Wartgamer

1940 total = 3,381 PzKw-I – 1,062 + 243 (command tank) PzKw-II – 1,086 PzKw-III - 329 PzKw-IV – 380 143 PzKw 35(t) + 238 PzKw 38(t) Czech tanks Even if the Germans could mystically know to increase production in 1940 like Jason says, would they also mystically know that many of the designs were obsolete and useless? Would they mystically know that they should concentrate only on the Panzer IIIL60?

Some stats... 4. “Barbarossa” – war with USSR – campaign 3.30 am, 22 June, 1941 Front-line 995 miles + 620 miles on Finnish boarder Sooner expand to 1,490 miles in length and 600 miles in depth German Army amounting ¾ of its field strength End-1941, USSR losses: (about twenty encirclements) 3,000,000 (3,500,000) captured, 4,000,000 dead, 14,287 tanks, 25,212 guns including: July, Bialystok-Minsk pocket: 324,000 men, 3,332 tanks, 1,809 artillery pieces captured/destroyed; July, Smolensk pocket: 310,000 prisoners, 3,205 tanks, 3,120 guns captured/destroyed; August, Rolsavl: 38,000 prisoners (18,000 later), 250 tanks, 359 guns captured/destroyed; August, Kiev: 103,000 prisoners, 317 tanks, 1,100 guns captured/destroyed; August, Kiev, battle is over: 665,000 prisoners, 884 tanks, 3,178 guns captured/destroyed; October, Bryansk-Vyazma pocket: 673,000 prisoners, 1,242 tanks, 5,412 guns captured/destroyed; Beginning-November, front-line is 50 miles far from Moscow By mid-November – 16 miles from Moscow German losses By July 31, 1941 213,301 casualties (15% total invasion forces), 863 tanks (25% of total invasion number) Motor transport lost about 50% (regarding “bad” roads) November (estimation by OKH (German Headquarter) 101 divisions = 65 full strength divisions 17 panzer divisions = 6 full strength Combat power of 136 invasion divisions = 83 Croup Army Center required 31 supply trains / 16 provided Example, Guderian: one panzer corps of 600 tanks established had 50 left Total losses by end-November (starting June 22, 1941) 743,112 (not counting sick) men = 23.12% of average total strength of 3,200,000 Example, On Eastern Front Army (Moscow direction) is short of 340,000 = 50% of fighting strength of infantry At home only 33,000 men available 50% of load-carrying vehicles runs out of 500,000 trucks 150,000 lost, 275,000 need repair December 1941 - March 1942 256,000 dead and 350,000 sick (frozen) 55,000 motor vehicles, 1,800 tanks, 140 heavy guns, 10,000 machine-guns

Dullness! Unlaid readily, Jason's Story. Figures. His droniness continues.

I thought Standard Oil started the whole thing by giving the Germans leaded-gas?

Yes Jason is indulging himself in mystical hindsight. The realistic decision point would have been after Dec 41. The Germans not only had thier tit stuck in a wringer (Russia) but now had the US coming into the war. To think that the Germans could magically get 1943 or 1944 levels of production happening in 1942 is silly. Speer only took over in 42 and had to not onlyy feed a large conflict, but increase production also. 1942 production of aircraft (besides Stukas) was not that much greater than 1941. German tank designs were in a state of change. Prolonged use of existing tanks placed a parts strain on any production increase.

Yes please relieve us of your anal semantics.

The Operational Art of Retreat? Also, don't forget the scorched earth policy. The Soviets were playing hardball. Could the Germans have really stopped the movement of that industry? They did not have a bomber fleet that would reach that far? Blitzkrieg could only move so fast also. One of the things to keep in mind about fuel is that it is not just production, but alos distribution. The US, beyond argument THE POL king, had problems keeping its motorized divisions supplied with fuel once they were moving. In some cases (Anvil), they were lucky and captured German aviation fuel (runs great in tanks) and also diesel (not sure if they could use it). [ June 02, 2005, 09:57 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

http://www.feldgrau.com/articles.php?ID=16 Germany reached a critical point when it decided to continue attacking England. It could have negotiated after the Fall of France. But it did not seal its own fate till it attacked the Soviet Union. THAT is when it started to lose the war. Germany was like a very good middle weight fighter taking on a pretty bad heavy weight fighter (SU). The heavy weight could stick it out and get better. [ June 02, 2005, 09:10 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

I do not believe that Germany could have ramped up as fast as Jason is guessing. They could have ramped up all sorts of vehile/plane production but ramping up all the fuel needs for those items would not be as easy. Germany did ramp up production in the long run but at the expense of spares. They clearly made a mistake there also.

