domfluff

So, not really, since the above example was intended to be inside the scope of a CM battlefield - within perhaps 4 or 5km. The point of the forward recce element there is to screen and protect your main positions - which really means concealing them from enemy observation, indirect fires and making it as hard as possible for them to build an effective attack. "Solid front" and modern combat are more or less ideas in opposition to each other. Even in current-Ukraine, the scale of the area means that the actual front is a lot more fluid than that, and it matters tremendously which 1km^2 box you're currently occupying, or even which exact treeline you're in. "Fixed fortifications are a monument to the stupidity of man" and all that. But the other examples you give are good reasons for the "and exploitation" part of "screening, reconnaissance and exploitation". Cavalry-type forces are small (and therefore easy to get moving in an operational sense), highly mobile, and usually have a vastly disproportionate firepower for their size. That means that they're usually going to be available and on-call to respond whenever this is needed. In a hybrid environment like CMSF then they're not going to be able to perform their intended role as efficiently as intended, but then that's true for every other part of the conventional warfighting apparatus, which is the whole point of asymmetric warfare, and the key challenge of CMSF. For a WW2 example, consider the Commonwealth Carrier platoon. A carrier section consists of three Universal carriers, each carrying a small team. Each team carries a Bren light machine gun, one team carries a light mortar, and one a PIAT. The platoon consists of four of these sections. That means that your Carrier section has about as many men as a regular Rifle section, but with a mortar pushed down to the squad level, a PIAT with every section, and three times as many light machine guns. That means that a platoon-sized element has significantly more firepower available to it than an entire rifle company, and has radios, mobility, and the ability to move under armour. Further, this element is embedded at the Rifle battalion level, so it's a very useful, powerful, and highly flexible asset which the battalion commander will be able to call on as an organic, ever-present part of his force. The roles this formation can play are the same - screening, reconnaissance and exploitation, and the flexibility that this can provide as a mobile reserve to plug a gap, relieve a base of fire, or to take advantage of a fleeting opportunity are all CM-scale tasks that this kind of light, over-powered formation can provide, and the same applies to Cavalry and Cavalry-like formations up to and including the present. It's certainly true that in some situations you're forced to go with what you've got - the entire theme of the British module in CMSF is that you're making do with what you've got to hand, rather than having the tools you'd actually want. Likewise the Stryker campaign in CMBS is challenging because you're trying to use medium infantry to confront a peer opponent. This is a real-world challenge and something of an unsolved problem, so it's certainly not "unfair", but it's no less difficult because of that.

