Bigduke6

Fair enough, but like you said the skill of the command makes a difference. The PKK kills Turkish soldiers pretty regularly, and seems to have a pretty good idea of how to exploit the country's political situation so as to make the rules of engagement favor the Kurds. The Turkish soldiers pay the price. My fave Turkish military trivia is from the Korean War, it turns out the Chinese/North Koreans had an awful time getting Turkish POWs to turn and go on radio and make anti-Capitalist statements, betray their buddies, and so forth. Americans supposedly were by far the easiest for the Communists to "re-educate"; the Commonwealth POWs somewhat more difficult, but the Turks basically proved impossible for the Chinese/NKoreans to do anything with. The difference was apparently social: when the Communists separated the NCOs, officers, and junior enlisted into separate groups, that left the privates and corporals from the English-speaking countries without a command structure, and it was every man for himself. When the same thing was done to the Turks, the oldest guy in the group just took over as the man in charge. As long as there were two Turkish POWs together, the story goes, it was always clear who was the commander even if there were no military leaders present - it was always the oldest man. Of course, I'd be willing to bet the Chinese/NKoreans had next to zero people of their own who could speak Turkish, and since Turkey was poor it's a reasonable assumption the people they sent to Korea were mostly volunteers, not like the draftees the Americans especially threw into the theater. Still, it's a great story I think.

You sure about that? How many infantrymen on the ground or local tribesmen bought to support your cause could you get, for the price of an M1 delivered and kept operational in theater? Plus there is the negative morale factor, once the bad guys figure out a way to deal with your ueber tanks (they always do) then your dead ueber tank becomes the poster child for "the technologically rich are losing" propaganda. No problem if the bad guys quit quickly of course, but in a longer war a tank like an M1 in some ways is a public relations disasters driving around looking for a place to happen.

Well boys, now the al-Assad people are saying it's the Turks that are the problem, Ankara isn't just arming the Syrian opposition but helping them set up bases next to Syria, and then Turkish troops are helping Syrian rebels sneak into Syria. So Syria's army is justified in tightening up its border with Turkey, if the Turkish army crosses into Syria Damascus will defend itself, etc. etc. You gotta believe that if somehow the NATO Turks wound up shooting at Syrian army, the Russians would do something. Maybe just bump up the ammunition stream, but they wouldn't ignore it. All in all this thing has the makings of a nice little proxy war.

Well boys, the Russian destroyer Smetlivy sailed from Sevastopol a couple of days ago and it should be showing up at Tartus to take on supplies any time now. Then she's supposed to be in the eastern Mediterranean "on training" into May. Here she is stinking up greater Istanbul: http://turkishnavy.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/810_4.jpg?w=890 As I understand it there is a Russian guided missile frigate floating around the region as well. Be it far from me to play the Red-baiter, however, Acmemapper informs me Tartus is about 60 kilometers from Homs. The nearest airport to Tartus (i.e., where an Il-76 could land) is in Latakiya, about 60 km up the coast.

That's true, but it's not exactly as if the Hitler-imposed delay prevented a huge German victory. No matter what Rauss, v. Manstein, v. Gudarian, and all those other rah rah Blitzkrieg guys might have us believe. Kursk came on the heels of the 3rd Battle of Kharkov, which though a clear German victory had written down German mobile units in the Ukrainian/south Russian sectors probably by close to half. That battle came on the heels of Stalingrad, or more exactly the destruction of 6th Army and if not the collapse of the German front then its extreme flimsiness from about the Black Sea to the Russian border. It is also worth remembering that the 3rd Battle of Kharkov took place not because the Soviets were at their last gasp and desperate for an offensive success, but because they were exploiting the victory at Stalingrad with Uranus and Rumyantsev. The Germans contained it, but it wore them down. In other words, three months prior to Kursk, the Wehrmacht was in no condition to attack anything in at least the southern half of the Eastern Front, and given terrain it's probably safe to say the entire Eastern Front. V. Manstein especially is disingenuous when he says Kursk's failure was all Hitler's fault, because Hitler was an amateur commanding true military professionals. V. Manstein said that his success at Kharkov "proved" the correct German strategy was to riposte against Soviet offensives, rather than conduct German offensives like at Kursk. This however assumed the Germans could collect force for a counterattack more efficiently than the Soviets could for an offensive, and further react to a Soviet offensive effectively, which certainly was not necessarily the case even in Spring 1943, see Stalingrad. It also assumes that the weather would support German mechanized advance; Feb-April is the flood season (melting snow) in central Russia and April - early June is the rainy season. By settling on July maybe Hitler gave the Soviets too much time to dig in, but he also made sure the panzers and the trucks carrying the infantry and supply could operate off-road. Had the Germans attacked at Kursk in, say, May or June 1942, that's somewhere between 30 - 60 per cent less Soviet fortifications, traded for German formations not at 100 per cent strength but say at 60 - 80 per cent strength, and with a proportionally lower amount of available fuel and ammunition available. An earlier attack at Kursk could also, depending on how much earlier, have reduced or even eliminated presence of Tigers and Ferdinands, which in the actual event turned out to be critical in getting the German armored spearheads forward. Since historically at Kursk the Soviets built I believe nine defensive belts and the Germans managed to overcome three, in July, I think it's reasonable to assume that in May Germans armed and equipped as the would have then, probably wouldn't have done substantially better. To me Kursk is one of those battles where the result was a foregone conclusion. The decisive thing about Kursk IMO was the Soviets' superior intelligence, not what happened on the battlefield.

