General Jack Ripper

pnzrldr,
 
In a QB for which I have the Save, I observed a complete Kill Chain occur in four (4) seconds. NO LOS from anyone but my tank, which had zero LOS until it Hunted forward and cleared terrain mask and foliage LOS block. While moving, buttoned, it saw a T-90AM at what I subsequently determined to be a range of 654 meters, lased and fired. First shot kill. Veteran vs Veteran. T-90AM got no shot off at all. I know our guys are super well trained, but to me, that seems ridiculously fast, even with SABOT up the spout. And I'm not sure I believe that, either. I'd think AMP would be the default round. Would very much appreciate your thoughts on this. Original post is on CMBS Tech Support.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Na Vaske,
 
Interesting to see a Russian playing as a Ukrainian. Your formidable Tank Serzhant Popova (extra points for use of patronymic) brings to mind this singularly apt classic Queen vid. Pay attention to the lyrics at 0:32, and you'll understand why.
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BAf2S6ij2gk
 
Reiter,
 
The piece of art at the bottom of your #63 depicts, I believe, depicts Death, who's clearly German, playing away over the corpse of (shot by a German firing squad) British nurse Edith Cavell, indicated by both the nurse outfit and the draped British flag. Years ago, and I forget where, I got to see a bunch of WW I propaganda drawings. This one's pretty tame compared to those, such as the one of the bestial German soldier with a baby spitted on his bayonet. this was the result of lurid (false) stories emerging from Belgium.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

 

DMS,
 
Most entertaining and informative DAR/AAR. It was exciting watching your T-90AM blasting away. Till it got blasted, Unfortunately, you didn't get to clobber an Abrams. Still, you partially repaid the production costs by actually causing some damage. c3k certainly found it damaging. The death ride of the Hummers! Your lasing preyed on c3k's mind and perplexed mine. I really like the look of the BTR-82A, with that high menacing weapon mount. Rather SF, and it does airburst, something I never knew until you and c3k had at each other. Regarding disembarking, the BTR-82A is way better in that regard than the BTR-60's side hatch, but doesn't compare to the time honored going out the back, preferably with the rear screened. If the vehicle is stopped, does it offer cover if between the men and the bullets? Hope so! I know it didn't in CMBN (unless AFV's already a flaming datum), and I don't have CMRT, so don't know what did or didn't happen there.
 
Speaking of explosions, I thought you did a great job letting Bog Voiny (God of War, artillery) have his way with c3k. Because of firing delays, I wouldn't normally expect to see 152s in play, but you're causing me to rethink potential FS options. Very nice shoot. c3k should be grateful his Bradley seat cushions don't have buttons, for the round that nearly got one of his Bradleys might well have caused that sort of instinctive stress response, requiring the removal services of a gastroenterologist! The Abrams is a phenomenal killing machine. If you're on the same battlefield with it, as OPFOR, death becomes effortless. Have ruled out career in Motor Rifle troops after watching your battle. Did Krizantema actually kill anything, or was it just a target for the Abrams? Your Grach certainly caused some excitement, putting down a torrent of fire. This version would be far more exciting, what with 4 x Kh-25 and 16 x Vikhr! It shows what sorts of things can be done if the need's perceived and the will and resources are there. That version is designed to survive, not 23 mm fire, but 30 mm fire into critical areas, not to mention a Stinger direct hit! Loved the hunt late in the game, even if it didn't work out quite as planned. In closing, I think the house rules you guys had, and making it immersive in the "got a job to do and don't want to die in the process" way you played it, made for an even tenser clash. Quite the fight, and despite harrowing losses, you carried the day. Well done!
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Cpl Steiner,
 
Here you go. Hope your head doesn't explode. Mine nearly did. In this sea of info, there are two things vital to your question, one is a very elaborate multipart symbol which has far more elements than did SPI's Seapower & the State game counters. Happily for your sanity, all you need to know is that the Text Modifier for force strength goes in field "F" and is expressed as ( - ) reduced, (+) reinforced or + and - stacked,  reinforced, reduced. That's probably way too complicated, so showing the tactical symbol with just the Text Modifier next to the UR symbol corner ought to suffice. If you're brave/foolish, you can have at the elephant!  Or you can tame it somewhat via something really cool called MILSketch--CM player approved. CMer Steve Dixon talks about it, and there's a direct link to the Forums! Tutorial vid below. For PC only. 
 