It's important to distinguish US Cavalry from that of other nations. Where the typical roles of Cavalry are screening, reconnaissance and exploitation, US Cavalry have a fourth role, that of economy of force missions (i.e., using them as a more conventional force, when the need arises). That's almost unique to the US, so it's not a "normal" capability in broader terms. Some of the typical Cavalry roles are indeed above CM scale, and will therefore play a role in scenario design. Many of the missions in CMCW use Cavalry units, because they're likely to be first to the fight in a Fulda Gap scenario. Nevertheless, *all* of the cavalry roles are also important on the scale of a CM battlefield, and that would be true regardless of equipment or time period. To understand reconnaissance units in general, it's important to understand what they're for. Most reconnaissance units are equipped with fast vehicles and good optics - whether that's just a jeep, a pair of binoculars and a radio, the large open windows of the BRDM giving excellent vision whilst under cover of armour, or sophisticated suites of thermal optics and satellite communications. Any armament they have is often secondary, but it's typically designed to deal with the threats they are likely to encounter - that of other reconnaissance units. The British Scimitar is a great example of a reconnaissance vehicle. A company-sized force might have a pair of them in the Cold War, and this pair would roam ahead of the formation, possibly dismounting to spot when appropriate. The job of this pair would be to screen - get advanced warning of the incoming enemy, and to do so in positions which do not give away their position to the enemy. They would do this by screening forward of the friendly positions, using their speed to get well forward. Then, the first enemy they would be likely to see in this context would be a Soviet recon platoon - perhaps three BMPs. In this situation, the 30mm Rarden is in it's element, and two Scimitars fighting from successive hull down positions are a serious overmatch for three BMPs. So consider this scenario from the perspective of the Soviet player. They've sent forward their recon platoon, with the hope of finding the enemy position. Instead, a pair of Scimitars has engaged them from a position entirely unrelated to their defensive lines, and further has destroyed their recon platoon without giving anything more away. That means that the only option for the Soviet player would be to turn their CRP from a force that's creating the conditions for the main body to operate - perhaps seizing key terrain or starting to shape the battlefield with artillery - and instead has been relegated to a probing force, slowing inching their way forwards without the information that the recon platoon should have provided. This tiny screening asset has just had an outsized impact on the way this entire battle will unfold. The "how" of Recon is better described by Bil than me (https://battledrill.blogspot.com/2014/01/reconnaissance.html), but there are two fundamentally different approaches to how you employ intelligence to shape your course of action. One is that you're relying on recon assets to form the plan - the entire early portion of the battle will be led by those assets, and you're intending to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy before you make decisions. This is the safer, more flexible option, but it's also very slow. It also represents the typical approach that a NATO force might employ in most situations. The latter method is that you lean heavily on your terrain and enemy analysis, and use recon elements in a much simpler role - to firm up that picture. Typically these would roam ahead of your force as per the Soviet example above, with the much simpler goal of working out where the enemy are. This is a lot more dangerous, but it's significantly faster, and it's therefore the approach that the Soviet armies should be using in CMCW. Neither is "recon by death", although both obviously involve accepting some risk. Sometimes knowing where the enemy aren't is more important than knowing where the enemy are, and making sure that a route or a terrain feature is clear from enemy can be equally or more important than actually seeing them.

Durations less than maximum are a fixed number of rounds (I made a mini-mod to display this once), so you can know that a given artillery piece can perform x number of medium length missions, or whatever. That definitely helps with planning, rather than having to count/estimate it manually.

I will vouch for Miles as having a positive impact on the CM community as a whole. That's not to say I necessarily endorse any specific positions or opinions, but he's firmly not a troll.

Yup yup. Valley of Ashes is a scenario which is weighted against the Soviets, because it's intended to be - the challenge is an attack through some deceptively poor and canalising terrain, and trying to make good. My first run through was also a draw (as you saw), and whilst I know I could have done better if I'd paused at the near objective, I pushed on and gave up the points in the process. I'm certain it's possible to do better than I did in that scenario. It's a tough challenge, but a fair one - the scenario is plausible and the representation convincing. I do agree that it's one of the stronger stand alone scenarios in Cold War. I've mentioned before that I think the correct way to think about "balance" in simulationist games is not a scenario where both sides have a 50% chance of winning. That kind of mentality has dominated the hobby space forever (Paddy Griffith wrote a whole essay about it decades ago, in relation to some of the WRG rulesets), and the idea that wargame should be two equal forces across an open table having a little fight is one that really stops thinking far too early, in my opinion, and it fails to really take advantage of some of the depth that this kind of deep simulation can offer. Instead of "both sides have an equally high chance of winning", I prefer something like "both sides have an equally interesting problem to solve". It's nice if you can tie up asymmetric objectives to represent that, but in most cases what it actually says on the victory screen is of secondary importance to the process.

I do think that CMCW is not a good first CM title. It's excellent, but it's aimed a little higher than some of the others, and things like the NTC reflect that. The real-world NTC is an environment where you're supposed to fail, essentially - it's a very powerful training tool, but it's brutal and intended to be. The CMCW NTC campaign is very, very good at showing you what you're up against - the BMP-1 in CMSF is a joke, and in CMCW it's a serious threat. You can't park US tanks on a ridgeline and destroy everything like you can in CMSF or to a lesser extent CMBS. You have to read the terrain and pick your battles, lean on combined arms and use every aspect of your force. It's a serious challenge, and in particular it'll punish bad habits learnt in the other CM titles. The M1A2 is such a large advantage in CMSF and CMBS that you can get away without using your armour correctly - it offers a *large* safety net, and will cover a lot of your shortcomings. This is objectively not true for the M60A1, and that's one of the major lessons which the NTC is trying to teach.

