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That is the finest paratrooper drop I have ever seen. I just teared up a little.

Re: BMD-4M It's better, but does it change the name of the game? It's still barely armored. It's still equipped with similar weapons to other IFVs. Basically it's better at what a BMD-2 does, but it still suffers from virtually all of the same problems the BMD-2 has. It's just not enough vehicle to reasonably take against an enemy using real bullets. Re: "Early" deployment against US Forces Here's the thing. You're going to have to gather all your forces, alert your paratroopers, collect up all your transports and stage them to go somewhere. Unless Russia truly is going the way of invading its neighbors without warning, this will likely come in the context of a building US air presence, which frankly makes any sort of airborne operating likely to be interrupted by AIM-120s over the DZ. Even if that wasn't going to happen for whatever reason, it's still enough of a risk that I cannot imagine a reasonable Russian planner would look at the gathering US air power and say "you know what, I think a IL76 can slip by an F-22." Re: inferior enemies Name a mission that couldn't be accomplished with lower risk by ground forces. The US uses paratroopers because we might need to open up an airhead on the other side of the world, but you guys have no viable mission where you couldn't just drive a tank from Russia. Re: "But the VDV can still be used as light infantry" And I'd contend that'd be the best use of them. The BMD just doesn't add enough value to the formation to be worth holding onto, but it looks great for dog and pony operations. Re: Tanks In a nutshell a tank's engagement cycle is much faster than an ATGM equipped vehicle's. This might not be the case with a hypothetical vehicle mounted Javelin, but the acquire-launch-guide cycle takes long enough while a tank just "lases and blazes." The tank, also being highly mobile could simply select when it was going to engage (or basically if the Stryker unit dismounted infantry to try to sneak up on the tanks, the tanks would fall back to the next terrain feature if they couldn't get at the infantry). Even in an ultimately successful engagement, this is the sort of thing that kills airborne forces. Without rapid link up to friendly forces, basically extermination occurs as the enemy is able to bring to bear all the heavy stuff that airborne has no realistic answer for, mechanized or no, and your supply links are a lot more ethereal. So again, VDV as is, much too weak as mechanized forces, much too heavy as airborne, your massed mech drops are canine-equine extravaganzas.

The BMD still isn't enough vehicle for the job. It's too light to handle a direct fire fight, and even a disorganized rabble in Afghanistan proved too much for it with direct fire type weapons. The BMD-4 isn't much better protected or capable. A good parallel we're facing right now in the US Army side of things is how to take a Stryker unit on the offensive against an enemy with modern to semi-modern armor and weapons. The BMD isn't much better off in this case, and relies on the same sort of tools to overcome the enemy. BMD is a little better for direct fire weapons (for now) but worse off as a unit in terms of supporting tools. We had an exercise a few years back in which a platoon of National Guard armor held off an entire Stryker Battalion for hours before falling back because they ran out of ammo. On the offensive, with paradropped forces alone a "light" mechanized unit doesn't have the sort of capabilities a mechanized unit needs to conduct mechanized unit type operations. Even falling behind the line, look to Market Garden for a great example of what happens in terms of paratrooper timelines, supply routes, and of limited axis advances. Basically with Russian paratroops you have: 1. Against a Near-Peer (mostly China) or NATO type conflict, Russia is too weak to gain the sort of air control required to keep it from being a suicide mission. VDV is deployed as inferior capability (although perhaps not training) motor rifle troops. 2. Against an inferior enemy, air drop is possible, but the inferior enemy are weak enough that there's no need for paratroopers given the high operational losses incurred by air assault type missions. It's solving a problem that doesn't exist. Russia does not have the global reach or influence to reasonably conduct operations outside of its immediate border area, or already deploying into permissive environments. With US type paratroopers: 1. Against a near peer threat the air drop is out, but light infantry still has a clear role that cannot be better filled by "heavy" type forces. In complex terrain, dismounted troops are very powerful. Failing that, they offer economy of force capabilities given the relative "cheapness" of the force relative to staying power on the defensive. 2. The US does have the influence and global operations capability, and the requirement to rapidly push troops to support allies, or intervene in developing crisis situations. The Airborne IBCTs are perfect for this force, and can conduct forced entry operations as required, and can be augmented by fly-in SBCT or even assets from ABCTs once the airhead is established, negating the need for bad IFV that can parachute.