The Germans wait till 44 to learn that diesel is easy to manufacture? [ June 01, 2005, 10:09 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

The Germans did ramp up weapons production for the invasion of the Soviet Union. But amazingly, they cut back on production in late 41! Clearly they believed in another short term application of the Blitz that would produce another victory quickly. They cut back on MG, rifle and mortar production in particular. Clearly the Germans were going for a short term war with the Soviets. A better goal would be the securing of the breadbasket of Russia, capturing/denying oil to the Soviets and restricting any imports from outside sources. The Germans should have concentrated all antishipping efforts from the Allies to the Soviets. Since they could not bomb factories in the US and England, sinking ships was just as good. The Germans should have got the Japanese to attack the Soviets and deny any supply from the Allies also. The German air attack on England (with its loss of pilots/planes) was stupid. They should have either finished off England or not bothered attacking them after the fall of France. In reality, they could not do it and it would not have been worth it. They just wasted resources. By attacking the SU, they just put themselves into another multifront situation that would spell thier own doom. [ June 01, 2005, 10:36 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

You think he has any friends?

Perhaps if the French had as much space/bad weather as the Soviets 'enjoy', they too could have had some options. If the French had an industrial Giant like the US supplying it, it may have also faired better/longer. Napolean should talk to the US troops that fought in the Hurtgen forest perhaps? They had great morale initially, but were worn down by bad terrain, second rate troops (with lots of ammo for the tubes) and many realities that Mr. 3:1 did not dream about.

According to this source the Allies sent 59% of the Aviation (high octane) fuel. The Soviets were quite capable of supplying thier own automotive fuel needs (97.5%). You probably are not grasping that fact. It is very clear if you bothered to read the link provided. Evidently, they needed aviation fuel. More than likely, it is harder to process than lower ocatne gasoline or diesel. Aviation Fuel thousands of tons (includes Allied deliveries) 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total % 889 1269 912 1007 1334 1017 4396 Allied Deliveries 2586 59 Soviet Production 1810 41 Trucks: They did recieve many trucks. They even used captured trucks also. They needed trucks. What dont you grasp? Bibliography Beaumont, Joan. Harrison, Mark. Accounting For War: Soviet Production, Employment, and the Defense Burden, 1941-1945 Ibid. Soviet Planning in Peace and War Jones. Sokolov, B. V. "The Role of Lend-Lease in Soviet Military Efforts, 1941-1945"; Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3, Sept. 94 Trucks http://www.army.mil/CMH-pg/books/wwii/persian/chapter08.htm [ May 30, 2005, 02:58 PM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

3 inch mortar is using WP. I compared 25 pdr. to 2 inch because they are both non-WP type smoke. 3 inch mortar WP is clearly inferior (just compare weight of bombs and assume similar % filling) to 2 inch mortar smoke. I would say both types of smoke are under modeled to one degree or another. In addition, the amount of dust/'smoke' generated by larger HE shells is under modeled. TNT generates a large cloud of black 'smoke' in addition to dust. [ May 30, 2005, 01:52 PM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

Again, we are talking ideal conditions. The general thought is that non-WP smoke is modeled wrong. For some reason, 2 inch mortars are the oft quoted proof.

It says 2 minutes emission. Not 5 minutes. Further bombs would have to be fired to maintain it to 5 minutes. Unless in a defensive position, this would rapidly use up a foot units smoke bombs. 2 inch mortar: 9 bombs times 2 pounds is 18 pounds times 30% filling is 5.4 pounds filling. 25 pdr: 2 rounds is 50 pounds times 7% filling is 3.5 pounds filling Rough math but there is nothing special about 2 inch mortar smoke.

