Begemot

Jim Storr ive gotten the book a few weeks ago and have read through it a few times now. Generally i found it easy to read though somewhat heavy on opinions rather than analysis.
You might have found a quite critical audience here as i  as several before me take issue with a certain aspect of the book. In my case ill focus on the chapter Infantry and Antitank Forces specifically your discussion of IFVs.
 
I think wargaming is a valuable source if information but always needs to be cross referenced with rl data.
However the IFV section is entirely at odds with the vast majority of modern armies and from reading it seemed inherently at odds with what was being said. It is also at odds with my personal experience so i was trying to wrap my head around it until i started collecting quotes from it to make a rebuttal ten i realized where the issue comes from.
"Ground-mounted cannon, such as the French and German 20mm, would have beenhighly effectivea gainst enemy APCs." p.116
"Cannon and ATGMs could be very effective [...] Once dismounted in cover, they could be very difficult to locate" p.123
So the Weapons the IFVs carried were effective so why not the IFV itself? Lets see the defense:
"IFVs located in a defensive position [...] tended to be knocked out by artillery fire, or neutralized and then easy prey to the attackers, be it tanks or shoulder-fired antitank weapons." p.124
"If IFVs were sited outside defensive positions [...] being quite large vehicles, they attrackted fire from the attackers Tanks and ATGMs." p.124
This implies that either a dismounted 20mm cannon is more resistant to artillery bombardement or its position wont be spotted and so not bombarded. That is strange in two ways. The IFV should be more resistant to artillery and given its mobility should be sitting outside of view only to move into its firing position when targets are called my the infantry and so actually harder to spot. Or dug in and just have its turret exposed in which case it should be equally difficult to spot but still be more resistant to artillery fire.
Now looking at the offense
"vehicle-mounted cannon and MGs did not help. [...] difficulty in locating the defenders, who were invariably concealed and often dug in." p.123
"Conversely they made the [...] IFVs obvious and high-priority targets for the defender´s fire." p.123
This is strange in two ways. First for supressing defenders and assisting the own infantry exact locations of the defenders need not be known. Simply supressing areas that could be dangerous to the own infantry if occupied by enemy infantry will do the majority of work since 20mm cannons firing he at 1000rpm cyclic into the defenders general area is going to keep their heads down. Even more if there is a full platoon doing this.
Second is that in the game even with their aparently ineffective fire they were still the priority target and not the supporting tanks (and if there werent any why?)
But what about using their ATGMs?
"Where IFVs used  [...] ATGMs [...] they were highly vulnerable to enemy ATGM fire, from either dismounted launchers or specialist antitank vehicles. In both cases the enemy were much harder to locate" p.123
This is again somewhat strange. An IFVs turret is certainly larger than an atgm launcher alone but for the ATGM vehicle that is only the case if it can go hulldown in which case an IFVs turret still wouldnt be much bigger and far more importantly the main way an ATGM will get located is dust and smoke kicked up from the weapons launch which will be the same in either case.
These contradictions between observed results and expected results indicate to me that:
1. There is a spotting mechanic in the ruleset used and IFVs are at a higher disadvantedge as a result
2. Improper defensive doctrine at least for western vehicles who should have several fighting positions and frequently switch. Possibly combined with the ruleset not giving the bonus for a defensive position when employing such a strategy
3. Strange targeting priorities or improper support. A defending unit should prioritize supporting tanks when employing anti tank weapons as they are the biggest threat to the individual unit. In wargaming its easy to always target the unit that will result in the greatest chance of overall success but for the actual troops individual survival is key. A tank will given the choice between an IFV or a tank first shoot the tank because that is the bigger threat. If Tanks simply werent involved the quewstion becomes why not? IFVs are combined arms weapons and suffer when left alone just like any other weapon.

Some questions for Jim Storr.
Starting with something non-contentious. You indicated that you and your brother developed a method in your gaming that reduced the "God's Eye View" factor and it seems allowed for actual surprise to occur on the game board. Would you care to tell us what you did to achieve this?
In your footnotes you reference particular games you and your brother played (e,g. "Battle 164, 12 January 2003." - pg. 231). Are these games referred to in the footnotes available somewhere to examine? If so, where? If not, why the footnote?
More contentious:
On page 149 you state: "Soviet artillery fire would probably be very heavy but inaccurate, and its fire planning crude." I don't feel you properly justified this comment in the preceding text and to be frank I find it doubtful for two reasons. First the importance that artillery has played in Russian and Soviet military tactics. And second, your assessment suggests a low standard of training. I know that the Soviets had artillery academies devoted to producing artillery officers. These were academies with four year programs that produced company/battery grade officers with engineering degrees. I can't imagine that such an education would produce incompetents. My wife's deceased father was a colonel in the Soviet artillery and was on the faculty of such an institution. He was a university mathematics student when he was recruited into the Soviet Army. Perhaps I am wrong, so can you explain why an army that prized artillery, seems to have placed it high in their tactical system and seems to have invested quite a bit in the education of its artillery officers would produce and be satisfied with such dismal results as "... heavy but inaccurate [fire], and its fire planning crude"?
Regards.