I define superpower as "country able to dictate its terms, most of the time, globally; and whose behavior if not defines then sets direction to the behavior of most other major nations - with the exception of another superpower." Further, the influence is by most measures and not just one or two measures. By my definition of superpower, the means of exercising that influence could vary and almost always are combined. It could be a bunch of ICBMs and the perceived wilingness to launch, it could be a greedy leadership controlling a resource very valuable internationally, it could be a populace really sure they have a global obligation to enforce their beliefs on other populaces. The Russians aren't thinking globally - yet - but it is clear they are already committed to becoming the leading Eurasian power. The longer-term goal, and Putin is very frank about this, is making Russia the leading nation in a block of nations that counterweights Europe and the US. (He doesn't mention China, but we all know he's thinking about China too.) That block is roughly the former Soviet Union for most issues but it could, real life example, include China for say a conflict over who whether it's ok for the international community to force regime change in Syria. Or it could include India AND China if the conflict is over, say, whose fighter jet system will be used for for pretty much all air forces between NATO and Japan. Or it could include India but exlude the Chinese, if the question is, who really has drilling rights in the Spratley Islands. The bottom line is that Russia has a pretty substantial cash reserve thanks to energy, and the Kremlin's avowed goal is to use that reserve to convert the economy from an energy/raw resource-based economy to include manufacturing and much higher consumer consumption. Yeah right, that's laughable, the Russians could never manage that. They're too corrupt. Of course, that's what a lot of people said about the Chinese in the early 1970s. Not many people are laughing at the idea of sustained Chinese economic now. And the top-level Russian position is, if the Chinese can do it without substantial resources, we can do it faster and give our people a better social contract in the process. On China, well, it's possible to argue that the Chinese are flouting the rules pretty much flagrantly and with impunity, if you consider their national currency valuation and market access policies unfair to the EU and the US. To wit, the Chinese break the rules and the EU and the US can't do anything but complain. So does this mean China, not the US, is the superpower? It's not like the US can just boycott Chinese goods, what if the Chinese dump all their US treasury bonds? I call that interdependency, and evidence that the US is a lot less a superpower than it was even 20 years ago.

Russia is the largest energy exporter in the world, and the EU is their key customer. If you tack on energy that travels to Europe via routes controlled by Russia ex the Caucasus and Central Asia, that's a pretty serious stick to swing if they want to. As to military capacity, the Russians aren't in a frantic hurry but they're not screwing around. They've got the money and they're overhauling their military. They plan to launch something like 1.5 top-end attack subs a year for like the next eight years, they've shifted their entire army over to brigades, they plan to have their first 5th generation fighter squadron operational like in 2014, the military purchasing system is now actually rejecting gear that's over-budget or under-quality, they've fielded new major end items (attack helicopters, smart munitions) in pretty much every category you can pick. In this modern day and age, population size isn't nearly as important as population willingness to back the war chosen by the leaders. Here the Russians have a strong advantage I would think, courtesy of national tradition and the state media. It's not clear that, as the Russians claim, they can organize C3 coordinated warfare across all the spectra with all the cool gee-whiz weapons the Americans have, for about 1/2 the price or less. The Russians are of the opinion that their guided weapons and intelligence collection are as good as anybody's and better than most. They also point out that what are entire theaters of operation for the rest of the world, are just opposite ends of the Russian national railroad for them. Maybe they're wrong. But they don't seem to think so. And as far as Russian state media goes, the threat isn't China, it's the aggressive militaristic West. You look at how the Russians are building their force, they are focusing on power projection into small conflicts, not a potential major war against a continental opponent. Like Georgia, which actually worked out pretty well for them.

Jer, I would say Razman Kadyrov is not a good example, he's a classic example. Yes I'm aware the insurgents are still out there, bless their gold-toothed little hearts, but it's not a coincidence most of them are operating in Dagestan not Chechnya these days. I saw his vehicle convoy go by once. It was like the court of Tamerlane, just with cop cars and sirens. LLF, One can always hope the Russians and Chinese will realize they are natural antagonists and leave the West to pick up the pieces, but frankly, Putin and Hu seem pretty much to have decided the game is economic development to create new superpower status, and ditzing around about ownership of islands in the Ussuri is a big fat waste. The Chinese need energy and have industrial capacity, the Russians have energy and need industrial capacity. They both know it, and they both know the country that plays its cards better gets to be the next superpower. But they also know, that to develop economically it's way better to have peace and trade, than it is to argue about who really should own Manchuria or the Maritime provinces. The Russians might just manage to ruin things because their leadership is just in love with its military-industrial complex, if they get a couple more successful wars under their belts then they might just decide they need all the military hardware their scientists can imagine, and then they bankrupt themselves and just maybe scare the Chinese into overspending on military as well. But probably not. The Chinese and Russians these days are jousting over things like whose national oil company gets to help fraternal Kazakhstan drill the north Caspian, or who's turn it is to veto the latest US resolution on Syria in the UN Security Council. Heck, the Russians gave Damansky Island BACK (or maybe generously ceded, you decide) to the Chinese in 2004.

Sorry, almost certainly no Russian nukes in harbor, the ships are a (naval) tanker and some kind of reconnaissance trawler. And I think the biggest thing they have actually in the Mediterranean right now is a frigate. A more reasonable scenario might be: - Assad goes from just homocidal to genocidal AND it spills over somehow into Turkey - This triggers some form of NATO response, we can't wait for the UN etc. - The Russians say "Oh yeah" and deploy troops themselves - NATO and Russia forces (obviously) studiously avoid getting near one another, but from time to time kill lots of Syrians on whichever side they're not backing If you posit spillover into Iraq I guess you might be able to theorize a US intervenion exclusive of Europe and NATO, but with Iraqi forces. For extra fun posit the Iranians then allowing the Russians ground transit to the Iraqi frontier.

