NamEndedAllen

I can’t find that quote from me in this discussion. I do see what you’ve said as *a* scenario for forcing a party to the negotiation table, and that it appears to be Ukraine’s current position as stated by its President. But I have said repeatedly that there is a large range of possible outcomes for this war. I don’t think I can be clearer than that. I also have stressed separating the possibilities from our preferences. We agree on this, yes? I didn’t assign probabilities here because that is a different topic. Here is what I first said 21 hours ago: “We’ve seen a range of possible outcomes from (improbable) total Ukraine defeat to some sort of fairy tale Russian change of heart, staying intact and playing nice with both Ukraine and the West under a new rational government AND: Other realistic but negative outcomes are a debilitating stalemate with continued agony, death and destruction; or a slackening of Western resolve coupled to strengthened ties for Russia and other outlaw nations like Iran and North Korea to deliver more weapons and matériel … AND 20 hours ago: “To be clear, I am looking for a range of outcomes, not one prediction that must happen. Not absolutes. I assume that the extreme on either end of most or least preferred outcomes tend to be the least likely ( kind of like life!). So I seek examples of outcomes along the spectrum of possibilities, always keeping in mind the difference between what I prefer and the squishy probabilities of what could happen” You were put off by my use of “weaker” in discussing end of war scenarios. By that I don’t mean their content, but their overall assessments. They are not being laid out clearly by how probable each scenario may be, and even more so in breaking down each step in individual scenarios. So these scenarios appear to be typified more by how much we prefer them. In my reading, there is more care in assessing the likelihood of specific next moves in each phase of the war fighting, separate from our preferences. If you don’t agree, that’s fine. That’s been my impression and I may be wrong. Lastly, you said: “There are many variations on these visions, even in the political signalling going on. I think maximalist positions are dangerous and may do more harm than good but obviously others disagree.” In this we are in total agreement! You’ve said “maximalist”, I’ve said “extreme”, and suggested they can be laid out along a spectrum of probabilities- and that *ordering* could be debated by the fine minds here, eventually distilling a best estimation and a rough group prediction. You’ve just elaborated a Russian defeat and how bad it may be. I wonder what percentages you would assign to several notches of just how bad?

I’ve been stressing this for a while. It’s my primary perspective. Repeated very recently in this discussion: Maybe a different topic? I was musing on the ways the entire war itself might end. I’ve already said I realize and respect the scenario you have elaborated on. I believe it is along the lines of a negotiation without bloody battles in Crimea and the Donbas. Instead for them to be administered by an (unspecified) international body for perhaps ten years, followed by them voting on their status. Also, deals with Russia to pay reparations, install a more rational if still evil dictator, and respect the borders. For this they receive restored trading with the West. It’s pretty detailed! Do I have it fairly correct? I’m sketching it from memory of your earlier posts. It’s a good scenario. You’ve been selling it pretty consistently. I do think it’s a bit of a stretch though. And I’m skeptical that Ukrainians would embrace it warmly. No idea how the Russians would read it. There are a lot of moving parts to achieve. But I’m not dismissing it! It is one of many scenarios, regardless of our opinions. You find your.scenario reasonable, and I suggest a nastier one may be more probable, where the force of arms drives one of the parties to believe it has no better choice than to sit down and accept terms. Or another scenario perhaps more likely, Russia largely retreats but without negotiating, in hopes of fighting another day. A messy conclusion with Russia a heavily militarized state, fuming and resentful. Rather like a far larger North Korea.. Unclear why those don’t seem even faintly possible. Iirc, neither Vietnam’s war, nor the Syrian civil war ended by negotiation. Somebody won, and somebody lost. The Korean War still isn’t over. Sure, some major conflicts end by negotiation! But certainly not all of them. We don’t know how this one will end. Most people here would cheer if NATO somehow agreed to bring Ukraine in while the war is raging. But It isn’t unreasonable to see this as a not high probability event. We should entertain lots of scenarios. I think it wise to rate them for probability. Separately from our personal preference. I think that has worked well here for speculating on what might happen next as events on the battlefield unfold - just as you mentioned . I think we are weaker when it comes to assessing the outcome of the war itself, and even being able to discuss it.