Some questions for Jim Storr.
Starting with something non-contentious. You indicated that you and your brother developed a method in your gaming that reduced the "God's Eye View" factor and it seems allowed for actual surprise to occur on the game board. Would you care to tell us what you did to achieve this?
In your footnotes you reference particular games you and your brother played (e,g. "Battle 164, 12 January 2003." - pg. 231). Are these games referred to in the footnotes available somewhere to examine? If so, where? If not, why the footnote?
More contentious:
On page 149 you state: "Soviet artillery fire would probably be very heavy but inaccurate, and its fire planning crude." I don't feel you properly justified this comment in the preceding text and to be frank I find it doubtful for two reasons. First the importance that artillery has played in Russian and Soviet military tactics. And second, your assessment suggests a low standard of training. I know that the Soviets had artillery academies devoted to producing artillery officers. These were academies with four year programs that produced company/battery grade officers with engineering degrees. I can't imagine that such an education would produce incompetents. My wife's deceased father was a colonel in the Soviet artillery and was on the faculty of such an institution. He was a university mathematics student when he was recruited into the Soviet Army. Perhaps I am wrong, so can you explain why an army that prized artillery, seems to have placed it high in their tactical system and seems to have invested quite a bit in the education of its artillery officers would produce and be satisfied with such dismal results as "... heavy but inaccurate [fire], and its fire planning crude"?
Regards.

Some questions for Jim Storr.
Starting with something non-contentious. You indicated that you and your brother developed a method in your gaming that reduced the "God's Eye View" factor and it seems allowed for actual surprise to occur on the game board. Would you care to tell us what you did to achieve this?
In your footnotes you reference particular games you and your brother played (e,g. "Battle 164, 12 January 2003." - pg. 231). Are these games referred to in the footnotes available somewhere to examine? If so, where? If not, why the footnote?
More contentious:
On page 149 you state: "Soviet artillery fire would probably be very heavy but inaccurate, and its fire planning crude." I don't feel you properly justified this comment in the preceding text and to be frank I find it doubtful for two reasons. First the importance that artillery has played in Russian and Soviet military tactics. And second, your assessment suggests a low standard of training. I know that the Soviets had artillery academies devoted to producing artillery officers. These were academies with four year programs that produced company/battery grade officers with engineering degrees. I can't imagine that such an education would produce incompetents. My wife's deceased father was a colonel in the Soviet artillery and was on the faculty of such an institution. He was a university mathematics student when he was recruited into the Soviet Army. Perhaps I am wrong, so can you explain why an army that prized artillery, seems to have placed it high in their tactical system and seems to have invested quite a bit in the education of its artillery officers would produce and be satisfied with such dismal results as "... heavy but inaccurate [fire], and its fire planning crude"?
Regards.

Some questions for Jim Storr.
Starting with something non-contentious. You indicated that you and your brother developed a method in your gaming that reduced the "God's Eye View" factor and it seems allowed for actual surprise to occur on the game board. Would you care to tell us what you did to achieve this?
In your footnotes you reference particular games you and your brother played (e,g. "Battle 164, 12 January 2003." - pg. 231). Are these games referred to in the footnotes available somewhere to examine? If so, where? If not, why the footnote?
More contentious:
On page 149 you state: "Soviet artillery fire would probably be very heavy but inaccurate, and its fire planning crude." I don't feel you properly justified this comment in the preceding text and to be frank I find it doubtful for two reasons. First the importance that artillery has played in Russian and Soviet military tactics. And second, your assessment suggests a low standard of training. I know that the Soviets had artillery academies devoted to producing artillery officers. These were academies with four year programs that produced company/battery grade officers with engineering degrees. I can't imagine that such an education would produce incompetents. My wife's deceased father was a colonel in the Soviet artillery and was on the faculty of such an institution. He was a university mathematics student when he was recruited into the Soviet Army. Perhaps I am wrong, so can you explain why an army that prized artillery, seems to have placed it high in their tactical system and seems to have invested quite a bit in the education of its artillery officers would produce and be satisfied with such dismal results as "... heavy but inaccurate [fire], and its fire planning crude"?
Regards.

