount.

[Praetori]

There is no way that is correct. Otherwise the Germans would have won the Normandy campaign. Allied armor was the chief German tank killer (TD's included). What else would be?

Though I think that the 17% is a gross underestimation (I've heard that towed guns had some real success though but 17% sounds a bit little). I would wager that, without any real hard facts to back me up but clouded memory, that A very large portion (of the total destroyed) was destroyed by the Germans themselves. To prevent it from falling into allied hands as they kept getting cut off and found themselves in situations where they were out of fuel.

As for attacking numerous Tiger's on open ground, you don't. Nor is that what the allies did. If such a position was found, the allies would immediately switch to the defensive on that sector and probe elsewhere. In the meantime, specialist AT weapons would shift to that sector (mainly 76 TD's).

Attacking Tiger's with 75 Shermans over open ground is the tanker's equivalent of sending a regiment of infantry against entrenched MG's supported by a battalion of 150mm+ TRP'd artillery. It is just something you don't do unless your goal is to murder your own command as efficiently as possible.

Well I didn't know the first time that I was facing a platoon+ of Tigers and after the barrage I called in I would have thought that any enemies in the area would be in bad shape (though I never thought of Tigers from Hell).

The second time was just plain stubbornness and I really thought that the combined firepower of 2+ companies (and they really could put A LOT of rounds into those Tigers as it were) would be enough to crush the opposition. But alas I've come to realize that it was folly.

It actually made me remember the good old days of Steel Panthers against my fellow officer colleagues where my Soviet T72 brigade was smashed by a few Abrahams.

I actually think that the maps in CMBN are too small for both Tigers and their opponents. The Tiger has a hard time taking full advantage of the 88 and the opposition have few means to navigate around the Tiger other than pure obstacles (which vs a Human opponent is MUCH harder than vs AI).

[winkelried]

Tanks aren't destroyed when abandoned or blown up by the crews.

Months after the breakout from Normandy the Forces Francaises de l'Interieur scavenged the battlefield between January and March 1945 and still were able to get together a small task force from abandoned equipment still in place six months after the battle - the Escadron Besnier was formed with 1 Tiger I, 2 Panther and 11 Panzer IV, 1 Marder I, 2 Jagdpanzer IV, 1 StuG III and quite a few of light vehicles (Sd Kfz 251/1, Sd Kfz 10/5, Maultier) and fought at Saint-Nazaire.

all brought to running condition and enough spares in 4 trucks and 4 small truck and one repair truck.

[nachinus]

Months after the breakout from Normandy the Forces Francaises de l'Interieur scavenged the battlefield between January and March 1945 and still were able to get together a small task force from abandoned equipment still in place six months after the battle - the Escadron Besnier was formed with 1 Tiger I, 2 Panther and 11 Panzer IV, 1 Marder I, 2 Jagdpanzer IV, 1 StuG III and quite a few of light vehicles (Sd Kfz 251/1, Sd Kfz 10/5, Maultier) and fought at Saint-Nazaire.

all brought to running condition and enough spares in 4 trucks and 4 small truck and one repair truck.

I bet the guys of that task force got a bit nervous every time they saw their own planes flying anywhere near them. I reckon they didn't ask for a lot of close air support.

[winkelried]

I bet the guys of that task force got a bit nervous every time they saw their own planes flying anywhere near them. I reckon they didn't ask for a lot of close air support.

they would probably have used air identification panels on the rear deck as did the allied forces in Europe (see Vanguard 39 US Armour and Camouflage Markings 1917-1945 p 18ff). tank recognition from the air at speed of 400-600 km/h might be a bit difficult.

[Steiner14]

it seems that there were even less lost to direct airpower - somewhere in the 10%. most of the tanks were either abandoned or destroyed by the crew. which in return can be caused by missing spare parts, missing time to retrieve a vehicle or indirect effect of airpower (interdiction). so to buy airpower shouldn't help either ...

Allied airpower was that massive, that movements during day became almost suicide.

One of the three SS Pz. Div. (i have forgotten the number) that had to alarm itself in the night of the invasion, because the traitors around Speidel in the german HQ didn't respond to the alarms of the troops and coordinate them, was rushing torwards the coast. As soon as the commander had sent the message, that he was moving on his own decision torwards the coast via radio, the HQ surprisingly immediately responded, ordered to stop and move in the other direction away from the coast, because "enemy parachuters have landed". When the tank regiment arrived at target, there were no enemy forces and the commander once again turned around and rushed torwards the coast on his own decision. The result was, that the night was over while still on it's march torwards the coast instead already at the beachhead, it was that heavily decimated from the air in the following hours, that only very few tanks - and much too late after the decisive hours - reached the beachhead.