There is a school of thought that goes that the closest thing the western Allies came to a war-losing mistake was, in mid-42 to early 43 the only way to close the central Atlantic Air gap was with Liberator patrols, and for several months the strategic air bombardment boys were unwilling to give up a couple of squadrons. This in turn, the argument goes, gave the Germans a fighting chance of cutting off supplies from the US. The amount of shipping was limited, Ultra or no Ultra there was no practical way for the convoy stream to avoid the central Atlantic air gap, and by mid-42 Doenitz had so many boats that unhindered by long-range air patrols they could have broken the Atlantic convoy system. As it was, again the argument goes, the powers-that-were forced the air bombardment boys to cough up something like 24 or 48 Liberators, and that was enough to keep the freight moving until jeep carriers could be tied to convoys. But there's a whole historical school of thought that says it was a very close run thing. But, while giving the Atlantic campaign its full due of importance, I personally would put it behind the East Front as the scene of the war's decisive battle, whatever campaign it is you decide to pick. The reasoning is that the Soviets would have defeated the Germans without Lend Lease, just more slowly. Glantz makes a pretty solid argument along those lines. Since it was the Soviets that knocked the Germans out of the war, therefore, the war's decisive battle should be somewhere in that conflict. Like always it ends in semantics: Is "decisive" to mean "set the train of events on an unalterable course" or is it "almost inevitable harbinger of the result" or is it "the moment the Axis started losing"? Assuming of course one single battle could be decisive in a global war. You could argue that the invasion of Pomerania and Brandenburg and the leveling of Berlin was the true decisive battle of the war, because after that Hitler was dead and Germany was a divided political entity, no more Lebensraum for you, game over.

What about the Battle of Moscow? Up to that point, the Soviets not only can't stop the Wehrmacht, they really are unable even to fight the Wehrmacht on anything like even terms. Wherever the Germans are capable of collecting force, they advance and destroy whatever is in their path, almost at will. Sure weather and terrain cause problems, but the Red Army is almost inidental. If the Soviets commit more troops and equipment to an operation, it's almost as if the only practical result is more Soviet troops and equipment destroyed or captured. And now the Germans are 20 kilometers from Moscow, the most important rail hub, training center, and government seat in the Soviet Union. Probably the Soviets would have survived the loss of Moscow, but that's not the point. Rather, up until the Soviets kicked off their counteroffensive, the Germans (and the whole world, pretty much) were convinced the Soviets had no counter to blitzkrieg, that they were in the same boat as every other European nation the Germans had overrun. 30 divisions of Siberians attacking in weather conditions the Germans were hard put even to keep their troops alive in, I think was a huge psychological shock on the German leadership, and by this I mean the military leadership. You read v. Gudarian or v. Manstein, the campaign is tough but goes competently forward during 1941, and there is no Fuehrer interference (in substantial terms) that the German generals later could use to explain every failure on the Eastern Front. And then all of a sudden, the Soviets manage to put a million man offensive in motion, and keep it going when the German logisitic network is failing. Sure part of that success was just Soviet ruthlessness, the willingness to spend whatever lives and equipment it takes to get a result. But that was the point. The Moscow offensive meant, that for the first time, the Russians had figured out a way to use their strong suits, superior amounts of men and equipment and (possibly) greater ruthlessness and (certainly) greater patriotism, and convert that to a decisive victory on the battlefield. It was also the first time (I believe) the Wehrmacht had been hit with a major strategic land counteroffensive, ever. For any one willing to look (or with the benefit of hindsight) the writing was on the wall. The Blitzkrieg jig was up. The Germans had an excellent tactical system, but they were human and their system had limits. Those limits, and the strategic implications of those limits, first became exposed with the Moscow counteroffensive. The people who inflicted that defeat were, with the exception on only of the Roma and the Jews, the lowest form of human life, by the Germans' own standards, that the Germans had ever fought. Certainly the Germans tried to write off the Moscow offensive as an anomoly, we had no winter clothing, the Russians got lucky, we'll beat them if the weather is ever normal, wait until we start making Tigers, etc. etc. But the damage was done; the German image of absolute invincibility was shattered. They could be beaten and by normal men. And what was worse for the Germans, the Russians were right there to learn the same lesson. Think of what it meant to Stalin and Stavka: Yes, we CAN beat them! A war where either side can win a battle is a whole new ball game, and that ball game began about 10 kilometers west of Moscow on December 5 1941.

Actually this is kind of old news, the word went out that there were some kind of Russian infantry on that tanker on Monday. The Russians have a naval basing rights lease in Tartus and by definition Russian naval infantry there is not an escalation, they have every right to be there. I've seen a couple of reports that it's a battalion of "anti-terrorism specialists". The Kremlin line on them is yes they're there but they have nothing to do with the Syrian civil war, they are part of an ongoing Russian effort to assist in supressing the Somali pirates, although they "might provide assistance" if it becomes necessary to evacuate Russian civilians. For practical purposes they appear to be Russian marines trained up to a standard for operations in the Caucases, which is pretty high. There are a couple of vids out there of these guys sticking it to the Somali pirates, they seem fairly competent and professional from what I could see. Potty mouths of course but then they are Russian marines. Anyway, I think it is fun to remember that the Russians also have a minor fleet element wandering around the eastern Mediterranean, and they could reinforce it fairly quickly and substantially. They have something like two brigades of naval infantry in Sevastopol and Novorossisk, carrier ships are ready to go. It's about four days' sailing to Tartus. And f the Russians could get air transit via Iraq (easier than you think, the Iraqis would prefer Assad stay in power) then theoretically the Russians could funnel troops in from the Caucasus and Central Asia as well. And that's not counting the Russian airborne, I think they have something like six brigades of those airborne guys who are at first level readiness. Unlike NATO, the Russians are not stuck in any wars and have a substantial amount of uncommitted infantry and support capacity available to them. Gaming a Russian intervention in Syria can be pretty entertaining.

