LUCASWILLEN05

You might not like Meyer because he was SS and a fanatical Nazi. Both true and one should be aware of his bias as a historian, just as one should be aware of any other historian's biases. However the oriinal qoute is clearl one of a conscript in the Hitler Jugund and details one of his training experiences. As a historical account it shows how the SS saw themselves and trained their recruits for the battlefield. It would be interesting to compare this wit similar documents by Allied soldiers and the German regular army to compare and contrst th ordinary recruits experience of traning. And to assess how that affected unit battlefield performance. We are often biased against the SS due to the Holocaust and their association with t. And it is quite right we should condemn this. But, from a historian's point of view (and I did my degree in History) we musty go beyond persoal views and , within the context of the current discussion regarding troop quality, try to make an objective assesdsment based on the unit's training and battlefield erformance. Which, in the case of the Waffenn SS n Normandy was actually very good. Then we must consider the reasons why this might be the case.

The Allies did have a lot of artillery and it was essential to their LW doctrine. Whether one wants to watch a half hour bombardment (a few minutes while your attack force closes can be quite spectacular viewing but we can cover most of a preliminary bombardment by other means.

Agree with you on that one. There were German counter attack/counter offensive plans drawn up but never implemented. And te Allies certainly expected a slow fighting withdrawl thinking they would only reach the Sene on D Day +90 if I remember what I read once correctly. Potentially lots of alternative history scenario ideas in these.

Much the same happened to most German divisions who fought in Normandy including the Waffen SS. I and II SS Panzer Korps were never the same again after Normandy as Meyer and other divisional historians such as Helmut Tieke admit even if tacitly. It was Allied firepower that was largely responsible for winning the Battle of Normandy rather more than tactical or even operational skill. Yes, the British tied down the Panzer Divisions around Caen while the US fought through the Bocage and broke out with Operation Cobra. Whether the Germans could have done better with another strategy such as a fighting withdrawl or a more moblie defence inland isd a question that is probably impossible to answer.

Certainly Nazism was an evid ideology and certainly political indoctrination was an important part of SS training. Which explains why Meyer and others held the views they had. And we must bear that bias in mind when assessing his writings as a historical source (Soviet historians are also guilty of ideologically motivated bias - I have seen some of their work and it can often be ideologcally slanted rubbish at its very worst. Meyer on the oher hand is recognised as writing a good history of his division though he does tend to gloss over or ignore cerrtain issues such as war crmes and complans much about the treatment of the SS after the war and fails to understand why such treatmment was meted out But battlefield skills were of great importance as well and, in the most effective units like Das Reich, Liebstandarte, Hitler Jugund and similar divisions that enabled these unts to perform as strong and highly dangerous battlefield opponents. So, while we all agree these units were nasty, brutal pieces of work they were also highly effective military units on the battlefield. Not all Waffen SS divisions or units were of this calibre. Some were only competent and indeed barely so. Others were only good at slaughtering unarmed civillians and fell apart as soon as they were asked to fight a real battle. We have to assess the Waffen SS based on actual battlefield performance and, in Normandy this was often very good particularly on the defensive as they usually were but they could moun dangerous attacks as well.

Hardly. The Germans mounted a number of punishing counter attacks after holding the British offensives. Epsom for example saw most of the captured salient abandoned despite the repulse of the German attacks at places like Rauray The Germans still paid for that and were increasingly worn don as the Normandy campaign progressedMeyer's figures for his own division show 13%losses (22% combat strength) in the first ten days (Steel Inferno P141) but, as Reynolds also points out Allied divisons took similar casualties. So, if high losses were par for the course in WW2 we cannot use casualty rates as evidence foor lack of competence. It was hard and bloody combat andthat was that.] I'll bet that most of us end up with relaively high casualty rates as wll in a Combat Mission scenario, particularly if we play aggressively and.or there are large amouts of artilllery available.