I've said before, but I think the NTC campaign might be my favorite across all of CM, precisely because of that sharp focus. Each mission and decision point serves a cohesive purpose, and the whole doesn't outstay its welcome. I do think the final scoring might be a little scuffed, but I'm not sure it matters really.

Sure, and that it's a lot easier to tear something down than it is to build something up... and there's often a lot more weight given to the former.

It's absolutely that. The recent discussion I'm less sure was in good faith, and was perhaps more of finding something to complain about. Nevertheless, I don't doubt that there can be bloat in the planning process, and a desire for some more efficiency at times. Whether that's actually a good idea is another thing - often insufficient planning to "cut through the red tape" ends with disaster, in practice.

Something I started to discuss with Miller, but didn't conclude, was a comparison of the US and UK approach to things. There's been some discussion recently about whether the planning process takes too long, and indeed I was on a webinar last night with John Schmitt running one of his TDGs - specifically designed to practice rapid decision making. There are certainly some aspects of the UK combat estimate that I think make a lot of sense - putting the enemy's actions first means you're considering them straight away, and potentially avoiding treating them as static blocks on the map, for example. I'd be really interested if you have any more thoughts about this, above "this is the one I'm used to"

Wargaming is stochastic, so nothing will ever give you perfect information. The question then falls to you - if you look at your scheme of manoeuvre, see a piece of terrain and think "gee, it'd really suck if there was an atgm team hiding in there", then you really have a few choices: You can get eyes-on and try to spot something in there. You can arrange for a recon by fire, exposing your scout position, but perhaps forcing a response. You can send a scout element into the terrain piece to actively clear it You could arrange for indirect fires to proactively deny this terrain feature. Each option involves accepting a different level of risk, and each provides a different level of information and result. Which is best is part of the Art of the thing - the probabilistic basis of wargaming decisions means that there usually won't be a best answer, just a least-worst one, and which one is correct for you will differ. Ultimately, you can't spot everything, so the trick is to engage with the things that really matter - to read the terrain and identify the areas that are going to cause you issues, so that your limited resources can be leveraged to the greatest effect.

I think in reality that superiority might have faded faster than that - perhaps they had the edge in the seventies, and they probably did have the edge in the sixties. CMCW represents this inflection point well - in 1979 the Soviets have some significant advantages, which are being eroded on a tactical level by 1982. Clearly the tiny number of Abrams, Bradleys and M60 TTS wouldn't have been *everywhere* in 1982, so the actual inflection point would have a longer tail in practice, even if the frontline would have been gnarlier than anticipated. As an aside, I did come across an amusing/weak argument that the notable wargamer Paddy Griffith may have actually averted WW3. He was a military historian, and participated in numerous wargames, both hobby and professional. A notable number of these professional, classified games were about Cold War doctrine, particularly with the US and modelling their policy of Active Defence - in particular the concept of an up-front defence, not giving up miles of West Germany to gain depth, as that wouldn't be politically viable. We don't know the results of these games, or how extensive they were, but we do know that shortly afterwards the dial started to move, and the US policy position began to change (culminating in what became known as AirLand battle, but even changing the policy before that). This change in policy was then matched by a change towards a more defensive doctrine from the Soviet Union. So... weak argument, but if we tentatively assume a direct line connecting all of the above, it's not impossible that a bespectacled British academic prevented an all-out nuclear war.