I think the Kremlin is is willing to play the "protector" card when it suits them, but as nearly as I can tell what drives their decisions is the intention to remake the country into a superpower. In their heart of hearts, they don't see themselves as Europeans. They see themselves as Russians, and as Russians their top priorities are build a powerful state and undermine competing states. If you are talking about average Russians, it's not so much Muslim fear as good old racism, I'd say. You go to the country and Russian language, culture, traditions, history you name it and if it's Russian it's overwhelmingly dominant. But if you talk to the people you find plenty who are just convinced the country is about to be overrun by foreigners and that justifies pretty much whatever the police want to do. You look at the Russian media and it has no problem making fun of Tajiks or Uzbeks. Interestingly enough the average Russian is not really aware people are dying in the Caucasus region almost every day from the insurgency, the rebels have gotten pretty good at assassinating cops and local officials that collaberate with the Russians. This is because the overwhelming majority of the Russian media simply doesn't report it. Educated, internet-saavy Russians of course know better. But the average Russian I would say is pretty much convinced the insugency in the Caucasus is repressed, so repressing elsewhere really isn't a big deal. Heck, the spin the Russian state media on Syria is, Assad is defending the Syrian state against rebels who are being armed by NATO. Since Russians don't assume national leaders should necessarily act democratically or spare the lives of citizens undermining the state, Assad's actions aren't that unpalatable. But the bottom line is not what average Russians think, but what Putin and his buddies think. And what they think is that Syria is a great way to get even with NATO over Libya. I'd be willing to bet that when they talk to NATO behind closed doors the Russian line is "You fools, look at the mess in Libya/Afghanistan/Iraq. Stop this building democracy crap, it just replaces a relatively stable dictatorship with the worst kind of chaos." Sometimes I think the western democracies get trapped into these "eliminate the evil foreign government and improve the world" campaigns becuase if they don't, they have to explain to their own populations how it is representative democracy at home isn't always improving general public welfare. But if democratic nation troops are committed to building democracy elsewhere, then at home the democratic nation leadership can point to that and say "See, we support democracy, and if you think it's bad here at home look at how things are over there, get back to work pay your taxes and leave us in charge of the country." But that is of course cynical and another thread.

Cool thread, I wish I had been reading it earlier. Here's my two kopecks (er, cents) on the Russians: This doesn't come up very often in the western media, but the Kremlin is being about as emphatic as it knows how that it will not repeat will not we'll say that again for emphasis will not under any circumstances known or unknown support an international intervention in Syria. They have promised about a billion times to veto UN sanctions against Assad, and actually done it twice. They even got the Chinese to sign on. The formal reason, our friends the Russians say, is that both sides are responsible for violence in Syria, therefore both sides need to stop shooting, sit down and talk etc. etc. The real reason, which people like Putin and Lavrov had stated repeatedly, but does not somehow get mentioned much in Western media, is that Russia is not going to allow a UN-sanctioned intervention for humanitarian purposes, because they did allow it in Libya and it turned into NATO-sponsored regime change. The Russians are really mad about Libya. Not that it's a hellhole now, but that their buddy Gadaffi got kicked out against their wishes and now Lukoil and Rosneft' have lots more competition drilling in Libya. Few things angers Russians in power more than handing them a fait accompli they don't like and can't do anything about. They remember forever. So now, they are unwilling to yield on Syria. Heck, more than that, they are willing to go way out of their way to make Syria as big and irritating a problem for the NATO nations, just to get even for Libya. They have made that position crystal clear, but somehow that cause-and-effect link - as far as the Russians are concerned - isn't making it into the western rhetoric. You read the reports and the statements, and it's like the Russians are in love with Assad. Not true, the Kremlin has stated up and down they are fine with Assad stepping down, as long as it happens peacefully. But forced regime change for them is a matter of principle, they aren't going to allow it in Syria, no matter how many people Assad kills. Now, this doesn't mean NATO etc. can't intervene in Syria. The Russians aren't going to start WW3 over Syria. But it does mean the West can't do it with UN sanction. People like to blow off the UN, but a sanction of international use of force against a regime is pretty important. Without it, intervening is a whole lot harder for the western democracies as they get their national legislatures and populations behind the sending troops and weapons, and try and sell that idea in western Europe these days. Assad knows all this, and I think that's a big reason why he's blowing the bejeezus out of Homs. Because he can. The Russians, moreover, are continuing arms deliveries to Syria, and unless NATO wants to pick a fight with the Russians those deliveries are going to continue. Assad knows this too. So the Syrian army doesn't have to worry about limited ammo, see Homs for what that means. For the record the Russians have rented I think two piers and some shore facilities in Tartus since the mid 1970s BUT (and this is really just as much a part of Russian military build-up for domestic reasons as it is international power politics) the Russians started repairing and modernizing everything there in the late 2000s. Last I heard (Monday) they had some kind of naval reconnaissance ship and naval tanker tied up in the port and the Kremlin confirmed there was some form of Marine Infantry/Anti-terror specialists/Russian soldiers trained for ground combat aboard the tanker. The biggest unit size mentioned was a battalion, but who knows? Anyway, the next day (Tuesday) the Kremlin says, well ok, we have these infantry in Tartus, but really they're anti-piracy troops. Sure if there's an emergency those infantry might help evacuate Russian civilians, but in general we Russians are peaceful and we'd never think of intervening on the ground in Syria. But the bottom line is pretty clear to the NATO boys, to wit, if there ever is a decision to intervene in Syria, that decision has to consider uniformed Russian troops as a factor in how the intervention would play out. Which makes things a whole lot more complicated for the NATO camp, which of course is the main Russian goal. So I would bet Assad is going to keep killing his people for quite a while yet, and whatever assistance to the rebels the West might manage, the Russians are going to match.

The man that wrote that article, James Bamford, is pretty much the reigning expert on the NSA and modern US code-breaking/electronic intelligence gathering. I can't say I'm surprised.

I'm about 99 per cent sure the metro is billingual these days. It has to be, I just didn't happen to notice. The city is by Russian standards incredibly well set up for tourists, there are kiosks with maps and signs pointing the groups the right way. When I was there last I walked from the Moscow station to the Winter Palace, and back, with the worst kind of slushy snow coming down, and I found nary a puddle or ice patch. (This last may not seem like a big deal in the West. But in Russia the concept of a large mass of well-groomed winter sidewalks on which pedestrians may walk confidently and with dry feet borders on science fiction.) From what I gathered the people in the tourist industry pretty much all had some basic English and you could certainly find students or professionals with strong English. St. Petersburg is still a very "intellectual" city, meaning a relatively high percent of students and university graduates. Factor in all the pirated Hollywood movies every one's been watching for the last 20 years, and I bet you could make your basic needs known to just about any one these days in English and have a chance of being understood. I was in Leningrad 30 years ago myself. The updated version from what I have seen is far more attractive than the Soviet version, but big picture it's still pretty much the same city. Hard to move all those palaces and roads and canals I guess.