Also the title of Gilbert's book covering the June 7 action Certainly Buron was the scene of hard fighting on the 7th The Canadias were defeated on a tactical level and they certainly failed to achieve their missiobn. TheGermans would have liked to advance further but were stopped frm doing so by Allied naval gunfire and, no doubt stiffening Canadian resistence The Canadians most cerainly got nowhere near their 7 June objectives at Capiquet Airport (Steel Inferno P65)and had to falll back at the end of the day's fighting (Steel Inferno P 67. All n alll a succwesful counter attack by the ermans though nt meeting the ideal hopes.

On the other hand, as Nipesays, if officers make false reports and are found out then they may get a transfer from that cushy staff job to something that is let us say, less comfortable. So the combat reports sent to superiors are likely to be honest. Although it is also likely that junior leaders at platoon or company level sent in false reports about making an attack that was ordeered but not seriously atempted. As for Rotmistrov we know now he lied about Prokorovka and he had good reason for doing so. But since he had achieved what was asked of 5th GTA and because his version of events was politicallyconvenient his version became the historically accepted one for over 60 years. #only recentl;y, when the Soviet archives were opened and the Geman milita\ry records studied did a differenr=t account begin to emerge. And that account challenges the traditional view of the Waffen SS Panzer Divisios as military incompetents. A perception that does not fit with the tough resistence to the British in Normandy. So, if Liebstandaarte, Hitler Jugund and the rest were incompetent, how is it they were able to hold up the British around Caen for so long? nless you want to say that that British, Canadian and US troops in Normandy were even worse soldiers than the Waffen SS? Clearly they were not although many lacked combat experence at all levels. Hitler Jugund on the other hand had some 2000 officers and NCOs transferred from Liebstandarte in late 1943. And that division most certainly had intensive combat experience on the Russian Front so most if not all of those officers andNCOs would have known exactly what they were talking about when they taught the new Hitler Jugunf recruits

Unless of course the sneaky Germans employy the Heiinrici metjhod and are not there. We can, if we want, put on large British/US bmbardments in Norndy and Italy. Not as much perhaps as the Red Army might use but certainly significant on a tactical level. Think Monte Cassino, the various Allied offennsives n Normandy etc. The Germans called it Trommelfeur (DrumFire) and with good reason.

No. Read George Nipe's bookas. And, from the Russian side, Zamulin. What we now know is that much of what was written about Prokorovka over the last 60 years was based on a Soviet era lie. Rotmistrov had to xplain to Staln how 5th Guards Tank Army suffered such high losses. He claimed II SS Panzer Korps had up to 70 Tigers (in fact they had about a dozen Tigers that were "runnerrs on July 12. and maybe 60 tanks in the area where the main action was fought Yet 5th GTA lost 300 to 400 tanks depending on whose account you read. Rotmistrov had to explain what happened to Stalin who would have been well within his rights to remve Rotmistrov from command and even have him shot. However, Rotmistrov had achieved what he was supposed to do, namely preven a further significant advance by II SS Panzer Korps and his claims were believed by his superiors. And so a convenient "official version" was produced. It could not be challenged in the 1960s because Kruschev was a senio Commissar with Voronezh Front whic gave 5th GTA its orders (responsibility even by association would be very mbarassing for Khruschev) And even after Khruschev wwas removed from power it would have been politically embarrassing to the Kremlin to admit that they had been lying about te battle for oover 20 years. Western hstorians, being unable to access the German documents being transcribed onto microfilm in the US had to rely on the official Soviet account whic ewxaggerated the German strength and claimed that the couragous Soviet tankers charged to close range of the German tanks and destroyed them at cloe range. We now know that this is not what happened. Certainly the Soviet tankers charged bravely and they certainly did stop the Germans (at least by gaining a critical day for the Soviets to brng up massive reserves and to exhaust the II SS in a physical sense) Bu the 5GTA almost immolated itself in achieving this. Prokorovka was certainly a tactical German victorywith hndreds of destroye Soviet tanks keft on the field but it was an operationl abnd strategic defeat within the context of an offensive that had already failed,

