kevinkin

It has been 5 years: https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/03/09/five_years_after_a_disastrous_syria_battle_wagner_is_more_dangerous_than_ever_886224.html Might be a bit of a stretch to compare Battle of Khasham with today in Ukraine. There seems to be a group of people who think air power is the one and only answer and not just part of the can opener.

https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-war-kyiv-odesa-kharkiv-40714ec02d628a95458594da6ba8a80e Uncle Joe has to get Uncle Sam off the couch. Every time something like this happens to civilians, there must be a tangible physical response. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/latvia-donates-drunk-drivers-cars-ukraines-war-effort-2023-03-09/?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d Latvia is thinking out of the box.

Have spent weeks in Ireland and the food is exceptional. Mild climate, surrounded by ocean, crisscrossed with abundant fields loaded with lamb and salmon smoke houses. Add in some training on the continent and voilà. The place is actually worth a trip just for the food.

Didn't their forefathers fight with pitchforks? https://taskandpurpose.com/news/russian-military-shovels-combat-ukraine/?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

Didn't their forefathers fight with pitchforks? https://taskandpurpose.com/news/russian-military-shovels-combat-ukraine/?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericmack/2023/03/06/russia-may-be-wasting-tons-of-munitions-blowing-up-inflatable-decoys-in-ukraine/?sh=5982957e64f7 The one thing the RA solders are good at does not work well in war time.

Nevertheless, in the first year of war, Putin’s partial escalation strategy has generally served him well. It has allowed him to maintain political stability through a combination of intimidation and indifference. Internationally and domestically, it has helped him prepare Russia for a very long war without making the kinds of sacrifices that might ultimately cause the population to rebel. And above all, it has given him flexibility. The more radical options—including economic nationalization and full mobilization—are still open, and the country’s bureaucracy is already prepared to set them in motion. The question is, how long can this not-quite-total war be sustained? The longer the war goes on, the more Putin will have to take some of the more drastic steps he has threatened. And at some point, he will run out of room to play with. Served him well? Anyway, he might have something left in the tank, but the tank is leaking all sorts of flammables and toxins right in his own backyard. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russias-halfway-hell-strategy We've got to hold on to what we've got It doesn't make a difference if we make it or not We've got each other and that's a lot for love We'll give it a shot Woah, we're half way there Woah, livin' on a prayer Take my hand, we'll make it I swear Woah, livin' on a prayer Livin' on a prayer

I think the assumption is they will get those jammers and ARM. That might be the third dimension the lady is talking about. Otherwise, why bother. I suppose she thinks a ground war is mostly 2D and gaining localized superiority in a 3D might move the RA out their trenches. In other words, even a small targeted contribution from the air might might chew up less manpower per effect on the ground. The UA needs some form of inflection that is greater than the sum of the parts.

Unusual camera angle (ground level almost) and the soldier gave the world the finger as if he saw it coming. One thing, foxholes need to be shaped to avoid funneling those bombs into the position. Reserve lobster trap.

Pretty good info: https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/03/07/which-fighter-jet-is-best-for-ukraine-as-it-fights-off-russia/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=dfn-special-report The country is not lacking for pilots, Bronk said, but the problem is they don’t have enough airworthy jets. The F-16 “is a lightweight fighter designed for nice runways,” Bronk said. “Most Ukrainian runways are pretty rough. So if they’re moving around like that, the fighter has to be [able to] handle it and not suffer a massive increase in maintenance [needs], and the support equipment and maintenance arrangements have to be able to do it.” A better option for Ukraine might be the Gripen, Bronk said, as its standard maintenance and logistics equipment can be loaded into standard 20-foot shipping containers and easily moved on trucks. (Let's see if US inside the beltway ego gets in the way of this.) But the status quo, Penney said, is untenable. Without a modernized Ukrainian Air Force, she explained, the conflict has become a war of attrition, echoing the trench warfare of World War I. That places Ukraine in a dire situation, she added. “Ukraine only has so many people they can feed into the meat grinder of land warfare,” Penney said. “They need to move this into the third dimension, and you do that with aircraft.” She said the U.S. could develop a streamlined, accelerated training program for Ukrainian pilots that would last two to two-and-a-half months.

On China: https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/06/china-russia-war-taiwan-ukraine-peace-plan-xi-putin/ Instead, China prefers measures be debated multilaterally by the U.N. Security Council, where Beijing and Moscow wield vetoes. Undoubtedly, the U.S. and European Union-led sanctions regime on Russia has exacerbated Beijing’s dread that it, too, could someday be economically hobbled. But whereas Russia turned to economically more powerful China for support, Beijing would largely be on its own if the situation were reversed. That stark realization undergirds China’s intensifying self-sufficiency push, which is aimed at sanctions-proofing its economy. Those measures include establishing a yuan-based commodities trading scheme and developing the Cross-Border Interbank Payments System, augmented by the digital yuan, to enable sanctioned entities to dodge SWIFT, the Western-controlled global payments network.