There's a reason the VDV didn't operate the BMD in Afghanistan after a fairly short stint. There's a practical limit to how complex/heavy you can make an airdroppable vehicle, and it does impact how useful that platform is. On the other end of the spectrum, the BMD isn't any less prone to maintenance issues and will still consume Class III (fuel, lubricants etc) just as much as similar non-airborne vehicles which adds more to the support burden, which when done via airdrop is again, problematic (especially if you've got an LZ that's forward of the FEBA). You can make a good IFV, or a good airdropped vehicle, and everything you do to make it better at one of those, virtually always is at the expense of the other. The BMD just isn't much value added for its cost, and it only really made sense when Russian "deep battle" plans for airborne troops did not fly in the face of how lethal skies can get these days. US Airborne had, last time I checked two airdropped things that were supposed to be in the works in terms of adding mobility/maneuver assets: 1. Troop transport. The stuff I saw looked a lot like a cut-down M998 crossed with an ATV, basically a light transport able to move 9 guys quickly with gear and nothing else. 2. Some sort of light tank. This was written more in jello, but could be seen as finally reviving the same recon-anti-tank-fire support mission the Sheridan did and XM8 was supposed to cover down on.

I think CMBS did a good job at including stuff that was futuristic and various degrees of possible, without making it FUTURE WAR. Some stuff is more out there than others (T-90AM, BMP-2M, and Oplot in quantity are out there), but it's in a way that's pretty possible to leave behind if need be. I think if there's anything that's almost/is a mis-step, it was the APS. The US won't have it at all for a while yet, and the Russians barely have any operational for now and the short term future, and it sucks some of the fun out of the game. But again all the APS can be left behind. About the only quibble I really have with "future" stuff is I wouldn't have minded a "real" M1A2 SEP v2 (without ERA, LWS, or AMP rounds), M2A3 without ERA, and then some M1A1SAs and M2A2 ODSes to let us pretend the North Carolina National Guard has made it to the fight.

No. There's no need to nit pick what you are saying nearly as much as there's simply shock you actually believe some of that garbage. The whining about Soviet POWs and trying to make some sort of equivalence between that an Katyn is intellectually dishonest and of course totally ignores twice as many Polish POWs were killed by the Soviet state during the Polish-Soviet war than Soviets by the Poles, and the fact Katyn is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of crimes against humanity committed by the Soviets against Poles of all walks of life. Your ramblings on Lend Lease are fascinating. There's a saying about amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics. The fact you do not comprehend how much having 90% of railroad equipment coming in from overseas meant (on top of all the other things) is frankly telling. We are not nit picking. You're just saying things that are some combination of lies, simply honest being incorrect, and frequently deeply offensive. You have every right to be wrong, I just firmly believe it is a bleeding hole in global peace that you continue to be wrong dancing on the bleeding bodies of Ukrainians (and others!) who lay on a bed of the bones of your nation's other victims. Your nation was wrong to have stolen Crimea. Your nation is wrong to claim sovereignty over lands simply occupied by people of Russian heritage, and your nation is deeply wrong for pursing aggressive war and lying about it to the world. Nothing from history justifies it, and if anything history only serves to cast this as why we need NATO, why Western Democracy must be guarded with sword and shield, and what is at stake if we let our guard down. If the Russian Federation collapsed tomorrow all it would leave is bad memories and endless rows of weapons. That is your nation's legacy, fields of tears and blood, rusty bayonets. This should bother Russians more than it does, given what you can do when you're putting your efforts to things that are not ridiculous new ways to kill people, or rewriting history to suit. You all are capable of such beauty, such art, great leaps in science, and all of that lays in the rubble and discarded while you kneel in worship over the weapons that only make you less safe, bought with treasure you do not have. And that's all I really have to say about that for now. Germany had to at least come to terms with what it had become, while you all erect statues to it. As to the original topic as has been conclusively shown, there's no reason to doubt the Russian forces in game lack for anything that might reasonably have in 2017. They're actually quite a bit better equipped in many ways (as the US is fairly better off).

That is not a good article. Not good at all. 1. It doesn't really take a M4 out of the fight. I'm a bit confused by the ranger thing too, as they'll gladly lug the much heavier Carl Gustav around and that is much heavier than the XM25. I've even known some units (mostly airborne dudes) who've mandated their M240 gunners ALSO carry a M4. 2. The weapon when it has worked got rave reviews. It was more popular with "normal" troops because they were the ones more likely to be engaged in a way that XM25 was helpful (at range from cover). 3. It has had some issues with rounds going off in the weapon (twice I think, and more of a partial detonation, no fatalities). It also has occasional feeding issues. This led to a safety stand down sort of thing, which is why the weapon is in limbo now. The Army is pretty darned aware of what it wants to do with the XM25. It replaces one of the rifle squad's grenade launchers with a weapon that is really awesome against infantry in cover. The question isn't what to "do" with the weapon, it's making it safer to operate, and economic to field.

