Kinophile

Not dead yet? 
 
 

Nice, if true. Feels a little inflated, but there's definitely money to be made in shell production these days, so why not. 
 

The other question is, what are they counting that matters?  Maybe Russia can sustain MBT losses, maybe continue to scrounge artillery shells etc.  But those A50 AEW aircraft are in short supply and appear to be an endangered species.  The UA seems to have a laser focus on strategic assets that have a downstream effectiveness on Russia's ability to fight this war. 
As you said a while back - "- Re-think C4.  Data is a resource more important than gas.  We need to see the modern battlefield as a competitive data, information and knowledge environment.  We need to stop going to war to validate what we already know and accept that things are evolving very quickly."
If the UA can further deplete Russia's C4 capability more options become available to wage strategic strikes on Russia's infrastructure as well as find opportunities to use the F16 aircraft as they become available.

That's what I interpreted him as saying. Asking when Russia will run out is like asking when the world will run out of oil. The answer is never, it just becomes more scarce. In fact the IISS estimate I posted above does not actually predict a run dry date, but rather how long Russia will be "able to sustain its assault on Ukraine at current attrition rates".

Technically, Russia will never exactly run out of mobiks.

I think he means that technically speaking, Russia will probably never exactly run out of war material, because before that happens it will reduce consumption/exposition to risk when faced with a shortage. Therefore one can not just draw a graph with one line representing average production, the other average consumption and at the point where they meet, the Russian army will stop firing guns or have no more tanks. He says this in all his podcasts in particular whenever ammo production is discussed, so I am fairly confident this is what is meant here as well.
And whereas the Russians can decide to reduce the firing rate/usage rate pretty much at will, they cannot increase the production rate by will alone, therefore the replacement rate is the more objectively observable variable.
 

Kerch Bridge delenda est. 

There's more nuance than that. 250K in Russia is All calibers. Nato 1.2M is 155 mm only. Quite a difference, plus NATO/West has far, far more latent capacity than Russia. 

This is more my angle, such as it is. Ukraine with a stable and steadily increasing shell supply is very dangerous to Russia. 

Confirmation bias on my end is possible, but it does still look like 2024 = Hold in the east, Strike in the South. 
Strike doesn't necessarily mean full ground invasion. 

Nice, if true. Feels a little inflated, but there's definitely money to be made in shell production these days, so why not. 
 

Sutton is a good source. Observant. 

It's anniversary visit for 25 years in NATO, at least on the surface- so no major decisions will be taken. You are correct, visit by both PM and president is rather unusual and may be connected to polarized political scene here (one theory say some DC officials think Duda may have some better vibe with Republicans in US than other world leaders and can be used as small leverage/lobby to convince them, but it is far-fetched in my opinion). Both camps speak in unilateral voice for support for Ukraine, though, and Sikorski is animating whomever he can behind the scenes for several months already. So no big news probably; Biden may want to shore crucial NATO countries for the future in case Orange Guy win the race.
 
Perhaps worth to check this article, it's CNN but since they have good contacts in Pentagon it may go beyond another clickbait. 100k shells a month to Ukraine doesn't sound that bad, if realistic.
https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/10/politics/russia-artillery-shell-production-us-europe-ukraine/index.html

Nice, if true. Feels a little inflated, but there's definitely money to be made in shell production these days, so why not. 
 

Nice, if true. Feels a little inflated, but there's definitely money to be made in shell production these days, so why not. 
 

Thats still just a policy setting, no? Eg France no longer exporting to ME. And a half of a steadily rising capacity is not a static number. 
Whereas Russia cannot spare anything for export, with that situation not improving. Its munitions production is three years into a full scale war and is barely sufficient for how it fights. 
Ukraine both fights differently now and in the future. Even with the bad shell hunger that lost Avdiivka the Rus offensive still petered out afterwards. There's now strong indications that that hunger is fading. 
I'm really curious about domestic UKR shell production... 
 

Kerch Bridge delenda est.