I know this is long, and I apologize in advance.
The background of USSR/Allied relations leading to the Molotov-Ribbontrop pact is one of those tidbits I found swept under the carpet of American and English literature. Imagine if someone wrote that between 1942 and 1945, the United States invaded Italy, France, Germany, and Japan. They invented the most hideous weapon known in history, and used it immediately, without warning, on Japan killing thousands of civilians. Without explaining WHY the US did these things. The statements are quite true as they stand, but there were valid reasons that need explaining.
I had only read when the USSR and Germany signed a non-aggression pact, which soon saw Germany invade and brutalize Poland and the USSR take Eastern Poland. And I have two and a half shelves full of books on WWII. But no explanation of WHY the USSR would do this, just the dates and famous name. All for a few miles of eastern Poland? Co-conspitators? I knew there had to be more to the agreement than this.
I later read the book, Russia at War, by Alexander Werth. He was born in Russia in 1901 but moved to England in 1917. He was assigned to and lived in Russia as an English war correspondent for the London Sunday Times and the BBC from 1941 to 1948. Similar to William Shirer, who wrote The Nightmare Years about Nazi Germany, Werth had unparalleled access to information and public opinion inside the USSR during WWII among English-speaking journalists. The book cover even is written by William Shirer, who is quoted “The result, I think, is the best book we probably shall ever have in English on Russia at War.” I’ll try and filter down the 49 pages detailing the background of this pact to the more critical or obscure details, and the perspective given by the author of how the USSR viewed events unfolding in Europe.
With the reoccupation of the Rhineland in March 1936, the Russians saw the French do nothing. This signaled that the mutual assistance pact between the USSR and France would be of little value against Nazi Germany. The men in charge of British policy were McDonald, Simon, Hoare, Chamberlain, Halifax. Appeasement had become the official policy of both Britain and France for the Rhineland coup, Spain, Austria, and Czechoslovakia.
The officially endorsed French press campaigns about a “greater Ukraine” under German control (as another appeasement option at Russia’s expense) went into Stalin’s reports, and was one of his principal themes in his survey of the international situation in his March 10, 1939 report to the Communist Party. Stalin divided the capitalist powers into “aggressive and non-aggressive”, but suspected the non-aggressive of wanting “others to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them”, suggesting that they might not be averse to seeing the USSR involved in a war with the aggressors. He referred to the have-nots, as Germany, Italy, and Japan were attacking the haves. The new imperialist war, Stalin said, had already started. And with the present disregard for treaties and international law, he essentially recommended on March 10 a similar stance to that of America-isolationism and trade relations with all countries. But the Nazi march into Prague March 15th- 5 days later- ended that illusion, and put the USSR into a position where a clear choice would have to be made before long.
Three days later, Chamberlain inquired of the USSR attitude if Romania was subjected to attack. The USSR suggested a meeting at Bucharest. The British rejected it, and announced a Anglo-Soviet-Franco-Polish declaration regarding threats to political independence in Eastern Europe. The USSR agreed as long as Poland was a signatory, but on April 1st Chamberlain relayed that he had dropped the idea.
On March 31st, Chamberlain made the guarantee of Poland’s sovereignty. Soon afterwards, Romania and Greece received the same guarantee, thus extending the British guarantee to cover a practically continuous front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Stalin has a buffer front, guaranteed from the UK and France, without committing the USSR in either man or material. It must have also become clear to Hitler that the only way to avoid a double front when he attacked USSR was to secure an agreement with the USSR beforehand.
On April 15th, the British proposed to the Russians that they give Poland, Romania, and other European states a unilateral guarantee, with the threatened country to decide which kind of help would be convenient to them. The Russians passed. They offered a meatier pact, offering a straight USSR-UK-France mutual assistance pact for 5 or 10 years, as well as a mutual defense pact including Poland, Romania, and all Eastern European countries bordering the USSR between the Baltic and the Black Sea. This could have saved the day for the horribly over-committed responsibilities of the UK and France-an “undreamed of offer”.
Chamberlains government responded with a more complex formula for commitments, which promised Soviet assistance to countries in which it was not welcome. The revised discussions went nowhere fast, and Chamberlain is squandering this unbelievable opportunity to get out of the corner the UK now find themselves in. General Beck (Polish), suspicious to the demise of Poland of the USSR, overly influenced the British position and policy regarding possible Soviet military support for Poland. In May 1939, Molotov replaced pro-Western but poorly received Litinov as Foreign Commissariat.
In Molotov’s survey of the international situation before the Supreme Soviet on May 31st, he was highly critical of Britain and France for having turned their backs on their collective security agreements. His remarks were highly critical of Germany.
At the time, whenever any serious business was discussed with Germany, Chamerlain sent Eden, Simon, Halifax, and even went himself. For the USSR, he sent Mr Strang. A token appointment, a request was made to Halifax on June 12th to come to to Moscow to conclude the pact between the USSR, UK, and France without delay. After failing to impress him, Masiky (Soviet ambassador to the UK) pointed out the urgency of the situation, to which Halifax looked at the ceiling and solemnly replied, “I’ll bear it in mind.” After a week there was no reply. Negotiations with Mr Strang were of a military commitment FROM the USSR, but not for. Which, surprise, was not what the USSR wanted from a mutual assistance pact. Something is missing from the mutual part of that agreement.
Soon the talks got past this, and were truly mutual. But the focus of the UK/France position was that the agreement would have a desired psychological effect (they did not hide this fact either) upon Germany, even if just an agreement in principle. Russia was of a mind that this was not a commitment to enter without knowing the commitment level of the UK and France, in light of their inaction in the face of German aggression to date. They wanted to know what, how many, and where. Not just a “we’ll be there”.
Another Anglo-Franco military mission was announced on August 4th of “the utmost importance”. Arriving on August 12th, coming over on a slow boat, Admiral Drax and General Doumenec arrived. Who? Exactly the Soviet response after a Soviet banquet given in honor of the mission was attended by all of the top Soviet brass, and these two unknowns show up. On August 12th, 1939 the last chance for co-operation from the outset was lost when the near retirement and non-powerful mission, without the power to make any decisions or agreements, failed to reach an agreement.
When a number of troops to commit was offered by the USSR, it was one of 120 infantry divisions, 16 calvary divisions, 5000 medium and heavy guns, 9,000-10,000 tanks, and 5000-5500 bombers and fighter planes. General Heywood, a member of the British mission, mentioned the UK would offer “about 5 infantry and 1 mechanized division”.
France seemed to realize the gravity of the situation, with German troops massed on the Polish border and ready to attack by August 15th. Doumenc requested that Poland rethink allowing Soviet military assistance on Polish soil. But Chamberlains unwillingness to pressure Poland to allow Russian troops to enter, and the feeble UK offers militarily, lead to the loss of this great opportunity. On August 17th, the talks were postponed so that the Anglo-Franco missions could consult with their governments and determine their exact position on Russian access to Polish territory.
Ribbontrop arrived on August 22nd, and after months of mucking around with the UK and France, an agreement was announced between the USSR and Germany: The infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop non-agression pact.