It will be interesting to watch how much Russian military has learned, and to what effect this year: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/03/world/europe/putin-russia-ukraine-war.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShareWith Heightened Anxiety, Putin Prepares Russians for Long Fight Ahead“American officials have said they see the Kremlin finally beginning to learn from its mistakes on the battlefield. Russia is improving its defenses and pushing more soldiers to the front lines, and has put a single general in charge of the war who was able to organize a retreat from the Ukrainian city of Kherson with minimal casualties in November. Russian commanders are also publicly reining in their ambitions. Gen. Valery V. Gerasimov, the head of the Russian general staff, said on Dec. 22 that Russia’s current focus was limited to trying to capture the rest of the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine”

To be clear, I am looking for a range of outcomes, not one prediction that must happen. Not absolutes. I assume that the extreme on either end of most or least preferred outcomes tend to be the least likely ( kind of like life!). So I seek examples of outcomes along the spectrum of possibilities, always keeping in mind the difference between what I prefer and the squishy probabilities of what could happen. So I prefer a Ukrainian victory, but recognize that it could take various shapes. Only one is as the Capt prefers, and only another one is as I prefer. There are quite a few. Lengthy stalemate is a possibility, also a grinding back and forth prolonged war. All these are possible, besides total defeat of Ukraine and total collapse of Russia and a new government there that pays reparations and embraces peace with Ukraine.

Yah, I’ve been seeing a lot of absolutes tossed about. So am looking for the more likely in-between states for outcomes. Absolutes about Russia will take Kyiv in three days, then the Russian army will collapse *last* year in May, then in June, then in August. Then the Russian government will collapse. Then either or both will collapse in Autumn. That Russia *must* lose. That Russia *already* has lost. So I remain skeptical of any of our peanut gallery predictions of what *must* happen. Skeptical, not dismissive. Because these are opinions about what we think *should* happen. Often very well argued (as by Steve and the Capt). Negotiation always seems like a nice way to end a big war. But basically, nobody seriously negotiates until the pain is extraordinary. Or there isn’t any negotiation: WWII Germany. Unconditional surrender. WWII Japan: Unconditional surrender. Russia in Afghanistan. Messier? But eventually run away. Pretty similar to the USA Afghan Adventure except after tossing tremendous mountains of taxpayer dollars into the fire. I understand your suggestions of what *could* happen, as you just outlined. I just don’t buy that they are most likely. They keep ignoring Ukraine, almost as if it is a puppet on Western strings, as Putin intimates. But it is not. Example: “We could simply redraw the borders and allow Ukraine to enter.” Sure! But NATO has not done this and I suspect Ukraine has had quite enough of other nations wanting to change its borders, thank you very much. Similarly, sure, NATO *could* change its rules as you’ve said a few months ago iirc. But it has not, and has not hinted at such a thing. In my opinion, the likelihood that NATO as a political body will ever vote to admit Ukraine as a member while the war is raging is akin to me becoming the Philadelphia Eagles next quarterback. I feel almost the same about predictions that Russia will collapse. And that it will pay a penny of reparations. Maybe so. But that is far from a strategy, let alone a given. My *opinion*, which is all it is, is that Ukraine will decide whether and when it is tired of its casualties, whether it wishes to give up Crimea or the Donbas. Likewise for Russia. So far, all the progress or lack of it is what has happened on the battlefield. I may well be wrong, but I think for Ukraine’s POV clear, unmistakable battlefield defeat of Russia is what precedes any sort of negotiations to wrap the hostilities up. I suspect Ukrainians sense it is now or *never* to liberate Crimea and the Donbas.

That is both true and probable. But once all Ukraine’s borders are its own again, without salients let alone Oblasts under the invaders’ control, Ukraine could become NATO membership eligible. We’ve seen a range of possible outcomes from (improbable) total Ukraine defeat to some sort of fairy tale Russian change of heart, staying intact and playing nice with both Ukraine and the West under a new rational government - no matter how attractive and rational that may be in the abstract. But neither extreme seem anywhere near the real world - too many improbable steps must occur in lock step and with no failures of the necessary steps. In my brilliant, far seeing and worth less than what you are paying for it opinion, the best outcome we can realistically hope for is the means for NATO protection for Ukraine. This requires no magical “better” Russian dictator, no decision by Russia to withdraw and become peaceful, no magical change in Russian control of their internal media and propaganda. It only requires victory on the battlefield by Ukraine. And that requires not only continued military aid, but ramped up aid that permits inexorable step by step battlefield exhaustion, defeat, and retreat by Russia. Other realistic but negative outcomes are a debilitating stalemate with continued agony, death and destruction; or a slackening of Western resolve coupled to strengthened ties for Russia and other outlaw nations like Iran and North Korea to deliver more weapons and matériel - leading to renewed gains of Ukrainian territory. Which leads into a spiral of weakening Western political and public resolve. Ominously, in my (literally) priceless opinion, these outcomes increase in probability as time goes on without Ukrainian victory. Thus the importance of hastening Russian defeat on the battlefield.

