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Leopard

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Everything posted by Leopard

  1. If we get to select the operational mode of units in SC2 (such as setting airfleets to CAP, recon, or grounded mode) perhaps the new SC2 will also allow subs to model their unique naval abilities. Especially the option to choose between surface, shadow, and submerged. 1. If submerged mode, the spotting could be reduced to around 5-10 % under perfect conditions and of course impose a penalty upon action points. 2. If surface mode, then spotting is increased by the sub and its enemies but with full action points. 3. If shadow mode, the sub would be considered to be "surfaced" for spotting and action points if it has not spotted any enemy units. 4. If in shadow mode (and the U-boat does spot the enemy) then the sub will follow the largest convoy or ship it has detected and stay in spotting range (but beyond detection range) without attacking. It will do this by moving during the enemies turn with the convoy or ship it has spotted and is shadowing. The u-boat is essentially functioning as a ramora, the parasitic fish that follow sharks and similar predatory fish around. This would represent the wolfpack tactic of maintaining contact while alerting U-boat command of the target, allowing command to direct other U-boats to the target. Since this will require radio communications, spotting a convoy/ship in SHADOW mode should cause an increased chance of detection. This would be greatly affected by the proposed new tech INTEL (which reflects information gathering methods and devices, code breaking, human intelligence and analysis). At INTEL level 0, with no advancements in radio intercepts or triangulation developed by the Allies historically, these shadow mode U-boats would be able to report their findings without much concern for detection. If the Allies have improved their INTEL to reflect advances in information gathering methods and devices, code breaking, etc, then reporting contacts becomes a risky to suicidal proposition. Outside of compromising positions through radio contact, or through aerial surveillance, U-boats were historically extremely difficult to locate. Ships rarely detected U-Boats with their lookouts-they usually knew U-boats were in their vicinity when their hull detected a torpedo impact. [ June 19, 2003, 03:02 PM: Message edited by: Leopard ]
  2. Immer Etwas said "Leopard has many interesting variations of this to consider, and should be congratulated for introducing this topic." Thanks for the kind words! The problems associated with stacking are precisely why I favor seeing INTEL or RECON to be a tech, not a separate unit. In addition, the size of a unit of this type does not fit the scale used in SC. The tech INTEL would assist the spotting/ID ability for all units. The factors I believe should be included in determining spotting could be broken down into major and minor factors: Major: maximum vs. actual spotting range, terrain type, Air Unit vs. Ground Unit, weather and INTEL. Minor: entrenchment, experience, recent activity Jersey John, I agree with the basic premise that the primary (and best) source of spotting will continue to be the airfleets and bombers. This is behind my opposition to a recon unit, as opposed to using a tech INTEL. I also support adding another category of spotted unit-suspected. I originally suggested a vague unit category be added (Unit presence and basic type: ground, air, small ship, capital ship), but “suspected, but unidentified” would work for this also. KDG mentioned the diminishing effectiveness of spotting at maximum range, which I proposed initially as maximum vs. actual spotting range and consider a very important aspect of spotting. Edwin P. made an excellent suggestion in that spotting be reduced by enemy air within range. This reflects the tactic of defending airspace to deny reconnaissance. Good idea! IMO, the three primary goals of this revision would be: 1. Eliminate the absolute certainty that now exists in spotting. Now, if the enemy is within spotting range, they are identified 100% of the time. A single airfleet can identify every enemy within 300 miles every time. 2. Consider factors in addition to range to determine spotting. 3. Add the tech INTEL to account for advancements in information gathering methods and devices, code breaking, human intelligence and analysis. I like Bill Macon’s idea that spotting could be concentrated in an area. Though another can of worms entirely, I wish we could set an airfleets operational mode at the end of the turn to either combat air patrol, recon, or grounded. CAP would have medium spotting ability, while at maximum readiness for air combat or defending airspace against enemy recon. Recon would have maximum spotting ability, but medium air combat readiness. Grounded would mean the airfleet would only defend if attacked, and would not risk air combat to defend either resources, other units, or enemy recon attempts. Revising Fog of War could have major implications upon battle planning. Not knowing the exact composition of the enemy force is a known component or war, and forces the aggressor and defender to plan for many contingencies. You cannot simply scout all known enemy positions within range and have 100 % knowledge of what units are present 250 miles past your borders, just because of a single airfleet. Thanks to everyone who has contributed their thoughts to the subject.
