Vark

I do hope they are just representative as the uniforms in Red Dawn look more realistic! Good link with hordes of pictures to show the 'real' look http://images.google.co.uk/imgres?imgurl=http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/attachment.php%3Fattachmentid%3D42978%26d%3D1202379697&imgrefurl=http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php%3F117915-Soviet-Afghan-war-79-89-Thread/page12&usg=__IBKO4w1JddjRCs4UadVj7DsDMXE=&h=401&w=610&sz=73&hl=en&start=103&um=1&itbs=1&tbnid=KLTGh7df5Pi8lM:&tbnh=89&tbnw=136&prev=/images%3Fq%3DRussian%2Buniforms%2Bafghan%2Bwar%26ndsp%3D20%26hl%3Den%26sa%3DN%26start%3D100%26um%3D1

Yes, and how come when you use move fast your men suffer casualties and pin as soon as engaged, but the AI can run towards your MG's, ignoring your veteran gunners best efforts. This same squad can then absorb a platoons worth of fire and pop up to gut your crack unit, when it launches a counter attack. After the battle you look in amazement as it is revealed to be a Green pioneer squad with rifles and SMG's. I now always work on the principle that whilst planning I factor in the 'whats the worst that could happen' scenarios. Don't assume your 76.2mm will KO that Panzer at 120 metres, assume it will survive and knock out the gun, then go on to avoid your hidden tank hunters and knock them out! Hidden flame thrower crews successfully ambush that armoured car, pah! Plan that the veteran crews will spray fire everywhere but the target, will be knocked out, and don't even hope that double AT minefield will stop it. So have a back up PTRD team waiting, better yet two teams, as the first will be knocked out by the MG team who survived a mortar barrage. Your MG teams are panicked by a mere handful of 50mm bombs, your opponents are fighting fit after a 200 round 82mm deluge! So, prepare for the most unlikely outcome and you should not be disappointed.

I believe in a moment of rare honesty, a French politician, who was publically against the US operation against Afghanistan, admitted. "If they (the 9/11 bombers) had attacked Paris, and killed as many people we would have found the country responsible and probably nuked it" This is paraphrasing, but the meaning was all too clear. I can see it now, a German Green MP calling for blood but very concerned the Leo II's power packs are not as enviromentally friendly as possible and whats this about DU!!!!!!!! CAS only allowed at certain times of the day so as not to disturb indigenous wildlife and only dropping bio-degradable munitions. In fact, imagine a mission where keeping your carbon footprint and environmental impact as low as possible was part of the victory conditions.

In 91, US troops mistook Iraqi armour for their own, in the attack on Khafji and in 2003 a Challenger II knocked out another Challenger. The image of a target in a thermal imager is not all that clear and if CM-N is to be realistic, unidentified target icons should be liberally used, there might, as another poster has suggested, even be a 'everything's a Tiger/88' syndrome' probability, depending on training and morale state.

