Lethaface

This is sort of how I feel too. However I think there are perhaps several parallel discussions going on. * Is tank obsolete right now yes / no * I have $50,- Bn to spend on R&D in 2025-2030, where am I going to spend it? Or: how much of the Leo/Leclerc 3 does one 'need'? Do we need to increase spending on armed/weaponized unmanned (aerial) vehicles? Or autonomous?! Will that affect tank funding? Are there cheaper / faster time-to-market alternatives? etc * How much can one learn from incompetent show on basic every level * What is new in this war vs Lebanon 2006, 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ** Or CMBS. I think CMBS can model the current war quite well, although it will require an incompetent player and soft settings for the RED side. Now if only QBs would allow some UKR (pricey) ammo dumps with Javelins ;-). * For lessons learned post war best to start with an open mind, instead of thinking 'tank obsolete' or 'nothing new to be learned'.

This x3. I guess they watched that same propaganda piece on the usual channel that was posted here yesterday orso. Being the daily star I'm not surprised they took that an presented it as official Kremlin communication. Not that I bothered to read it lol.

The subject on this show seems to be evolving, at least no mentions of nuking everyone looking at Russia in 'unfriendly' way lol

Have a like!

Good point, I'm still thinking of it lol. It's been almost 20 years since I last set foot in a uni and or indulged myself in the inner workings of the global currency market (so a bit rusty). However I'm not sold that this will 'double finance' Russia's war. Some thoughts: * The CBR regulates the supply of Rubles but is not the only 'venue' holding Rubles in reserve (or other means of receiving Ruble) and selling them (although I guess lack of demand has it's impact on the availability of Rubles worldwide ;-)). * Worst case it would mean an extra $1Bn worth of demand for Rubles on a daily basis, which are promptly returned to Russia's reserve. Not sure how much that would do for the sustained value of the Ruble. * Currently Russia (CBR) is hindered in their ability to buy up Rubles using their foreign currency. So this move would in theory circumvent their hindrance a bit, although limited to the net worth of their daily spot price gas sales. * What about longterm contracts? Not everyone buys gas at spotprice. Longterm contract in Rubles holds risks for Russia as well. * Looking at the temperature outside, some parties might simply refuse and that would mean less gas exports for Russia; one of the remaining solid 'value streams'. All in all I'm not sure if this won't backfire in Russia's face, but it's sure an interesting move from economical perspective. And yes should they actually be able to increase the status of Rubles as a reserve currency due to gas trading, that would be a gain for Russia. Another thought: in theory they could have made this move already a few years ago, why didn't they? Long term contracts and the potential volatility of the Ruble might be part of the answer. That problem didn't go away overnight, although question has become how long term the long term contracts will actually be post Ukraine invasion. So short term it might be beneficial to Russia but I'm not sure of middle/long term. The underlying problem isn't addressed by this move.

I think that's quite winnable as an attacker to be honest. But restricting the attacker to using platoon sized formations on mounted fast-moves into uncontrolled terrain would be more 'realistic' I'd say Also, large urban area's would make it much more hard and costly; unless there is enough artillery to level much of the urban area before the attack. Russian tactical acumen isn't much unlike CMx2 AI on the attack, back when all scenario designers where still finding out how to work with the AI scripting ;-).

Indeed it's an interesting move. However it would also mean less hard currency for Russia to trade with on the black market (or with other countries that don't implement sanctions).

Now that's some sick **** that beard guy. Talking about nuking Warsaw like it's a mundane, look what I can do, thing. Perhaps a bit strange but I'd actually beat that men to death avec plaisir; why not? Very local special civilian operation. Could go pretty fast too. On a more serious note, is this a sign of desperation in some circles?

Apart from the universal religious chants most of the chatter didn't seem Arabic to me (and although I don't really speak it, I've heard plenty of Arabic day to day chatter).

Wouldn't necessarily have to be eastern Ukraine but I digress. I'm in the camp that if/given that 'we' (seem to) care about Ukraine, we should/could have done more to challenge Putinnot to take the step. Although it's difficult to define 'we', it should be the 154 countries in the UN condemning the invasion after the fact. I'm reminded a bit of the 'polder' model we have in NL. While seeking compromises is good for many situations, one of the consequences is that **** really has to hit the fan before 'everybody' agrees something significant needs to be done about basically anything. After the 1953 stormflooding causing thousands of deaths, it was clear something needed to be done and we built the 'delta works'. Without such a disaster happening, politicians seem to be reluctant to take drastic measure and rather manage the joint status quo, passing any difficult decisions over to the next installment/generation. But I agree, the current dimension we live in for sure isn't the only one thinkable a while back. We/I/anyone sure could have been wrong!