Ofcourse this doesn't mean, that the alliied airforce was everywhere and always present but when it was, it was often decisive because it made movement during day impossible. Ofcourse the Germans protected their tanks as good as possible. But then they had to hide them and couldn't use them in the usual way.

[winkelried]

One of the three SS Pz. Div. (i have forgotten the number) .... The result was, that the night was over and on it's march torwards the coast it was in the following hours that heavily decimated from the air, that only very few tanks and much later reached the beachhead.

wondering which one you're talking about: 12th SS HJ reached the beachhead on June 7 in the morning with little hassle by aircraft. 2nd SS DR marched from Toulouse to Normandy - which is quite a bit - and could march only by night and had quite some losses on soft vehicles, but not that many on tanks. And I don't recall that 1st SS LAH had significant losses on the march either.

It seems that most of the divisions (also Lehr etc) marched during the night and had some issues in getting into Normandy, but tank losses were not significant - or you have a source which tells the contrary.

[Steiner14]

When i'm home in a few weeks i can look after it.

[Chainsaw]

21st Pz Div was denied moving up, then sent against paratroopers and then sent back to beach. its not this one you think of? I cant remember them being chopped up by allied air force though, but that can just be bad memory

[winkelried]

21st Pz Div was denied moving up, then sent against paratroopers and then sent back to beach. its not this one you think of? I cant remember them being chopped up by allied air force though, but that can just be bad memory

and they were the only ones to get through to the beach at Lion-sur-Mer on 6 June in the evening. They fought the paras as quick reaction in the morning of 6 June and then got the orders to attack the beachhed.

Between 6 June and 7 August half of the losses of the division were due to armor piercing shot - just a minimal number due to airpower.

[GerryCMBB]

In Beevor's book, he talks a few times about Allied Air attacks thinking that they had devastating results on armored units but when the area was investigated later it showed that most damage had not come from the air attacks. Air Command was not happy. Curious if that was a standard protocol to investigate what caused damage to enemy tanks?

Of course air power did stop the movement of German armor during the daytime.

Gerry

[YankeeDog]

In Beevor's book, he talks a few times about Allied Air attacks thinking that they had devastating results on armored units but when the area was investigated later it showed that most damage had not come from the air attacks. Air Command was not happy. Curious if that was a standard protocol to investigate what caused damage to enemy tanks?

Of course air power did stop the movement of German armor during the daytime.

Gerry

In general, all sides made a substantial efforts to investigate and record the cause of damage to enemy tanks -- in a war, knowing which of your own weapons system are or are not effective is very useful information.

Of course, in many cases, conclusions required a certain amount of inference and conjecture. There can be substantial unknowns. IIRC, by U.S. Army figures compiled from their own investigations after the Normandy campaign was over, something like 30-40% of German armor losses in the campaign were classified as of unknown or undeterminable cause. That's a pretty large margin of error.

[winkelried]

In Beevor's book, he talks a few times about Allied Air attacks thinking that they had devastating results on armored units but when the area was investigated later it showed that most damage had not come from the air attacks. Air Command was not happy. Curious if that was a standard protocol to investigate what caused damage to enemy tanks?

Of course air power did stop the movement of German armor during the daytime.

Gerry

the data is from the operational research unit which was set up during the normandy campaign. I didn t see such large figures for unknown reasons. It seems that armor was also pretty well protected by AA. Maybe this influenced the result too.

[abneo3sierra]

wondering which one you're talking about: 12th SS HJ reached the beachhead on June 7 in the morning with little hassle by aircraft. 2nd SS DR marched from Toulouse to Normandy - which is quite a bit - and could march only by night and had quite some losses on soft vehicles, but not that many on tanks. And I don't recall that 1st SS LAH had significant losses on the march either.

It seems that most of the divisions (also Lehr etc) marched during the night and had some issues in getting into Normandy, but tank losses were not significant - or you have a source which tells the contrary.

The division in question was SS Das Reich, delayed however by around 2 weeks, not just overnight, and the heaviest losses were to allied air power hitting some trains with the division's equip. on them iirc.