The reason I have heard, from the horses mouth so to speak, was a political and military one. Whilst attending a lecture, by the MOD, on future wars and the problems of strategic implementation I talked to a senior British Army Air Corps helicopter commander. As the conflict had shortly ended, and as I found out he had commanded Helicopters in that operation I asked him about the lack of AH-64's. His response could be broken down into four distinct parts 1. The AH-64's ECM/ECCM suite was not deemed suitable, as the peace dividend had affected upgrades. He contrasted this with the British AH-64 with far better systems. This could be the traditional 'our kit is better than yours' but he did hold a senior rank and later on Flight International reported on the delays to upgrades, mentioning the Apache fleet 2. Poor pilot training, caused by cut back in the US meant that the attrition rate, during NAP fling at night in heavily wooded high contour areas was deemed too risky. The US suffered casualties to their AH-64 fleet in night training accidents when they deployed, so their might be some truth in this. The loss of pilots allowed a delay in deployment, casued by an inter-service row. See below. 3. AH-64's SoP was to operate with both special forces units and artillery units to help prepare targets and rescue downed crew. The higher ups in the USAF wanted to put the AH-64's under Air Force control and refused to allow the support units the AH-64's were used to. They apparently feared that a rescue mission across into Serbia could escalate into a shooting war with US ground troops, in a defacto 'invasion' calling in MLRS and 155's into Serbia, to support the AH-64's. As a result the Army refused to use the AH-64's saying it would put the pilots at too great a risk. 4. Lomir, to back up your point, he said that intel said Serbs were hiding MANPADS teams in the forest edges, of likely ingress routes, to launch second generation IR missiles, like the SA-18's, in counter helicopter ambushes. The plan was to shoot the missiles as the helicopters flew over the dense woods, impossible to avoid in some areas if tank hunting, as the Serb armoured columns had by then dispersed into the thick pine forests. The AH-64's TI systems could not penetrate the heavy foliage cover and the antiquated IR warning and counter measure systems would have given only seconds to react to a rear aspect engagement. The surviving crews were then to be captured for propaganda purposes, as Saddam had done, hopefully undermining the war effort, don't forget the opposition from leftist/socialist countries to the operation in Europe was high and the Democrats were in power. Having said this, the capture of the US army soldiers only seemed to boost the US governments resolve, so perhaps the Serbs had been a victim of their own propaganda, aimed at the US.

I guess it was only fair, given the number of Soviet 'advisors' on the otherside of the canal. Given the tempo of a war between Nato and Warpac forces would have precluded any but the smallest of field modifications, the force whose equipment was fit for purpose would have won. Your weapons not performing as predicted, tough! By the time you analyse the problem and come up with a working solution the war is over. There would not be the luxury of having time to rectify your mistakes as in previous conflicts.

I once talked to somebody on the commitee who named Chicom SSM's, he felt the nadir had been reached when they picked Seersucker for the Silkworm replacement!! Some of my favourite inappropriate/insulting names MI-24 Hind. HIND!!! Thats a graceful deer, not a bloody great flying tank, nicknamed the pike or hunchback, by the people who fly them. Mig-15 Fagot. Hmm, enough said, you are either smearing the pilots sexuality or saying his plane is a lump of wood waiting to be burned, actually thinking about the last one quite appropriate. Mig-21 Fishbed. Sleek interceptor, named after a what!! Tu-22M Backfire. Graceful maritime bomber named after a mistake/mechanical deficiency Mig-25 Foxbat. Superfast interceptor with two f***off engines and radar after a cuddly furry Chiroptera Talking of maskirovka, just how much ordnance would have targeted decoys? The air operation against Serbia, with far more complex weapon systems available to NATO, than in the eighties, and a far more benign operating environment failed to discriminate between targets (vintage Warpac) and a variety of sophisticated and crude decoys.

More links, yee gads i will have to take a holiday to read this stuff. I now have a new file with all the url's pasted in and will take a dip over the week. Amazing how much information is out there, but feel a bit overwhelmed. John, knew about the SA-2 PK's, don't also forget the kidnap of its radar array, by Israeli commandos and Super Frelon, helped limit its effectiveness. John, you beat me to the theatres I was alluding to in my post to hcrof (sorry for being opaque, I should have made myself clear. Don't also forget for most AD systems shooting down a plane is a bonus, preventing damage to the protected target is a victory, that way a repeat strike has to be made and extra exposure means extra risk to the attackers. So if a Platoon of Shilka's and Gaskin/Gophers (did NATO deliberately pick belittling/harmless code names for Soviet equipment) did not shoot down one A-10, but prevented the average kill rate against the column they were protecting, they had done their job. The 73 war showed the dangers of tackling an interated AD network and the 82 Bekaa takedown was a use of novel tactics and a stupid deployment, SA-8's have wheels for a reason. Also most of the Syrian SAM's were well-known to Israel so posed little threat, as evidenced by their loss rates. Having said that the USN ignored the Israelis and attacked in a conventional stream of aircraft, losing an A-6 in the process (I think another plane was lost as well). Similar story with the Sea Harrier in Bosnia, pilot`came around for a third pass, pilot floated down on a parachute, courtesy of a MANPADS. Secondbrooks, this is the quernel of the argument regarding stereotypical deployments and tactics by the Soviets, it would be most unwise to assume your opponent will perform as expected. As Tzun Tzu realised, knowing your enemy, not knowing how you hope your enemy will be, is the key. Otherwise, you have just given your enemy a might stick, with which to beat you.