In Dutch we have the great saying 'van achteren kijk je de koe in zijn kont', which literally means 'from behind you can see inside the cows arse'. But I remember thinking that and looked it up, 9 December 2021: "What happened to USA 'keeping all options on the table'? Not sure what is gained by saying you won't do something. Although I don't really see Russia invading, Ukraine has had plenty of time to prepare for various scenario's. Also occupying large parts of Ukraine without popular support doesn't seem like a very wise thing to do when a certain power clique likes to stay in power. Let alone the sanctions.Anyway I guess we'll see So yeah I didn't expect what was coming that's for sure lol I can follow the logic you describe, but would personally have chosen different. Anyway I'm not calling any shots whatsoever in that regard so there's that. And indeed the good bit is that we can even think of lessons learned going forward because Ukraine seems to be effectively dealing with the situation (defense against war of aggression).

Agreed that making the intelligence public was a good move, to stay with the poker game it's like showing everyone the other players hand. Still didn't have to tell about what your planning on your own hand first though, at least imo as just another armchair geopolitician ;-).

I'm not sure I agree. Although you only quoted part of what I said, as my remark was "I also don't get why NATO/USA was so explicit in that they won't be sending troops, before the thing happened." Bold added. I agree that it was wise to make perfectly clear that NATO/USA wouldn't directly intervene, after Russia invaded. However, I remember somewhere last year not understanding why the USA (/NATO) felt the need of emphasizing that they won't send any boots on the ground in the case of a potential conflict in Ukraine. It was free info for Russia, while not saying anything or being vague about it wouldn't have cost anything and might have influenced Russia's risk-analysis. It's like sitting at the poker table while in a hand telling another player that you'll fold if they go all in. Although I'm quite sure that message was intended for 'internal use' (edit: national public). Another thing I wondered was why nobody planned a hasty 'friendly port visit' of a frigate of some kind to Mariupol / Odessa, when they saw the invasion materialize early this year? Or organizing a new bi-annual combat medic field surgery biathlon in Ukraine, with several countries attending Shenanigans, two can play that game and I feel that 'things' have been made too easy for Putin / Kremlin, at least until the **** show started. Now that's all sort of irrelevant, but I hope 'we' learn from this for the future and try to increase the chance to proactively prevent warmongering endeavors instead of reacting after the fact; by all cheeky means necessary.

I was thinking about this, maybe it's just a different mindset / life experience whatever. Anyway, I'm not in favor of WW3 and or NATO mindlessly jumping in the current war. I'm not in favor of starting up MAD if Russia chooses to use one tactical nuke. However, it will be a game changer and unfortunately would bring 'total annihilation' a step closer. Probably governments/militaries are already working on such contingency planning. Personally I'd say tell Putin that if he uses a tac nuke, all options are on the table including boots on the ground in Ukraine. I also don't get why NATO/USA was so explicit in that they won't be sending troops, before the thing happened. Keeping some boots on the ground in Ukraine for whatever invented reason could have dissuaded Putin to invade, but even just saying the previously usual 'keeping all options on the table' wouldn't have cost a dime and might have done the same. Anyway regarding the nukes, isn't this just a classic case of 'expect the worst, hope for the best'? There is plenty of game theory around MAD, but all assume that both sides press the button when it is clear the other side has launched. If we aren't prepared to press button, we might as well handover the nukes (and our will) and be done with it. But I refuse to allow Putin (or whomever) the pleasure of having me/us worrying whether he will be mad enough to destroy the earth. Because that's probably exactly the intent of such threats.

Not sure if casual is the right word, but what are you going to do about it? Worrying won't help anything

I think the question is, do we have to think about it? That might be a personal thing though. Personally I don't think too much about it, because what difference does it make for me? In fact I think that for too long we have catered to his threats and sought to find reasonable compromises. This (finding reasonable compromise) is, as long as the other party is reasonable, the safest thing to do and usually causes the least tensions. Every story has at least 2 sides, so usually there's much to be gained from trying to find 'common ground' and settling a dispute in such a way both parties can live with. However when someone acts unreasonable, there is no merit in trying to be reasonable in order to deescalate. Unreasonable doesn't have to mean irrational, but in the end our response to threats should be the same whether the threatening party is being rationally unreasonable or irrationally unreasonable. The important part is whether the threats are in theory realistic (in this case they are, so better double check that nuclear readiness if we didn't do that already). I'm reminded of some dialogues in Civilization 2, in which there was the option to either cave in to a demand or to choose 'we ignore your hollow threats'. That's basically what I think about it (or just another coping strategy ). It is what it is and if the global nuclear war starts I guess it'll be over real soon.