I do think there's some confusion of ideas in here, but I don't think that's unusual for wargaming in general, especially when it comes to conflating scope and scale. Thinking is good. What. Okay, Clausewitz is an important work on military thinking, but this, like many things that quote Clausewitz, confuse scale significantly. I don't know how you "sue for peace" on a CM battlefield, really. Wargaming has a focus on the decisive battle. Especially with CM, you're only ever seeing the sharp end. You're not necessarily seeing the main part, mind you. That's definitely a good point to bear in mind. Uh... sort of. CM's focus is the tactical level, and that's the kind of questions it can ask and answer. Focus is a good thing, because it means you can answer one thing well, not a ton of things badly. It does mean you're not so concerned with stuff outside of your remit. It's not only realistic, it's vitally important. "The Soviets" may or may not have cared, but the chap in charge of the regiment certainly would, as well as the people fighting. It turns out that Russians are also people, and a CM-scale game is concerned with people above all else. There are also broader points here about the extent to which numbers actually matter - it's been very common to have ratio-based CRTs in wargaming, but it's not actually clear how important that is. "Why do people compare BMP-1 and M60?" - playing Top Trumps is absolutely not useful in the broad scheme of things, but the two also have to engage. If you're looking at it in terms of "which tank is the best", then that's never going to end well, but it's no different from saying "Well, if the Sherman and the Tiger were on a flat field, and they don't see each other until 200m., and there's no air cover, and..." "Fair" is irrelevant, and playing Top Trumps with AFVs is useless. Comparing capabilities can be a lot more fruitful, but you need to consider a level or two higher than "my tank has a really large gun". It's very useful to know that both the ATGM and the 73mm HEAT round of the BMP-1 can penetrate an M60 from all aspects, since engagements will likely happen, but "which tank is best" is not useful. Soviet doctrine is not, and has never been, about reckless charges into prepared kill zones. The whole reason for the CRP/FSE/main body march sequence is to avoid precisely this - attacking off the march trades risk for tempo, and correct movement techniques reduce risk. You're still accepting risk - you are launching an offensive operation after all, and that's inherently risky - but you're going out of your way to minimise that risk as much as possible, whilst working within the bounds of a scheme which you believe offers you the best chance of actually achieving victory. Attacks from the march would have been the most common, and typically the first engagements, because the emphasis was on speed. The Clausewitzian approach to war described above more accurately describes the Warsaw Pact approach than anything Western. There's a good argument to be made that the "bypass and force a capitulation" concept isn't terribly plausible in reality, outside of the 19th century context. There are a number of reasons for that, I suspect, but that's pushing the scope of this. Prepared Soviet attacks would be something that would come later, especially if the attack from the march failed, or couldn't make progress otherwise. Maintaining tempo is the important thing.

3/4/5 tanks is a long standing question, but partially. The logic behind three is that you maximise efficiency - you're the least likely to have more than one targeting the same enemy at once. More tanks in a platoon add more firepower, but you get diminishing returns in a broader, analytical sense. Four allows you to split into two teams of two, so gives you more flexibility, and five lets you stack a team of three, or have two teams of two with a floating HQ. Three tank platoons are a Soviet thing, but not just a Soviet thing, since the British use them too (or have done at various points). Equally, not every Soviet tank platoon is 3 tanks strong. So, I don't think the three tank platoon is *primarily* because you're forced to use them as one unit, but it doesn't hurt.

Was playing this last week. Is John's semi-rigid Kriegspiel of the first couple of weeks of Ukraine, discussed here: http://wargamingco.blogspot.com/2022/03/ukraine-2022-why-are-our-wargames-wrong.html Brigade level, but I think it did a pretty decent job of modelling some of the fundamental problems with this, notably in how easy it was to stymie the Russian advance by using depth (and how ridiculously big Ukraine is).

This is an older post by JasonC about how the Soviets should attack: That specifically describes one method of attack (the attack in column), which is not the only method, but the principles there are sound. Do you "just accept you're going to take 50% casualties"? absolutely not. One of the main principles of Soviet everything is mass, and that follows things like Lanchester laws - as in, if you have enough mass, then you end up taking less casualties than you might expect, because trades aren't 1:1. So the attack above describes infantry moving to contact, then going to ground, let the supporting assets take the weight, then repeat. The infantry will take losses, sure, but they don't have to be heavy, and the second company then takes over and picks up the remains of the first. In general terms, "thinking one level up" isn't quite accurate, but it's a good shorthand. You use a Soviet platoon as a single unit, on-line, and the support comes from somewhere else, like a second platoon or supporting assets. As a basic idea, treat a Soviet platoon like an extended squad, and move them as one unit.