The qoute waa from Meer's book and he was qouting on of the men of his division writing of his own experiences. This isan example of how they saw hemselves. Well trained and highly motivated as recognised by many of their opponents. Also they could be and often were a bunch of thugs. They certainly killed POWs though there are instances of Allied troops dong the same thing The German policy of dealing with "saboteurs" (resistance fighters) is of course a different matter but not reallyne relevant to the task of assessing a unit's combat capabilities. So, distasteful as it is we have to put certain issues and feelings aside for a moment whil we assess the question of combaat capabilities. Faliure to do so risks clouding the historial judgement with personal bias. At tyhe same time we also need to bear in minfd that Meyer, as a former commande of Hitler Jugund has his own bias and wants to cast his unit in the bestlight possiblle. However, how they saw themselves is still important historical evidence Reynolds, writing 60 years after the event is a more neutral source than #meyer acknowledging both the German War crimes and the harsh post war treatment of former SS incuding mock trials and mock executions which in themselves might be regarded as war crimes. Much as one dislikes the Waffen SS the accounts of this are difficult and sometimes harrowing reading.

Some US veterans in the Hurtgen Forest hung back while the conscripts were sent forward to get killed. Then we have Desert Veteran British units in Normandy lke 7th Armoured Division. These were units who were veteran but had seen too much and were being asked to fight in terrain ofa type they were not used to. So, while these are veterans and should be rated as such they should also have relatively low (just below average) morale in Normandy plus most leaders should be rated at average (0) to make this unit twend to be somewhat "sticky"

Point is the Waffen SS wre often abler to keep going dspite the very high losses. Meyer records that, in Normandy his division lost Officers 128 wounded,55 killed, 56 missing/captured, 7 dead other causes NCOs 613 wounded, 229 killed, 192 missing/captured, 18 dead other causes Men 3684wounded, 1548killed, 2012 missing/captured, 96 dead other cause And we know that after Normandy Hiter Jugund's performance declined significantlydespit several months out of th line. Even Meyer's owown account, read between the lines, confirms this. The only area where the German histories written by former officers are significanly dishonest is on the matter of war crimes. On occasion where there were failures thatreflect badly on a unt where the writer was a former officer of the dvision even when nt directly involved himself. Spaeter's account f the 10th Panzer Brigade attachedto Gross Deutschland on the first day of Kursk for example.

Hmm their counter attack against the Canadians at Buron for example? And in many cases, not just in Normandy, Germancounter attacks foundered against Allied naval gunfire and artillery .support And if Htler Jugund and the other divisions of 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Korps were so incompetent perhps you would like to explain Operations Perrch, Charnwood, Epsom, Goodwood and Spring to me. Were the Allied troops who ailed against the SS incompetent? Noo, they were not. They faced a tough, highly motivated and resourceful enemy highly capable in defence and with strong abilities to launch punishing counter attacks even in the face of US and British firepower. And if SS Panzer/Panzergrenadier divisions were so incompent perhaps you would like to explain Prokorovka, 3rd and 4th Kharkov to me (just fr starters) in the light of the research published in the last decade or so by George Nipe and Valeriy Zamullin who, having examined sources such as the official German reports and records (and for that matter the Soviet archives) tell a very differnt account from the one we were told since WW2.

We all just want to game Salerno, the Volturno, Sangro, Cassinoamd Anzio. Not to mention the British half of Husky. And we want it now Stamps foot!

General Michael Renolds (you have presumeably read his books) also grades the Waffen SS divisions thatfought in Normandy as very high quality trooops. If they were not how is t they were able to hold up the Allied armies for two months n some of the bitterest fighting of the war? It was the Waffen SS who stopped Operations Perch, Epsom, Charnwood, Goodwood, Atlantic, Spring and others. Though the Waffen SS certainly committd war crimes and are onsidered guilty by association with the Algameine SS for the Holocauastthey were also, in the case of the premier divisions such as Liebstandaret, Hitler Jugund, Das Reich, Totenkopf, Frundsburg, Hohnstauffen and others, highly skilled and brave (to the point of fanaticism) soldiers. They were also thugs who committesd serious war crimes. Allied soldiers too dd commit war crimmes execuing POWs in cold blood though they did not massacre civillians as the Waffen SSsometimes did. But if we are going to seriously studt WW2 on the Western and Eastern Frnts we must get over the erroneous view that the Waffen SS were all murderous thugs only good at slaughtering civillins. That is not the case though there were ndeed SS units who were only good at that and came apart as soon as they were asked to fight a professional oponent I have no liking for the Waffen SS bt it is important we get the history right.