Indeed. Although if it's 'just' a sportshall without concreterebar floors / walls, I guess a large warhead (thermobaric or HE) would blow apart the construction holding it together which declares the lack of rubble. If it would have been a stone/concrete building, we would have seen heaps of rubble left I'd say.

This. Plus if he goes that way, he won't have any credible threats left.

Nice touch ;-). Although I guess the campaign had surpassed it's point of culmination for quite a while already. Lol even giving advice in good faith Perhaps they're addressing the Russian generals staff with some 'trolling'? This part was also striking imo: "It is instead continuing to feed small collections of reinforcements into an ongoing effort to keep the current campaign alive. We assess that that effort will fail." Although we've seen plenty of 'piecemeal feedings' since the war started, it's interesting to see the ISW qualifying the theatre wide effort as such and basically calling it a failed campaign.

Thanks for the nice read! (no sarcasm) Learned some new things about specific history as someone with some Prussian blood but not specifically interested in Prussian history more than other history. I'm not in a position to discount the rights or wrongs regarding whether Brandenburg/Prussians were forced to focus on a landpower. However, conceptually on almost all focus decisions in the world there exists the problem of focus vs spread. I agree that it is not necessarily required to focus on one thing if you have the options to do both / all. But if you don't have the money to do both air and land good, it sure helps to focus on one them based of your geopolitical requirements and existing capabilities. Plenty of countries/organizations/individuals have learned that lesson one way or the other. Actually I have learned about this Kamil Galeev through @LongLeftFlank post on this forum and thought he had quite some interesting threads or posts. I don't think he's worshipping the source as a hero, but just as an interesting source. Personally I always try to think fully independent, sources are nice to be informed; conclusions will be done in my own cpu. Obviously we all will be influenced by the sources we read (or don't read), so (I) just keep that in mind. So this Kamil also has his own agenda, glass color and bias; still his arguments regarding the question of whether it was smart for Russia to invest as much in Naval as they did aren't completely invalidated because he chose an analogy based off perhaps incorrect history, at least imo.

Ah, wasn't there yet. Among various other sources (including this thread) I've been following their assessments since the start. Extrapolated I think the conclusion can be made that the war hasn't been going good for Russia, not at all. While the south has been looking threatening since the beginning of the war, it is now 18 March. Invading a country from 3 sides and sieging it's capital indicates that the political objective was regime change (although that was already clear from other things). The goal was not to create a new Afghanistan and stop winning after few years ;-). On paper Russia has a lot more men and material. But can they actually bring them on the battlefield and apply combat power? More than what was already available to them? It's not looking like that at all. Ukraine has undoubtedly taken casualties as well, it doesn't look like the defense is crumbling; rather the contrary. From geopolitical and economical perspective this war has arguably already caused big losses to Russia. The question is whether the political objective will be reached. Imo the chances for regime change are bleak or rather non-existent. And should Putin manage to install a puppet government, how long will that last? Strengthened NATO, reunited EU (for how long nobody knows), economic fubar, military giving show of incompetence and hints of corruption. No, from my perspective Russia isn't winning. They have technically already lost from geopolitical and strategical perspective. The operation has been a fiasco so far. So fair to say that it's already lost, but not over. I think the consequences of the war are that large that Putin feels he can't throw in the towel yet, given the little results to show for. But will the situation get any better? I doubt it. So he might have the will to continue the war until something is reached, but does his army / the people also have the will to stay with him until that moment? And do they have the capability on economic/logistical/military fronts?

Did you bother reading the assessments of this very website? Todays one: "Russian forces did not make any major advances and Ukrainian forces carried out several local counterattacks on March 17. Russian forces made little territorial progress and continued to deploy reserve elements—including from the 1st Guards Tank Army and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade—in small force packets that are unlikely to prove decisive. Russian forces continue to suffer heavy casualties around Kharkiv, and Russian attempts to bypass the city of Izyum are unlikely to succeed. Russian forces continued assaults on Mariupol on March 17 but did not conduct any other successful advances from Crimea." https://www.understandingwar.org/

Lol I noticed a lil something with the sun coming up No worries, it was probably not good choice by me to quote that exact reply. My reply was more of a continuation of our conversation. Anyway fwiw I didn't interpret your posting as pro Russia at all, more 'humanistic' which is a positive thing in general imo.