Grigb

Did not want to bring it here (it is completely separate). But I could not find another topic for that and decided to ask if there is one. Just sad to waste it.

Quick question - do we have topic regarding Israel? I am subscribed to the RU channel of David Gendelman. He writes short but informative posts that clarify some aspects of Israel operation.

The problem here isn't the missile or its flight characteristics. It's more about targeting. According to my approximate calculations, following missile launch, A-50 must descend to 3000m to avoid observation by ground radar. Once A-50 is below 3000m, the missile must operate autonomously. Mashovets said that the S-200 missile can utilize A-50 radar tranmission as guidance, but the natural instinct of any RU radar operator is to switch off the radar.So, for reliable success, the missile must be capable of targeting A-50 on its own in the presence of EW while evading RU AD fire. We're talking about developing an incredibly capable missile in around two years while under RU fire. They might combine a Western head with an S-200 body. That would be simpler and faster. In addition, they would not require radar since they could send target data straight to the missile via the western data link. Still not ideal: the body is not stealthy, and you must handle liquid fuel not far from the front line. However, that would explain why ambushes are so rare.

And If we consider only a few locations, RU drones are not a major issue for Ukraine. That Magyar crew disables 70% of the drones that RU sends to the Krynki area. UKR has the ability to minimize drone damage for a few crossings.

Arab-Israeli conflicts and Vietnam demonstrated to Soviet AD generals that AD complexes must be maneuverable. The unwieldiness of the S-200 was regarded as a key drawback. In addition, dealing with the liquid field was painful. So, when S-300 became available, they withdrew S-200.

Unfortunately, no.

The top UKR drone commander Magyar and his team defend Krynky. They didn't defend Avdiivka. Patriot or S-200 defended Krynky. They never defended Avdiivka itself. The UKR command appears to value Krynky substantially more than we do. BTW, Putin personally monitors the Krynky issue. What do the Ukrainian command and Putin know that we don't?

They are talking about altitude 9,000-10,000.

Alexe Kopytko, collegue of UKR Mashovets wrote several posts about losses. I am not going to translate them as they are aimed at the general public. However, I am going to translate relevant information. UKR is a significantly more open society and country. So, it is much easier to find and count deaths using open sources. The oldest community in Ukraine that monitors War deaths is "The Book of Memory of those who fell for Ukraine". Quote from the UKR news article [I recommend but I am not going to translate for now due to lack of time] about UKR losses up to November 2023 Second article [for the same period] From Kopytko posts Zelensky numbers are close to actual numbers. UKR is nowhere near the defeat.

No. but we have: 40% mobiks 50% contract soldiers who signed contract after start of the war 10% contract soldiers who signed contract before start of the war 10% others Mobiks and contract soldiers can be privates or low-ranking non-commissioned officers only. As a result, officers could only make up 10% of the total.

RU Nats video about effectiveness of fish nets.

RU Nats close to Girkin (including his wife) say it is not true. Lets wait.

I'm looking at RU MOD directives on how to defend vehicles from FPV. Interesting bit: FPV-suicide drones «Hawk» airplane type - max speed 120 kmh «Kross» quadcopter type - max speed 60 kmh [Insane speed] Warheads PG-7L PG-7M PG-9C PG-18 [Bar armor and spall liners are still effective. RU vehicles do not have either that or ERA] P.S. I checked it. Well, the directives are not really interesting to us. They describe how to build cope cages and install RU crappy EW devices on various RU vehicles. The diagrams of Cope Cage installation would be interesting if the RU intelligence officers understood how the FVP attacks in practice. But they don't. So, the diagrams have glaring mistakes and are mostly useless.

BTW we forgot about this boi @The_Capt

We are talking about army corps at most, and it might have an impact for a few months at most. There is also the issue of latency. It is tough to desert from the front line. It is considerably easier to desert from the rear. Most Wagnerite deserters would flee once Bakhmut's attack ended, and they were settled in rear areas (end of summer). But by that time, it was a shattered army corp. The impact cannot be that significant. Whether we consider Wagnerites or not, the trend of large increases in desertion during the last year is significant (if we use the limited data from the project).