Dammit, more juicy things to read! Just for interest, if anyone is aware of The Miniatures Page (TMP) there is a thread on Soviet tactics, in the modern gaming discussion forum. One of its most knowledgeable contributors is very dimissive of the traditional view. http://theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=188798 Quote from 5:19PM post "I had commented on the drafts of FM 100-2-1, -2, and -3 from our detachment at Fort Hood in 1982 and 1983. Bill Gray may have been on some of that before he PCSed, too. At that time, we had very little in the way of current Soviet doctrinal literature to draw from. The manuals were published in 1984; they were in many ways not much better than Isby or the ITAC "Red Book" when it came to combined-arms tactics. "I showed up at Leavenworth in 1985, and after helping kill the "Sergeant York" DIVAD, was given the specific job of revising chapters 2, 4-7, and parts of 13 in FM 100-2-1--basically all the combined arms subjects--and the tank and other AFV sections of FM 100-2-3. We started working with the newly-formed Soviet Army Studies Office, particularly COL Dave Glantz and LTC Les Grau, to exploit Soviet materials (and also, sometimes even more so, with their counterparts at RMA Sandhurst). With the help of these gentlemen, as well as with individuals who had actually been through the Soviet system, we began to develop a better understanding of what Soviet tactics were really like. We had updated versions of 100-2-3 and 100-2-1 basically "in the can" ready to go to publication, when I left Leavenworth to come out here to California in late 1989. By that time, Training and Doctrine Command was not interesting in publishing anything on the defunct Soviet Union; they wanted a generic, "world class" OPFOR model for training. Some photocopies of the revised volumes were circulated to the schools and centers, but the new manuals never went into the doctrinal literature publication system. From Fort Irwin, I continued to use the Army's OPFOR professional bulletin to disseminate useful stuff, particularly as Les Grau was researching the Frunze Academy materials from Afghanistan, and Michael Orr at Sandhurst was digging fascinating bits out of military journal articles. And of course, the NTC OPFOR eagerly siezed on every snippet of Soviet tactical art that could give them an advantage. But basically, a more sophisticated understanding of Soviet combined-arms doctrine was never passed on to the US Army at large The British Army likewise moved on from updating the threat volumes of the Army Field Manual to Genforce, a generic potential adversary, the same way the US Army went. FM 100-2-1 (1984) is OK, but it was still a stereotyped, misleading, and woefully incomplete view of the subject. And I'm afraid that very few people know that as intimately as I do. Sorry." Most Cold-War 'veterans' I have talked too are very thankful that it never came to a shooting war, as they witnessed enough cock ups and confusion in the peace-keeping era to realise the big one would have been utter hell on earth. If we attack our troops in open deserts, where enemy AD assets are minimal what would happen in the close terrain of Europe where over-exposure is fatal and the pilots are under far greater stress?

hcrof, as for airpower these factors might apply 1. Spetsnaz/fifth column 2. Maskirovka 3. Real world examples of the efficacy of Western airpower v's Warpac equipment and docrine. Take any factors, and multiply by a factor of ten. 4. Soviet CAP, GCI, CAS and AD docrine and real world examples. 5. Priority targets for Soviet nuclear and chemical strikes were, amongst other HVT's, were airfields. It was not for nothing that in the event of of likely threat all US bases in the UK were given powers to impose martial law in a 10 plus mile radius.