  3. You see the 5 little demon possessed blues brothers continue dancing when you are not looking at the thread? The 5 little demon possessed blues brothers sit down, have a cup of coffee and read a newspaper when I am not looking at the thread. I wonder how they do that, making it behave differently for each Forum reader when they are not looking. Odd indeed. Oh yea, there was something I wanted to say about SC2, but I keep not looking at those 5 little demon possessed blues brothers and my train of thought just seems to....I forget now. SC2...AND THERE WAS GREAT REJOICING.
  4. Is "looing" an English expression?
  5. Newer 1.07 patch worked-PBEM fine now.
  6. I was just told in an email that there is a newer version of 1.07 (b?)-I was not aware of this, must have missed this on the forums.. I'll try this newer 1.07 patch once I get home, and let you know if that resolves the issue.
  7. I just began getting this message tonight, sounds similar: "Your PBEM directory contains unreadable files most likely from previous versions of Strategic Command...." Options are to: 1)Delete the PBEM folder 2)Delete the incompatible files Have Win 98. Deleted folder, emptied recycle bin, rebooted. Could access Load saved PBEM through the game without error message afterwards. However, I redownloaded saved PBEM game (.sav) into new PBEM folder. Same error. Repeated process, same error. Both opponent and I have been playing for several weeks, both 1.07. This was a new game. [ June 11, 2003, 10:03 PM: Message edited by: Leopard ]
  8. To me, this would work out OK if the 'recently advanced unit' had to get a refit in a City (5 MPP+) or Port before the new tech took effect. Refits were a constant means of quickly introducing new technologies while at war. Then the decision of whether to continue to fight/remain on station at present level or go in for a refit would add another layer of strategy that models real war strategy.
  9. I will try to clarify this. In Strategic Command, the FOW system has only one variable that determine how opposing forces can be identified-range to enemy unit. If opposing forces are one hex away, we can see the unit type and exact strength. If two or more hexes away, but within the spotting range of a friendly unit, we see the unit type with an – (representing unknown unit strength). If outside the spotting range, no unit ID or strength is known. These three absolute conditions determine FOW. A single no-experience corps marching into a just conquered territory with no air support nearby has the exact same spotting ability for adjacent hexes as would an army which occupied the hex for the past three months with four airfleets in the immediate vicinity. I believe it would add to the replay-ability and intrigue of the game if these were calculated with consideration given to other factors including: Maximum vs. actual spotting range, entrenchment, experience, terrain type, recent activity, weather and INTEL (a new Tech which needs to be funded and researched). A bonus for air units and their perspective should be given also in certain terrain types. Fog of War is one of my favorite aspects of the game, but I could see it becoming better if it considered the above factors, and if it could be a more variable and less absolute quality. I would like to see FOW become a greater weapon/tool than it currently is. If Germany has five airfleets during the opening of Barbarossa in Northern Russia and the USSR has only one, five in-spotting-range airfleets should provide better spotting than a single airfleet. The lone inexperienced USSR airfleet could not identify all enemy units in the surrounding 900 square miles as well as five veteran German airfleets would. My thoughts are that FOW should consider factors other than just range to enemy and spotting range. It would create more doubt and uncertainty in identifying the enemy, one of the most fundamental aspects of war. I think this a solid idea that would add a lot to the game. But I'll let it go if it is unimportant to most people. [ June 06, 2003, 04:47 PM: Message edited by: Leopard ]
  10. Liam, Was that movie about Czech pilots "Dark Blue Sky" or something like that? If so, I really enjoyed that movie. It has some excellent scenes featuring aerial combat.