This has well and truly shambled into things worth eyerolling at. Re: World War Two We don't need to debate this. It's functionally irrelevant to the crimes Russia is committing in the Ukraine, and against world peace. The acts of other countries, historical or ongoing are irrelevant to the wrongness of these actions. Vlad's perspective on World War Two is about as rooted in reality as someone binge watching John Wayne flicks and washing it down with Sgt Rock Comics. His country venerates World War Two and does not do serious study into it. The absurdity of his statements are patently obvious to even non-western observers of his statements. This is not two different opinions on the same topic, this isn't even two perspectives on the same planet. Or at the least, failing to understand the relevance of trains vs tanks is one that reveals much, and frankly the continued Katyn lies and justification ranks up there with holocaust denial. The refusal of Russia to face its totalitarian past in an honest way serves as a good counterpoint to what Germany could have looked like given a armistice in 1945 vs total surrender, unapologetic, unbowed, and soaked in the blood of the innocent (who all had it coming!). It's frankly repellent not even worth giving a forum or discussion. Re: Topic It remains, Russia has a long way to go before it could reasonably challenge NATO outside of some very unlikely circumstances. It may be impossible unless we see some very radical shifts in the world as we know it for Russia to stand a reasonable chance in a full fledged shooting war. It's a shame that a war with Russia is even a semi-reasonable scenario for a video game. The tensions between East and West right now are wholly manufactured by Russia, and western restraint has likely prevented a much worse crisis.

It's mostly frustration. It's not like Russians are stupid, or bad people. There is zero reason at all Russia cannot be both not in the Western orbit, but also a net positive contributor to the world at large. But instead it's this cheering insistence on finding the decaying remains of the cold war, and rolling in it because that was GREAT TIMES and we should all go back there because reasons.

The presense of American citizens in Mexico who might be at danger from drug violence totally justifies us invading and carving off portions of Northern Mexico. The presents of Americans in Canada means that if their leader is opposed to us, Abrams in Ottawa are greatly justified. If those were Russians in the Ukraine, then they belong back over the internationally recognized border in Russia, not in the Ukraine. Russia has no right to invade its neighbors, and it disgusts me that war has returned to Europe for such a sham reason. I have no respect for Russia as a country. Your troops are unwelcome by anyone who isn't in the process of gassing their own people. Your "word" means nothing. Your country's contribution to international relations is regular injections of weapons and precious little else. Our statues to our fallen in Europe remain, standing unmolested. Yours are cast down, your sacrifices as a nation erased by the rape of Eastern Europe, and oppression of free people. Your former "allies" flock to NATO to seek protection because they fully believe if they don't, they will again see your troops killing their people, and you just proved this to be true with your nation's actions in the Ukraine. But hey, Putin's got 82% popularity so why worry about the rest of the world?

He has interesting opinions, although it's certainly an opinion I would not care to have to take cover behind when someone is shooting 25 MM at me. If you're talking about the Terminal Lance guy, I only wish I was as cool as he is.

Re: "Academies" Deeply missing the point, as has been stated. Re: "Other JRTCs" Again, missing the point. Plenty of other countries have large training reservations, but it's the meeting of dedicated personnel, equipment, training, and space that makes it a unique experience that is frankly terrible for all parties. Re: "Always desert?" NTC offers primarily: 1. Open desert of unending suffering, that is broken up by wadis (dry riverbeds), wind created land features, and sprinkled with full on towns of varying construction (some have many large buildings, constructed like something humans may actually live in, others are still fairly large complexes constructed with some creativity using shipping containers). Great country for armor operations, and there's places entire battalions can do live fires. 2. Rocky unforgiving mountainsides, passes, and everything you'd expect from going to war on Mars. It does allow you to move large forces freely, and as a result can offer all sorts of pain for the visiting training unit (ranging from being caught up in a "rope a dope" fight with enemy light armor, full on clashes of the titans with dozens of AFVs, to intimate, terrible house by house fights). JRTC runs pretty much the same only instead: 1. Swampy terrain, filled with various murderous wildlife 2. Swampy forests filled with various murderous wildlife 3. Dense forests filled with various murderous wildlife. 4. Dense urban clusters filled with various murderous wildlife. Historically NTC trains mostly "heavy" units with not infrequent visits from light or Stryker units, while JRTC mostly takes "light" units with not infrequent visits from heavy or Stryker units. NTC is much more "educational" for conventional warfare as it has an entire Armored Cavalry Regiment (Brigade sized element) that plays the bad guys, with supporting aviation and other funtimes assets. JRTC still does a pretty good number on the conventional front and has its own fun times (it used to have a small number of authentic Russian helicopters to add a bit of realism to the battle). There are also a wide variety of training areas on, and off major posts, but they do not come with a homegrown OPFOR (usually, sometimes they'll borrow troops from NTC or something, or have a reserve/guard unit set up camp and be bad guys for the summer). They do usually have digital live fire courses (which is to say computer controlled targets and scoring), and virtually all of them have several "towns." Regardless all a bit more valuable than "academies"

The inevitable result of building a highly complicated combination of rocket and electronics by the lowest bidder. Of course, the Russian stuff is built by the lowest bidder and a semi-educated workforce so your mileage there will be fuuuuun.