John, intersting post, as for 11 years professional experience I can only offer a well informed semi-amateurs perspective (wrote my Masters dissertation on the RMA) though so not quite a neophyte. I agree with everything in your post, the articles author I seem to remember was an M1 tanker who I think was trying to dampen down the air-land battle hype and reminding people, as you and Michael have vividly done that if the balloon had gone up it would be a hard, viscious slog with victory not a foregone conclusion. Don't also forget the Soviet laser blinding systems fielded at regimental level, the intelligence suggestions to counter such weapons were, use the other eye or fogged optics! I remember a discussion with an intelligence officer whose analysis, of a European conflict, was brutally brief. "By the third day no one would know where they were meant to be and they'd probably be killing their own side as much as the enemy!" I think I read a US study suggesting blue-on-blue incidents running at 30% after the initial clashed shatter and merge both sides FLOT's so that much loved terms like the FEBA become redundant. My point was that the tactics might not have worked quite so well and the Russians might not have conformed to their stereotypical portrayals in manuals and countless exercises. In fact the NTC regularly showed that US forces, when confronted by the sheer tempo of a Soviet assault rarely had the time to execute their carefully planned decapitation strikes. In fact the much vaunted flexibility, created by doctrine and advanced technologies often worked against the defenders. All the Soviet approach needed was a weak link, as hcrof has pointed out a Soviet regimental attack would be a success if just one company managed to breach the MLR and create an exploitable breach. Who cares if the other twenty odd companies lie eviscerated, as per the nice DoD paintings, the weaklink has been found, FOFA not withstanding. As for the use of tactical nuclear weapons and chemicals, any person studying the BMP's design would have no misconceptions about the reality of Soviet thinking. The machine was designed so that infantry could rapidly exploit the breaches made by such weapons, without these NBC force-multipliers their design short comings become glaringly obvious, as per Afghanistan, Chechnya, etc. I remember a game of GDW's "Arctic Front", a force of Royal Marines were holding up my Norwegian armored spearhead, in the montain passes North of Oslo. My timetable was slipping badly and victory was slipping away, answer nukes, no more Booties and the armour rolled into a radiation blasted objective (once I'd overcome my moral objections I used them regularly). I guess the Soviet plan was clinically simple, attack, wait for the inevitable counter-attacks with attendant massing of forces and nuke them. The evidence is in the Soviet advance to battle drills that including seperation distances of Regiments/battalions that were designed to minimise the effects of convential CAS and nuclear weapons. They expected us to use them, is there any doubt they would no have done so? I guess it's why they used their formidable propaganda assets to stop enhanced-radiation devices being deployed in Europe. Oh, and don't forget in your list of horrors, EMP would have crippled the sophisticated Western forces proportionally far greater than the cruder Warpac units. I guess the only way we will find out whose doctrine would have likely prevailed is if BF produce a Cold-War game and we can battle it out. See, I'm nothing if not persistent, perhaps somebody could set up an online petition to see if there is a market for the game. Final point have you read Brixmis? http://www.amazon.co.uk/Brixmis-Untold-Exploits-Britains-Mission/dp/0006386733 It has some very interesting accounts of how traditional, military, perceptions of the Soviets was all too accurate and all too inaccurate. The intelligence gathering operation on the Soviet tanks is worth it alone. Facinating thread, thanks to all contributors.

At this rate I'm going to have to phone in sick for a week just to look at all these links! With the Steelbeasts site ,jjhouston, don't you have to be a member to download?

