jacobs_ladder2

My original point was not that they are the same or different. In fact, it's completely irrelevant. The point is that FOW is the ONLY control, except for rarity, that players are allowed over realism aspects of the CM engine. Rarity was added for a reason as was FOW. Rarity to maintain play balance and FOW to allow players to receive more or less information on enemy units. Rarity could not be made an absolute rule because it would limit the engine's ability to model exceptional situations. FOW is similarily offered in grades. My argument is that a bogging parameter control would only be added if it were proven to be a valid exception to BFC's long-standing trend towards realism. Obviously they do not add these sorts of options lightly. In the several years I have been watching, despite numerous attempts by players such as yourselves, they have only done it once (FOW is an original feature) in response to a serious issue (players running rampant with heavy tanks). In my opinion bogging does not qualify. Why? Because bogging is a single aspect of realism similar to the psychological model, track hits, errant arty, friendly-fire, shells breaking up on impact, MGs jamming, etc. Bogging has no more impact on gameplay than any of these other factors. So let me get this straight. You DO NOT have control because you DO have control just NOT in all situations. In the descibed situations, which are not ALL situations, you have NO control. Does that about sum it up? In other words, in the exceptional situation where a tank inexplicably, or without apparent explanation, bogs you have no control. In other situations, which we are, according to you, not discussing, you have control. Therefore, you have no control. Please correct me if I have mistated your reasoning. ...in your opinion. So, once again, I will summarize. Bogging is more annoying than other features designed to add realism to the game. Realism factors which are exceptionally annoying should be controllable.Therefore I should have control over bogging. And finally, a synopsis of the above statement... being historically correct only matters when it is not detrimental to the player. Which logically implies, the player should have control over historical accuracy for those situations in which said accuracy is a possible detriment to their chances of winning. If aforementioned realism is provided merely as a subjective context than it is ok. Should it prove to be a nuisance it should be made an option. Or better put...historical accuracy should only be included in the game when it is not potentially disadvantageous to the player. If it is potentially disadvantageous it should be provided as an optional feature. Unless of course it is not too annoying. Does that about cover it? Cheers Paul [ April 17, 2005, 05:11 PM: Message edited by: jacobs_ladder2 ]