On the air war: https://www.airandspaceforces.com/ukraine-has-lost-60-aircraft-taken-down-70-in-russian-invasion-hecker-says/ Ukraine has lost roughly 60 aircraft so far since Russia’s renewed invasion of the country in February 2022, while the Russians have lost more than 70, according to the top U.S. Air Force commander for Europe. After Russia’s larger air force failed to establish air superiority in the early days of the war, the air picture has turned into a mutually denied environment, Gen. James B. Hecker said March 6 at the AFA Warfare Symposium. “Ukraine’s downed over 70 Russian aircraft. So both of their integrated air and missile defense, especially when you’re talking about going against aircraft, they’ve been very effective. And that’s why they’re not flying over one another’s country.” The U.S. has attempted to bolster Ukraine’s air force with AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles, which have been jerry-rigged to work with the country’s Soviet-designed fighters. “Obviously, they’re not as integrated with the airplane as it would be if they’re on the U.S. aircraft, so they do have limitations,” Hecker said of Ukraine’s employment of HARMs. “But they’re doing a pretty good job.” The U.S. has also recently provided Ukraine’s air force with JDAM precision-guided bombs that have extended the Ukrainians’ strike capability. Hecker said that allows them to hit targets slightly beyond the current range of the GMRLS rockets fired by HIMARS launchers. The GMLRS rockets the U.S. has provided Ukraine have a range of nearly 50 miles. The U.S. has declined to provide Ukraine with long-range ATACMS missiles which have a range of nearly 200 miles. “Recently, we’ve just got them some precision munitions that had some extended range and can go a little bit further than a gravity drop bomb,” Hecker said. “And it has precision. That’s a recent capability that we were able to give them probably in the last three weeks. But Ukraine still must fly low to terrain mask its aircraft against Russian surface-to-air missiles." Flying low and longer range don't exactly go together so I wonder if the GLSDB is being deployed in test amounts?

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-bakhmut-0713f4b6c03e04e88a9a7d589cf00000 The Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think tank, said Kyiv’s smartest option now may be to withdraw to positions that are easier to defend. “Ukrainian forces are unlikely to withdraw from Bakhmut all at once and may pursue a gradual fighting withdrawal to exhaust Russian forces through continued urban warfare,” the ISW said in an assessment published late Sunday. This is what I mentioned this morning but called it a local insurgency fielded by UA's cream of the crop. Almost a suicide mission. But everything in this war is almost a suicide mission given the modern battlefield.

ET phone home? https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1742654/Wagner-Group-Vladimir-Putin-Russia-Ukraine-frontline-Bakhmut-Prigozhin-latest

Detailed operational summary writer by a recent convert: https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/03/06/fortress_bakhmut_885482.html Reading between the lines, once/if the UA withdrawals from Bathmat, this might be a direct sign the clock has started counting down to a UA summer offensive. If meaning perhaps Bathmat could become a hotbed of a local insurgency while mechanized formations rumble to the north and south. It would be the bravest left behind to do that fighting. By applying pressure everywhere, it can disperse the forces Ukraine needs to stage a breakthrough operation and exploit it later this year. Assaults on Bakhmut again are crucial to this approach. Holding Bakhmut has cost Ukraine significant manpower, meaning the longer Ukraine commits to holding the city, and Siversk to the north of it, the harder it becomes for Ukraine to accumulate reserves. The issue with Russia’s approach is that Ukraine has, despite breathless Western reporting to the contrary, countered it rather well. Ukraine has continued its deep strike campaign into the Russian rear, hitting ammunition depots and command and control nodes with Western-provided rocket artillery. It has also brought several its traditional mechanized brigades off-line, rotating in National Guard and Territorial Defense Force (TDF) units. The Ukrainian National Guard and TDF are not well equipped for mechanized maneuver warfare. But many of the soldiers in these units saw combat during the 2014-2022 Donbas War, giving them extensive experience in trench warfare and urban defense. These soldiers, then, with artillery support, are precisely the units needed to confront Russia in grinding close combat. In turn, the West must keep its equipment deliveries coming apace. Tanks and armored vehicles are critical, along with ammunition plentiful enough to support and offensive and ground-based air defense systems to protect Ukraine’s cities and free up mobile anti-air units to support armored spearheads. War does not abide by a consistent rhythm. But it does contain a strategic logic, identifiable to the observer. Every sign points to Ukrainian success – if the West does not crack.