More new tech for HIMARS coming to Ukraine: The U.S. Army Contracting Command (ACC) at the Aberdeen Proving Ground last month put out a 'Sources Sought' notification for possible future delivery of International Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (IFATDS) to Ukraine, as well as Taiwan and Latvia. The international export version of the Army's Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), IFATDS would increase HIMARS lethality by providing a secure communications system stitching together incoming information from various sources across the battlefield for a better common operating picture and greater situational awareness. This would give HIMARS operators a much better idea of where to fire the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) munitions that have already been used to devastating effect by Ukraine https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-pentagon-may-give-kyiv-advanced-himars-fire-control-system

I am, and I am. Imbibing his swill is the equivalent to the act of aligning with Tokyo Rose in WWII. Except he isn’t funny.

Concerning the use of casualties in attempting to predict victory or defeat - Cap laid out the complexity of the many confounding variables in rather a lot of detail. However, I think we can set this method aside using the analytic method of Face Validity alone. Consider just one more example. Having seen how miserably the metric of body counts worked out (not!) in the Vietnam War, I would suggest that these attempts are fool’s errands. It isn’t a sports game with a scoreboard and a set number of time periods (quarters, innings, etc) that end the game with a final score determining the winner, all neat and tidy.

President Zelensky. From the front line at Bakhmut to the Congress of the USA. References to Americans desperately fighting the Nazis on Christmas Eve in Battle of the Bulge. To the turning point in the American War for Independence: The Battle of Saratoga. Not asking for American soldiers fighting in Ukraine, assuring instead, Ukrainians can definitely fly American jets and drive American tanks (!). But the two simple words that should ring out, should be THE message to everyone, everywhere: ”ONLY VICTORY”

Wait! His motivation is actually rather sane, at least it’s tied to reality!! Might not be the wisest decision with regard to a cost/benefit analysis, but still…assuming of course he HAS a daughter.

Thanks! Somewhat better than even more evidence my brain is turning into grey goo and oatmeal. Or worse.

“The past is never dead. It isn’t even past.” -Faulkner

Thanks! Those would be keyboard commands, yes? I’m using a tablet - no keyboard- which might be why the options are fewer. But thanks! Might be some alternative, although I can always just copy, paste and use quotes to indicate. Like I have been doing. But definitely not as slick looking.

Thanks Pete. I would do exactly that, except I never see the quote tool selection. Looking even now, I see the U underline button, and next to it on the right is the link button. I also don’t have those font opytions you have. Must be a full or abbreviated tool choice in Settings, that I’ve never noticed?

(How do you guys get quotes from other sources displayed in the forum’s quote blocks? I used the link option but only see underlining! Probably stating he in the face!) Remember those upgunned, upgraded very old M-55 tanks from Slovenia? https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/12/17/ukraines-super-upgraded-m-55s-tanks-have-equipped-a-new-kind-of-brigade/?sh=1061d27b739b We finally know which Ukrainian army unit took ownership of those super-upgraded, but very old, M-55S tanks that Slovenia donated to Ukraine.  It’s the 47th Assault Brigade. A new kind of unit with a very special leader. A famous veteran and author named Valery Markus.  The M-55S is a deeply modernized Soviet T-55, a tank type that first entered service in the late 1950s. In the 1990s, the Slovenian army paid Israeli firm Elbit and STO RAVNE in Slovenia to modify 30 of its 36-ton T-55s.  Among other enhancements—including reactive armor, an uprated engine and a new fire-control system—the M-55S has a stabilized, British-made L7 105-millimeter main gun in place of the original Soviet 100-millimeter gun.  The gun is what makes the M-55S valuable to Ukraine. The British gun is compatible with a wide range of modern ammunition, including armor-piercing sabot rounds that can penetrate the armor of a Russian T-72. As recently as a week ago it still was unclear which Ukrainian unit would operate the M-55Ss. A video that circulated online on Dec. 9 depicts crews training on the new-old tanks in the thick, cold mud that’s typical of early winter in eastern Ukraine.  The news finally broke on Saturday, when Markus shared photos with the M-55Ss in the background. The tanks now belong to the 47th Assault Brigade.  The 47th is a young unit—and unique in the Ukrainian order of battle. It’s an entirely volunteer formation—no conscripts—and it is, for lack of a better term, more Western than sister brigades are. It reportedly leans heavily on its non-commissioned officers, like brigades in NATO armies do.  The 47th also possesses a greater proportion of NATO-style weaponry than other Ukrainian brigades do. The M-55S itself is a hybrid: a Soviet hull with a NATO main gun.  Markus, a famously-mustachioed veteran of the fighting in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region in 2014 and 2015 who wrote a popular book about his wartime experience, helped to recruit volunteers for the 47th and also serves as its sergeant major. “In the 47th Brigade, we are trying to create the principles of a truly new Ukrainian army,” Markus wrote on social media.  The 47th was a battalion with around 400 soldiers when it first formed back in April. Over the summer it expanded to a regiment with 2,000 or so troops. The addition of a tank battalion with M-55Ss apparently compelled the Ukrainian general staff to redesignate the regiment as a brigade.