No, it does not. There are other factors, but it does seem clear that large numbers of Russian tanks were operable. Glantz quotes 29% requiring capital maintenance and 44% requiring "lesser" maintenance. These two sources put operational vehicles somewhere between 70 and 80%. The problem with these numbers is the subsequent high breakdown rate suffered and the uneven distribution of that rate. Some divisions seem to have suffered severe losses before ever reaching the battlefield while others did not. This leads me to believe that a higher number of tanks were qualified as "combat ready" before the war, but did not last long under combat conditions. Also, some corps were much better prepared than the majority. These numbers pretty much agree with other sources. However, they do not give an accurate representation of the true state of readiness of the armoured forces. The distribution of these tanks (and other resources) amongst the various corps is interesting. By military district: Leningrad---1st MC---1,037 tanks---4,730 vehicles ------------10th MC---469 tanks---1,000 vehicles Baltic---3rd MC---651 tanks---3,897 vehicles ---------12th MC---749 tanks---2,531 vehicles Western---6th MC---1,131 tanks---4,779 vehicles ----------11th MC---414 tanks---920 vehicles ----------13th MC---282 tanks---982 vehicles ----------14th MC---518 tanks---1,361 vehicles ----------17th MC---63 tanks---607 vehicles ----------20th MC---94 tanks---431 vehicles Kiev---4th MC---979 tanks---2,854 vehicles -------8th MC---898 tanks---3,237 vehicles -------9th MC---298 tanks---1,067 vehicles -------15th MC---749 tanks---2,035 vehicles -------16th MC---482 tanks---1,777 vehicles -------19th MC---453 tanks---865 vehicles -------22nd MC---712 tanks---1,226 vehicles -------24th MC---222 tanks---229 vehicles Odessa---2nd MC---517 tanks---3,794 vehicles ---------18th MC---282 tanks---1,334 vehicles A few things are apparent from these numbers. First, the Western Special military district was badly understrength and, second, tanks and vehicles were distributed in an extremely uneven fashion (much less so in the south) with one corps receiving the bulk of the tanks at the expense of the others. A more easily understandable way to look at these numbers is to calculate the percentage of establishment. For example, taking the Western and Kiev Special Military Districts as counterpoints: Western---6th MC---110% tanks---93% vehicles ----------11th MC---40% tanks---18% vehicles ----------13th MC---27% tanks---19% vehicles ----------14th MC---50% tanks---26% vehicles ----------17th MC---6% tanks---12% vehicles ----------20th MC---9% tanks---8% vehicles Kiev---4th MC---95% tanks---55% vehicles -------8th MC---87% tanks---63% vehicles -------9th MC---29% tanks---21% vehicles -------15th MC---73% tanks---39% vehicles -------16th MC---47% tanks---34% vehicles -------19th MC---44% tanks---17% vehicles -------22nd MC---69% tanks---24% vehicles -------24th MC---22% tanks---4% vehicles Obviously the Kiev Special was far better equipped than the Western, but still badly lacking in transport (4-55% of establishment). And look at the variation amongst corps (6-110% in the Western and 22-95% in the Kiev). Predictably, the better equipped corps were amongst the original 9 formed in 1940 while the newer 20 formed in 1941 had hardly even begun to fill out their requirements. In terms of newer models, the numbers are fairly convincing. There are 2 corps, the 6th and 4th, having 82% and 75% newer tanks. Later, 4 of the corps have between 10 and 30% newer models. The rest, for the most part, have no newer tanks except for a few scattered exceptions having a maximum of 5%. Once again, the 6th and 4th were formed in 1940. These numbers are accurate, but they do not tell the whole story. If we look at the makeup of those men we find that the vast majority are enlisted men. Some corps have up to 130% of their establishment in enlisted men. Generally, the average corps has around 30-50% of their fill in command and junior officers. There are variations, but they fit the same pattern. The newer corps have more and better personnel at the expense of the others. In terms of training the pattern is predictable. Older corps have some degree of preparation while the newer ones range from completely untrained (with large numbers of conscripts never having fired a shot let alone having laid eyes on a T-34) to having rudimentary skills. This is an interesting point. The use of tractors was actually planned from an early stage and it was well-known that production could not hope to meet requirements. In the event of war the corps were ordered to requisition large numbers of vehicles from the civilian population. Unfortunately this did not work out very well. Farm tractors were not good at hauling artillery and the numbers of trucks available were not nearly as high as anticipated. I have to assume that this severely limited the maneuver capability of the corps. The performance of the various corps is another topic entirely. Certainly the older, better trained, better equipped corps fared better than others, but generally, even those that arrived on the battlefield in strength suffered remarkable attrition. My opinion is that the corps lack of preparation, trucks, tractors, etc. added up to an inability to maintain vehicles in combat. Therefore, the more successful corps were able to put up a fight for a short period, but sooner than later found themselves losing the battle of endurance with their far more prepared enemies. Taking into account the horribly uneven distribution of tanks amongst corps and the severe shortage of trucks and tractors I think it safe to say that the Russians, in reality, possessed a small portion of their paper strength. The few mech corps (4-6 of them) prepared for war, were able to hurt the Germans, but were unable to maintain themselves under the stresses of combat operations. Certainly the accelerating rate of losses bears this out. The uneven distribution of tanks, both geographically and amongst corps, exacerbated by poor command and control, probably prevented the Russians from massing their tanks in all but exceptional cases. This allowed the Germans to easily obtain local superiority and to destroy smaller numbers of tanks piecemeal. Cheers Paul [ April 17, 2005, 02:22 PM: Message edited by: jacobs_ladder2 ]

It was pretty bad. The infantry divisions were stripped of their trucks in favour of the need to equip the 29 new mechanized corps (each with two tank and one motorized division). Remember that the original 9 mech corps (ordered in July of 1940) were a huge stretch for the resources on hand. When 20 more were ordered created (in February of 1941) the RKKA went from the realm of the monstrously difficult to tooth fairy land. Look at the sacrifices Germany had to make to expand their panzer divisions. Now imagine that you are in the process of making those sacrifices and Hitler orders you to create another 10 panzer armies. Worse, he orders you to do so when you are fairly certain that war is right around the corner. Still worse, while you are doing so he is arresting, shooting and killing your officers. In terms of shortages you can throw a lack of trucks onto the pile. There were severe shortages in everything (including manpower). According to Glantz, 2 corps were overstrength (in older model tanks), 2 more were at around 75% of the required newer models and the remaining 25 averaged around 53% (mostly older models). In fact, on June 22, there were only 1,861 of the newer model tanks. Unfortunately, 1,475 of them were distributed all over the western military districts and were destroyed in the first two weeks of Barbarossa. The Red Army had managed to fill 19% of the required heavy tanks and only 11% of the mediums. An additional 16,500 newer model tanks were still required to reach establishment (not to mention that only 20% of personnel had even minimal time training with the new tanks and that many of the new models had not yet been bore-sighted). In the meantime older tanks filled the gaps. On 15 June 1941, 29% of the older models required capital maintenance and 44% required lesser maintenance. Other shortages included the lack of 39% of vehicles and 44% of artillery tractors. Corps manning ranged from 22-40% fill in enlisted personnel and 16-50% fill in junior officers. Shortages in experienced and senior officers were worse. Glantz offers a few examples of the results. Major General Shestapolov, commander of the 12th Mechanized Corps reported after the first few days of Barbarossa that: 1. After the 1st day's march and especially after the 1st day's battle, entire "tens" of tanks rapidly broke down. Because of the absence of reserve units, both on the march and during combat actions, these vehicles were not restored, and, if they were restored, it had to be on the field of battle since the lack of tractors did not permit their towing to the damaged vehicles collection points. 2. The AA battalions were poorly supplied with shells. On 26.6.41 enemy aviation destroyed and burned 17 combat and around 20 transport vehicles. 3. Shells for the 152mm guns are completely lacking... 4. Command and control of forces was weak because of the lack of radios. Radio communications almost completely did not work. The only means of communication during the operation were liaison officers. The 21st Mechanized Corps went into battle without tanks and having only "mixed groups formed from the tank and motorized divisions". By the 11th of July, 3rd Mechanized Corps had only 400 men and 1 BT-7 tank and 12th and 1st Mech Corps were down to less than a hundred tanks. As far as the Western Front is concerned, forget about it. The end result was the complete destruction of 11th and 14th MC and the reduction of 6th, 17th and 20th MC to rifle formations. The 20th MC, for example, by the 27th of June, was essentially operating without tanks or vehicles of any kind. 17th MC was reported to have been in the same boat. To the south the situation ended up the same way although, admittedly, it took longer to get there. The list of reasons for the disaster go on and on but all harp on the same points. Lack of rear service units, no ability to evacuate damaged vehicles from the battlefield, poor command and control and absolutely no defence from enemy aviation. In total, lack of transportation was a significant part of the picture, but thrown into the mix of the many other critical shortages it was almost overlooked. Cheers Paul