But guys! The Armata was in a parade! It WILL be in regular service shortly, and will destroy all HATO tonks because supreme design!

Sigh, okay turning and burning: Re: Training Just no. You have literally nothing like NTC, JRTC, or even YTC. The Russian military does not conduct the same sort of exercises, with the same degree of difficulty, and it shows in your leadership. On a list of things the US Army worries about if it has to face Russia, the ground based direct fire component of your forces does not rank highly. You guys have come some distance from 2008, but it remains to be seen how far you will come. Simply because you conduct exercises does not mean you have the same end product. Re: Angry NCOs The National Training Center is pretty much in Death Valley California. It was selected as a training installation for anti-aircraft units at first simply because it was a howling terrible open nothingness in which god neglected to place anything of value. The Joint Readiness Training Center is in Fort Polk Louisiana in which every body of water on post is labeled with alligator warnings. Either environment will generate no small amount of unhappiness, and it tends to lead to an opposing force with no concern for morality or fairness, and observer-controllers who have gone somewhat feral (I had an instructor who once served as an OC at NTC. Rather than bother driving back to main post from the hinterlands so he could get in his normal human car and drive home to sleep for three hours to go back out again, he simply pimped out the back of his HMMWV nearly went Colonel Kurtz out in the desert). Re: Chechnya Same deal. Also if you're a Chechen and an ethnic Russian who is obviously in the military, or similar organization asks you your opinions on their relationship with Russia, they're not going to give you the most honest answers. Steve covered it pretty well, Chechnya is something you can hold onto, but there's some pretty strong doubts you can keep it. Re: VDV Our paratroopers still exist because there's several realistic global missions that could call for a brigade of light infantry overnight. When they're not airdropping, the Airborne BCTs are standard IBCTs, capable of air assault operations, or just operating as "leg" troops. The missions you have listed are frankly, marginal. If you're bolstering friendly forces, simply flying into existing airports, or using ground transport to bring in more conventional mech-armor type forces makes sense, or even just landing the VDV as is on a runway given the increased risk and complications of airdrops. Dropping over the Ukraine is suicide given how large aircraft fair against stealth SU-25s, or failing that there's still enough ADA threat to make it high adventure for the super awesome advantage of...yeah something? I mean I know you're big on the whole "havoc behind the lines!" line, but what are you going to accomplish that a conventional land based attack wont for cheaper? Re: NATO KILLED ALL THE IRAQS! NATO was not part of the Iraq mission. Afghanistan was a NATO mission because it involved a direct attack against a NATO member. Iraq was the US and people who opted to come along too. Some of whom were NATO members, quite a few were not. I don't think you honestly actually know enough about NATO to comment on it to be honest.