 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Tanknut Dave has a very good page on the T-84 Oplot, a term I now understand to mean "bulwark." This page goes into tremendous, glorious grog detail (manufacturer's sheet?) on the tank, to include the thermal sights (don't understand the magnification stuff at all; makes no sense--NFOV is 1/3 mag of WFOV), other visionics, signature reduction measures of which I knew effectively nothing, even how many grenades and AKS cartridges are carried. Part of this page is a mini tutorial on the nits and grits of the ammo carousel and its specific operating parameters. There is a full discussion of the CM suite on the tank, too, including the duration of the aerosol screen once deployed. Don't plan on staying long. Lasts all of a minute. The ballistic protection section seems impressive, but it's much easier to claim the ability to survive various threats and something else altogether to actually deliver on the claims. Vid of an Oplot on the Poligon is pretty cool. Amazing how little can be seen of it when running through the brush.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler
 
 

This thread, methinks, very much needs to be put back on the track. Am not going to attempt to respond by individuals, so am going to address this by specific issues.

Yom Kippur War IADs effectiveness
 
IAF CAS losses were so severe vs Egypt for days that Israel terminated them altogether. They didn't resume until IDF tanks, which had crossed the Suez Canal, drove into the SAM zones and systematically shot up the SA-2/3/6 SAMs and dense AAA, of which the most notable AAA was the "airplane eater" ZSU-23/4. DEAD Israeli style. Against Syria, the story was much the same, but in both cases, Israeli CAS was effectively out of the war until the SAM problem was addressed, of which the pacing element (and eye waterer to defense types in the US and) was the lethality of the highly agile, mobile SA-6, a weapon against which the IAF had no ECM capability whatsoever. None. The SAMs were sufficiently deadly to force IAF planes to fly low, placing them in the deadly embrace of radar directed AAA, not to mention a plethora of SA-7s. The US provided Israel with as many as 40 F-4s and definitely 46 A-4s as replacements for terrible air losses. What's not generally known is that the US provided Israel with numerous complete tail end assemblies for A-4s. Why? The planes were eating SA-7s, but barely getting back home. Spare part planners never envisioned such a situation, so the IAF suffered major virtual attrition as a result. The IAF started the war with 440 combat planes and lost, depending on which numbers are used, 107-387, but I don't know offhand whether the US supplied additional planes over attrition during the resupply effort.
 
Given the above, I'm having real problems signing up for the "lessons of the Yom Kippur War." Likewise, I'm having similar problems with GW I. There were other factors at work other than those enumerated including: precision destruction of a key Iraqi air surveillance radar, the removal of which allowed the entry of the Stealth fighters and more visible friends. Inter alia, this resulted in the pinpoint destruction of the key Syrian AD HQ, spectacularly shown time and again on strike vid broadcast worldwide. Even in unbroken state, the IADS had very little capability vs Tomahawks which are, many don't realize, pretty stealthy in their own right, let alone when whizzing down the boulevard so low details on the weapons were clearly visible. This isn't the famous footage, but it gets the idea across.


 
The US went into GW I with not merely with superlative intel on Iraq's IADS, it went into battle with a direct conduit right into the IADS situation center, thanks to a physical hack into the fiber optic trunk line from the front, a hack put into place by a brilliant US SpecOps mission. Reportedly, the US was able to show, or not show, IADS HQ whatever it desired, but the hack is believed to have been used as a generator of enormous numbers of false targets. I firmly believe it's dangerous to draw sweeping conclusions without a fundamental understanding of what was going on to begin with. I recall the mighty MOD himself came out from Russia with his experts to figure exactly this out. One such insight was a demand for a weapon capable of downing a HARM attacking a defending SAM site. Pantsir, anyone? Tunguska itself has substantial capabilities vs things like GBU-15, LGBs, JDAM, JSOW and Tomahawks.
 