WSJ: Russia’s Wagner Troops Exhaust Ukrainian Forces in Bakhmut - Deadly fight against the penal battalions threatens Kyiv’s ability to mount spring offensive - Will see if I can find the rest of this published 2 hours ago.

Functioning yes. Accurate no. Accuracy mean nothing unless you are trying to win an all out nuclear exchange where silos and specific hard targets need to be destroyed. But 10 nukes hitting 10 suburbs of 10 major US cities is enough of a threat to be geologically effective. At least in the mad man first strike scenario. Even if Russia is annihilated in response with high accuracy, would anyone want to live in a country that is partially annihilated by MIRVs with terrible accuracy? And we got out of sorts about dirty bombs back in the day.

Functioning yes. Accurate no. Accuracy mean nothing unless you are trying to win an all out nuclear exchange where silos and specific hard targets need to be destroyed. But 10 nukes hitting 10 suburbs of 10 major US cities is enough of a threat to be geologically effective. At least in the mad man first strike scenario. Even if Russia is annihilated in response with high accuracy, would anyone want to live in a country that is partially annihilated by MIRVs with terrible accuracy? And we got out of sorts about dirty bombs back in the day.

Turing the screws?: https://www.nbcnews.com/investigations/two-ukrainian-pilots-are-us-training-assessment-attack-aircrafts-f-16s-rcna73426 Two Ukrainian pilots are currently in the United States undergoing an assessment to determine how long it could take to train them to fly attack aircraft, including F-16 fighter jets, according to two congressional officials and a senior U.S. official. Range finding study that could have been conducted long ago. Unless the AF knows and this report is for public consumption.

But close enough for horseshoes, hand grenades or government work.

I agree. In addition the UA needs to finds ways to increase the firepower against RA supply networks even the distribution points for tactical formations. If they can get a mix of direct and indirect fire on those tactical points, along with long range destruction of operational points, the UA can maneuver the Russian out of their prepared defenses. So it's movement not so much to occupy, but to gain a strategic barrage. (Old Napoleonic term) Get the Russian on the move and into the open and good things will take place.

For what it's worth: Today, nuclear deterrence provides the Russian forces with a modern “Ukraine Line.” With the threat of atomic weapons, Russian forces are able to withdraw from campaigns that are failing, reconstitute, and redeploy to other portions of Ukraine. Ukrainian officials have noted that there are more Russian forces currently deployed than were massed last year at the start of the invasion. Clausewitz’s short treatise on a seemingly obscure conflict in eighteenth-century Russian history imparts lessons for strategists today. First, even in ages that focus on the rules of engagement and laws of war, enemy forces might target civilians in order to distract their opponents and shape the situation to their advantage. Second, logistical problems can hinder a force more than enemy action. Third, the center of gravity may not be military casualties; heavy enemy losses do not always equate victory. Fourth, creating a situation where your home territory is defended from attack enables withdrawal, reconstitution, and redeployment. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/03/02/clausewitzs_analysis_resonates_to_this_day_885101.html We understand the power of having nukes, the importance of logistics and suicidal nature of Russia when it comes to operations. They are doing the "same old, same old". The UA should forget about the center of gravity and maneuver against Russia's critical vulnerability by finding surprising ways to break Russia's ability to sustain forces in Ukraine. Sort of reminds of the isolation of Normandy and interdiction of German supplies via the air campaign. Like guerrilla warfare but conducted by regular forces on a large scale against irreplaceable targets.

I agree. And speaking to those bridge laying AFVs publicly is a message of confidence. Who knows what else is in these packages that is not publicly known. It also appears that Nato training is in general cycling through more and more of the UA. Perhaps, becoming self sustaining with regular rotations soon.

All that's been mentioned in the news are M60 AVLBs. What is the training cycle for engineering equipment of this sort? Could be more about coordination with all arms than just plug and play there is a bridge.

Show / sign of confidence: https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-weapons-russia-biden-war-0e52e87ade3d2300da8be14a3ebcc9ff The Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge is a portable, 60-foot (18-meter) folding metal bridge that is carried on top of a tank body. Providing that system now could make it easier for Ukrainian troops to cross rivers to get to Russian forces. More of the equipment: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/former-m60-tanks-fitted-with-folding-bridges-are-headed-for-ukraine Sending the M60 AVLBs to Ukraine also makes good sense because of the more specific nature of the conflict there. While armored bridge layers are most often associated with crossing narrow waterways, like canals and small rivers, they can also be used to help get heavy equipment across areas full of other obstacles, including trenches, large craters, and soft, muddy ground. Been mentioning the shell holed landscape as a factor in operations for a while now. Not sure if this is a force multiplier, but close enough. Still not a break-in enabler. I think they might be too few and vulnerable. More of a way to maintain momentum and have friendly AFV appear where the enemy thinks they can't go.