Wheeeeee, Re: Nukes From a former political science student perspective, stop viewing them as weapons, and start viewing them as foundations of international policy. They establish a scary tripwire no one really wants to cross. The DPRK doesn't want nukes so it can put LA in the ocean, they want nukes because it ensures they can do pretty much everything short of a full fledged war with someone and not get invaded for it. The cost of actually employing a nuclear weapon is so high that it really would have to be something like we're going to enslave all Russians, eat their babies in front of them, and then take their land and give it to the Kenyans out of especially random spite before it really becomes use or lose. Putin likely has an exit plan to "retire" and leave the flaming mess he may make behind, but nukes are not likely part of it. Re: Training. Again. Look. Your idea of tough training is someone shooting bullets at a safe distance from you. My idea of training is putting a unit somewhere, against a real thinking "enemy" role playing an enemy force that is given capabilities well in excess of what anyone has,* on their home turf where all they do year round is beat the best trained military forces in the world. You go to NTC or JRTC (the major training centers) you will lose 75-80% of the time. Your administrative officer will file paperwork in full chemical weapons gear in 38 degrees C weather because GAS GAS GAS....but the paperwork must flow. You will face an enemy who cheats, and is encouraged to cheat, you will face insurgent ambushes on the Company level against your platoon, and then you will be instructed to place your assembly area in literally the stupidest place to set up on the planet because CONGRATS YOU WILL DEFEND YOUR PLATOON AA FROM A BATTALION TACTICAL GROUP. And you will have to find a solution. Your little doctrine book means very little because your enemy has read the same book, and is using it as a planning aid to beat you. You Mr Squad Leader Man will have to attack and clear a complex of buildings specially designed to make you lose if you use the book answer**. You will have some angry, sunburned, wreck of a man, likely brought back from the depths of hell, given a rank from a hat, and told to take out his anger at his failed marriage and numerous STDs on you deciding who died. And he will pick the smartest, strongest leaders. Failing that he'll pick the biggest, tallest guys you've got, and he'll make the only available LZ for pickup 700 meters dismounted across sweltering desert. Because he hates you. He hates everyone and everything. I'm sure those bullets were scary. But what did it do besides make it stressful to go in the preordained right direction? Re: insurgents Here's the deal. You prevent the insurgents from just out and out taking over. Then you have to work to diffuse the thing that was generating insurgents. You can keep a lid on things for some time assuming national will and resources, but unless you deal with the grievances of the population, you are likely just ensuring that once you cannot keep the lid on, it will boil up, and over again. The few successful counter-insurgencies all ended with the insurgent alienated from the population, and some sort of conciliatory settlement of what was being fought over. You guys have given Chechnya thug president, leading a thug government, and chechens keep disappearing into places. So long as you hold on tight, you may yet keep it, but if you slacken that grip, I think it will end poorly for you. Which is not so much winning, as much as what is usually defined as a "dilemma." Re: Paratroopers So again, why do large scale drops at all? You've agreed the large scale assault drops are suicide, and the best you can come up with is rapid deployment on internal lines...but then why have a mechanized unit with terrible IFVs (as the BMD is a good airborne vehicle, but not at all a good fighting one), and only the armor it can fly onto a runway? The way you're describing it is frankly if you cut the whole airborne element out, and just became an elite mechanized infantry force, using the same vehicles as the rest of the army, you'd have a more useful force for a whole lot cheaper. Our Airborne hangs on because we've got global commitments, and it has mostly commonality with our other light infantry units. But the massive circus of an airborne mechanized unit that cannot airdrop except for over friendly lines, and is much weaker than other mechanized units when on the ground is perplexing. *We don't use "Russia" as the bad guy not because of politics, but because we grant equipment and capabilities well in excess of what Russia actually could manage. **I am not making this up. There was a building with a staircase especially placed to defeat standard room clearing tactics. The OPFOR put a machine gun there just to ensure we were all deaf by the time they let fly with 40+ rounds of 7.62 blanks in an enclosed space.

I too am in the not confident it would work in reality camp. It seems like if anything you'd program the APS to NOT shoot objects that are landing some distance away from the tank.

re: Training Brutality in training is rarely the hallmark of good training. When combined with good training, tough or grueling training can indeed be useful, I'm not making the argument that it should all be fluffy sunshine and puppies. But again, ask yourself, what did someone firing bullets into the ground accomplish? Did it add more risk to the exercise? Unless the instructor was a moron, no. Did it make the exercise harder? No, the conditions you faced were likely just as terrible. Was it any more effective than the US manner in which Drill Sergeant Staff Sergeant Spearman gets real low and whispers in your ear that if you're still on this spot in 10 seconds, he's going to unzip your neck and have sexual congress with your windpipe, before counting down from 10 in that freakish booming voice of command only DSes seem to master? Likely not. When training, and pairing in brutality it needs to have a purpose or a function, especially one proportional to the "cost" of the action. When I was a Company Commander I did 22 hours straight of attack-defend drills with my Company.* I took away all phones, made the Koreans who followed our field exercises leave, ruthlessly enforced noise and light discipline, demanded all those sketches and hand drawn overlays for maps that no one ever has to do once they've left school, and variously added in things just to make it harder (lots of chemical weapons attacks). I also started it within an hour or so after the last night's training, The purpose however was to inject a better sense of what an armor company on the move does. It's a constant drum beat of operation, and no one, especially this guy got any sleep. It made people get creative, figure out solutions, prioritize solutions, and get their heads torn off when they made stupid choices. But again, it was with a Purpose as I already stated. And that purpose couldn't be easily accomplished with other means, it wasn't brutality for brutality's sake, or adding a little spook factor into it, it was trying to replicate as best we could what sort of suck fest being on the march would result in. re: Doctrine And I would contend in the sort of agile, hyper lethal environment, centralized control is obsolete. If you're always 1+ choices behind your foe, he will have the initiative, and he will win all other factors being even. Also it's not like you are the only guys capable of jamming communications. I was reasonably comfortable with nearly all my platoon leaders**, that if I told them to do a thing I could walk away and let them do it, and also adapt to mission changes fairly well. Same deal with when I was a scout platoon leader and my scout sections. Re: COIN Your response indicates you still don't "get it." Russia's loss in the 1990's was a conventional military defeat against an asymmetrical threat. They met you in battle, and you lost. When you came back, you met them in battle, and like all good insurgents, they went to ground after you started flattening villages. Looking at the fact you all are still doing raids, still finding caches, still having random attacks, and we're still finding chechens inside major islamic terrorist networks, I think you guys are riding a tiger vs having tamed it. There's more to COIN than shooting terrorists. As sburke actually reminded me, try reading "A Savage War of Peace" for the lessons about Algiers I was trying to pass onto you when I got a movie and book on the same subject matter all cross-wise. Re: Paradrop That's....suboptimal really. Like in that role you'd have been better off just bringing conventional mechanized forces forward, and in both of those roles you wouldn't even really have to train the drop portion extensively as it's troops basically falling out of the plane and collecting on the LZ. It doesn't really answer the mail in why you need a massive dog and pony show, or justify having a large airborne vs airmobile contingent. *So like the first platoon would attack, half of second platoon would defend against first platoon while the other half established defenses elsewhere, while third platoon did all the reset, maintenance, and mission prep for when it would attack after first platoon had assumed second platoon's defensive mission. this took something like 50 minutes to an hour and ten to go total reset. **One of them was a total idiot though. His survival in the job was largely due to my benevolence and believing in giving someone a chance, and his already being there when I took command, so by the time I well and truly established he was terrible, he was a few weeks out from being replaced anyway.