I would like to repeat two points and add a third: First, there is absolutely no precedent for allowing the player control over immobilization. There is no other similar option in the game except for rarity and, arguably, fog of war. What you are asking for is a special concession distinguishing bogging from all other realistic facets of the game. In other words, bogging should be an option because it has a greater impact on the game than, say, errant artillery strikes, friendly fire from passing fighter-bombers or soldiers not following orders. Second, BFC would have to make this concession based on the huge assumption that it is a critical issue. Or rather, that a large number of players are having their game experience ruined or significantly impaired by this feature. They are not and it is not. And lastly, I have been playing since CMBO and I have NEVER had a tank become bogged on a road. Sorry guys. You have as much control over your vehicles fate as you do over any other element of the game. Cheers Paul

Did some more reading over the last few days and decided I should clarify something. The purges were not entirely responsible for anything. They did contribute to the disaster, but were not the absolute determining factor. One also has to take into account several other factors and realize that the picture is still blurry in many places. For example, the purges themselves would not have been so devastating if the army had not been in the midst of a massive expansion. How massive? From 1939 to June 1941 the ground forces increased from 98 to 303 divisions and from 1.6 to 5.3 million men. Imagine trying to coordinate this while losing well over half of the most capable officers are being arrested and, in many cases, shot or imprisoned. All of which was symptomatic of the regime in charge of Russia at the time. The purges were not officially happening, so efforts to compensate for them were few and far between. Command training remained essentially unchanged from 1932 to 1939 despite the massive loss of personnel and the concurrent expansion. New officers needed to be found, but from where? Hundreds of thousands of educated men were hard to come by in the Russia of the 30s. How would the hundreds of new divisions be brought up to establishment? The answer is, they would not. Most remained dismally understaffed. And of course, this led to a score of smaller, yet equally debilitating, problems which plagued the RKKA, in some cases, throughout the entire war. The illusory world of Moscow allowed for this to happen, but my problem is understanding how the illusion came to be. Why did the regime choose to destroy the Red Army from the inside? Was Stalin just a wingnut? If so, how nutty was he? Why did military men like Zhukov and Timoshenko back him when they had to know how damaging his actions really were? It is impossible for me to really get at the issue without understanding the players. Cheers Paul

Well, I guess that depends on how many of these on/off switches players would require before ceasing to complain about "losing this or that unfairly". Does bogging effect one player more than the other? No. It does not discriminate. Is it a completely random factor? No. There are determinants (i.e. ground pressure). Can immobilization generally be avoided by the experienced player? Yes. If tanks are used historically, do they perform historically? No. They perform much better. Historically, these things were a nightmare to maintain. BFC has made a huge effort to accomodate many different types of gamers. The result is that a game, which by all rights should be a niche product, has done extremely well with a very diverse group of people. And surprisingly, it has done so without losing the respect of even the most hardcore grog. And amidst all this talk of parameters, I would like to say that the player has VERY limited control over the realism of the game. A large amount of control is given over factors such as weather and force mix, but there are no on/off switches available which change the mechanics of the engine. Arguably, the only one is the rarity option which was implemented to stop people from buying masses of panthers (and little else) and running rampant over the other guys who bought (imagine the stupidity!) a more historical mixed bag. And as a closing point, the passion which many of us show for games like this one is easily understood. Simply put. We appreciate the amount of research, knowledge and energy that went into them. And we know how much more they are than "just a game". Sadly, there will always be people who will look at them and say things like... "why shouldn't there be a repair truck? or some way to replenish ammo on the battlefield? we're talking about a game here, so why bother with what happened in real life? if something adds to game balance and playability - bring it on!" and... "I don't care if BFC has precise statistics on how frequently tanks became immobile in the real war." ...statements which essentially say to BFC, thanks for all the hard work, years of study, passionate dedication and attention to detail but next time don't bother. Cheers Paul