Bugged, You have to take all advice about Russia (including this I suppose) with a healthy grain of salt. Frankly, I found the St. Petersburg drivers to be quite polite and extremely predictable provided I stayed in the pedestrian crossings and obeyed the traffic light. Yes one might get honked at for jaywalking, but hey, you're jaywalking. Certainly driving there is more, ah, peppy than say in a US suburb. But Italy and the Balkans are worse, this is my first-hand experience. On the visa and trip, do I get you right, what you're trying to do is basically organize the ferry ride yourself and then since the ferry touches in St. Pete you want to get off and make your own itinerary? Total time in city about 48 hours? If that's the case, certainly that's possible, but if I were in your shoes I would at least consider some kind of package tour. This is because: - I don't know where cruise ships dock exactly in St. Pete, but whereever it is it's not in the center because the Neva's too shallow. Meaning time and energy figuring out mass transit to get to the center. Certainly doable but maybe not how one might want to spend limited tourist time. - It certainly possible to get an individual visa to Russia, I've done it and probably millions of other people do it too. That said, as a general thing the Russians seem to do better dealing with large groups and organizations, and less well with individuals. This is an argument in favor of a package tour or at least getting in on paper at least as part of some group. - As to being locked into the itinerary of a package tour, it is helpful to remember that in Russia cutting class, skipping work, and not putting in full hours are not nearly the social faux pas that such behavior is in the Anglo-Saxon West. Likewise, useful explanations of why one didn't keep one's word - "It didn't work out", "I was sick", "I had to help my mother", "The water pipes/telephone/heating/whatever in our apartment broke and I had to fix it/them", "I had to go to (fill in the blank) government office and that took all day", and "My kid was ill" - might be considered hogwash in the Anglo-Saxon West, however, in Russia one can dodge massive responsibility by making such declarations. And since Russia is a very chauvinist country, women are expected to keep their word even less. Clever Western women exploit this social loophole from time to time. I'm off on a tangent but point is there is no law that says if you are booked to go to say the bus tour of the Great Siege of Leningrad as part of your package tour that you must attend. Likewise, there is no law that says you can't go somewhere else at the same time. No one will lock you up in the Peter-Paul Fortress, you won't be shot like a Decembrist. It is very possible to book pretty much whatever tour you want, or go whevever you want, under your own power. The only problem is practicality, Russia is very doable but it's not user-friendly and there's a learning curve. So if there are ways to bypass learning how to organize one's stay there, so as to have more time just staying there, I would think seriously about taking advantage of them if I could. If get to St. Petersburg during White Nights you will not forget it, I promise you. In the middle of June you might very well have clear days but they could be muggy. This is an argument for a better hotel with AC, the cheaper one's might not have it. But it's sort of a roll of the dice, it might be chilly enough to wear a light jacket. Main thing is carry an umbrella. Oh, one other thing, St. Peterburg is walkable but be prepared for some pretty substantial distance. The subway/underground is excellent but during rush hour you just might get the teeming ant effect. The signs I believe are in English and it's fairly easy to cope with, but the first time a foreigner goes in there it takes a bit of bravery. They always come out fine somewhere else of course. My suggestion at this point is read up on Wikitravel and decide what's interesting, and then see if you can get a package that allows you to do it, with the qualification that "allows" is understood to mean "There will be this block of time for this uninteresting tour, which I will skip to do this cooler thing."

Bugged, I think I can say I know the city fairly well. As it happens, I was in St. Petersburg just last week. What to recommend depends a lot on what you want to do, what you're interested in, time and money available. Glad to make suggestions if you can give some ideas. If you want to get a general impression take a look at Wiktravel, that more than covers the basics. As Russian cities go, for tourist visits anyway, St. Petersburg is definitely one of the very best. The center is very attractive. Way, way better than Moscow. If you get to choose between summer and fall, I suggest choosing summer. During the summer solstice it's pretty much a holiday atmosphere, the sun doesn't set very much, they call the period "White Nights" Two caveats right off the bat though: - It will probably be a bit more expensive than you expect, this is primarily a function of tourist funneling, there is cheapo stuff out there but it's not so accessible to foreigners who (I assume in your case) don't speak Russian. - The weather can suck. Blame Peter the Great and take your umbrella. Glad to help more, just ask.

Isn't is sort of a propaganda piece? You know, the Navy provided support and got to censor out anything they didn't like? It's not exactly breaking box office records, according to Wiki.

I'm sure the Aberdeen engineers were dead on, a known failing of the V-2 was "inefficient sealing rings". I'm not an expert but I've had a mechanic (they still use these engines in some Russian trucks) explain to me it has to do with the higher-than-normal design pressures for a diesel that size, which gave more horsepower for weight. FWIW. In any case a a Soviet tank designer might very well say: "Why do we need a reliable battery/electric starter for the engine, when there is the air compressor thingie in there already. Either it's a low-stress start and it starts, or it's a high-stress start and you have the compressor. And in any case (thinking Soviet here) there's no such thing as a T-34 operating on its own, therefore, there is always some one to give you a jump. Not that any of that makes the engine any "better". It is interesting to note that the 1941-era T-34s were considered much better machined and finished than late-war T-34s; this due to a conscious decision to simplify and cheapen production. Probably engines went that route too. I have read that actual engine life on T-34s actually improved substantially (1.5 - 2.0 times expected), this due primarily to better-trained crews. Although I bet driving in Europe as opposed to the SU had something to do with it too. They had a pretty good version of the 120mm mortar, just to stay on thread.