Now, let's look at the Vietnam War, shall we? It's fashionable to deride NVN's IADS as ineffective. This is based on another faulty premise. That premise is that the aggregate performance figures reflect how the national IADS performed historically throughout. Not the case. What you're seeing are the effects of a lot of really bad outcomes late in an otherwise impressive career.  When the US first ran into the SA-2, the SA-2 was killing 0.5 planes per engagement. 0.5! Indeed, there were several cases of two planes downed in one shot. What broke the back of the NVN IADS was a masterful CIA op called HA/BRINK or HABRINK. What was that? The CIA slipped people into Indonesia's SA-2 warehouses and obtained the relevant guidance link frequencies, allowing the US to pretty effectively jam the SA-2. Why Indonesia? The Indonesian SA-2s were identical to the NVN's SA-2s! Sure, evasive maneuvering, Wild Weasel, Iron Hand played their part, but HA/BRINK was what undid the IADs as far as SAM coverage. By late in the war, Linebacker II, jamming, better tactics, SEAD and other means had so degraded and cowed the SAMs that they were blind launching (no radar at all, optical direction only)  dozens of SAMs at once, and that's why the overall numbers look so bleak. That wasn't the case through much of the air war over NVN and the DMZ. We lost a family friend and his WSO to an SA-2 over the DMZ. It came out of the clouds below, so they had no chance to see the launch and evade. Boom!  Two wall entries on the Vietnam Memorial.
 
For a more informed view of Russian SAM operational effectiveness than what I've seen in this thread, please see Carlo Kopp's analysis here. Kopp has some scathing things to say about how the Arabs not only fundamentally disregarded a throughly thought out Russian doctrine, but did some things which would've been comedic had they not been so hurtful to the using force! Suggest interested parties also look at what specific threats the newer generation SAMs were designed to defeat, what their tactical-technical characteristics are and how that applies to the ability to detect, localize, engage and kill them. Makes rather sobering reading. A Serbian captain with his ancient SA-6 unit not only survived a major SEAD/DEAD campaign, but also cost the US the stunning loss of an F-117, damage to a second one and an F-16.
 
As a longtime student of military history and a former defense professional, I deem it folly to expect the USAF to be able to so thoroughly control the skies that Russian CAS and similar can't operate. US AAA threat is risible, so there's no real dense AAG penalty for operating in the weeds to make it really hard vs both fighters and Patriot to engage it, and SU-25s have survived hits by things much worse than MANPADS. Russia's not going to sit idly by and let the US/NATO gin up its air power before striking, so the force ratios, for a time, at least, are not going to be pretty. Contrary to popular opinion, the AWACS supply is quite limited, and people need to remember that these vital birds can stay aloft only so long before they have to be replaced to keep a given area in coverage. The harder they're flown, the less reliable they become, and the worse the even more critical highly trained control crews perform. Tired radar operators miss things. That. of course, presumes the plane ever gets airborne to begin with, A single Russian sniper armed with, say, an OSV 12.7 mm rifle, could ruin NATO's day at places like Geilenkirchen, which when last seen, had a whole 5 E-3As. It's even worse with JSTARS, where there are but a handful of planes in total.
 
And this discussion is without taking into account Russian missile hard kill systems or jamming. Put it this way, for every long range sensor we deployed, the Russians deployed countermeasures. Jammers vs the E-3A, the TR-1's SAR, JSTARs. I used to have some SECRET diagrams of the E-3A radar display under jamming. Thanks to steerable antenna nulls, the system performed very well in the face of one or two jammers, but after that things progressively fell apart. It was entirely possible to jam the E-3A so effectively that entire (pizza slice wide) sectors were blind. Additionally, the more jamming energy received, the shorter detection range becomes, totally compromising the vast volumetric region a Sentry ordinarily controls. This allows even crude Stealth weapons a veritable free ride through the defenses.
 