Regarding WinSpMBT, I had no problem with the interface (SP addict) and as for elevations there is quite a neat 'what I can see feature' which shows all visible hexes, in normal colour, and all blocked hexes greyed out. Again the targeting button allows long range targets to be selected, but the tiny screen is a pain, on monster maps. The map editor was my favourite, I'd spend hours creating little fragments of the globe (once did a whole Goose Gree map to replace the awful SP II one and the not so brilliant WinSp one). The TO&E's, regularly updated, are fantastic resources in their own right and the models of units are colourful, although the infantry are pretty spartan. Why did it get banished twice from my hard drive then? The problem with SP was never with the graphics or the options available, it was the actual game engine, which now, in comparison to BF's offerings is Neolithic. My top peeves Opportunity five V's movement. Example one If you look at the text when you click on a unit you see for each hex it travels its speed increases, but opportunity fire occurs when ever a unit has a chance to fire. You get the ridiculous situation where a unit travelling at 50mph (BTRD-2) breaks cover for 50m and gets engaged by an ATGW from 2000m, before the BTRD can get into cover again it is KO'd. In reality it would offer such a fleeting target by the time the crew aquired it, it would be gone. Example 2 Because each unit is moved individually yet op fire is for all units in range, another silly situation occurs where numbers mean little. A battalion of T-64's crests a ridge and engages a tank company from the flank, quickly overwhelming it? Er no, each tank crests the ridge and is engaged by each tank, until it is destroyed or survives the gauntlet of fire. This process is repeated until most of your force is in tatters, and heaven help it if it has the temerity to fire back then the whole process is repeated. Soviet deployment from column to line is suicidal as a result. Infantry suffer from this as well especially crossing open ground or roads. No effective Command and control Because the WinSp engine is a modified SP II engine it has no real C2 function and therefore dislocation of forces by rapid, aggressive manoeuvre and getting into your opponents OODA loop is a non starter. Any attempt to turn flanks lead to minimal benefit as an enemy reserve can instantly react and poor quality troops are far too flexible. Infantry firepower model When a Navy Seal unit in cover, fires at a Hezbollah militia unit 200 metres away and suffers 2 casualties in the return fire, you know something is wrong. When an elite USMC sniper team approaches a house, from a jungle, is instantly spotted and destroyed, you know something is wrong. Ridiculous ammo loadouts remove any sense of fire discipline allowing 20 minutes of sustained firing. SPWaW is even worse, with infantry sections regularly being slaughtered at 400+ metres. So, in the end, after the initial excitement, battles became repetitive slogging matches or bloody slaughters, shame.

John, can't remember where I read it (Red Thrust Star/Military Review perhaps) but the 'kill all the command tanks and we will be ok strategy', was shown to be based on a Western premise that it would seriously dislocate an attack. The writer said it was a classic piece of projection, if our command units are knocked out it cause serious problems as emergency command handover procedures take longer than textbook studies. Red Thrust had a great piece about a Blufor combat team shot apart because the change over took so long, and said it was all too typical. Conversely, the highly coreographed and centralised Warpac were less like to suffer disruption, simply because they they were coreographed and centralised. The article conceeded that the loss of command elements would cause problems, especially in follow on operations and allocation and direction of fires, but critically momentum would not be so badly affected as hoped or expected. This last point was the reason for the article, the author's conclusion stated that any advantage gained from this specific targeting could be reduced by the realisation and attendent shock that the effects were not as drastic as expected. It was fascinating reading, because this fixation on eliminating command elements led to bizzare studies such as the studying of the Russian langage to see if commands changed the inflection of words and if so could weapons home in on these. Assault, by GDW, had a clever way to show the different command strategies, NATO units had far more flexibility at a platoon/company level but could not transfer these command points to future turns. Warpac units were dead losses at platoon level but their command points could be built up over the turns. In practice NATO could shoot apart a Warpac attack if it was conducted like a Western attack, if the Russian player waited and stocked up his points, a battalion could sweep across the board with devastating results. Not perfect, but a clever way of showing the different command concepts and strengths/weaknesses of the forces wielded. Again, SP III with it objective flags and renewable command points did a better job than CM's command delays, which punished the Soviet platoons far too harshly and did not focus on the real problem guys, the Company commanders. Reading accounts from Afghanistan and the GPW, one sees quite remarkable levels of low level unit initiative achieving success, only for the dead hand of the Company commander to sweep away the advantage, usually with heavy losses. jjHouston you can dowload FM 100-2-1 from here http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/docrepository/FM100_2_1.pdf It can be a shaky link but worth it.