The 'Myth of the Blitz' was no more than an 'All-In' using mobile warfare against an enemy for the first time. It worked against the Poles and the French and defeated these nations. It was not a myth but a unique employment of weapons to maximize effectiveness. It worked primarily because it accomplished exactly what it needed to do; it defeated the enemy before they learned the technique itself, or a reasonable defense against it. The Germans learned from Poland that consumption of material would outstrip production. They knew that any further attacks had to be quick and decisive. They had to also benefit in some way from winning the next nation. Raw materials, food, coal, etc. were the payoff if the German Reich was to benefit from attacking nations. The land-based 'blitz' technique failed against England. Airpower could not really 'blitz' and the Germans got a bloody nose. 'Blitzing' in the desert was just grinding sand. The German 'blitz' into the SU was clearly the biggest mistake of WWII. It created an enemy with ample room to absorb the shock of initial losses, gain allies that would support her, and turn the Germans own weapon against it with an even more capable method of attacking. The US/Allies also developed a mobile method of using brute force against an already over-stretched Germany and collapsed the Third Reich under logistical pressure. Mobile Warfare replaced any 'blitzing' after 1943. All combatants had settled into using AFV in rougly similar practice and there were no more nation-toppling without brutal combat. [ May 30, 2005, 10:47 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

..Almost forgot to mention the truck/jeep factor... Clearly, the Soviet response to the 'Blitz' (Operation Art of War) would not have been possible without Allied pipeline of transport resources (rail/aviation-fuel/trucks).

I believe its true that the US supplied the SU with 60% of its aviation fuel. In other words, high octane refined gasoline. The SU had refining capabilities (and resources) and supplied its own diesal (and other fuels) it seems. The SU probably could not have had half the working air force without US support. Sorties consume vast quantities of fuel. http://orbat.com/site/sturmvogel/SovLendLease.html I imagine that the US supplied diesal tank and TD to the soviets. The US made shermans with both diesal and gas engines. US trucks also ran on gasoline so they would have needed a source of lower octane gas. The US did just send truck chassis in some cases so I suppose that the soviets could have assembled diesal trucks. It appears that the US supplied the SU with great quantities of rail equipment including locomotives, rails, cars. On the eastern front, rail was a major method of moving equipment. Between fueling half the Soviet airforce and supplying the majority of rail equipment; the Allied shipments to the SU decided the eastern front theater. If the Germans could have limited this pipeline of material better, they would have had some chance of winning on the eastern front. Clearly the German inability to stop the Allied supply line to the SU was a major factor in its losing WWII. [ May 30, 2005, 09:43 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

The Germans had to 'blitz' for a simple reason... Early in the war, when the 'blitz' worked, it had to work. If France could have put up a longer lasting defense, and other nations supported her at this point, then WWII would not have spread like it did. If most of the effort put into the maginot line was put into something as simple as mobile antitank guns and AA guns, 10's of million of people would not have died. A prolonged war against france would have rapidly depleted the German war stocks, and not having the ability to ramp up quickly, they would have been stopped from making the error of attacking the Soviets. http://orbat.com/site/sturmvogel/images/ussbs/fuelpro.jpg If Germany's fuel production could have been attacked earlier in the war, it would have saved many Soviet lives. Given the fact that the Germans were tight on fuel from the beginning, its startling that the industry was not identified and destroyed earlier. [ May 30, 2005, 09:40 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

Did 2 inch mortars have some uber smoke fillings? They probably had the same fillings as many non-WP smoke shells. Except less.

WP does not burn for as long as a scenario. So you are imagining too much. Friendlies can enter the smoke screen within minutes. Non-WP smoke will make a tank crew bail out. It is sucked into the crew compartment (by fans) and makes operating the vehicle impossible. A field expedient is to take two smoke grenades and tie them together. This is then thrown over the vehicle. WP burning particles can be sucked into the engine compartment by the powerful fans and destroy wires/hoses/radiators/fuel/etc.

http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/Forum1/HTML/000420.html This thread discusses the reasons.

This is Charles comment..1999