[tuhhodge]

If you fancy dipping into tales of the effectiveness and battle-hardiness of the Tiger tank, try reading Will Fey's book 'Armor Battles of the Waffen SS' in the Stackpole Military History Series. As an Englishman it was depressing reading of my forebears being skittled by hungry Tigers in Normandy.

For example, Tiger 134 of Panzer-Abteilung 102 (Fey's panzer) alone claimed 88 tanks destroyed between July 10 and August 30. On a single day, August 15, he claimed 15 Shermans and 12 reconnaissance vehicles destroyed. On August 18 Tiger 134 was damaged and blown up by its crew. The book has many, many firsthand accounts of the encounters between Allied armour and the Tigers and it's sad reading: So many lives wasted through incompetent (albeit gallant) tactics.

Whilst I imagine a lot of Allied tanks that succombed to the 88mm rounds from a Tiger were irrepairable, I'd dare say that many damaged by enemy action that could have been repaired were left in junk yards because of the overwhelming flow of brand new tanks from the factories. The Germans did not have that luxury and made every effort to repair their tanks, especially the Tigers.

[Bigduke6]

Now you know why the allies had "Tiger fright". (BTW, it took for WWII tankers to get to the top of the army command to get that lesson fixed: Creighton Abrams and the M1 tank. Great armor, great gun sure beats hoards of cheap tanks. Usually.)

I get your point, however, Comrades Konev and Rybalko would probably dispute that statement.

[akd]

Don't forget, that only 17% of German tanks were lost due to allied tanks in France.

WO 291/1186 (May 24, 1950)

The comparative performance of German anti-tank weapons during WWII

The percentage of tank losses, by cause, for different theatres is given as follows:

Theatre (tanks)....Mines.ATk guns Tanks SP guns Bazooka Other Total

NW Europe (1305) 22.1% 22.7%....14.5% 24.4%...14.2%...2.1%..100%

Italy (671)...........30%...16%......12%...26%......9%.....7% ...100%

N Africa (1734).....19.5% 40.3%....38.2% nil......nil....2%....100%

Mean values.........22.3% 29.4%....25.3% 13.5%....6.1%...3%....100%

Taking tanks and SP guns together, you get 38.9%. That kill ratio isn't exactly spectacular for the side generally on the defense (although a very much devastating reality for the guys who had to fight in tanks in Normandy).

[winkelried]

The division in question was SS Das Reich, delayed however by around 2 weeks, not just overnight, and the heaviest losses were to allied air power hitting some trains with the division's equip. on them iirc.

yes - i'll check the armor losses on the march. that they lost quite a bit of soft equipment is pretty obvious. in addition they left a trail of war crimes against civilians on their march northward (Rouffillac, Carsac-Aillac, Tulle, Argenton-sur-Creuse, Marsoulas, Oradour-sur-Glane, Trébons, Bagnères - just to name a few of the villages hit).

[JonS]

For example, Tiger 134 of Panzer-Abteilung 102 (Fey's panzer) alone claimed 88 tanks destroyed between July 10 and August 30. On a single day, August 15, he claimed 15 Shermans and 12 reconnaissance vehicles destroyed. On August 18 Tiger 134 was damaged and blown up by its crew. The book has many, many firsthand accounts of the encounters between Allied armour and the Tigers and it's sad reading: So many lives wasted through incompetent (albeit gallant) tactics.

Own-side claims are worthless. In every case where German claims have been compared to reported losses, the claims have been found to be wildly inaccurate.

Making deductions based on worthless own-side claims isn't compelling.

[abneo3sierra]

Own-side claims are worthless. In every case where German claims have been compared to reported losses, the claims have been found to be wildly inaccurate.

Making deductions based on worthless own-side claims isn't compelling.

I think this is quite right also. You wind up with 2 tanks both aiming at a target, it explodes, both count the kill, etc..happened even more with air combat in that war, sometimes by 2x,3x..not even to mention the INTENTIONAL lies.

[Vark]

Often as Reynolds has pointed out, claims were duplicated because tanks shot up already bailed out or KO'd tanks. The Western Allies refused to designate official tank aces, just for this reason and that often a tank kill was a partnership between other arms (artillery suppress, infantry harass etc). It is notable that as the Germans start to lose the war, these tales of teutonic daring do rapidly increase, wonder what the correlation is there?