NYTimes: U.S. Will Train More Ukrainian Troops, Adding Advanced Battle Tactics ”Combined Arms” Infantry, artillery, armor, and air support when available.

U.S. Will Train More Ukrainian Troops, Adding Advanced Battle Tactics S. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/15/world/europe/ukraine-troops-training-pentagon.htmlWill Train More Ukrainian Troops, Adding Advanced Battle Tactics The expanded training would emphasize “combined arms” warfare — tight coordination among infantry, artillery, armored vehicles and, when it is available, air support, so that each group is strengthened and protected by the others. Ukrainian officials have been wary of pulling too many troops off the front lines at any given time for specialized training given the intensity of the war. But with winter slowing the tempo of fighting in many parts of the combat zone, officials said the coming months would provide a window for more troops to benefit from training. The training is expected to begin in January and would enable American instructors to train a Ukrainian battalion, or about 500 troops, each month, a number that could grow, Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder, a Pentagon spokesman, said at a news briefing. Other U.S. officials said the battalions could range up to 800 soldiers each

Not my aim! And I mostly agree with you. Unless your ideas are about racist supremacy crap or favoring the Dallas Cowboys. Or Jewish Space Lasers. That stuff. I was responding to Cap’s post stressing the need to correct mistaken ideas here and elsewhere, lest they affect governance and the like.

Sanctions, like war plans and everything else in life will never be perfect. But they sure do help.

Very good to hear. And wise words. I believe similar recent comments here are more concerned with the sharpness of tone, than with the extremely valuable thrashing of ideas and proposals that do serve as you indicate: Sharing valuable reports and information, then winnowing out the worst and emphasizing the best. Fact is, that doesn’t require absolutely convincing any particularly entrenched holder of a bad idea. Rather, ensuring that the majority here see the best facts and reasoning. If stamping out and annihilating every last instance of a bad idea were possible, politics at least in the USA would be far more rational than today!

Thanks. Well, I’m not touching the Leo Wars here! That’s why I highlighted ATACMS, as representative of systems to reach just the next layers where Russians have had re-organize - due to the existing HIMARS/new artillery. Wouldn’t pushing them back even farther once again contribute to a similar set of happy events including evacuating, abandoning the most forward positions or losing them? I’m not trying to be argumentative - I just haven’t grasped why another similar increase in reach would not result in similar benefits. I hadn’t thought that their transportation net, HQs, supply depots are already all pushed back into Russia itself

He sends me emails urging me to collect a very large amount of money, if I just follow a few simple steps. Credible?

Steve, I would like to think that at least some significant number of my fellow patriotic taxpayers are supporting massive war fighting aid not because of any sense that Ukraine is entitled to it (wherever that odd couching came from), and not solely morally motivated either. Rather, it is because the stark danger to Europe itself, the structures that support the relative prosperity snd freedom of Europeans and by extension, Britain, the USA, Canada - Western Civilization as we have known or deduced it to be. Russia’s actions are a threat to us all. It doesn’t take a weatherman to see the gale force winds so reminiscent of 1939. And everything you have correctly observed points to the importance of ending the Russian invasion sooner. Nothing is more likely to erode voter support than another long, grinding, seeming endless morass war lasting not months but years.

I think “The Tank Is Dead Bandwagon” is dead. And starting to smell bad! But otherwise agree with your points.