Duh, BAOR, not BOAR, I had visions of Chieftains in Stillbrew armour battling in Berlin, not viscious brisly creatures. I'd been watching a stupid clip of a boar hunting a hunter and got confused. MBT, hahahahahahah!!! Thanks, needed a good laugh before bed.

Stop it John! I'm a getting sentimental now, remembering my mispent youth. Ten million bayonets, sigh, it's all flooding back, I particularly liked the description of the M1-24's IR jammer, a blowtorch encased in a roughly cast ceramic turret! Come on BF, a Cold War module, I want Polish Marines battling Jaegers, I want Czech paras fighting Danish Leopards, I want T-64's and BTR 70's fighting meeting engagements against M60A3's and M-113's. Surely the market has to be there? Look at the demographic, all us old 40 somethings, many ex-wargamers, getting the chance to refight these battles without having to wade through yet another table in our Combat Commander rule book!

John, I was astonished at the wealth of detail in Bellamy's book, given I got my hands on a library loaned copy in the eighties. Ah, Isby's book, I used to go into the specialist bookshop and pore through it's pages, but never bought it, might rethink now. All this talk about MMR's and BMP's has got me to dust off my collection of articles and collected notes about CRP's FSE's and and Mainforce Advance Guard units. I really wish BF would produce a Cold War module! Just to see a MRR deploy and begin to eat into the forward units or MLR of a BOAR force, complete with airborne blocking units would be worth quite a steep price. I tried SPMBT but after the initial excitement of all the units (the TO&E's are exceptional) the same old SP problems arose, especially the lack of any command simulation, apart from an effect on morale, so it got binned. The stowage is probably needed to collect the money when they sell their opponents all their best gear, either that or the monthly gold run to buy off the competing tribes!

I liked the tables for the artillery, with type number of guns and target type and then a list of times needed for each combination to suppress, neutralise and eliminate a target (not sure on the terms they used but it meant the same). I always thought the Russians God of war was not their artillery but their maths tables. As for combat loads my meagre resources say 120 rds for the AK (makes sense as in the eighties they were fielding the three mag rig) and 1000 rnds shared between the PK's, not sure what the RPK loadout was. I guess there was more for both in the BMP.

Question, can that ever be simulated in a game, or will the designers bias creep into the mechanics of the game? I played too many games where the Russians were like any other army, except crapper and more numerous. Their different approach to doctrine was ignored and only their numbers were superior, I would have liked different CRT's to reflect the advantages and disadvantages of the doctrines. For example the Russian military definition of initiative is not that of a Western model and as you have said John is intrinsically linked to their doctrinal approach. To a Russian initiative is the ability of a soldier, in combat to follow orders and achieve his mission, using tactics he has been taught. The mission to the Russians is the be all and end all, which is really a continuation of the Medieval principle of 'maintenance of purpose'. It is not for nothing that the Russians developed the term 'Operational Art' and when we look in disdain at Russian equipment it was designed as a brush for that art, nothing more nothing less. As a USMC general said of their tanks, they cannot do what ours can do, but they can do what you expect a tank to do. I would love a game in which you could do justice to the Russian concept of war and not have to do with a western model that either grudgingly accomodates them or vastly inflates their capabilities because the game model spectacularly fails to simulate their true strengths. Who cares if Lt Strachwittpeiper's Tiger Company destroyed 22 T-34's, in a morning if he then has to retreat 200km the next day, losing most of his tanks due to breakdowns. So what if the Panther has a super-duper radio and the T-34 had flags, if the Panthers are deploying so rapidly, to constant threats of breakthroughs, that they cannot establish a proper radio net to use it. Afghanistan though, showed that the Soviet way of war, with vehicles/ air assets and doctrines, designed for sweeping frontal manoeuvres had a very tough time adapting to the battle without fronts. Having said that talk to soldiers in that theatre now and they have doubts if we have adapted our approach to deal with the unique environment.