In another game (I won't say which) a certain company made a version of Battle of Smolensk. Being during Barbarossa, the company decided to add a feature modeling the actual breakdown rate of tanks. Their reasoning was simple. Russian tanks simply sucked in 1941 and that was that. A good portion of them never moved, most of the rest didn't survive the trip to the battlefield and large numbers ran out of fuel, broke down or whatever. End of story, far more were lost to technical problems than to the Germans. Crappy, but there you go. Players were up in arms within days after watching their tanks simply disappear. Most gave up immediately when they discovered they could not freely maneuver their armoured reserve about the battlefield. In fact, they whined about it so much that the company decided to lower the breakdown rate to something more in line with 1944. Then those same players complained about their infantry being too vulnerable. Then they said their artillery was too weak. Then they said their men walked too slow and should have more trucks. In short, they started to sound just like Russian commanders in 1941. After spending three months trying to make everyone happy the company realized that they had ruined a perfectly good game and undid all the changes. Ten years later people are still playing and loving the game, the company is still making new campaigns on the same engine and the designer sells his new stuff to the military. And, btw, what is all this about being outplayed and not outlucked? In short, give me a break. If you are so easily beaten then your problem is not bogged vehicles but rather poor tactics and force selection. Sure it's crappy to lose a big tank to soft ground or a blown transmission, but that's life. You take that chance when you spend all your points on a tiger. If you were clever enough to have purchased some AT guns, for example, and then knew where to place them you would still be able to kill the other guys stuff and have points to spare for arty or whatever. Suggesting that CM change because you can't have blazing tank battles with the unstoppable metal beasts that you want is hilarious. Cheers Paul

Another interesting topic is the effectiveness of the Russian KV series. According to what I have read, these vehicles were not nearly as invulnerable as they are reputed to be. Similar to the reputation of the Tiger in the later war, the KV has enjoyed some bolstering, shall we say, which may or may not reflect its reality. Cheers Paul

There are a few routes I can suggest. All involve contacting someone directly and asking them for sources and/or advice. 1. Take a look at the website belonging to George Nafziger (The Nafziger Collection). He offers to collections by Charles Sharpe and Craig Crofoot. Look for both under "books" and "WWII Organizational Studies". Contact Mr. Nafziger by phone or by email and ask him what he has. Be ready for a long chat if you call. This man can talk for hours. 2. Check the Stone & Stone website here . Specifically, do a search for the name David Glantz. The site should give you a link to contact Col. Glantz by email. Contact him. 3. Check with the Aberdeen Bookstore and contact Tom Petteys directly. He is a good guy. His email address is on the home page. 4. Check at www.orbat.com for material. They have a section or two dedicated to Russian OoBs. Contact them and see what they say. I am working on a Russian OoB for the Western Front in 1941 (July 6-September 10) and it is a big job. My suggestion is that you spend a bit of time reading a few things to get some insight into the reality of the RKKA. David Glantz and Stephen Zaloga offer the most accessible material. "Colossus Reborn" and "Stumbling Colossus" are both incredible. It will be very difficult to nail down the location of individual battalions unless you can get access to Soviet archival material. Good Luck Paul

I think the problem is the translations. The designer is looking for help to get all the material into English, but is probably finding it near impossible. I have been spending time going over the Russian mirror and it is amazing. In fact there are two sites covering the mechanized forces and another covering everthing else which are excellent. Both of them seem to share material with the Russian version of Battlefield. It's a real tragedy he can't get more help because these sites have an amazing amount of info to offer. Try using Babelfish on them and you will see what I mean. Cheers Paul

I should also add that Marshal Kulik was not the only one making decisions that, in retrospect, seem idiotic. The pre-war RKKA is full of examples of imcompetence and inexplicably bad judgement. The reason for the odd behaviour displayed during this period is of course the purges. Kulik's predecessor was arrested and shot after pointing out and attempting to rectify the failings of the Soviet Army during the Winter War. Amongst these, most notably, a lack of infantry firepower (SMGs and portable AT weapons). Kulik, predictably, and hardly in isolation, decided to undo the work of the man he replaced. Another example of this trend was the abolition of the early mech corps after the Polish campaign. Still another the repressed examination of costly Soviet tactics used at Khalkin-Gol. Cheers Paul

