panzersaurkrautwerfer

There's some number of preposition stocks that are a combination of in flux, not advertised widely or actually mobile (like the various preposition ships, they might be in Europe right now, or they might be hanging out near Kuwait). The actual composition is also somewhat intentionally obscure (like the Norway prepo stock is mostly M1A1 FEP because it's designed to support Marines arriving in country, while the Germany training support stock is M1A2 SEP v2s, but the contents of most are operational security type issues). There are however no combat units with tanks assigned to Europe at this time, with 2 CR (which is a Brigade sized Stryker unit) and the 173rd Brigade (which is an Airborne infantry brigade) being the only remaining full-time combat units assigned to Europe. Conceptually it looks like we're going to dusting off REFORGER in that the troops will remain in the US, but will be deployed and linked up with existing equipment on the ground in event of Russian aggression. Re: CROWS At a glance it certainly looks like the current standard CROWS. The LP one has not yet been selected, however the mount for the CROWS itself is fairly modular in that the integration with the tank is largely a software issue, so it's entirely possible that the LP CROWS might be delayed...but the first run of v3s might roll with CROWS drawn from the current stock, with an eye towards replacing them some time down the road.

Nah, just didn't feel like trying to see how in service it is at the moment.

It's not a M1A3 or something, if you skim what it's going to have in regards to new or updated equipment it pretty much is what the M1A2 already has in-game. All I'm really arguing is that now that the model of M1A2 in game has a distinct designation rather than being some sort of semi-mythical M1A2 SEP v2+. As far as reaching service by 2017 it is a fair bit more likely than the T-90AM, most of the modern Ukrainian lineup. The equipment to add is generally already fairly mature, and is component based vs structural (or enhanced Gunner's Primary optics can simply be dropped into an existing tank). If we're already reaching with Russian and Ukrainian hardware, it is a very modest reach. So given that it is simply changing a name, making it available without ERA, and then adding in a less capable model of Abrams. Already answered, but the longer answer is the current CROWs was originally designed to be mounted on top of HMMWVs and other vehicles. It gets in the way of the commander's LOS when unbuttoned and also is just makes the vehicle much taller in regards to going under low bridges. The Low Profile model rearranges some of the bits to make it not quite as tall. The preferred model last time I checked moved the optics to the side of the CROW instead of under the gun making the whole thing a bit shorter.

http://armyrecognition.com/ausa_2015_show_daily_news_coverage_report/general_dynamics_land_systems_displays_m1a2_sepv3_most_advanced_digital_main_battle_tank_11210157.html The M1A2 SEP v3 has been revealed (or rather, it's made an official public affairs sort of debut) at the AUSA annual exposition. It looks pretty much spot-on for the current M1A2 SEP v2 in game minus ERA (which is actually a kit that can go on any M1 Abrams), LWS (again, another bolt-on kit) or the APS (which is a hypothetical bolt on kit). I propose for a follow on module we split the current Abrams into six basic vehicles: M1A2 SEP v3 APS/ERA The current M1A2 SEP V2 from game+ERA+APS M1A2 SEP V3 ERA As above with APS omitted M1A2 SEP V3 Base As above without ERA Above all should have different lower profile CROW too. While modeling is not "simple" it doesn't present too drastic of a difference in performance. Then: M1A2 SEP V2 APS/ERA As current minus AMP (so MPAT and CAN rounds instead), and LWS, M1A2 SEP V2 ERA As above minus APS M1A2 SEP V2 Base As above minus ERA And as a special bonus: M1A1SA M1A1SAs remain in the inventory of some National Guard units, and offers a narrower gap between blue and red forces. It would require new model, and would likely at least need both ERA and non-ERA models. The M829A4 remains compatible with older model non-data link Abrams, and would likely be the theater standard Sabot. Conceptually the M1A2 SEP v3/v2 would represent the US Army mid-refit. The varying degrees of ERA and APS would also well model different levels of preparedness, a unit with lots of APS and ERA would represent a long build up to conflict, while the base models would reflect a shorter faster build up. It would also allow for more granularity in QB selection, I could trade off AMPs and LWS to squeeze in another Abrams or two, or make the choice that ERA isn't so important as having V3s over V2s. Just a thought. In terms of modeling, as mentioned earlier the real visual difference will be a shorter profile CROWs.