Well, that sorta depends on what you want from an engine. The V-2's power to weight ratio was solid, it was dirt cheap, it could handle nasty fuel, and it dealt with wear by burning (slowly) motor oil. It could start at minus 30, without a battery if necessary, there's this cool air compressor thingie that will boot the engine into motion w/o electricity. (Although to be fair that's the tank not the engine.) The way the Soviets figured it a T-34 engine was good for about 70 - 100 hours of operation with an average of maybe 5 - 10 kph speed. So if you issue a T-34 it's good for 1-2 of those big offensive operations or maybe three to six months of war. Not many T-34s were going to last longer than that, anyway. And if it did then the crew for sure rated a new tank. But yeah, if the definition of a good tank engine was one that operates properly for hundreds of hours, the V-2 was a bad engine.

Soviets didn't have to collect people in trucks. They could just level the buildings and burn the fields, and make the only place with food the concentration camps. That would bring in at least women, children and non-military age men - who would of course become hostages. That would compensate for a great many super-skilled Finnish partisans in the woods. But even though the Soviets were first-class land-grabbers, I think it is worth bearing in mind they didn't do it because they thought it was fun. They already owned the biggest land mass in the world. Rather, the Soviet strategic problem always was that they had this giant periphery and all along it were territories that could either be a threat or an opportunity, and it wasn't always obvious which place should be a priority and which should be back-burnered. Unless there was a real reason to focus, if you look at how the Soviets behaved in most times, they sort of lurched from one policy to another for any given border region, and it wasn't uncommon that domestic issues would influence whether it was time, say, to be agressive in Central Asia or to play for stability on the Manuchurian frontier or try and cut trade deals with the Romanians or the Americans. The German attack created a rare exception to that rule, where the Soviet government and people became (almsot) absolutely united on pushing towards a single clear strategic goal, that being the obliteration of Germany as a potential military threat, forever. When it became clear that goal was going to be reached, the Soviet Union's leaders suddenly had to deal with not just becoming a major political player in Central Europe - the Tsars had done that in their day - but figuring out how to be a global power. Stalin and his advisers first began grappling with that seriously in late Summer/Autumn 1944, when it was clear the Axis no longer could halt a deliberate Red offensive, it was only a question of how long it took to concentrate the forces. Finland historically was one small but important piece of the Soviet strategic puzzle, primarily because of its proximity to the Leningrad industrial region, but also because Finland arguably could interfere with Soviet domination of the Baltic region or rail links to the North Cape. By the latter stages of the Continuation War, all these Soviet objectives had been reached. This was also the status quo at the end of the Winter War, and also the status quo for the entire post-WW2 period. It may not have been the view of the Finnish leadership, but clearly the Soviet view was this Finnish-Soviet balance was stable and most desirable. To me, and yes this is hindsight, the Finnish leadership made a strategic blunder of the first order by signing on to the German attack on the Soviet Union, and so challenging that Soviet view of the proper Finnish-Soviet balance. Just like the Germans, the Finns underestimated how hard the Soviets would be willing to fight, and the Soviets' capacity to organize people and resources, if necessary ruthlessly. Also in hindsight, it seems like the Finns made an extremely intelligent move in making clear their war aims were not Nazi war aims, and at the same time making sure that they treated Soviet POWs and ethnic Russians under Finnish control more or less responsibly, at least as compared to what the Germans did in the Soviet Union. This meant that when the Red steamroller came back in the opposite direction, it was just looking for victory, and not vengeance. Personally, I think this more than anything else is why Finland did not share the fate of the rest of East Europe. The German conquests of France, (most of) Scandinavia and the Balkans were spectacular but it only took a look at the map to see that France is a lot smaller than Russia, and the Finns of all people should have known what kind of weather Russia can see in the Fall and early Winter, and how crappy the roads can be. None of this was a secret in May 1941, and if the German leadership can be pardoned somewhat for not knowing Russian history, can we say the same of the Finnish leadership? So why did Mannerheim (if it was indeed he that did it) commit to joining the Germans? Certainly there were good moral grounds, the Soviets had shamelessly stolen Finnish territory and if the Germans did their part there was every chance the Finns would get the stolen territory back. But was it a smart, well-informed decision as well? Here's on possibility: Mannerheim served - with great distinction - in the Tsarist army for 30 years, and he saw it come apart at the seams in 1917. He knew how bad morale and diorganization could get in the Russian military, first hand. The incompetence, corruption, waste of life, alcohism and laziness that is often the standard in any Russian organization lacking dicipline, Mannerheim had spent an entire career watching, if not trying to prevent. A conviction the Soviets were rotten soldiers and their officers were worse, had that been Mannerheim's conviction, could only have been reinforced by the Winter War. Could Mannerheim's deep knowledge of the Russian military and its failings have deluded him into thinking the Soviets could not resist the Germans? Could his personal experience leading forces in Finland have misled him into thinking that, there was no way the Soviets could invade Finland so that the Finns could not just halt them, but punish them? If in fact that was the case, then at bottom the reason the Finns intervened on the German side was because Mannerheim made the military calculation the Soviets could not resist effectively. That was of course the same strategic error made by Hitler and the German General Staff. The difference is, of course, neither Hitler nor the German General Staff knew the Russian military from the inside. The thing is, Mannerheim was no dictator, as I understand it he wasn't even an elected official. But at minimum he was a highly respected figure and Finland's top military man. His opinion was critical. It is very hard to conceive of a way Finland could have begun the Continuation War, without Mannerheim's direct approval. So what happened when the Finnish leadership began contemplating the Continuation War? Did Mannerheim recommend an attempt to recapture territories lost in the Winter War? Or did he caution the politicans saying "Hey, it would not be a great idea to make the Russians mad, that can end badly." Which makes me wonder even more: if not Mannerheim, then who was it in Finland that made the decision to launch the Continuation War? What was their logic? How much deliberation went into the decision? Even if it was Mannerheim (which, frankly, is the most likely scenario) did any subordinate stand up and say "Er, getting Karelia back is great if it works, but what if the Soviets manage to hold the Germans? Maybe we should keep in mind Soviets may have to fight their way across half of Europe to get to Berlin, and defeat the entire Wehrmacht in the process, while for us Helsinki is about a six-hour auto drive from Leningrad?" Sergei, you are welcome to challenge what I've said or just not participate in the discussion. If you think this is mindless trolling, you can report me to BFI.