Also just came across this and thought you guys might want to have a look at it. Appears to be various penetration formulae. Awesome site if you can read Russian, btw, but luckily this page is in English. Cheers Paul

Also, in all fairness, I would like to offer a few numbers in connection with the purges. (All quotes taken from Stumbling Colossus) "The roster of purged commanders included two deputy commissars of defense (Tukhachevsky and Egorov); chiefs of the Red Army training, air defense, intelligence, air force, artillery, signals, mobilization, education and medical directorates; all 16 military district commanders; 90% of the military districts' deputy and assistant commanders, chiefs of staff and chiefs of arms and services; 80% of corps and division commanders; and 91% of regimental commanders, their deputies and chiefs of staff. This grisly total amounted to 3 of 5 marhsals of the Soviet Union, 2 of 4 army commanders first rank, 12 of 12 army commanders second rank, 60 of 67 corps commanders, 136 of 199 division commanders and 221 of 397 brigade commanders. Even the NKVD did not escape the wrath of Stalin, for more than 20,000 of these select men were purged, including 10,000 men from the internal and border forces." Given that the vast majority of these purges took place starting in 1937 and continued right through the initial period of the war, one can only imagine the effect they would have had. Here is one example: "So serious and rapid were the losses that the Voroshilov General Staff Academy class of 1937 had to be released early to fill command and staff vacancies. Of the 138 man class, 68 were assigned to key command and staff positions; another 60 were purged and shot." Also, it must be remembered that while all of this is happening, the Red Army is attempting to double in size. In fact, the rate of growth of the Red Army is matched only by the ever-expanding reach of the purges. "For example, Air Force commander Army commander 2nd rank Ia. I. Alksnis was executed in 1938, and his successor, Colonel General A.D. Loktionov, was arrested in 1939. His successor, Lieutenant General P.V. Rychagov, was also arrested and the two were shot without trial in October 1941." Horribly, this example is hardly abnormal. Readers may draw their own conclusions about the effects of the purges. Cheers Paul

Yes, please do provide one. Please point out when you do so where you see the US/British equivalent of the Einsatzgruppen formations, and where the destruction camps were located in the USA and Great Britain. Any information about US/British 'destruction through labour' programmes, human experimentation, and hostage killings would also be appreciated. I would also like to point out that we are talking about the movie here, not about Nazi Germany in general, and that I took your remark about good people becoming evil to refer to those who are the topic of 'Der Untergang', i.e. the Nazi leadership. If you meant all German war criminals, then that is a different story, and you should have been clearer. </font>

Two things. One, are you aware of the reputation Zhukov was able to garner himself after Khalkin-Gol? Any idea how he got it? Two, I was not comparing Stalin to Montgomery and Patton. My question was simply an open-ended one. What separated Stalin, Zhukov and Timoshenko (for example) from their contemporaries in the west? Cheers Paul

And where do you suppose all the manpower came from? We are not talking about a handful of "evil" men here, but a much larger group. Thousands. Tens of thousands if you include the Waffen-SS. Do you imagine that Hitler and his goons fashioned them all in some underground lab? Where did all these "evil" men come from? Where are they all now? Did Hitler hit "evil" paydirt in post WWI Germany? In other words, if he had risen to power in an economically devastated United Kingdom would he have been unable to find the same wealth of shear "evil"? Yes, the Nazi's did horrible things. Care for a list of horrible things done by the good guys? Cheers Paul

Excellent film. A bit fanciful in parts, but still well worth the time. As far as the duality of the nazi regime and how it was perceived by different interested parties, I would say that this is what it is. Historical figures are always considered heros or villians by different people at the same time. Genocides are being committed or are being permitted to continue right now as I write these words. No dominant power in history has ever been even remotely innocent. Power corrupts, the powerful commit atrocities and depending on who controls the media those atrocities are either magnified or glossed over. Take for example the failure of history to give the Soviets the respect they deserve for their accomplishments in WWII. How would we in the west react to a movie portraying Stalin as a hero? Was Zhukov a hero? Was Peiper a hero? And what separates these men from Montgomery and Patton? Is it a coincidence that the winners are always the good guys? I, for one, want to see these men, the Nazis, portrayed as human beings. Why? Not because I think they were heros, but because I do not think that it is a good idea to simply write off evil acts as the work of evil people. It is far more beneficial to look at what happened/is happening and ask how good people became/become so monstrous. Anyways, just a few thoughts. No offense meant to anyone. Cheers Paul