I'm not sure if it was a BMP-1 or BMP-2, but neither model appeared especially robust, both of which proving entirely vulnerable to concentrated .50 cal and 40 MM HEDP. I do remember the through and through penetrations were in the troop bay which had rather macabre effects to say the least. BTRs too. Generally most "light" Russian (well, Soviet) vehicles have proven to be fairly weak against .50 cal, API or SLAP-T. There may be angles at which the vehicles are resistant or even immune to .50 cal fire, however if this is the case it has not made a significant impact on the perceived vulnerability of BMP or BTR type vehicles which would cast if those angles or areas were especially effective.

We still trained to hose down BMPs with .50 cal at close range. My 1SG talked about hosing down a BMP during the 2003 invasion with his .50 and finding that the rounds not only penetrated, but penetrated and came out the other side of the BMP with expected results on crew and passengers. Granted it was a flank shot, but it's entirely reasonable to use the .50 cal (frontal shots still tended to penetrate, but usually did not go through and through). The AMP (or MPAT/HEAT in current use) would be preferred at range though, or against a stationary target at 500+ meter range* Either way as of October 2014 we were training that it was okay to go with the .50 cal instead of 120 MM against BMPs. *At close range the odds of a BMP-1/2 surviving a "manburst" of 10-20 rounds .50 cal is pretty limited, or it will survive but with damage/dead or injured crew, and it is not in a good position to really get off an ATGM. At longer ranges however the ATGM threat goes up so ensuring total destruction becomes a priority.

All the tanks minus the T-90A and T-64BV are somewhat future/counter-factual tanks. M1A2 is pretty modest as nearly everything missing from the current batch of M1A2s in service is either in service, but not often mounted (like the LWS or ERA), or is near-term on the horizon upgrades (like the ammo and ammo datalink). Contrasted to the T-90AM and the various Ukrainian late model tanks, it's pretty much stone sober realism. However I would like to have a sort of "tanks of 2014" module that is just the as of December 31st 2014 what the various vehicles of each nation looked like (either things like the Abrams with only its modern set of equipment, or the inclusion of the much less modern Russian armor that still makes up a fairly big chunk of their inventory). Battlefront did a good job with keeping the future systems only between "very likely" to "modestly optimistic" for CMBS though. Abrams is a good example of the "very likely" stuff.

Well on the old M1-M1A1 the vision block reasonably could give some spotting from around the 12-4 o'clock positions. However on the M1A2 you lose about the 11-10 because the CITV is parked in front of the loader's hatch, and most modern M1A2s also mount the loader's armor kit which just all and all makes it not at all useful. It remains a useful induction point for monsoon rain* to get into the tank however, and many crews choose to apply trashbags or other improvised waterproofing measures to the vision block's mount in especially wet operating environments. *It should be noted that most AFVs in monsoon/that epic down pour that the American Southeast does sometimes conditions look like a "Das Boot" reenactment party.