If memory serves, the wartime scenario over West Germany envisioned only two E-3As up, covering the entire region. What happens if one doesn't show up, is shot down or is jammed so effectively it can't do its job? How many would likely be available to support ops in Ukraine, and how much coverage, even best case, would be lost just to keep things like S-300PMU and S-400 from simply devouring them? The Russians also have the Il-76 MAINSTAY, their Gen 2 AWACS. Nor, as a look at page 3, #46 in that thread will show, is that by any means the limits of what's going to be faced. The Russians are building a combined function aircraft able to handle everything but undersea warfare from an AWACS perspective. I'd argue that Russian force effectiveness will be greatly enhanced by even the vanilla MAINSTAY of the Cold War period, never mind what it's evolved into since. Patriot will assuredly be a key Spetsnaz target, and if it goes down, there's no way the Air Force can handle the flood which would ensue. SAMs are 24/7 systems, but planes, even with in-flight refueling, have to go home sooner or later. There is no in-flight replenishment of munitions, LRUs or crews. And who's to say that the planes keeping the Russians away in one place won't suddenly be retasked elsewhere, leaving the poor ground force commander in the denuded zone in a Heinz factory sized pickle?!
 
What are the MCRs (Mission Capable Rates) for the F-22A under high sortie conditions?  We already know the F-35 is compromised practically across the board when it comes to just about every combat metric, so why should MCR  or sortie generation rate be any better? It'll probably break a lot, not least because it'll be anything but a mature system. We know how those tend to be. As a mature system, the F-14 Tomcat was running ~65% MCR. This meant a two-carrier CVBG could use only one CVN on a given day for strike--because the other could do nothing but conduct FAD to keep both alive! Doubtless the numbers these days are better, bit I think they nicely illustrate the main issue. Complex things, and the F-35 is super complex and broken to start, are iffy at best to depend upon. The more you stress a complicated system, the faster it breaks, not necessarily in ways anticipated, either. Given this incredibly important issue, does it really make sense to make campaign success dependent on breaking the Russian Air Force via aerial combat, as seems to be the general expectation?
 
I don't have the latest numbers and all the tech specs for what I fervently hope are upgrades from what I knew of US capabilities, but I do know the overall situation should give serious pause to US/NATO planners, operations and combat personnel. There is a strong case to be made for a real integrated US tactical air defense a la Russe or similar. I close with a cautionary tale from my Hughes AIM-54 Phoenix days.
 
The FAD (Fleet Air Defense) Section Head vs His Boss, the Operations Analysis Department Manager.
 
My section head, Bill Knight, ran OPFOR--Tu-22M BACKFIRE & SOJs (Stand Off Jammers); his boss, Dave Spencer, had the FAD for a BLUFOR CVBG (carrier battle group). Site of battle? Navy tactical simulator in Monterey, California. Each side had its own war room, and there was a separate Control room where all was known. The stakes? A good bottle of wine and gloating rights on Monday. Event was part of a threat conference the weekend immediately before Monday.
 
OPFOR objective:
 
Penetrate FAD screen and launch long range Mach 3+ AS-4 KITCHEN ASCMs to hit and destroy CVNs (in the days before AEGIS was deployed)
 
BLUFOR objective
 
Use CAP and DLI (Deck Launched Interceptors) to destroy OPFOR before it can reach the missile release line.
 
Execution: BLUFOR
 
BLUFOR radar detects jam strobes on expected threat axis and gleefully commits both CAP and available DLI to attack OPFOR. Once in range, and operating in HOJ (Home ON Jam) mode, salvos of Tomcat launched Phoenix missiles kill the jammers, clearing the radar scopes. Dave Spencer exults, thinking he has destroyed the attackers and won a crushing victory.
 
Execution: OPFOR
 
Bill Knight fully anticipates BLUFOR commander's battle plan and uses it to destroy him. OPFOR demonstrates with SOJs, getting exactly the response he anticipated, but sends the actual striking force, without SOJs, around to the back door, conducting completely unhindered AS-4 missile attacks. The SOJs and crews blown to bits? Regrettable losses necessary to fulfill OPFOR commander, Bill Knight's, operational intent.
 