Well, we definitely drew different conclusions. In fact, I find it hard to believe that we are talking about the same book. While Glantz does offer some of the arguments you have stated he does not wield them independantly of each other. Taken separately they are indeed trite and ridiculous. Glantz, however, being one of the world's foremost authorities on the subject, has quite a bit more to say. And, while I did not agree with him completely, I found little suspect in his method of presenting his case. What I find suspect is your reduction of his work to the status of "not differing from the views which I have already stated". It does not differ greatly, but that is not surprising considering that the predominent school of thought on the subject came from his work. Stumbling Colossus left few doubts in my mind as to why it all went down the way it did, but I guess others will have to read it and form their own conclusions. The book tells you how poorly prepared the RKKA was for war, why it was so poorly prepared and the main result of that lack of preparedness (i.e. staggering losses of men and material). Decidedly, many could have guessed that, but before Glantz, guessing was all they were doing. I fail to see how the dozens of cited documents from almost every major player in the game could be perceived as an excuse factory. Certainly, it would be natural to try to wriggle out from under certain death. The mass executions of the purges would probably have had that effect on any army. Mix them and the enormity of the loss and it is easy to see why so many lost their heads, but what is striking is that they are all so similar in their choice of excuses. Essentially, inadequate signals equipment at all levels (down to tank platoons using flags to coordinate their movements), horrendous logistics, no air and little ground recon, enormous technical problems and pitiful logistics. Taken individually they explain nothing. Combined, in multiple instances, they explain everything. Add on the drastic shortages in men, tractors, trucks, equipment and ammunition and you can see just how bad the Red Army looked. In fact, the enormity of the disaster is equal to the enormity of the distance between Stalin's illusory world and the number of serviceable vehicles in a tank park in Minsk. Put simply, the boys at the top had no idea what their new toys could do. As a result they asked far too much of them. Remember, the man who knew what to do, Zhukov, was "riding the pine" while Timoshenko struggled to organize a counterattack with divisions down to 3000-4000 men apiece. His last mobile reserve squandered needlessly at Lepelem. Yes, there were a few well-aimed counterblows, but the reality is that most of the tanks were gone within weeks. Why? Because of botched pre-war planning. The infantry was meant to soak up initial losses while the mechanized corps gathered for the counterattack. Unfortunately, this rather good idea was lost to the rather bad idea that the Germans were not to be antagonized. Accordingly, the mech corps were broken up into pieces so as not to invite the attention of German intelligence. Once the dust settled, there were only a few armoured formations remaining and these, despite being in much better condition, were destroyed at nearly the same pace. In the case of the counterattack of 20th army in the Senno/Lepelem region, the Russians simply went blindly into battle and were chopped up by an opponent holding all the cards. The Germans, mainly due to air reconnaissance and near absolute air superiority, were able to follow the Russians' every move, while the aforementioned found themselves constantly bombed and sending out recon parties which either did not return at all or lacked the training to form a meaningful picture of German positions. Predictably, the Germans were ready. They chose the best ground, dug themselves in and, according to sources from both sides, decimated both corps to the tune of 40-50% losses in 2 days of fighting. Even worse, this "well-aimed" counterblow actually missed the mark rather badly. The main German thrust fell to the north. While the 5th and 7th were counterattacking into the expertly prepared anti-tank defenses of one and a half panzer divisions (of Panzer Group 3 and not of Panzer Group 2 as Timoshenko had intended), the Germans were crossing the Dvina and seizing Vitebsk against a few understrength rifle divisions. When the Stavka learned of this they ordered the beaten mech corps to turn 180 degrees and rush to the defense of the fallen city. Needless to say the Germans were not accomodating enough to let them go quietly. Some two weeks later the remnants of the two corps ended up mixed in with the rest of 20th army encircled hopelessly in front of Smolensk. This story is not typical. It is actually blessed with a few glimpses of operational success. With a few minor exceptions, the other corps did not fare so "well". In fact, the fate of the mech corps can be summed up rather succinctly. Barbarossa caught the Red Army in the midst of a massive transition. The blow expected to be aimed at the Ukraine instead went straight through Minsk. Chaos ensued. Stavka screamed for counterattacks but no one, for a number of reasons, was listening. When someone finally did start to listen the border divisions had already been swallowed. In desperation, the few remaining mechanized corps were forced to move hundreds of kilometres in a matter of days to counterattack without proper support or intelligence. The counterattacks failed badly. All of this before July had ended. I will never find the passage where Glantz explains the loss of 1000s of tanks because that passage does not exist. I can, and already have, named the books where the story is told. If you require an abbreviated version, the previous paragraph will have to suffice. Cheers Paul [ April 04, 2005, 03:48 AM: Message edited by: jacobs_ladder2 ]

Lol, that got a lot longer than I wanted it to. The short answer to your question is, basically, Marshal Kulik, overestimating German armour thickness, prevented the development of a simple, easy to mass-produce AT rifle until very late in 1941. Accordingly,the weapon did not become common until 1942. Cheers Paul