  11. Excellent discussion and good points made by all. Even the most well-documented facts of WWII are more interesting to read about for the thirteenth time than some new revelation about most any other subject. Well, time to leave work now and go play some SC 8), but I did want to add that the German navy was not supposed to be ready by 9/1/1939 as referred to by Liam. The brilliant Doenitz (IMO anyway) would have became a Naval icon if he had his fleet of 300 U-Boats at the onset of War, wither in 1939 or later, especially the Type IX seagoing version. With the tactical use of wolf pack attacks, milk cows to extend time in the areas of operation, sub bases like Brest within a day of the shipping lanes, and long range aircraft to locate targets the German U-Boats could have delayed the opening of a Western front. Whether or not the UK could have been starved is another matter for debate, but a second front could never had been launched in 1944 if the ground war equipment and men used for D-Day had been hunted and sunk by a fleet of 300 U-Boats, of which some 100-175 would be on station at all times. Those wicked charts of Churchill portraying the Battle of the Atlantic would have looked even worse, or perhaps would have become archives in the Thrid Reich war museum in Berlin.
  12. As Axis, you are fighting your way West. Beginning the turn, you only occupy hexes along the Rhine. You destroy an Allied unit and move into the hex southeast of Brussels and north of the Ardennes. A corps is moved into the recently cleared hex that has opponents on 3 sides: in Brussels, in the open hex south of Brussels, and in the Ardennes most Eastern hex. I believe that there would be a difference in that corps ability to determine what the opponents makeup and strength is. That for a perfect ID opportunity it would have an experienced corps, which has seen battle before and knows the difference between a few tanks or aircraft as being part of an army group or a tank division in itself, and could judge the strength of that force based on past experience. They would best observe units at the closest range, the 50-mile hexes in direct proximity. They would notice more if they had been on their own hex for 2 months than if they had just marched in, and they could see more in open terrain than they could inside cities or forests. Especially if they had been in recently engaged with these enemy positions. In poor weather there are obvious limitations on sound and vision. Additional friendly units observing the same enemy position from a different hex 50 or more miles away would contribute to the assessments of the enemy, as would good intelligence. In the extreme, a rookie corps marching into a freshly conquered hex in heavy rain with no friendly hexes occupied, poor intelligence and no air recon, would not know the exact composition of the enemy entrenched in the forest 50 miles away. However, a veteran army that has spent 3 months on a hex will know what the opposing army in the open plain that they have been fighting for 2 months in good weather with good intelligence reports, and friendly air surveillance, had for breakfast on the second Thursday of the month. [ May 26, 2003, 01:26 PM: Message edited by: Leopard ]
  13. 1. Naval improvements including more hexes to allow for destroyer screens and decreased ability to track ships. Heavy seas effects (reduces action points/spotting/naval attack) similar to Marsh effect. Subs rated for surface (increased speed/spotting/detection) and submerged. Milk cows, longer build times. 1a. Add destroyers to complete the fleets and allow for more realistic naval action. Make transports more expensive and reduce their spotting to 0. Also, have their movement occur during opponents turn, allowing opponent to attack AND move afterwards. This will remove their gameyness. 2. Weather effects, especially at sea to affect spotting/action points, and on land to affect air operations 3. Improved Fog of War for unit identification. 1. Marillion 2. Yes 3. Porcupine Tree