Battle Resolution 
 
About the time Dave Spencer was celebrating his great victory, Control informed him  his triumphant Tomcats would begin ditching shortly. Seems both of his carriers had been sunk by Bill Knight, and no fixed airfield, or even another carrier, was anywhere to be had. This was the end. I have no idea what the wine was, how expensive and delectable, but the wine of victory was thoroughly savored by my section head, for he had wiped the floor with Dave, who possessed an awe inspiring Ph.D. in Military Operations Research, from Harvard, no less. Come Monday, though, his customary arrogance and aura of superiority were gone. He walked about head down, visibly depressed and like a man in a daze. He couldn't believe what had happened to him; so catastrophically at the (perceived) moment of victory.
 
Summing up, I believe the expectation that the US would almost immediately own the skies over Ukraine to be on the scale somewhere from delusional clear up to clinically insane. Such expectations seem to be predicated on a largely incompetent opponent who hasn't a prayer of prevailing vs western military might and training. Additionally, this seems to be predicated on the notion that Russian pilots are no better than Arab pilots and would be flying planes just about as capable relative to US combat aircraft. Does the US have some nice toys? Absolutely. But how many will actually be usable--and stay usable--over the course of the envisioned campaign? Is it reasonable to assume that other US foes are going to lie doggo so the US/NATO can fight Russia absent other military crises? I think not. And has anyone here bothered to look at the Russian approach to BVR aerial warfare in a very heavy jamming and rapidly maneuvering target environment? Once you have, consider this notional engagement, but with as many as 4 x AAMs targeted on each Raptor. This engagement presumes, too, that AWACS isn't attacked and downed or badly crippled. Nor does it recognize the existence of a technology called forward pass, in which missile shooters simply salvo missiles on command of aircraft whose far superior sensors allows guidance of those weapons even though the shooters can't see the target. All of a sudden those numerous not Stealth planes become a real threat, making the already enormous missile loads of Russian Stealth fighters many times larger than can be carried. 


 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

panzersaurkrautwerfer,
 
Judging my your apparent reactivity to my post, I appear to have struck a nerve or maybe nerve plexus. To characterize me as a "man who thinks tanks are aircraft carriers" is pretty snarky, and "thread-Stalin" was even worse. The latter wasn't wry humor, for it "bit" the instant I read it.
 
You did a bang up job of misconstruing and distorting a whole series of things I said. I never said the US IADS is all, to the contrary, I depicted it as subject to multiple forms of attack, including SpecOps. I pointed out, in instance after instance, where the vulnerabilities lay and what the Russians had the wherewithal to do, having very carefully thought through what they'd be facing. I then essentially argued that a variety of frictions (ECM, anti AWACS and anti Patriot weapons, OPFOR SpecOps vs Patriot, AWACS and such, poor US MCRs and more) would significantly degrade expected US combat performance, in turn making Russian aircraft more survivable. That would likely reflect positively in the Russian CAS/BI side of things.
 
I very much appreciate the detailed force breakdowns. Things have changed past drastically from what they were during the Cold War. Back then, Russia and the Warsaw Pact held the numerical advantage, but now it's Russia vs practically everyone. I agree US and NATO forces are far better trained and get more flying time/month. The FRG may be gone, but that in no way invalidates the point I was making about AWACS coverage.  I do NOT share the views of some here who think the A-10 wouldn't be survivable in the campaign we're discussing. A-10s have flown as many as seven sorties/day in combat, too. Consequently, I'm very much of the same opinion regarding the SU-25's prospects. In one case during that Georgia business, a Russian Su-25 took an engine hit (SAM blew up under the plane) from an SA-6/SA-11 (don't recall which) SAM which destroyed one engine outright, but thanks to armor around the engines, the other one was fine, and the plane got home. Any such hit on a single engine plane is goodbye plane.
 
Nor was the wargame I cited irrelevant. It was relevant precisely because it spoke to how a single poor decision can unhinge a defense composed of the best of the best of everything a nation has at its disposal, which is exactly what Phoenix armed F-14s, with top notch highly trained crews, operating off CVNs, were then. Superior technology, even the revolutionary technology embodied in the tracks 24, simo engages 6 AWG-9 FCS and the associated ultra long range Phoenix missile, which was unique in AAMs, still failed to deliver the expected win. As I said, it was a cautionary tale. And how many here are blithely prepared to sign up for the "Russians won't be able to fly CAS" while at the same time proclaiming over on CMRT how the Russians beat the Germans at the operational and operational strategic levels? Do the chess playing Russian strategists now suddenly revert to tiddly winks just because it's air warfare and not ground combat? Somehow, that doesn't seem like a safe bet at all.
 