Zaloga answers this question fully in "The Red Army Handbook", but it's a long explanation. Here is the short version: By the late 30s the need for an infantry AT weapon was clear. In 1938 specifications were drawn up for a 14.5mm AP round (but not a rifle to fire it). Trials were carried out and the result adopted as the BP-32 AP-Incendiary round. Before trials had been completed, Nikolay Rukavishnikov began work on an accompanying rifle. The result was adopted as the PTR M1939 in October 1939 and plans were made to produce 15,000 the following year. TO&Es were changed in September of the same year to provide 18 such weapons to each regiment in a rifle division. Unfortunately, these weapons were eliminated along with much needed submachineguns by the same man. Marshall Kulik, acting on his own overestimation of both German armour and Russian infantry firepower, decided that neither the AT rifle or the submachinegun could play any useful role in modern warfare. In his opinion, the infantry had, or would soon have sufficient firepower from other sources. Unfortunately, the weapons he was counting on either did not arrive at all, arrived late or never arrived in sufficient numbers before the German invasion. In July 1941, understandably, the Stavka hurriedly decided to reverse Kulik's decision. The PTR M1939 was revived but quickly proved too complicated for mass production. Degtaryev and Simonov, far more experienced in the art, were asked to come up with (in as little time as possible) more feasible models. Their work initially resulted in two semi-automatic weapons. Degtaryev's belt-fed design proved too complicated and was quickly simplified to a bolt-action single-shot rifle. The semi-automatic Simonov model survived testing virtually unchanged. Both weapons were accepted in August 1941 as the PTRD (Degtaryev's model) and the PTRS (Simonov's model). Unluckily for Simonov, quantity and speed of production was the name of the game. The PTRD, being much simpler, was able to meet the needs of the infantry in a more timely fashion. 17,688 of them were produced in 1941 and 184,800 in 1942. The PTRS, lagging behind, was not produced in significant numbers until 1942. The PTRD weighed 35.2 lbs and required two men to carry it and its bulky 14.5mm ammunition. According to Zaloga it could pierce 35mm of armour at 100mm (angle and type of armour unspecified but most likely 30 degrees and homogenous). Of course, by 1942, this meant the weapon was only effective from the sides and rear when engaging German tanks. Still, given that no replacement was forthcoming (with the exception of LL bazookas and PIATs), the weapon was better than nothing and remained in service throughout the war. Cheers Paul

"Stumbling Colossus" was published in 1998 and "Colossus Reborn" about two months ago. "Before Stalingrad" was published 2003. Their bibliographies essentially quote the same sources. "Before Stalingrad", while an excellent read, is a more general discussion of Barbarossa and its failings. "Stumbling Colossus" specifically targets the Red Army, its prewar state of readiness and the resulting disaster in 1941. "Colossus Reborn", as you can probably guess from the title, covers the later period of the war. My suggestion was that anyone who has questions regarding the early part of Barbarossa would benefit greatly from reading Stumbling Colossus. The book was written to directly refute Victor Suvorov's assertion that Stalin was planning a preemptive attack against Germany. It dedicates a section to each part of the air and ground forces, details their prewar readiness and then shows how that lead to disaster in 1941. May I ask why you included this? Cheers Paul

duplicate post [ April 03, 2005, 11:28 AM: Message edited by: jacobs_ladder2 ]