GSR type radars are not inherently superior to thermals in terms of short range spotting. Not to mention the issue is more "wide" angle spotting, and less narrow angle.

re: Training Here's something to ask though. What did your instructor firing into the ground do that telling you to get your ****ing head to the dirt wouldn't have done? This is something fascinating to me, like there's a lot of value in realistic training, but that isn't really realistic as much as it is...like it's dangerous but objectively it is silly. I suppose it gets you some familiarity with what bullets sound like incoming, but incoming isn't exactly something you miss the first time. I keep pointing out the Russian army's problem is not bad soldiers, it's a lack of leaders, or at the least, a qualitative gap in junior leaders. re: Thinking on the go This is really where people get the Russian army wrong. You guys are not robots, but you centralize control and decision making to a degree that slows down your decision making loops. The simplest way to describe it has already been said, the kind of decisions and independence you expect from a Russian platoon is exercised at a squad level in the US Army and so forth all the way up. Basically if we're going back to OODA loops, the lower echelon leadership of a US formation allows it to complete these cycles faster, and generally with less higher control which in turn allows that higher echelon to focus farther into the future, which becomes the key advantage. re: "Career" You'd be surprised how many folks are in for the first four years then out. There's a fair amount of benefits that come with military service, or for a lot of folks it's just a way to get a start in life. What's funny is as you stay in longer, your "community" gets smaller until you tend to keep running in to the same people over and over again (I was a company commander alongside one of my former fellow platoon leaders, and my troop's old fire support officer, and my old boss was a battalion commander in Korea at the same time). re: Not a Hammer The most obvious would be COIN. You guys don't do that so well. Like you shoot people well enough, which is important, but try "The Battle of Algiers" for a good understanding of the shoot-not shoot parts of COIN. As far as in a conventional fight, a lot of it isn't exactly a "situation" nearly as much as what happens when you're two or three OODA loops behind someone else, basically you're trying to interact with what the enemy was doing several minutes ago, while he's already exploiting your being oriented in the wrong way. The hammer is good as long as the nail cooperates if you get my drift. re: VDV But then that begs the question, why do large scale assault drops as training exercises if there is no large scale assault drop mission? The US Airborne has paradrop missions such as they are, oriented against people who don't pose a major ADA threat, or alternately, do the airdrop as a way to rapidly flow into a region to assist friendly forces where disembarking onto an airfield is too slow or not practical. The VDV doesn't have that more realistic mission, and again what it trains for is something that frankly is borderline absurd. Just as spoilers: Market-Garden was a UK-US paradrop effort to secure a route across the Rhine into Germany in the fall of 1944. A joint US-UK parachute element (the US 82nd and 101st Divisions, UK's 1st Airborne Division plus the Polish Airborne Brigade) would secure several bridges, while a UK armor corps attacked up the main road. In a nutshell even the fairly mauled German forces proved to be difficult for the paratroopers to subdue quickly which lead to major delays, the axis of advance was by far too narrow, and the whole attack sputtered out short of the last bridge. Varsity was another Rhine crossing done in the spring of 1945. While US armor had breached the Rhine elsewhere, Varsity was a large airborne operation intended to secure a farside lodgement for troops crossing the Rhine via amphibious vehicles and assault boats. it was highly successful, however at a very high cost relative to German forces in the area largely because of the profound vulnerability of airplanes conducting paradrop operations.

