Lethaface

How I understood things is that Russia build up a rather large reserve in foreign currency and gold. Quite a part of that seems to be frozen, while gold of course retains it's value. The income from gas / oil will probably also still give hard currency / trade value. But not all of that income will directly flow in the cash reserves of the Kremlin. With their economy cut off from much of the rest of the world and the ruble in freefall, they can print extra rubles at little extra cost but the civilian population won't be happy their money turning worthless. The sanctions also hampered their ability to utilize the hard cash reserves to stabilize the ruble. All in all I think they can finance the salaries of the current forces and fuel for quite a while without issues, (getting it to the front is another question though ),although the departure of Shell and other Oil companies might have it's effect on the refining capabilities (although I'd expect them to be able to 'fix' that). However, continuing the (commercial & military) production that was already in place will become much more costly over time, let alone restocking all those missiles and rebuilding lost tanks/helicopters and planes. The main issue economically imo is that the civilian economy is rapidly disintegrating. Switching over to 'exclusively self sustained' and or build up economic relations with the remaining willing parties will require time and may take a generation to get back to similar level for the population, if it does.

Shooting someone over taking a chicken is a rather harsh imo; shoot them because they're enemy soldiers which haven't surrendered.

That's certainly the aim of the sanctions 'special measures', afaik.

Yeah, let's also keep in mind that Gross Domestic Product isn't the same as the chequebook in the hands of those in power. The war is very expensive. I believe the warchest is rather deep but there's many other cost than direct liquidity can solve and the question is how solvent that liquidity is given the sanctions (edited).

Agreed x2. Total 'cost of ownership' of this invasion seems unsustainable in the long run.

AFAIK Russia's GDP was $1483.50 Billion last year, so 1%.

I'd be happy if those ordering the indiscriminate (or consciously targeted civilians) strikes face a public trial for the world to see and get the punishment they deserve or become sunflower fertilizer, and soldiers to go home. Alas I don't make the calls. Turning into sunflower seeds is part of job risk of invading army.

Indeed, I'd be happy if Ukraine successfully manages to defend itself against this war of aggression. But I'm not cheering for a larger war ;-).

No, he means that we shouldn't become war-cheerleaders.

Born '82 so wasn't really conscious of the whole cold war threat. But not really scared about MAD now either. Of course, if you think about it too much it's a scary / strange idea that things can all be over in a big flash after some button pushes. Why would anyone do it? But, if it comes it comes and it will probably be over very quick. It's all outside my control anyway, plus on average people with large responsibilities have enough braincells to not destroy their own livelihood, family and future for vague reasons. On the other hand, seeking a war with Russia would be stupid. Not because of fearing them, but because the loss of life and destruction would only become larger. I also don't buy the inevitable war with Russia. Maybe it comes, maybe it doesn't. I'd put my money on 'doesn't', because some quick fait-accompli like taking the Baltics seem less and less likely while the repercussions are clear. Nato won't start a war with Russia. Personally I believe Mr Putin will be drinking some nice special operation tea when he is thinking about starting thermo nuclear warfare.

I trust that Germany gründlichkeit will play it's part now that the 'shame' seems dealt with (I think it's time for it, past is past). For the short term buying some stuff will probably definitely help, for the longterm plans can be worked out and cooperation inside NATO / EU can surely help with 'inspiration' how to organize stuff and support where necessary.

100% agreed.

I think it's more that Europe should be looking after it's own defense, also when there seems no need for an actual army. Countries like ours will never be able to, by themselves, deter any major power from doing stuff it likes to do; apart from sanctions and stuff. In theory the EU represents a large economic player but on the security level it punches well below it's weight. For a large part that's even outside of military spending or capabilities, but rather foreign policy / geopolitics. But if we want to have a say on security matters directly relevant to EU, we should have the capability to back that economical power up with a clear foreign policy and military means; without having to constantly look over our shoulders to see and worry whether bigbro USA will step in to bail us out of scary stuff. Now what capabilities, budget or hardware is necessary for that is something I think is in well hands with the military. The more difficult part is the politicians agreeing on something I guess, or an actually united foreign policy post the invasion of Ukraine.

Especially from a strategic / geopolitical POV that's a fact imo (and has been for a couple of days).

Yeah its pretty clear. If only there was a global body administering the serving of punishments. Threatening to nuke the UN would be an interesting concept as well.

And I fully understand those former easter bloc countries. The interesting 'what if' is perhaps what we could have done early '90s to support Russia transitioning from the USSR ways into new ways and weather that would have enabled different leadership later on. There are several excellent documentaries about how, after the collapse of the USSR, many ex state industries were acquired by the new oligarchy using mafia practices. "Thieves by law" is one of them. Financial motives played a large part in our inaction as well, I guess. I think USA does indeed have a rather large 'told you so' card they can play in this. One part of the divide, I guess (although I know for sure it played a role politically in EU), is the 2nd Iraq war and the consequences it had. After, the EU more and more wanted to choose it's own course and not follow the USA course, which is perceived to often mainly serve it's own interests. And indeed Putin was playing all the instruments rather smart in a form of divide & conquer. Although at the end of the fold he seems to have grossly overestimated his own hand especially with regards to the Ukrainian resolve. Imo the overarching issue is the lack of tooth on the UN, or more simple the VETO rights in the security council. Now one could also call it a pipe dream (or wonder what I'm smoking), but instead of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization it would have been conceptually MUCH more fitting imo, if a United Nations body would be serving law and order across the globe. It's a rather clear majority of the world against this invasion and the moral ground for doing something about it would be much more powerful from a United Nations perspectives than from the 'West' / USA police agent perspective. There are some other resolutions on the backlog in need of serving as well. Maybe in a couple of centuries lol.