Sorry, am I missing something? You put a rear, hull mounted, telephone on a machine whose exhaust spews out Smaug like volumes of heat! Or are the TUSK models exhaust manifolds a different configuration?

Lethaface, thanks for the toast and same to you, we actually migh have some champers tomorrow, given the year has actually been tolerable and not the usual vintage of bloody awful. Do I believe in a Jewish destiny? I cannot answer that question but I do know that if you work hard, value education and love life, you should succeed, destiny or not. Thanks to all for a well tempered, well informed debate on a very contentious issue. I have not posted as much and as regularly for a long time, but the Middle East has always fascinated me. Final question, does being wargamer, paradoxically, make you more, not less compassionate?

Beer! What a wonderful Iraqi invention! That is when that part of the world actually led the civilised world in innovation and 'scientific' discovery. The problem is that now the tiny state of Israel is far more successful than the Muslim world, a point made in this Pakistani article, for "The News". http://plusmo.com/wap/site/article.shtml?pid=560829&iid=&aid=1&q= This, I think is the 'dark secret' behind the problems in the Middle East, the refusal/inability of the majority of the Muslim world to adapt to the modern world, not any military industrial complex 'conspiracies'. Israels presence daily reminds the Arabs of this inferiority, hardest I think, for the Arab world is their military impotence, given tribal societies take great pride in their ability to protect their people. Yes the US supports Israel but it also pumps in billions to the states around it, especially promoting education and scientific research and the OPEC countries can more than match US funding. Just imagine if there were oil fields in Israel? Yes Yair, the Arabs I knew and worked with, in Israel, lived in very tight knit supportive communities, but so did the Anglo-Saxon communities in this country a thousand years ago. The cost, it seems for more technological progress is a more fluid, insular work force and a breakdown in social cohesiveness and traditional ways, look at the different Iraqi reactions to the creation of a 'modern' political civic state. Yossarian, the destruction of the Holy Sepulchre in 1009 began a worsening relationship between Christianity and Islam and the halt to Christian pilgrimages and the battle of Manzikert, in 1071, threatened the Byzantine Orthodox Christian empire. By 1084 the Seljuks had captured Antioch and in 1092 Nicea, two very important metropolitan sees, especially Nicea; the site of two important ecumenical councils deciding the future of the Christian Church. Pope Urban II's call for a Crusade was in direct response to a plea by Emperor Alexius I, for help against this continuing aggressive Muslim expansion. It was in 1095 that the Council of Claremont was convened for the first Crusade and as you rightly said in 1099 it was successful. So, not a knee jerk reaction but a direct response to a threat to their Christian heritage and lands. I did not get confused, the Crusades have always been a favourite period, but I might not have made my argument clear, a failing of mine, sorry. Anti-semitism in Arabic society is well-established and does not reflect a minority opinion, though the levels to which it is practiced/believed do differ. http://www.adl.org/main_Arab_World/default.htm http://www.newsweek.com/id/186974 http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/patext1.html The last link is particularly distasteful, as it undermines my professions integrity. Yair, I think the difference between a suicide bomber killing civilians and a military strike killing civilians, who are not the target of the strike, is the intent. I think there is a moral difference between the two as it comes under the ethical theory of double effect. I certainly know, from my studies that modern Western nations go out of their way to reduce civilian casualties, but their opponents often deliberately exploit this SOP and hide amongst those civilians. Anytime a soldier deliberately targets a civilian then yes, they are no better than a terrorist, I don't know too about the IDF's SOP's but it seems to follow the Western model albeit more robustly. As for the debate about about Ahmadineajad's comments, I seem to remember it all revolved around the translation about time, but as this article suggests it was very useful to have a statement that was 'ambiguous'. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1213794295236&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull Lethaface, I know I have used media sources but if you triangulate them they can give you a rough idea about what is going on. More importantly I tend to look at sources who have been proved correct, over ones who seem to not have a clue and indulge in wish fulfillment. I don't excuse Jewish atrocities but you are right I am definitely more sympathetic to the Jew situation over the Arab one, which I think is more self-inflicted. The people I most sympathise with though are the brave Muslim moderates who seek change, especially the woman academics and politicians. Finally, I know that Iran is not an Arab country but proudly Persian but under the present leadership its views are atypical of other Arab states. Now in that vein I will indulge in a Persian discovery, wine. Yes I know the Georgians claim it as well but we can have a bit of poetic licence here, can't we?

