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tharawdeal

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About tharawdeal

  • Birthday 11/19/1981

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    Athens, GA, USA
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  1. The CLU is its own separate piece of equipment. The missiles are individually loaded onto it before being fired. The CLU itself doesn't weigh anything near 49 pounds, and the missiles and CLU are never carried by the same guy. Of course, it's not meant to be run around with as a complete package; you find where you want to kill your tanks or bunker from, you set it up, you fire, and you get the hell out of there. Yes, it does take a while to "warm up." You have to start the system and then wait while it performs its own diagnostic self-check. Then you have to wait for the unit to cool itself down, which takes a little while as well--the CLU reads very minute differences in temperature which it then translates into a video image. And yes, it does suck batteries if you use it a lot. It uses the same batteries that the ASIP and SINCGARS radios use, which is convenient, but if you carry a lot of them they add weight.
  2. I think that is a very smart solution, but even so, only one guy in the whole squad is going to suffer from carrying the CLU. As was mentioned earlier, in a situation like that it might actually be better to keep the CLU for the optics. Which makes me wonder, how far can the Javelin troops see in CM:SF?
  3. Well, when that very advanced weapon system costs more to replace than you do, guess what the Army is going to say about leaving it for the enemy? Not, as Martha Stewart might say, "a Good Thing." Sure, you might be able to preserve yourself by throwing away the CLU or the missiles and running, but you would be leaving your buddies up **** Creek without the proverbial paddle if they came up against more armor and didn't have the equipment to deal with it. That would be like throwing away your rifle, except worse, because rifles cost beans and can't kill tanks!
  4. I understand about design creep; sometimes less is more. It's better to have 5 fleshed-out, bug-free features that work really well every time than 10 minor ones that are hit-and-miss, or that somehow interfere with what's already been done. In other words, I believe in the twin axioms of "if it ain't broke, don't break it," and "get the live RPG round out of your own leg before you try to take the ricochet out of your buddy's." Still, it's fun to talk about what we'd like to see. After all, it's understood that nobody can force you to add something to a game, so talk is just talk. [ August 14, 2007, 12:07 AM: Message edited by: tharawdeal ]
  5. Active Duty Army 11B (2003-2006) 2003 - Ft. Benning, GA (OSUT): C Co., 1/19 2003-2004 - Camp Giant, South Korea: A Co., 1/506th IN (Air Assault), 2ID - RTO 2004-2005 - Camp Habbaniyah (Camp Manhattan), Iraq: A Co., 1/506th IN (Air Assault), 2BCT, 2ID - Driver/RTO, team leader, SAW gunner 2005-2006 - Ft. Carson, CO: Unit redesignated A Co. 2/12 IN, 2BCT, 2ID - Rifleman, SAW gunner
  6. It might be interesting if the scenario designer could "check a box" and specify: 1. You have no fire support. 2. You have fire support on positively identified targets only. 3. You have full fire support. But overall, I think it's a minor issue, and I understand why things are the way they are.
  7. There seems to be an awful lot of gloom and doom in some of these threads. The game hasn't even been out for a month yet. It's far too early to say whether or not it will be a success or a failure, and what the margin of either will be.
  8. In my opinion, CMSF treads a very fine line between game and simulation, which, again IMO, is why the CM series has appealed to people over the years. I understand why calling for fire out of LOS could be undesirable in a game. Certain terrain features are almost always bound to contain defenders: tall buildings (in a city), buildings (in a rural area), trenches, orchards, etc. The ability to bombard them to dust before moving a single unit can really hamper a scenario designer's vision for how the action will play out. One could also say that the inability to call for fire out of LOS is simulating the reluctance to drop shells without eyes-on intel, but unless there is some explicit reason why it can't be done (limited resupply, unwanted damage to infrastructure, inevitable civilian casualties) it should be possible. It might seem like a throwback to the WWII policy of "shell first, ask questions later," but in a scenario where you know every warm body you will come across that isn't wearing your uniform is an enemy, let 'er rip. Easier to waste a few shells than to expend your men.
  9. I think that a simulation should allow you to make the decision to do things like call for fire out of LOS. Even if they're not always smart decisions, and may even violate ROE, that's war. Only the outcome of the battle can ultimately decide whether such an action was effective or not.
  10. Exactly. Plus, grenades don't roll up stairs...
  11. The expectation that some of the vehicles will be lost during the course of the mission is probably built in to the scenarios, which could lead to a lot of "extra" IFVs being included. Also, one platoon of infantry can not be transported to the battlefield with only one IFV. Depending on the size of the platoon, it would take 3 or 4 just to get everyone in the right place. The number of IFVs grows when considering a company-sized engagement, unless multiple groups of troops were ferried to the battlefield by fewer IFVs making multiple trips. It could be that the scenario designer is taking this into account, so that the player isn't left wondering how all of these infantry troops arrived and how they will leave. What to do with your IFVs will be dictated by the mission and the commander's intent. In general, armored units should adhere to the "buddy system" just as much as infantry units do. Unless your vehicles will be close enough to each other to provide mutual support over the course of the entire mission, isolated IFVs are in danger of being disabled or destroyed with no other friendly force with similar capabilities nearby to provide security. If one aspect of the mission is to present a "show of force" to the enemy or to a hostile civilian population, multiple vehicles present on the battlefield can serve to intimidate any would-be attackers. Vehicles placed at key points around the engagement zone can also serve as a cordon that will prevent the escape of enemy combatants from the area or prevent the influx of reinforcements to it. Of course, the flipside of using all of your vehicles is that it presents the enemy with a greater range of potential targets. At some point, having more and more vehicles will yield diminishing returns. Most commanders understand the need to have a reserve force that will not become immediately engaged, but can be sent to various trouble spots to provide rapid support. They also exploit the value of having an "ace in the hole" with maintaining some forces that the enemy will not be aware of right away. If you feel that your IFVs are getting in the way of each other, you might consider leaving some outside the immediate fight to be used as a quick reaction force. This way you don't risk more vehicles being destroyed or disabled, but you retain the ability to bring extra firepower to bear when and where it's needed.
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