If the Russians perceive a need for CAS, they'll find a way to do so or get the same net effects some other way. One of the ways to get there from here is to, by one way or several, tear a hole through the SAM belt and do to the US/NATO what we did to the Iraqis in GW I. Create a corridor through which to ram further forces to wreck the SAM defenses and create a secure corridor through which to move the strike force proper. During the Cold War, we called this the Air Operation. This Air University Review article explains the enormous differences between how the Russians looked at conducting offensive aerial warfare and how the US thought they did. This Air Operation concept has doubtless evolved dramatically since, not least because strike aircraft can now do many times more damage /sortie than was previously the case, and they can do it from standoff ranging from minor to several hundred klicks. The latter case would involve such things as AS-4 and follow-ons launched from Tu-22M BACKFIRE, which is a theater level multipurpose aircraft; Putin has shown a willingness to use against NATO, as seen in his NATO interception challenged probes of NATO nations in the region.
 
blottes,
 
Welcome aboard!
 
The scenario I cited was played well before Red Storm Rising was ever heard of. What I described wasn't some wrongly credited memory from the book. The book wasn't published until 1986, and I was only at Hughes until late 1984, so there is no confusion on my end about what happened and whence the scenario came.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

GAZ NZ,
 
If it does all that, please send me one, for I'd love to see it. Somehow, though, I doubt the Pentagon would let me have it long, but first, the people there need to know I have it. I therefore urge discretion in packaging and shipping it. May I suggest "tractor parts," since so much of the domestic manufacturing base is now gone? 
 
Douglas Ruddd,
 
I remember that pic. First saw it, I believe, over on the CMSF Forum. I've never understood why so many SF movies and such insist on using such lurid paint schemes. Unless this is for combat on Mars, in which case it's in the same color palette as NASA's portrayal of Mars.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Target options for attacking Iraqi AD via its own fiber optic trunks. Note it's not just Kari under discussion. On the other end, a widely reported story regarding cyber warfare vs Saddam's AD does indeed appear to be a myth. For sure, I never heard anything about a virus infected printer. A bit bulky to drag along for digging up fiber optic trunks in the desert! 
 
http://archive.org/stream/AirpowerAdvantagePlanningTheGulfWarAirCampaign1989-1991/AirpowerAdvantagePutney_djvu.txt p. 299
 
"Only about a week before the start of the air war did new intelligence reach
campaign planners about Iraq's new copper telephone cables and a fiber-optic
communications network. The intelligence surprised its recipients because the
fiber-optic cable network was not, as originally thought, associated with oil
pipeline operations but was indeed a fundamental component of Saddam's mili-
tary C 2 system. A DIA analyst working with the Leadership Facilities Team
broke the news to Checkmate, and Colonel Howey immediately passed it to
Deptula. Meanwhile DIA began to prepare and send messages reporting the
information, which carried the caveat, "not finally evaluated intelligence." 147

When Captain Glock studied the incoming messages identifying elements and
facilities associated with landline communications, he informed Glosson that he
would have to consider targeting the Baghdad bridges. One message indicated that
cables were attached to the underside of the roadways of two Tigris River bridges
in Baghdad. Buried fiber-optic lines connected C 2 sites and the al-Rashid Hotel
and linked the Iraqi capital with the KTO. 148 News reporters from around the
world, including CNN, stayed at the hotel, a component of the military C 2 system.