  14. I would like to offer for discussion a new Fog of War system. Spotting as a whole could be based on a qualified basis incorporating a new tech category INTEL (Intelligence). This could be a combined rating, calculated with randomness, by turn per unit. Factors could include maximum vs. actual spotting range, entrenchment, experience, terrain type, recent activity, weather, and INTEL. A bonus for air units and their perspective should be given also in certain terrins types. At maximum range, there is less time spent in/over the area to be surveyed and less chance of gathering information from virtually all sources. Experience and entrenchment improve observations. Recent Activity would allow for better identification for units you have attacked the turn before, or units that remained engaged by attacking you during the last turn. INTEL would be a combined tech including information gathering methods and devices, code breaking, human intelligence and analysis. The basic premise would be that even in direct contact (at spotting range 1), spotting becomes random and qualified. At the beginning of each turn, spotting is recalculated. Exact identification-including unit strength- would only be known after an attack involving direct contact with the enemy unit. Until this probing attack a unit’s identification is based on the calculated ID at the beginning of the turn. Unit ID could be calculated in 3 qualifying ways: Unit presence and basic type (ground, air, small ship, capital ship), exact unit type (HQ, army, tank, airfleet, carrier), and unit strength (Tank unit at 6 strength). The same enemy tank group strength 6 might be unseen by 2 friendly units, seen as just a ground unit by 1 friendly, seen as a tank by 1, and seen as a medium strength (strength 4-7) tank group by an experienced friendly unit in direct contact. At the beginning of each turn, each opposing unit’s ID is based on the combined spotting “snapshot” of all friendly units within range. Each units snapshot is affected by random factors, and are added together and averaged to form a base ID. If only one or two units can spot an enemy, the base ID is reduced. More independent observations, especially when coming from different perspectives (different hexes), are always superior to a single report. The level of the tech INTEL could then analyze this base ID. The higher level the INTEL, the more weighting of the best ID gathered from the various sources. If there is poor or limited information, INTEL can only do so much to assist in getting a detailed ID. But even with no information from spotting, INTEL could at level 1 have a small chance (say 2% per INTEL level) of identifying enemy units from other methods such as spies, electronic surveillance, civilians, fishing boats, etc. So INTEL would add a small amount on its own to proper identification but its primary advantage would be in helping to prioritize the best reports from other units. Whether to allow only levels of identification or to include misidentified units or incorrect strengths is another argument, but I believe this system would improve the already excellent concept of Fog of War. It would add to the strategic possibilities and realistically incorporate intelligence in combination with the factors mentioned above.
  15. Excellent and interesting game accounts. Thanks for the detailed reports.
  16. Rambo, Read your orininal post while reading past threads-and after remembering your recent comments, couldn't let it go..I'm glad you took it as it was meant, tongue-in-cheek. About the bicyclist part, it was from a Seinfeld episode and too good to pass up. Trapp, I was talking **** before the Dr slapped my butt, so I'm not likely to wait for your approval. From what I have seen read here, we need to encourage newbies-not chase them away or tell them to shut up. IMO This game still needs more players and the forum needs a variety of opinions.
  17. DDoouubbllee ppoosstt..edited out [ May 22, 2003, 05:54 PM: Message edited by: Leopard ]
  18. Rambo, Umm, excuse me for noticing, but wasn't this topic started by the same person who later whines about: 1) Having to stay up late to play the champion at the champions hours. 2) Not getting Jets level XXX. Over and over. 3) The fact that his Italian Air Force didn’t rule the known universe against the champion These petty moanings coming from the self-proclaimed icon, legend, forum-cop, industrialist, philanthropist and bicyclist. I would think this would prompt a review of your self, which could lead to the conclusions: 1) If the hours bother you, play someone in your own time zone –maybe below you on the ladder-in your own time zone and quit nagging us about your personal decisions. 2) Play the game in hand, not the game you wish had developed. 3) Get sober/ some sleep before expecting El Duce’s airforce to defeat Terif’s UK airforce. Just a newbie’s way of looking at the soapbox……and keeping icons accountable. 8)