I came across this article the other day. It is a comparison of several sources written by John Salt. The introduction (admittedly in an abbreviated form) is very interesting. Here goes: To be useful, armour penetration figures should specify not only the gun, range and penetration achieved, but also the ammunition nature and model fired, the angle of impact, the type of armour attacked and the penetration criterion used. I believe that the usual British penetration proof criterion early in the war was to have the complete projectile length pass through the target plate on 80% of proof shots fired. Later, some tables give the "critical thickness" of armour, that is, the one for which a shot win and a plate win are equally likely. The Russians used two penetration criteria, the "Army" criterion requiring complete perforation of the plate, and the more demanding "Naval" criterion requiring the complete projectile to pass through. Few, if any, sources provide all this information. An additional annoyance is that some sources are obviously mistaken or misprinted in places. The customary angle of impact when quoting penetration performance is 30º from the vertical, but some American weapons are quoted for 20º. German practice was (and current NATO practice is) to measure angles from the horizontal, so where 60º is stated, it is usually safe to assume that 30º from the vertical is intended. In action, unless firing from exactly right-angles to the target vehicle, there will be an additional angular component depending on the target tank’s facing. A table for rough conversions from sloped armour to an equivalent thickness of vertical plate is given as one of the extracts from WO 185/118; it will be seen that well-sloped armour seems to be more effective than would be indicated by a simple cosine calculation. It is also traditional to quote penetration against homogenous armour. Performance against facehardened plate, especially for smaller weapons firing uncapped rounds, can differ greatly. Armour hardness may vary considerably. For example, according to Kenneth Macksey's "The Guinness Book of Tank Facts and Feats" (Guinness Superlatives, Enfield, 1972), British homogenous armour at the outbreak of WW2 came in "soft" (machineable) and "hard" grades with Brinell hardnesses of 380 and 450 respectively, while Vickers Cemented armour had a Brinell hardness of 600 on the front and 400 on the back. 50 Brinell points corresponds to 10 tons per square inch; 1 Brinell point corresponds by my calculations to 0.315 Kg/sq. mm, or to put it another way 1 Kg/sq. mm is equivalent to 3.17 Brinell points. It seems that there is a certain velocity band which face-hardened plate protects against best, and for projectiles arriving outside this velocity band, face-hardened plate is less effective than the same thickness of homogenous armour. Even when sources of variation are accounted for, authoritative sources can seem to disagree. Consider the German 75mm PaK40, a common and well-documented weapon, firing PzGr 39 against homogenous armour at 30º at 500 metres (or 600 yards, which is near enough). Even discarding the highest and lowest observations as outliers, we find a variation between 90mm and 106mm, a difference of 17% of the lower figure. This highlights the point that armour penetration is far from being a deterministic phenomenon, and giving penetrative performance in millimetres (and even in some cases half-millimetres) suggests a degree of precision that does not really exist, even for proof shots fired under tightly-controlled conditions. Performance in the field, of course, is subject to very much greater variation. As Shelford Bidwell says in "Gunners at War", "All simplified tables showing the performance of anti-tank guns are misleading". The Bovington booklet "Fire and Movement" says "Chance also causes discrepancies — for instance, a normally certain penetration may be prevented by the deflection away of a projectile on a lifting-lug projecting from a turret; conversely, a normally certain immunity may be removed if that same type of projection deflects a projectile towards the armour at a different angle". Using penetration tables takes no account either of behind-armour effect following penetration, nor of non-penetrating damage. In principle, penetrating shell with a bursting charge should have better behind-armour effect than solid shot, but whether this matters in calibres above about 50mm seems highly questionable. The most supremely futile attempt to improve behind-armour effectiveness must surely be the German inclusion of a small tear-gas pellet in the AP bullet for the PzB 39 anti-tank rifle. It should still be borne in mind that most of these figures generally indicate the thickness of armour the projectile will just penetrate; the greater the degree to which the armour is overmatched, presumably, the greater will be the damage potential of the penetrating projectile. Hollow-charge weapons are a special case, in that the projectile itself does not penetrate the armour, but rather the jet formed by its charge does. Hollow charge weapons of the WW2 epoch were reputed to have less-than-ideal behind-armour effects. As the Bovington "Fire and Movement" booklet points out, "If the projectile is not an appreciable overmatch for the target, however, the penetration can be small enough to do little damage". Penetration tables also take no account of non-penetrating damage. The running gear of all vehicles canbe vulnerable to AP or HE fire from nearly all calibres. Extremely large calibre rounds can cause catastrophic damage without needing to penetrate the target; a Soviet 122mm shell, for example, might completely remove the turret of its target. Germany and Russia began using welded construction in the 1930s, but Britain and America continued to use rivets until the beginning of WW2. A shot hitting an exposed rivet-head could cause the rivet shank to break off and be projected into the tank, causing damage. The British continued to use rivets in the Cromwell until the end of the war, but these were tapered to prevent this happening. I have the article on PDF (193kb) if anyone would like a copy. It contains somewhere in the vicinity of a hundred tables from a slightly lower number of sources. Very useful. Cheers Paul

Not sure if anyone has mentioned the books "Stumbling Colossus" and "Colossus Reborn" by David Glantz. I have been going over them in detail for about 2 months now. If you want to know what happened in 1941 and beyond these books are unbelievably good reads. The destruction of the mechanized corps is well documented and Glantz leaves little doubt as to what happened and why. In fact, I would say that the first book "Stumbling Colossus" would pretty much answer the majority of questions raised in this thread. Apart from Suvorov and perhaps Zaloga, Glantz is the only historian I know of producing this kind of work. And of the three, he is far and away the best read. Cheers Paul

Remember also, German intelligence and Russian deception produced two effects. One, the number of Russian infantry divisions was badly underestimated (but overestimated in the border zones). Two, the number of Russian armoured formations was badly underestimated. German high command believed the Russians were all bunched up at the border and were supported by a few cavalry and new tank divisions. In many cases, the new armoured formations were formed from cavalry divisions. German intelligence missed this fact and erred quite badly in its assessment. Nobody had any idea the Russians had several armies sitting in second echelon and the capability to mobilize several more should the need arise. Hitler's thinking, no matter how muddled or clear, was based on the intelligence provided to him. Barbarossa, based on what was known of the RKKA, should have worked. Only, German intelligence was disastrously wrong and, of course, the plan ended a little on the bad side. Cheers Paul