Well I wonder. I can see the Soviet logic in kicking off the Winter War, standard Total War strategy, find the wealthiest adjacent neutral province that no one big can interfere with, and annex it. Repeat until you reach a larger empire you DO have to worry about, and hope by that time you've gathered up enough provinces (i.e., population, production capacity, transportation bottlenecks, what have you) that you are now bigger and badder than your real strategic enemy, who hopefully hasn't gathered in as many neutral bits of terrain as you have. In the pre-Great Patriotic War period, when you stop and think about it, the Soviets were giving the Germans a good run for their money in terms of grabbing terrain. It wasn't just Karelia and Pentsamo. The Soviets one way or another grabbed Bukovina, Chernovtsi province, Moldavia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, western Ukraine, and a sizable chunk of eastern Poland. Plus, in that same time period, the Soviets established whether or not the Japanese would stay on the right bank of the Amur (most emphatically they would as Zhukov stomped the Japanese at Nomonhan) and who gets all the sheep in Mongolia? (Again Moscow). If one is willing to extend that window of concerted Soviet expansion just a bit beyond the beginning of Barbarossa, then the Soviets had overrun something like 1/4 to 1/3 of Iran by September 1941 as well. To me, if nothing else, all that is proof that Stalin in no way was picking particularly on the Finns. Finland got the same treatment as pretty much every other state actually bordering the Soviet Union in the 1938 - 1941 period. It is true the Finns made a better fight of it when it came their turn to cough up terrain to the bear than say the Lithuanians or the Romanians, but the end result seems to have been the same. Until the Germans invaded Stalin chose to expand the Soviet perimeter frequently, and he did. Likewise, it was not just the Finns that teamed up with the Nazis when it seemed like there was an opportunity to get that stolen land back. The Romanians and the Hungarians as we all know are Axis troops in CMBB, and who hasn't heard of the SS units of ethnic Estonians or Ukrainians? And we all know the Soviets overran all the other Axis minor allies, but then, and this is my point, all of East Europe was inbetween the Soviet heartland and Germany. The Red Army was never a surgical tool, it just flattened what was in its path. The best way to avoid being flattened, was arranging things so that it never came at you in the first place. Finland was not inherently in the Red Army's path to Germany. Nor was (roughly speaking) Kurdish Iran, nor was Manchukuo and all its industrial potential. Since the Soviets left Iran without a fight, and indeed left Manchuria after a fight, I wonder, how valid is the arguement that the Soviets would have attacked the Finns during the Continuation War period, had the Finns not attacked (with perfectly good grounds, at least from the Finnish POV) the Soviets first? From a Soviet POV I don't see a compelling reason. In May 1941 Leningrad has a nice deep hinterland, the Leningrad-Murmask RR is now fairly deep in Soviet territory, Pentsamo is now Pechenga leaving the Finns with no outlet on the Arctic. Finland from the Soviet POV is already pretty well emasculated as a potential springboard for German agression, and until the Baltic states are properly built into the Soviet economy what possible point could there be in grabbing more of south Finland? If the Swedish comparison isn't fair, okay, let's think about Turkey. True the Turks didn't have a common border with Germany, but they certainly did and do with Soviet Armenia and Georgia, and the Black Sea coast road south from Batumi is a great corridor for a mechanized offensive. Unlike the Finns, and like the Swedes, the Turks stayed neutral during Soviet-German war. True there were no real territorial disputes between Turkey and the SU at the time, but in an era where almost every European state seems to have caught the invasion bug at one time or another, it is a little wierd that the Turks of all people turned out to be peacable neighbours. Be that as it may, the end result the Turks achieved was the same, practically speaking, as what the Finns obtained. The June 1941 border with the Soviet Union was the same as the June 1945 border. The difference was the Finns fought a pretty bloody war against the Soviets, and the Turks, staying neutral, did not. And for the rest of the Soviet period the Soviets, arguably, simply had bigger problems than figuring out whether it made sense to invade peripheral states like Turkey and Finland. I have no doubt the difficulties the Soviets had in organizing force in the Continuation War to break Finnish defenses, although they figured it out eventually, was a factor in the Soviet decision to leave Finland alone after the war. But personally, I suspect a much bigger factor was simply, the Soviets by 1940 had grabbed as much of Finland as they felt that they needed.