I posted previously, about the Cadillac M1's and Challengers and to an extent the M2's and Warriors as they sway about the battlefield. I don't think it is the amount of rocking but its speed, which gives the impression they weigh very little or have pimped their suspension! Perhaps if BF could just slow down the animation, Panthers and Tigers are going to look silly if they react the same way. It is a minor point, but it does get in the way from the immersive experience that BF seek to create.

Michael, I thought the reverse was true, due to the M1 automatically ejecting the clip after the eighth round, casing an unmistakable sound and signaling that the GI was vulnerable. Flamingknives, are we talking Mons? If so the reason for the phenomenal ROF was the BEF being veterans, the M1's rate of fire was independent of the quality of the firer, though accuracy is another matter. Talking of Banzai charges, is there any data regarding the Khalin Gol conflict between Japan and Russia, I know most of the former successes were due to nightime infantry attacks. Normandy and deployment of the MP-44's brings up so much contradictory evidence that a little deduction should be used. 12,000 were produced by early 43 and the total run was just under 450,000. By July 44 Hitler has approved a significant ramping up of production and the weapon seems to have been initially distributed to elite units first, with the Eastern front a priority. It would be ok to speculate therefore that Paras in Normandy might have perhaps 1-2 MP-44's per squad with the 12 SS able to field some. I'm pretty sure in CM1 they were available to my "Waffen-Grenadiers" but CM2 will, I believe not feature such troops.

YankeeDog, curse you for being American and being able to fire those rifles! We here, in the UK are treated like little children, rifled, full bore guns are naughty and only the police, army and criminals are allowed to have them! I have dry fired the 98K and the Lee Enfield and could easily maintain the sight picture of the later, when working the bolt, but the 98K's was pretty cumbersome and necesitated me concentrating on it, not my sights. I believe that doctrinally the US method was to often eschew aimed fire and concentrate on area fire. Whereas the British rifleman might be instructed who to fire at and with how many rounds the US stressed rounds all around a target area, maximising the M1's semi auto capability. The article I read also stated this is where the Americans got the reputation for being trigger happy, instead of well aimed shots at clearly defined targets the GI's were seen, by the British as haphazardly shooting. If anyone knowledgeable can comment on the accuracy of this information it would be helpful. I would also have thought that the M1 was far more suitable in what is now known as CQB environments. Moving and snap shooting with a semi-auto must be easier than having to work a bolt action. Didn't Patton call the M1 the queen of the battlefield because of its ability to fire whilst its owner moved, ordering his riflemen to conduct marching fire? The number of SMGs in British units steadily increased as the nature of the combat environment became all to clear. Osprey's passable book on Normandy has a very interesting plate; a photo, taken in August, of a rifle element of a section, training to attack a farmhouse, there are two Sten SMG's in the three man group. As for sounds of MG's, Spike Milligan, one of the Goons, commented on hearing a firefight at night, in Italy. He contrasted the aggressive and impressive ripping sound of the German guns to the rather pathetic thumping of the Brens. Though a veteran told me, in Tunisia the Germans prefered the Bren, whilst on patrol and the British the MP-40. A practice that had to be discontinued given the number of blue on blue engagements at night!