Hungarians fought during Operation Bagration and the Roumanian during Lvov Sandomierz. Anyway it would be nice to have the option otherwise it would be like leaving the Italians out of Sicily. Anyway, leave it to the gamers to decide which armies to play! But give us the option!

June 4th. To coincide with the 69th Aniversary of the fall of Rome. Sarcasm Mode will now be set to the "Off" position so I wil make no comments about Battlefront taking as long as it took to crack the original Gustav Line. :-) I will however be very pleased when it finally becomes available. PS Battlefront are probably used to this by now as we go through this every time! -)

Hmm that still leaves out the Roumanians and the Hungarians And the battles in Roumania and Hungary in the autumn/winter 1945. And the fight for Upper Silesia. Plus thw early 1944 Russian attempt to invade Roumania.

Apart from the shell holes, yes it does. Looking forward to some winter battles at long last. And a future Russian Front offering that will let us fight Stalingrad, the 1943 Winter Offensive (including 3rd Kharkov) and the 1943-4 struggle for the Dnieper Line. Not tomention the winter struggle on Germany's Western borders of course. But i suspect his may be some way off yet.

Methinks Battlefront arre engaged in a little "D Day Dodging" We'll never be in Rome by June 4th at this rate! :-)

Want the Gustav Line now:-) Now! Now ! Now! Love that winter terrain even if the background does not match. You cann always patch it later! :-)

"no matter how repetive or realitic t But that's the point. Allied training methods and German training methods particularly those employed by the Waffen SS were very different. Balkosi on the 29th Infantry Division "No Matter how repetitive or realistic the 29th Division#s tactical exercises were , the 29ers knew theywould have to learn te subtlties of combat the had way, on the battlefield. In combat however it took a few weeks for thesquad leaders to graspthe significant differences between war and 'war by the book' and by then many of thm were dead. Effective rifle squad leadership in the29th Division during its firrst weeks in combt was hazardous for the men discovered that he infantry tactics they had been taught were in urgent need of modification. Unfortuneatly for the GI's German tactics, having been refned over five years of war needed little revision" Beyond the Beachhead P87) Hubert Meyer on the other hand regarded the Hitler Jugund as fit for offensive action on 1 June 1944 (The 12th SSThe Historyof the Hitler Youuth Panzer Division P24 Volume 1 "The Divisional commander inspected the exercse. Early n the morning we left for comat training with live ammunition. Our platoon deployed fom a village towards cardboard cutout soldiers to the left of a heavy machinegun position whose firing range restricted our attack sector on the right. Bullets were just whistling past us. We crawled into firing range off the cardboard soldiers and fired on them with all we had. This exercise was applauded by Divisional Commander Witt who had just been promoted to Brigade Fuhrer (one star general)After that our platoon sat with mixed feelings before the sand box whicgh was set up in a building next to the castle: we were supposed to demonstrate our tactical knowledgeto the commander. Witt himself, while his calmness and relaxed behaviouur set us at ease, pickwed one of the course participants by putting a kindly hand on the shoulderof our comradeduring his briefing of the situation. Wittexplained themission to himand suggested our comrade think about the best tactical approach outside in the open for five minues.It wrked out well. Contact was quickly established and we answered without hsitation and in an acceptable manner (Meyer P53) ""The leasdership and troops fully realised that difficult and, at the same time decisiveattles lay ahead. After nine months of intensive combat training they trusted their own abilities . All in all , they were well equipped and armed. They were looking at the coming action with confidence" (Meyer P54 The Allies regarded the HJ as the "Baby Milk" Division but "We knew we were quick, agile and confident. We trusted our officers and non-coms who had been hardened in battle. We had known them since the beginning of training. During combat training with live ammunition we had enjoyed seeing hem in the mud together with us, with steel helmet and submachine gun (Jochn Leykauff (Meyer P54)