Re: Loader He's actually the least useful for physically spotting targets. His optics are (if fitted) a single vision block in a swiveling mount that effectively lets him survey the area behind the loader's armor to make sure the snacks he left up there are still secure. His machine gun has the mounts for a PAS-13 type thermal optic but it is not especially often mounted* but generally he stays in the tank What he is useful for though is letting the commander and gunner focus on looking out though. He usually manages the radios, does most of the in-turret trouble shooting etc etc. This is a lot more useful than you'd think (or rather, think of how many people crash their cars texting/changing radio stations etc etc. He's there to make those things happen without the TC or gunner taking their eyes off the road). Re: Driver Actually very useful for spotting so long as you're not hull down. He's doing nothing but looking forward (the hatch being closed makes surfing facebook on the phone next to impossible) and on the current generation of tanks his thermal optics are actually pretty good at letting him see if something tanklike is in front of him, and then if he's not a terrible driver** cuing the turret crew onto it. The fact he's always watching the frontal arc is pretty helpful. Re: Gunner He's an essential link in the spotting system. If you watch tanks on the range (or anywhere fairly open there's targets to hit), you'll see the turret is constantly swinging left to right***. In terms of "narrow" vision on the Abrams, and most tanks, the wFOV is usually only 3x, which at all but abjectly knife fighty ranges is actually pretty good for a thermal optic. You scan in wFOV and drop into nFOV once you find something worth shooting. The main limitations on the Russian crew is that again, you've got additional in-turret things they have to do that on a US tank the loader would manage which takes them off of spotting, and most of the Russian thermal optics we know of have okay detection (in the sense of finding a hotspot) but poor discrimination (hot rock or hot tank?). *For the following OT reasons: 1. It's tricky to boresight and generally no time is allocated during training to do so. 2. The real utility of the loader's MG is that it serves as a spare for the much more effective coaxial mount. The PAS-13 is one more thing you have to mess with to swap out those guns. 3. The PAS-13 is a very effective infantry machine gun optic. It doesn't keep resolution well on the move. As a result most loader MGs are aimed simply by walking the target on, and I've heard of them getting a tracer heavy load in some units. **Drivers are generally either the most junior soldiers in the unit, and occasionally just the ones too dumb to let into the turret. Bad drivers generally exist only as an interface between the TC and the vehicle though so generally their inexperience isn't a liability as much as it just means the essential functions of not crashing the tank will be accomplished and nothing more. Good drivers will totally help with spotting, or be able to do what the tank driver wants by intent vs explicit instruction though. ***In a defensive BP, it's usually a slow, deliberate scan, while on the move it's an aggressive rapid scan. The CITV maintains bearing independently of the turret so long as the pressure switch on the commander's controls is engaged. Generally the way you get the most out of this two optic arrangement is splitting the frontal arc at the driver's hatch, with the gunner scanning with the turret over one side, while the commander scans the other with the CITV. This can however work a little different within a platoon or company fire plan if the tank was given a different sector to cover, but even then it's usually a matter of splitting the sector in the middle.

Certainly couldn't hurt, and M1A1SAs are still used by a few of the National Guard ABCTs last time I checked. Wouldn't hurt to have some less advanced Russian stuff too for a more varied red vs red, or more gentle RU-UKR fight.

It's a pretty reasonable go either way. I haven't seen ERA armor mounted at all outside of theater, and this included Abrams and Bradleys stationed in Korea (although I did find some of the mounting equipment for the Abrams). So in that regard its distinctly possible units might show up to the fight sans-ERA. On the other hand in 2010, the last time I went to Iraq all of our refurbed M1A1s and A2 series Bradleys received ERA. And that was a much lower threat than a shooting war against a near-peer enemy state. The limitation is not one of material, it's of desire or perceived need. So in that regard, mounted ERA is not at all compulsory and it wouldn't be unreasonable to see ERA-less vehicles. On the other hand, it's equally reasonable to imagine a US military that's purchasing Trophy APS off the shelf with the government charge card is also pulling every TUSK/BUSK kit out of storage and putting them on C-17s to go to wherever the reception point is for US forces arriving in theater is.

In the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, a Company of US armor got in a "knife fight" with Iraqi T-72s in an urban area. The ranges were close enough that the Abrams crew were generally unable to use their optics to really aim, as even at 3 power it was simply too much magnification to reliably lay the gun tube on the target. As the case is the commander hanging out of the vehicle's hatch was able to basically "kentucky windage" the main gun onto the target, and then let fly. The Iraqis were unable to acquire at all. Not to slap my chest too much, but I was a tanker once. It's totally reasonable to have all sorts of spotting weirdness, as even with fairly modern optics you're only covering slices of the battlefield at a time, and often a cluttered and confusing space full of thermal hotspots or dangerous looking shrubberies. The game tries to simulate this sort of environment to a degree and builds in lags and delays into targeting acquisition to give a reasonable reaction of the spotting crewman from "is that a rock or a tank?" to "TANK!" then to "Gunner sabot tank-identified 1200 meters-UP-FIRE-ON THE WAY." The issue is when placed into a very unrealistic (or unlikely at least) situation in which tanks are magicked in front of each other, the game is still treating it with some basic assumption of tactical maneuvering/concealment with inherent built in acquisition delays. As to sensor parity it really depends, but it's not so straight forward. Thermal nearly always beats daylight handily. More modern thermal always beats older (or export as it is) thermals because the real differences is "scanning" resolution retained vs stationary resolution (or NATO tanks still produce fairly clear thermal images when moving the camera, while Russian ones generally do not respond as well). So to my original point, you're presenting a system designed to include a certain "fudge" factor to ensure realistic delays in spotting, and it doesn't do highly unrealistic gunfight at the OK Corral scenarios well.