Like, here's what I'm getting with the variables thing; Again, you're describing what is pretty standard battle drill stuff for us. It's not BAD training, it's just training designed to illicit certain responses, even if it is simply chaining drills together (react to contact>clear building>evaluate and evacuate a casualty). If we were making the training event hard/variable-tastic, we might throw in civilians on the battlefield, enemy counter-attack with a superior force, booby traps, or set up a room specifically to defeat whatever room clearing technique was being taught (walls in the wrong places, or worse, OPFOR with paintball guns in all the wrong places). Philosophically Russian and Western views on doctrine tend to fall into a divide: Russian/Soviet doctrine has generally followed "war as science." Not that doctrine cannot be wrong, but it's the assumption that you can find a right answer down to the amount of bullets required to suppress someone. Western/US Doctrine has generally followed "war as art." Not literally art, but less specific, and more using the knowledge and skill available, to create a solution on the fly. It is not devoid of the "Science" (especially in some fields) but generally the doctrine is presented as a template to be modified as suited vs being the optimal solution (which drives a lot of former Soviet observers nuts, as it appears we either don't know doctrine, or opt not to follow it at all). Again, Russians can certainly practice the "art" of war, and Americans can certainly be scientific. But it lends to certain viewpoints on what warfighting looks like. So what you're describing as variables, or choices to be made to me, sounds profoundly restrictive and well matches the sort of choices I had to make as a brand new cadet. Which is not to say you're dumber than I was as a cadet haha (as nothing is dumber than a cadet), simply that the way Russia and the US run wars is different. You were expected to be the ultimate paratrooper, shoot, move, communicate ah-hah etc etc. In that regard think of yourself as a hammer. You hammer things. You hammer things really well. As long as the problem can be hammered, you are the man for the job. The American perspective is we expect our soldiers and junior leader especially to be multi-tools. We can get away with this because we have the time (as in years and years of someone in uniform), and the budget to train them accordingly. So the point I'm getting to is that Russian and US troops are likely both entirely adequate at being hammers. The difference emerges once you take Russian forces out of roles where the hammer is correct, or where something is better than being a hammer, they tend to suffer. Re: Paratroopers There's nothing implicitly wrong with paratroopers, simply that it's a really hard case to make that there's still a role for the large scale massed drops against conventional forces. If you're into paratrooper history, look up Operation Market-Garden and Operation Varsity for some good history on some of the problems that face massed drops that came into play circa 1944-45....that still really haven't been sorted out that well.

I use slow when working close with infantry. If you set the infantry to use one of the "keep moving" sort of commands, and then set the tank for slow, they keep pretty good cohesion, and the tanks stay close enough to support the infantry pretty well.

Supremely, and completely in ways not yet measurable in science for their magnitude. However keep in mind the basic BMP 1/2/3 and the Bradley itself were designed before it had been entirely discarded. So in that regard the stuff that's pretty hard coded into the basic vehicle in terms of dimensions remains influenced by that school of thought, and the vehicle commander remains the squad leader. Re: M3 I think they do suffer a spotting penalty if the scouts are dismounted. In the real world...well Cav doctrine is written in jello to the degree that just who, or what dismounts changes widely. Each M3 carries two "scouts" in the back. In high intensity fights they're largely seen as crewmen to reload the TOW launcher although in yee olden days they'd also often be kicked out with an ATGM to augment the platoons AT capabilities on the defense. When dismounted generally the scouts from several vehicles would link in under a vehicle commander and become a dismounted scout section. How this looked varied widely depending on the composition of the section, but assuming a two Bradley section, it'd be a five man scout section (the two scouts from each vehicle, plus the senior vehicle commander usually with ATGM, often with M240 too plus optics and radios), then the remaining Bradley commander would remain mounted and control the Bradleys. Again, varied widely. 19Ds are weird.

IFV were originally concieved as a platform from which infantry would fight from, like literally shooting at people from the troop bay. The troops would kick out every now and then to do things the IFV couldn't, but it makes sense if you view the BMP and the dismounts not as two units, but as a collected weapons system, with the squad leader controlling both. The "real" life rendition is the squad leader goes wherever he's needed/makes more sense.