Well, I figured if a Finnish individual soldier and his achievements fighting Soviets was fair fodder for a CMN thread, then talking about how much effect that soldier had on the Finnish-Soviet confict was germane as well. In general, in my personal opinion, most wars that seem a good idea at the time usually turn out not to have been. That's a conclusion drawn from study, discussion and personal experience. From what I can tell there are very few good wars and a whole lot of wars that get advertised as good, and actually weren't. Thus, I am suspicious when I come across an arguement, anywhere, that a particular war made good sense. Part of the advertising is almost always packaged in the form of "our heroic indivudual fighters against their clumsy semi-civilized masses." All of which made me wonder about the Continuation War, and whether or not it fighting it actually made good strategic sense for Finland. To me, the question at the very least seems debatable. Looking at the conflict from the Soviet POV, the whole Continuation War was a campaign by Moscow to "recover" what the Soviets had taken from the Finns by force in 1941. This is not to justify Soviet motives, Heaven forbid, but just to understand them. Another factor in my thinking in this is, had the Soviets really wanted to occupy Finland, it seems to me that they could have. They had the force and if necessary the will to expend lives and treasure, look at how much they sacrificed to erase a war-capable Germany from the map of Europe. Is it really credible that the Soviets cut a deal with the Finns in October 1944 because the Soviets were so battered by the Finns they decided they couldn't overrun the country? Me, I would guess "no", I would say that if Stalin had decided the Soviet Union needed control of Finland more than say the Balkans then that would have been that. I would say a more probable estimate of Soviet motivation to settle with Finland was, they were at war with the Germans to the death and for the Kremlin Finland was a sideshow. Certainly, the Soviets were not happy the Finns had this idea they might take back Finnish territory the Soviets stole from them but, from the Soviet POV, but at a guess I'd say "punishing" the Finns wasn't nearly so important for the Soviets as utterly destroying the German military, and then taking over the most valuable parts of Eastern Europe. If one was a Soviet strategist at the time, and resources are limited, and you're picking and choosing which parts of Europe you want to make part of your sphere of influence, well, places like Poland and Hungary have far more resources and population than Finland; and Finland - unlike East Europe - cannot act as a buffer zone between Russia and Germany. So did the Continuation War really keep Finland free? Or does Finland owes at least some of its independence simply to its location, which is not strategically vital to the SU/Russia. (As opposed, say, the land approaches to Leningrad, one of the SU's most critical centres of production. This, the Soviets as we have seen made sure they kept, which is why people speak Russian not Finnish in Karelia today.) Which begs the question, if the location of Finland and its strategic importance to Moscow wasn't going to change, then why should Finland fight a war against the Soviets to convince them not to overrun Finland, when as it turned out the Soviets had the opportunity and they didn't? Which makes me wonder all the more how wise it was for Finland to throw in on the German side in 1941. Maybe it made sense in Finland, but if the Soviet Union was not going to collapse then it was inevitable they would do what it took to re-establish what they considered their lawful borders. If the Finnish logic was that, ok, we will re-occupy Karelia since the Soviets just took it from us, and since the Soviets know grabbing other people's territory is bad they will accept Finnish re-occupation of Karlelia, then that obviously was a bad, bad calculation. That would not have been consistent with historical Soviet behavior, the Soviets were obscessive about their borders since day one, and the Russians still are. And since intelligent people like pretty much the western military establishment were of the opinion the Soviet Union could not resist a German attack for more than three or four months, as of late June 1941, I think it is reasonable to ask whether the Finnish decision to intervene on the German side was influenced, at least in part, by that same faulty estimate? Is it really credible that the German General Staff could consider defeat of the Soviet Union a probable matter of months because they were basically uninformed and stupid, but the Finns wound up in the same war on the same side, against the same opponent, because the Finns were clever? I guess it's possible, but to me it seems doubtful. If the modern Finnish historical evaluation of the Continuation War is, it was an informed strategic choice, then I would be curious to know what was the reasoning. I would be very interested to know what the historians have concluded about the the Finnish view of the Soviet Union's capacity in June 1941 to resist the Germans. As to the rest, and this is really just for the sake of debate: The Soviets had plans to finish off every one, more or less. The question was which was important. Germany always came first, that was the priority, everything else was subordinate to that. All Finland needed to avoid Soviet conquest, was a viable military and more important strategic goals for the Kremlin than owning Finland. You're right there can be no sure conclusions here, but it seems to me attacking the Soviets so that somewhere down the line they will be so convinced Finns are such tough fighters, that it's not worth trying to conquer Finland, is not a great idea. Memory of the Winter War was fresh. Indeed, I've just thought of another point: All things being equal the Soviets probably were more likely to consider a major attack against Finland after 2-3 years of static war following a Finnish invasion of Karelia, rather than if the Finns hadn't. Why? Because the Soviets knew 2-3 years of static war against Finland was long-term attrition warfare that favoured the Soviets. I dunno, did Finland have anything wartime Germany needed? Or for that matter the SU, the Russians have a long history of starving their own population to get spiffy western stuff. In any case if I hold up the balance, and ask, which is worse, grain shortages, or the Karelian and Leningrad Fronts firing 100 guns per kilometre in the breakthrough sector, well... Well, if the Finns were willing just to cede the territories instead of fighting for them, then obviously yes. All a question of how hard the Finns were willing to fight and whether or not that was enough to get the Soviets to conform to the Finnish goal. Indeed. But absence of a crystal ball does not preclude discussing history, in an attempt to learn from it. Well, that's where we disagree. As I see it, there indeed was a parallel: Both were relatively developed Scandinavian countries, both had big dangerous superpower neighbors, both had to try and maintain their independence while the rest of the continent was going nuts with the worst war it's ever seen. As noted, I'd be very interested to know what the logic and strategic outlook that went into that choice. This is nothing personal, I'm not fully convinced the US made absolutely the right move in putting so much effort into defeating Germany, for instance.

Huh? Actually I don't have too much of an opinion on the subject, that's why I'm asking how the Continuation War is considered in Finland. It seems to me like you can make a case from a hard-nosed realpolitik POV that it was not a good idea; it put Finland on the side of the odious Hitler regime and ultimately Finland lost lives and material and gained no territory from the war. True, the Finns gave the Soviets plenty of experience on how bloody it would be if they ever decided to invade the rest of Finland, but I'm not so sure that was a great lesson to teach the Soviets, if they decided a goal was important they were willing to pour a lot of bood into the effort. As I said, a direct end result of the Continuation War was two Soviet Fronts inside Finland and attacking. If the goal of a government is to protect its citizens, can we not ask whether the Mannerheim government did the right thing by setting a chain of events into motion that led to those Red Army forces attacking Finland? Perhaps asking such a question flies in the face of the "fight outnumbered and win" doctrine. And if the issue here is that I am opinionated against that doctrine, well guilty as charged I guess. But if the comparison with the Swedes is somehow inappropriate then substitute the Swiss, they also stayed neutral without too many ill effects. In any case sorry if I gave offense, I didn't mean to.