Some questions for Jim Storr.
Starting with something non-contentious. You indicated that you and your brother developed a method in your gaming that reduced the "God's Eye View" factor and it seems allowed for actual surprise to occur on the game board. Would you care to tell us what you did to achieve this?
In your footnotes you reference particular games you and your brother played (e,g. "Battle 164, 12 January 2003." - pg. 231). Are these games referred to in the footnotes available somewhere to examine? If so, where? If not, why the footnote?
More contentious:
On page 149 you state: "Soviet artillery fire would probably be very heavy but inaccurate, and its fire planning crude." I don't feel you properly justified this comment in the preceding text and to be frank I find it doubtful for two reasons. First the importance that artillery has played in Russian and Soviet military tactics. And second, your assessment suggests a low standard of training. I know that the Soviets had artillery academies devoted to producing artillery officers. These were academies with four year programs that produced company/battery grade officers with engineering degrees. I can't imagine that such an education would produce incompetents. My wife's deceased father was a colonel in the Soviet artillery and was on the faculty of such an institution. He was a university mathematics student when he was recruited into the Soviet Army. Perhaps I am wrong, so can you explain why an army that prized artillery, seems to have placed it high in their tactical system and seems to have invested quite a bit in the education of its artillery officers would produce and be satisfied with such dismal results as "... heavy but inaccurate [fire], and its fire planning crude"?
Regards.

Some questions for Jim Storr.
Starting with something non-contentious. You indicated that you and your brother developed a method in your gaming that reduced the "God's Eye View" factor and it seems allowed for actual surprise to occur on the game board. Would you care to tell us what you did to achieve this?
In your footnotes you reference particular games you and your brother played (e,g. "Battle 164, 12 January 2003." - pg. 231). Are these games referred to in the footnotes available somewhere to examine? If so, where? If not, why the footnote?
More contentious:
On page 149 you state: "Soviet artillery fire would probably be very heavy but inaccurate, and its fire planning crude." I don't feel you properly justified this comment in the preceding text and to be frank I find it doubtful for two reasons. First the importance that artillery has played in Russian and Soviet military tactics. And second, your assessment suggests a low standard of training. I know that the Soviets had artillery academies devoted to producing artillery officers. These were academies with four year programs that produced company/battery grade officers with engineering degrees. I can't imagine that such an education would produce incompetents. My wife's deceased father was a colonel in the Soviet artillery and was on the faculty of such an institution. He was a university mathematics student when he was recruited into the Soviet Army. Perhaps I am wrong, so can you explain why an army that prized artillery, seems to have placed it high in their tactical system and seems to have invested quite a bit in the education of its artillery officers would produce and be satisfied with such dismal results as "... heavy but inaccurate [fire], and its fire planning crude"?
Regards.

Some questions for Jim Storr.
Starting with something non-contentious. You indicated that you and your brother developed a method in your gaming that reduced the "God's Eye View" factor and it seems allowed for actual surprise to occur on the game board. Would you care to tell us what you did to achieve this?
In your footnotes you reference particular games you and your brother played (e,g. "Battle 164, 12 January 2003." - pg. 231). Are these games referred to in the footnotes available somewhere to examine? If so, where? If not, why the footnote?
More contentious:
On page 149 you state: "Soviet artillery fire would probably be very heavy but inaccurate, and its fire planning crude." I don't feel you properly justified this comment in the preceding text and to be frank I find it doubtful for two reasons. First the importance that artillery has played in Russian and Soviet military tactics. And second, your assessment suggests a low standard of training. I know that the Soviets had artillery academies devoted to producing artillery officers. These were academies with four year programs that produced company/battery grade officers with engineering degrees. I can't imagine that such an education would produce incompetents. My wife's deceased father was a colonel in the Soviet artillery and was on the faculty of such an institution. He was a university mathematics student when he was recruited into the Soviet Army. Perhaps I am wrong, so can you explain why an army that prized artillery, seems to have placed it high in their tactical system and seems to have invested quite a bit in the education of its artillery officers would produce and be satisfied with such dismal results as "... heavy but inaccurate [fire], and its fire planning crude"?
Regards.