It might not be the thermals though. It might be the number of optics, or the crew load and training. If the Abrams has a larger number of "eyes" and a crew that has more time in a tank, it is going to more quickly spot a target, begin the engagement cycle, and fire at a rate faster than the Russian tank could attain. Also with the exception of during the physical act of loading the crew work load is better spread out over a four man than a three man crew which more effectively puts eyes "out" vs "in" the turret.

I would ascribe it less of a "It cannot spot it" and more of a "Failure to OODA* loop. I wouldn't mind a more transparent rendition of spotting just to see how it is actually working, but given similar spotting circumstances seems to be the Abrams will more rapidly acquire and destroy a target. Spotting is one of those things were rarely does the capabilities gap narrow based on environmental factors** *https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA_loop **Or rather armor and weapons superiority does become less pronounced with less range involved, even fairly old KE rounds fired from very close range can have an outsized effect on a vehicle, while if tank A is totally immune to tank B's AT rounds at 2000 meters, but it can suffer penetrations at 500 meters, the disparity in armor is largely irrelevant...if the battle is happening at 500 meters. However even in all but the most barren, thermally polarized environments (or anything that isn't a heat source is too cold to give a false positive, and the only heat sources are targets), the vehicle with the superior optics (in quality and quantity) will generally win the race to get the first shot off.

Depends a lot on round employed in terms of mechanically how far the cannon can reliably hit a target. To this end given something to shoot, the 2A46 can reliably strike targets well past most in-game ranges. Additionally efficiency of the round will very depending on round and target. However the more relevant limitation on Russian tank engagements is the optics system, and in that regard there will be some very real, and very "fuzzy" limitations on how far the 2A46 can strike. With that said we used to be taught that 90's vintage Russian tanks had a max effective range around 2500 meters, with the goal being to roughly handle the Russians before they got to that point.

Exactly. The tracer on a 7.62 burns out around 900 meters. For the M829 type round, it's pretty much flat trajectory until 1200 meters, and I think the HEAT is around 800ish. It just doesn't make much sense to open up with the coax when you've got a very high p/k with the main gun at sub-1000 KM ranges.

I'm guessing that's the case, it's off of a for reals US Army website. If you've got three dollars USD to burn you can get it in kindle edition off of Amazon. Either way look for "Breaking the Mold: Tanks in the Cities" by Kendall D. Gott, maybe you'll have luck finding a place you can download from.

Look, I just want to make it clear, war would be terrible for all parties involved. I'm deeply concerned at some of the saber rattling that comes out of Russia though and the actions towards many of the former Soviet/Warsaw nations. I can assure you no NATO country wants war with Russia, but the fury and destruction unleashed by provoking NATO will be terrible, and while the west may seem soft, historically a lot of the concerns about collateral damage, human rights and the like go out the window when we've been threatened or attacked. For me it's important to make it understood that NATO is not a paper tiger, and while it isn't what it was in 1990, it's still a sleeping giant. The reckless military adventurism in the Ukraine, and the actions of the Russian government are running a risk of awakening that giant, and we'll all be worse off for the end result. On topic: I tend to prefer 155 MM and rotary wing, but fixed wing offers a lot better assured destruction of point targets (like especially annoying buildings) and unlike even precision artillery, the first shot first kill capability of fixed wing is pretty effective. It's a tool. Just as your screwdriver is a bad hammer, a lot comes back with finding the right use for it and asking yourself if it's the equipment you need. In that regards the only asset of the three you can buy for the price of an Eagle I find is worth a damn is the SP guns. At the scale of battle you're whipping that many points around on fire support, two 60 MM and two 120 MM tubes doesn't do much.