I think that touches a larger geopolitical issue of blocs, spheres of influence and whether people think (or thought) these were still into play. The easy argument to make is that nobody in EU would have been surprised that USA rather sold it's own gas to EU than Russia's gas. Some people in the EU (including me) feel/felt that the EU should be more independent as a 'bloc'. The other side of the medal is that independence also comes with security (which we can't manage ourselves yet) and for the EU there is/was an issue about unity as well. Coupled with politics, bureaucracy and 25 nations 'in discord'. I don't think anyone really expected Putin to go for regime change in Ukraine. And yes in hindsight it is a fair point to make imo, that EU has partially funded this war. Then again anyone who traded on large/state level with Russia has partially funded this war. I think people aren't saying much about it because of, well, the political sensitivity ('we were wrong' is difficult to say for politicians). Between the sheets it's easy to validate though, Germany is moving towards energy independence and investing EUR 100 Bn plus 2%+ per year in it's defense. So clearly a case of a paradigm shift. At the same time there are geopolitical analysts (on both sides of ocean) stating that aggressive Western (USA) geopolitical strategy is the cause of this and that all could have been diverted if we would have allowed Russia in NATO or had made clear that Ukraine wouldn't join NATO. Personally I'm not in that camp, although I think that NATO / West should also look at itself. But that 'ship' has sailed so I doubt there will be much looking in the mirror.

Good points. Time will tell how things unroll, I sometimes wonder if the 'think tanks / experts' have more data which we/ I don't have. For example UKR casualties. I haven't seen much more arguments from the think tanks / experts than that 'Russia has the strength / combat power and the will to take losses'. Some mention logistics but most seem to assume Russia will overcome these issues.

Russia is now supposedly threatening to cut gas if we ban their oil. Not sure who will hurt that one more in the long term. But indeed I don't see EU banning their energy imports without alternatives. Before the war started the energy bills were already much higher, for lower incomes their might be real problems paying the bills if gas becomes more expensive. In the middle long term there are alternatives though. For example in NL we are sitting on some EUR 850 billion worth of gas, however due to the earthquakes involved with extraction the plan was to let that gas remain in the ground. I guess that's under review now.

In principle it is simple. Ukraine is not in NATO. So, no NATO article 5 involvement. The fact that some previous operations / coalitions had some NATO sticker applied to it, was more of a geopolitical choice and none of these were a direct result from article 5 compulsory response (irrelevant what one thinks of those operations i.e. good/bad). The only article 5 was 9/11. If Libya had SSBNs, ICBMs, a large airforce and AA network there wouldn't have been a 'NATO no-fly' zone there either.

It is an interesting feat that a lot of the 'think tanks' and geopolotical / military strategy experts keep stating that Russia will be able to press on the attack and take Kiev and Charkov (although all predict guerilla war starting after), vs the observations in this thread, that Russia won't be able to keep up sustaining the losses in men and equipment, as well as the consequences these have on the 'will to fight' among Russian troops. After the first couple of days I suspected that Russian forces would learn from the fighting and adapt to the situation, leading not necessarily to less casualties but to more tangible battefield results. However from my (incomplete) perspective, it seems that not much lessons are learned (or rather the teachings put into practice). One explanation for this could be simply the lack of footage and information about the more successful engagements from Russian perspective. But if one looks at the amount of (supply) columns destroyed by apparent ambushes, engagements near to objectives which fail to fully control / clear the objectives but do cause heavy casualties, continued strikes on important assets (AA, fuel ,etc) behind enemy lines, the amount of abandoned vehicles, etc; It doesn't look like the Russian forces are learning much lessons and applying that knowledge to the actual operational/tactical level. So, to get to your QB example; a new CM player can quickly learn how to play 'better' especially from PBEM defeats. But only if he/she is willing to learn & improve. Sticking to the same ways will lead to similar results. If the reports are correct that currently 100% of pre-invasion forces are committed AND that no serious reinforcements are currently being shipped to the area, this could also mean something of a longer operational 'pause' on the side of Russia. Can they hold on to their current gains and just keep shelling/sieging with the remaining forces in place, while waiting for better weather and new operational plans that do incorporate the lessons learned? If April / May weather is better for mechanized operations, that could in theory allow time to build a new 'invasion force' (they have the numbers in theory) and commit it alongside a new 'mass fires' operation (if enough missiles etc can be produced and delivered in that time), sort of implementing an invasion plan 2.0 (this time done right). Now for that to work they'd have to hold out economically and at least part of the current gains. While also assuming that invasion 2.0 will be much better then the 1.0 plan, troop morale/motivation is good enough and some form of air superiority can be achieved. Of course giving Ukraine the same allotment of time to prepare for such a thing will not necessarily make the whole thing more easy. Coming back to political goals (which is the reason of this war), if they still want to demilitarize Ukraine and topple the regime, some form of a invasion 2.0 is necessary. The current forces committed can maybe gain some more ground in the south, maybe capture Mariupol but unless miracle happens not actually take Kiev of Charkov. In other words, the political goals are quite a stretch at the moment. The other two options are imo a ceasefire with lengthy negotiations (which may fail in the end, resuming hostilities and provide options for clandestine operations). Or the military collapse mentioned. However, I'd expect Russian leadership to move towards ceasefire / negotiations before that happens. Because a military collapse and general withdrawal seems not healthy for Russian regime. Basically they'd have destroyed their economy and much of global relations at heavy cost in lives and military readiness, and 0 results to bring to the table.

Thanks. Will be interesting to find out the exact details, when/if they come available.

I read reports that Poland will buy 200-300 Abrams, said to be M1A2SEPv3. Not sure if that's accurate / will those be same spec as used by US Army? IIRC not even Australia could get those, although that was a while ago / different times.

Indeed just send the support to Red Cross directly, they are already setup to receive donations.

Good points imo.