Hokay now, I suppose I've got a little writing to do: RE:Drills Do feel free to tell me about the choices you guys had to make. You're really making it sound like simple battle drills which are generally limited to picking rally points, or which door to stack on. Where I feel you're missing the point is your fixation on "soldier" skills. Strictly in terms of shooting straight, running around, low crawling whatever it is pathetic dismounts do to earn their pay, the Russian soldier isn't like, deficent. He might not be as good of a shot simply because the US equivlent spends more time on the range, but as far as a dude who moves in formations and shoots at a man, he's perfectly fine. Move away from that however. I'm sure you're aware of OODA loops, but he's a refresher if you are not: The OODA loop was developed during the cold war as a model for decision making for fighter pilots. Not so much "how" to think, as much as an observation of how the decision making cycle goes. It stands for: Observe: Figure out what's going on. Orient: Posture yourself towards the thing that's going on Decide: Figure out what you're doing to do to the thing that's going on. Act: Do the thing to deal with the thing that's going on. It's called a loop because it's a repeating process as the situation continues. The person/organization that completes the most OODA loops is almost always the winner in any fight as the faster looper is more rapidly adapting to the situation, and usually assuming some control/dominance over it. What drills are intended to do is enable someone/an organization to skip the "decide" step. The event the drill was planned for is observed. Organization orients assets on that event, and acts in accordance with the drill. This is often vital, especially in "react to attack/disaster" events, because you're already likely a few OODA loops behind the event, so faster loops are a means to catch up. The problem with drills is they do very poorly with things that are not quite one drills or the other (see Grozny), and rely on variables that are often in someone else's hand. Thus especially if the enemy is aware of how the drill works, he can make actions that will defeat that drill (again, Grozny, but see the fates of several Soviet trained forces when facing "agile" enemies). Also the more drills drive lower formations, the more demands that puts on the higher command structure, which in turn slows down higher's OODA loops outside of drill scenarios. The other way to complete OODA loops quickly is very "agile" formations, capable of completing OODA loops independently without higher formation input. A drill-centric force will rely a lot on it's leader to position properly or move on a battlefield. An "agile" one will have sufficent leadership at lower echelons that the leader only needs to give intent vs specific guidance to accomplish a task. This allows for significantly faster OODA loops because lesser questions ("where should I put my tank?") are answered by junior leaders, and in many degrees it is self-orienting. Russia simply lacks the professional core of NCO level personnel to have agile formations. It needs to use drills to substitute for that missing knowledge and experience. As a result it does not deal with variables well, and as seen in the Ukraine often tends to flail about when expected conditions are not met. So in that regard, it's irrelevant if you guys shoot back well, if you're still working through the "okay we're engaged, what next?" while the unit you're shooting at has already moved onto "call for mortar support and bring around 2nd squad to flank." Example is way too simple (especially because it's the sort of thing drills do okay), but you get the drift. Re: Dirt Darts The original statement was: " other than we parachute in large scale behind enemy lines, disrupt their logistics, and cause massive havoc among the targetted units. " Which is profoundly stupidly impossible against what I described as a "near peer" threat. If you've gone as far as to destroy an enemy's air force, and ADA network as to allow for a full scale paradrop, then I'd contend you've likely destroyed him to the degree where paratroopers are irrelevant. Large scale paradrops are profoundly, stupidly dangerous, and against an enemy that is even remotely coherent, practically impossible. Airborne operations as a means to rapidly enter a region unopposed, deploy worldwide rapidly, etc are not terrible ideas. But the very idea of VDV troops conducting a large scale parachute assault against a NATO, or even Ukraine type enemy invites a lot of messy cleanup of crispy critters in stripey shirts if you get my drift. And I don't think the Russians are stupid enough to try it. It's just this silly paratrooper pageant is part of the Russian attempt to project an an imagine of strength domestically/internationally. Re: "Say something positive about the Russian military" It's not a bad military. It is highly capable, and would do all sorts of terrible stuff to many NATO countries if it somehow started a one on one fight with them. There's just two topics worth discussing as caveats: 1. The Russian military is burdened with unrealistic mission sets. Russia wastes a lot of time getting ready to fight enemies that nuclear deterrence has handled, or enemies that it has more or less invented (or created). It wastes a lot of time on "prestige" items like manned long range bombers, naval forces, the mass drops of the VDV, while failing to address a whole host of organizational problems. Basically it's like if the UK had reclaim historically British ruled parts of France as part of its military priorities. It's not a realistic mission, but it would eat up a whole lot of resources to chase that mission at the expense of much more reasonable, and pressing matters. 2. The Russia is not the Soviet Union. There's a lot of huffing and puffing imagining the Russians as standing equal to the US, again back to the old East vs West two competing nearly equal superpowers. However, the Russian military is not the Soviet one. It's a weaker, less capable force in more than a few ways, and would be hard pressed to deal with a real shooting war against the west (which isn't to say it'd be a cakewalk for NATO, but simply the question is how bloody of a conflict it would be vs who would win). It's not a matter of it being "bad" nearly as much as if I rolled up in my car to a street racing competition and started bragging about how I'm going to school everyone. My VW is a really nice car and does a lot of things very well. But it very clearly is not up to speed with someone's tricked out Corvette or something.