You're missing the point. In terms of what's relevant to this discussion, the establishment of a reliable air defense network via PATRIOT, fixed wing assets, and other NATO ADA systems will happen well before the three week mark. It may take some weeks to have all the hospitals, division HQs, motorpools, MWR tents set up, but it isn't like there is absolutely no combat power until the CSM's parking placard is precisely 90 degrees to the ground. I worked a number of exercises, and in a variety of places that revolved around the ability to rapidly deploy and mobilize forces. Putting up a ADA network, and flying in fixed wing assets to existing NATO airbases within range of the combat zone would be done in a matter of days, and Dragoon Ride had nothing to do with showing the "speed" of US forces and everything to do with showing the locals they would not be abandoned to the Russians. It makes very little sense as an exercise in mobility simply because of the routes taken, and was done in a manner not to too annoy the locals. If it came time to rapidly flow NATO forces into Ukraine it'd be a very, very hostile air space to anything with a Red Star in short order, which gets to the point of my earlier comments. The airspace would be hostile and difficult for NATO air to operate in. It will be as lethal as the surface of the sun for Russian aviation barring exceptional measures to establish local parity. So in that regard any reasonable observer could say that the end Russian user wouldn't expect to see much at all, while the NATO end user might from time to time receive fixed wing assets. Either way it's strictly my belief Russia has far more to lose by expanding the war, as once you've hit Germany and Poland why not bomb Russia? And while Russia's air defense network is vast, so is Russia, and it is full of things that react poorly to blowing up. The safest way to prevent Vladivostok from being the graveyard of the Russian Pacific Fleet, the return of Konigsberg or even something truly outrageous like the Japanese flag snapping smartly in the breeze over the Kurils is to keep the war contained to the Ukraine. Whatever benefit could be gained from striking NATO bases outside the region is vastly overwhelmed by the harm that can be, and certainly would be caused by giving the west the justification to widen the war. Time and time again the one thing that'll make the west bloody minded will be believing a few easy cheap strikes will keep it cowed, or a short daring campaign will sew it all up nicely. It's simple strategy. The spartans didn't leave Xenophon because it was the most favorable place for them to fight a war. Russia might stand a chance if it kept the war tight, contained, bloody and focused in pro-Russian regions. Once you're dumping missiles into Eastern Europe there's no longer a matter of simply accepting that the Donbass is basically a tumor on the Ukraine, it's a matter of a population that already despises Russians now having a reason to hang Russians from lightpoles, and the justification to do so. Same deal in regards to unconventional warfare. The Russians can send some terrorists into Eastern Europe. I imagine their success will depend on how long it is before the Russian immigrant population in that country is rounded up (as again, they're unloved and largely unwanted). It might do some damage to the NATO war effort. And someone could also write a blank check to the Saudis and given them a wink and a nod and set the Caucasus ablaze. It's all a matter of retaliation and the ability to do harm. Expanding into unrestrained asymmetric warfare is much more dangerous for the Russians than it is for western proxies (who might just set Chechnya on fire again because Allah Akbar without any nudging or desire from the west). So in that regard, I believe Russian capabilities will be limited simply to avoid moving the war from a struggle over a lesser failed satellite state to something that might actually gravely damage Russia over the long run. A narrow fight keeps the damage limited, and at the end of the day the most likely case of a small, not wider war is some manner of cease fire which will likely not be abject surrender even in the event of Russian defeat on the battlefield. It's easier to spin that into a victorious war to defend all Russians everywhere, than even winning in Donbass but facing a renewed Islamic insurgency, infrastructure damage, and watching various Russian assets get fairly well mauled elsewhere, AND risking nuclear escalation (as Russian deterrence isn't worth anything without a response to attacks on its homeland). So in that regard, it's likely to be an unwanted war, fought in a box with various machines and formations of men fed into it and well mauled. The CMBS scenario captures this pretty well. The ability of NATO to press home air attacks likely greatly outpaces Russian ability to press home attacks inside that box. If we're being realistic Russian fixed wing should be super-rare and into the realm of APS equipped US vehicles rarity.

I never got why the death gratuity was more than the injury one. Dude's dead. That's sad. But it's over for him. If Putin used you and gave you back broken occupying the Donbass, seems like you need the cash more than the stiff.

Nerdwing stole my thunder, but yeah ammo cookoffs are funtime events with lots of fire and doom. That looks like the ammo went up but the brevity of the fire and lack of continued pronounced burning seems to indicate the ammo going off and not much else. Ammo blowing up is no joke, it's why Russian tanks murder their crews and throw their turrets into low orbit. It's going to look violent either way with lots of fire. It just happens that the violence on Abrams is a huge pillar of fire without the turret riding on it, and the crew is defiling their coveralls instead of being reduced to their base elements.