  19. And this isn't even touching on the "Texas as a sub-continent" controversy.
  20. Santabear: Agree totally on Chamberlain, Stalin, and Beck. Chamberlain wanted Germany to fight Russia, and when cornered, Stalin probably realized his best interests would be in influencing German aggression towards France and Britain with their analogous “cement shoes” guaranteeing the sovereignty of Poland and Romania. Stalin likely knew where the other shoe would fall when the non-aggression pact was signed. From what I have read, I believe Stalin DID know that Germany would invade anyway some day. I think by early 1941 however, he felt his political career was married to the non-aggression pact and thus ignored reality and information of anything contrary. I believe he felt that anything BUT peace with Germany would not include him, so he ignored the invasion signs and became briefly paranoid, withdrawn, and German appeasement-even to the point of not returning enemy fire-became his panicked response. It lasted until several days after Barbarosa began on 6-22-41.
  21. HolzemFrumFloppen : “In fact, I count on every leader being petty, selfish and power-hungry as a matter of course; and when I do count on that, historical events become crystal clear”. Great points about the selfish factor inherent in those who seek and attain power. There are exceptions, especially Jimmy Carter (whom I’ve always admired, but presidency wasn’t his bag), but I agree the majority of leaders are interested in remaining in power foremost. If the group/nation they represent benefits, that’s OK too. Jersey John: You are right about Poland’s impossible position-much like Belgium. They needed military assistance without provoking the nation that threatened them. Both basically chose the oft chosen but worst road possible: they hoped for peace instead of preparing for it. Preparing for peace sometimes leads to war, but remaining vulnerable almost always leads to surrender. Somewhat off topic regarding Iraq, but bear with me. The Coalition has low keyed (for obvious reasons) the #1 benefit I could see for the years after the war. Not oil, nor eliminating WOMD, nor political systems that are more democratic. But future military bases in Iraq. A friend of mine who teaches was discussing the war in his high school classes, with the various reasons for and against war, and the possible futures that could arise from the choice. But when I asked, he said that this was never brought up. It was the first thing that occurred to me when the war approached, so maybe I play too many war games. Substantial airbases will be built in South-eastern (with a port nearby) Iraq and in the Western Iraq desert, and maybe in Northern Iraq since Russia seems to have irritated the situation of opposing the military action with their reported weapons sales to Iraq. Serious, B52 capable airbases. The USA has been dependent upon giving aid and paying for the right to base its air fleets in various nations in and around the Persian Gulf. They are providing protection as well as paying nations for this service. Buying their influence and support also- to be sure. But when their diplomatic support checks bounced, I believe there was a permanent shift in US policy that has yet to become apparent. But once the focus is sufficiently dimmed from Iraq, I would look for the US to complete at least 2 state-of –the-art air bases in Iraq and maybe 3 or 4. And afterward expect to see a shift away from bases in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, etc. I would not be surprised to see less military aid to Israel, since the US will have large bases just down the road. And if you have large numbers of aircraft in strategic Persian Gulf land bases, you don’t need as many carriers in the Persian Gulf. Carriers are strategically compromised by being in known locations within strike range of land-based weapons anyway. When you are able to move those carriers out, you increase their safety as well as your coverage of the oceans. Oil as a means of recouping some of the expenses of war pales in comparison to the military savings that could be realized by getting a cheap lease on a few hundred acres of agriculturally worthless, but strategically valuable land which could replace many bases costing the US out the ass. And allow the US to re-identify its friends when times are tough without being tied to their strategic location. Connection to Poland and Belgium? They should have realized their location would make neutrality impossible, and that war was coming to them. If there was any chance on negotiating with foreign armies, it was pre-war. Once you say no and they come anyway, either as invaders or as liberators, they tend to stay awhile. And once your strategic benefit has diminished, it is tough to keep the big boys interested in your own difficulties. They will defend your territory with far more passion when their own men are on it. Strange bedfellows war does indeed make, as Yoda might say. But allowing foreign troops from Russia (for Poland) or France/Britain (for Belgium) could have made a difference in 1939-1940, even if it may have provoked war sooner. By remaining weak, their fate was sealed.
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