I suspect I agree with this. My specific feelings about this scenario is that the lessons it's teaching are the most fundamental ones - particularly around coordination with artillery and the importance of mass (especially when it comes to overcoming deficiencies in spotting). I have seen people fail this scenario, which means I think it's doing it's job. The second training scenario pair takes those same basic principles and puts them in a significantly more complex scenario, with a lot less hand-holding. That scenario is still simple, but there's a good progression from the absolute basics, into something more applied.

I do think its going to be tough to quantify how "realistic" this is, or even what this is actually showing. There's a quote around real world marksman accuracy, and how the same person who is 90% accurate on a range, is 9% accurate on exercise and 0.9% accurate in real conditions. If you're talking such small numbers to begin with, then judging the influence of comparatively minor factors becomes ever more difficult. Having said that, cm generally rewards being taken seriously, and assuming that the model reflects reality. It's similar to bogging - tests have indicated that speed has no effect on bogging, but I'm not personally convinced by the clarity of those results. So yeah, try to keep your guys unexhausted. Its generally a good idea, and I would be unsurprised if there weren't knock on effects in surprising and untested directions (do exhausted troops have lower morale?, etc.)

@Bil Hardenberger I ran Miles through your Squad Attack scenario: I was impressed by both his ability to estimate both the enemy disposition, as well as failing to do anything about that (whilst providing a good learning opportunity along the way).

In mechanical terms, the most obvious one is that it restricts their movement. Since there's often reasons why you need to move *right now* (e.g., incoming mortars), it's generally a good idea to keep them fit and happy.

Sort of. On the final screen you can click on each unit and see their kills, which gives you an idea. Otherwise nope. Would be a nice thing to have, but it's a bit of a niche really.

I don't know if it's "nearly impossible", but yeah, if you gave them better tech the balance would shift significantly. There's a reason why CMCW is centred on an inflection point. You can actually see the same kind of thing in the NTC campaign - if you replace the M60s with M1s you end up with something that looks rather more like Shock Force than Cold War, with all of the "learning bad habits" and general simplicity that implies.

Area fire goes all over the action spot. Targeted fire will only happen when they can physically see someone to shoot at, and they will stop firing when they cower out of sight. In all things there's a degree of wiggle room and variance, and if they spot something whilst area firing they might target it, but that's essentially the distinction. Worth noting that with any targeted fire you're telling them to open up with everything (if you let them find their own targets they'll be more conservative), so inevitably area fire will consume ammo faster, since they're opening up, and won't lose sight of the target.

Now, I don't doubt that having that kind of regular experience (not to mention experience so close to home) was useful during the Cold War, and might reasonably be reflected in a CMCW-type scenario, but yeah, I can see how that thinking could have been an easy trap to fall into post-2000.

That line made me think of something else. Obviously there's a risk of clutching at straws, and trying to justify the cold war mentality as being about something real, rather than a waste of time, but if we assume that's not the case, and the above is accurate: This reminds me of a conversation around the British army in Iraq and Afghanistan. Throughout the Cold War, it's been a common statement that the British infantryman has the benefit of experience in patrolling Northern Ireland - that they had all of the potentially-mundane-but-still-vital experiences of being deployed and operating as a team, in a potentially hostile situation. That's the same army that went into the Falklands, and that experience has been suggested as one of the reasons why Goose Green was saved from being a complete disaster. Certainly the army would have gained some solid, practical COIN experience. The conversation around the more recent deployments was that the army went into them assuming that they had this same institutional knowledge of counterinsurgency operations - without acknowledging that this really belonged to the previous generation, and that experience just wasn't embedded anymore, and an awful lot of it had to be relearned, quickly. So, yeah, I wonder. I wonder if there might be many Soviet principles which are based on a sound foundation, and may at one point have actually worked extremely well... but now aren't matched by the depth of experience to be practical.