That is an interesting assertion, although I believe it might be colored by your experience with the speed of the Russian army. The ability of the US (and NATO allies riding in US equipment) to deploy to a region is something measured in days. Getting a lot of high priority stuff like PATRIOT into country is no great leap. Also counting on long range missiles is interesting, it assumes hitting targets well outside the Ukraine, which might lead to a NATO response in kind, which as much as Russia claims to be ready to start popping nukes at random if anything touches the motherland, but on the other hand is Russia willing to start a nuclear war over a few burned out SU-24s? I believe it is more likely that out of fear of being forced to either accept whoelsale attacks on Russian soil, or potentially trigger nuclear war, strikes against targets outside the Ukraine will be limited. Better to lose in Ukraine than have the Russian people see the motherland bombed, or risk the apocalypse to ensure Donbassian freedom or whatever. Regardless if there's a rarity value assigned to US forces based on the operational enviroment, the rarity value for Russian CAS should be frankly several times the US rarity simply based on the airframes and complexity of defense (especially given the vast disparity in sensors and observation threshholds). Re: Sublime I'm not arguing that a total lack of red aviation with stars and stripes forever. The Germans in 1945 were still able to surge assets to achieve air parity and accomplish some bombing missions against tactical and operational assets. Which is sort of my point though. The Germans had to mobilize most of their remaining airframes to accomplish these sort of missions. Same deal for the Russians, as to get even a fairly modest package on target, it'll need a fairly large element to keep the NATO CAP off of them (and there's a huge numbers and capability gap in favor of NATO there), planes to jam or suppress air defense locations etc etc etc. So while you're flying a strike package of say a dozen planes, it's actually supported by many, many more. So once that occurs you're worried about the Russians gunning for key infrastructure, command posts, things that are worth committing high numbers of airframes and risking losing same. CPT Panzersaurkrautwerfer's motley crew he picked up for this QB likely doesn't even merit a note in the Russian targeting order however, so in that regard the average NATO element has little to fear from air because the Russians will be forced to make their airforce "count," while on the other hand, the NATO disparity of numbers alone makes it not unreasonable to see some CAS, especially for priority missions (there's more USAF F-16s alone than Russian fighters of all types in service).

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/gott_tanks.pdf I'm on a borrowed wifi so my apologies if it's actually nothing but graphic pornography of offensive nature. However that link SHOULD get you to "Breaking the Mold" which is a handy little historical look at the employment of armor in urban settings from World War Two through realistically Grozny (Fallujah is included, however the book was published only a short time after that fight ended so it's pretty short on details). It's short, and gives a few great examples of doing it "right" and a few equally quality examples of doing it wrong. Which is the long way to say the experience with the Bradley in an urban fight is about the same as any of the other IFVs. It's more likely to find enemies, and a bit more robust against short range AT. But in a practical sense regardless of BMP-2 or Bradley the machine in the close urban fight matters less than the tactics. Bradley is just a bit more likely to accomplish mission if you use the tactics poorly or you get unlucky (and then lucky again!) Also just read the damned book. It's enlightening.

On the other hand if we're using operational arguments, Russian fixed wing should be an especially rare beast indeed, as everything that limits NATO fixed wing applies several times over to the Russians.

It was Korea, but for the first few weeks in the event of an outbreak of war we simply were told not to expect fixed wing air support. Not for lack of aviation, but because they needed to prep the battlefield first by chewing up the enemy airforce pretty good, conducting "deep" strikes against strategic-operational level targets, Air Defense suppression missions, or interdicting enemy movements. While the A-10 is a great CAS platform, it'd also have reaped a terrible toll on enemy forces moving forward and likely would pay more dividends in that role at that start of the conflict. Once things settled down a bit, a few weeks in it would have been a lot more fixed wing CAS on call. I don't think the North Africa-Italy comparison for CMBS is quite accurate* but in a shorter war with a higher capacity enemy, much of your aviation has more important things to do than pickle especially stubborn stone houses, or fry two or three tanks parked in defensive positions. On the other hand, Apaches would be doing a lot, if not the overwhelming majority of air support for those first few weeks. Wish their stand-off capabilities were better modeled though. *In another thread I did a breakdown of available airframes in terms of NATO forces vs Russian, and it's frankly absurdly in favor of NATO even before trying to factor in airframe age and capability factors. In so many words the USAF alone is something well beyond what the Russian air force can handle, let alone with USN/USMC and NATO allies.