Avdiivka. RU fighters tested UKR Humvee armored windows. Windows withstood 3-4 close hits without penetration. Any further hits though most probably would result in penetration. What's interesting is that they used Igolnik cartridges. P.S. @Battlefront.com I think you will need that data for CMWW3

Real Wagnerite group do not exist for like 6 months. And the majority of them stopped participating in combat after their withdrawal from Bakhmut 9 month ago.

We don't have actual numbers to evaluate it. What we do have is the number of deserters who contacted the organization that assists RU deserters. It is a small set, but it is all I have for now. Also I have heard that number of desertion court cases is also increased.

Some numbers: Ukrainian military analysts Taras Cmut: cost of classic ATGM missile is 30 000 USD. You can get 25 good combat FPV drones or 20 very good combat FPV drones. Top UKR drone unit commander Magyar: 5 FPV crews block the tank company's [10 tanks] advance with preparatory mining and persistent patrolling, as well as the quick employment of attack weapons [drones].

We have GrigB Intelligent Translation Services. During next week, the Russian Statistical Service will release a fresh report. Over the weekend, Russian opposition economist Milov will assess the campaign's strategic impact. If nothing bad happens on my end, we'll have a summary by Sunday night.

The artillery situation there is not as dire as we believe. Agent 13th reported three days ago. At the very least, UKR CB has been successful there. I watched a new RU video regarding FPV drone suppression. The most fascinating remarks, however, are those concerning the current situation: UKR took Million Drones program seriously Reports from different [front] locations say that life of RU fighters is getting worse and harder [due to FPV drones] [Situation] is getting hotter [for RU troops] Unlike RU, UKR regularly suppresses control of RU drones because RU drones en masse are not prepared to counter EW. UKR drones are prepared [RU FPV programs are seriously lagging behind UKR]

I think it would permit UKR AF to begin hammering RU Kherson direction troops with JDAMs. The RU Kherson troops are not in very good shape already. The JDAM campaign has the potential to tilt the balance in favor of UKR. And once it is done the overall RU situation in the whole southern operational zone is quite perilous.

RU Rybar gave following most probable description of UKR attack on BDK Novorossysk. RU did not detect neither take off nor flight of UKR Su-24 from Starokostyantynyv airfield toward Feodosia (target location) At 3 AM RU detected missile launch from direction of Snihurivka (direction is not equal to near, usually it means closer to target but on the same axis) RU did not detect flight to Kanatovo airfield at 4 AM RU detected take off and flight of two planes from Kanatovo airfield to Starokostyantynyv airfield Analysis Given Rybar said truth, from the old patrolling area: RU could detect air targets at medium (and high) altitudes throughout Central Ukraine RU could detect air targets at low altitudes only at the Storm Shadow detection line UKR planes could operate at low altitudes undetected during attacks, but for routine operations, they prefer to operate at medium altitudes, even if it means being detected (probably because low flying operations reduce range and are dangerous) Monitoring UKR air activity makes it simpler for RU to establish the approximate present location of UKR planes for missile attacks that UKR has minimal possibility of countering Conclusion First, Pushing A-50 further away reduces the risk of RU missile attacks on UKR airfields, that UKR cannot defend against. Given the arrival of the F-16 (HVT for RU), it is likely that UKR are providing a "safe space" for the F-16 to operate. Interesting, but it appears that the delay in sending F-16s might be due to the risk of operating them while the A-50 is near, rather than a lack of political will. Second, pushing A-50 further east brings missile detection range directly to the frontline. It allows UKR planes to fly at low altitude to the front lines undetected, providing support for troops at a considerably lower risk.

Yes. And they know it and have done it. Except that rounding up even a hundred people could cause immediate closure of the average RU enterprise like this. So, they were taking maybe a couple dozen males at one time.

Let's look at detection and early warning ranges. New sketch based on UKR Mashovets post Here are detection ranges from A-50 Old Patrolling Route. Some info