Information on January 11 revealed new, ominous information about the
fiber-optic system: it transmitted Scud launch commands. 149 Because of the asso-
ciation of landline communications with Scud missiles, a raw truth confronted
the planners: some high-value military targets also had a clear, overt civilian
function, the targeting of which could kill many noncombatants, including for-
eigners, generating an international outcry and undermining the Coalition's
cohesion. "We weren't allowed to hit either the Babylon Hotel, which was where
a lot of leadership was staying, or the al-Rashid Hotel," Deptula noted. 150
Intelligence during the war did, indeed, reveal that fiber-optic cables ran beneath
bridges in Baghdad, and air strikes hit the structures to cut the C 2 landlines. 151"
 
Wicky,
 
Was unaware of that SBS op, which I thank you for bringing to my attention. The presence of the super secret even to SpecOps ISA makes no sense, since I'm sure SBS was quire capable of blowing up fiber optic trunks absent such assistance. ISA would make sense, though, if something either intelligence gathering related or information injecting were involved. In turn, this suggests not all the trunks were destroyed. If you think about it, wrecking most, but not all, the lines forces the Iraqis to put more data through the pipeline that's left and/or use alternative means, probably radio. 
 
Schwarzkopf also talks about the "snake eaters" and their "crazy plan" involving the fiber optic cables. I came across it in researching this, but got distracted by the sea of info in the Gulf War air attack planning history.
 
Guys,
 
I again appeal to you to stop bringing in prohibited topics. If I can't so much as mention them, why should you have any such license?
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Codename Duchess,
 
I never said they were. I don't. My purpose was to point out that, in my estimation, the ability of the US/NATO to dominate the CMBS battlefield was overblown, thus positively impacting the Russian CAS situation. Unlike Iraq, there will be no free ride for US AD when it comes to Russia. What used to drive me nuts, though, in my Hughes days was that we routinely modeled a whole series of degrades (P this and that x P something else detrimental x something  inefficiency creating x asleep at the switch = lousy PK) of Russian SAMs, yet didn't do so to our own. Consequently, this kept attrition down to (defense customer) acceptable levels, yet our AD shone, because otherwise NATO would've been overwhelmed. I'd point out, too, that Hughes had dogs in both ends of the hunt: AMRAAM for AD, Maverick and GBU-15 for CAS and strike and Roland mobile SAM for SHORAD.
 
panzersaurkrautwerfer,
 
Thank you for your self-censorship. The gibes do nothing, after all, to advance the core discussion. Hard kill of major C4 nodes is indeed hard to fix, particularly under rapidly unfolding combat conditions. I do find it interesting that the Air Force, at least, was so late to the party on the fiber optics, but wonder when the ground force intel and SpecOps types first noticed them?  
 
sburke,
 
Well said.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

panzersaurkrautwerfer,
 
I was in the T-62 they had in the "know the enemy" garden at NTC. Technically, I wasn't supposed to be in it, but what's an excited Threat Analyst presented with real Russian tanks to do? At just over 5'11" I was too tall by a bunch of inches (couldn't close turret hatch while standing), but I'm here to tell you that thing was dangerous. While static. It's full of unradiused square steel bars (as in will cut you) and flanges with sharp corners and ends. I thought about trying to get into the driver's seat but was already dinged up and was also afraid I might get caught by hanging about too long. Clearly, there's a reason for those well padded tanker helmets, but for the tankers' sakes, I hope their coveralls are thick and tough, too. Interestingly, while the Israelis upgunned and reworked their captured T-55s, they did nothing of the kind with the T-62s and happily took as many as they could get. But then, they're Israelis, the Finns of the Middle East!
 
Love your plywoodium! Where does that fall on the Periodic Table? In any event, it should be much cheaper than the Holy Grail of military aerospace--Unobtainium. 
 
MikeyD,
 
Fortunately for the Russians, Armata's supposed to be a tank, not an IFV. Theoretically, it could pull off all that weaponry. Using it effectively? Another matter entirely.  Might wind up as the high tech version of the T-28 and T-35, though. Lots of weapons and no real way to use them as intended.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

What an intriguing question and promising answer!  I freely admit the notion of using a shorter than the target arc to suppress lasing never crossed my mind. Yet, since the guns are so flat shooting, out to fairly appreciable range, battle sight setting ought, in theory, to work.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Andrew Kulin,
 
I did some research, and the facts indicate you're a much better ROW player than you think you were. Agreed you weren't BigDuke6 or walpurgis nacht, but you were better than many others, facing some incredibly tough competitors. Here's the latter part of the ROW V thread. 
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/45410-row-v-part-5/
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

panzersaurkrautwerfer,
 
I was the Soviet Threat Analyst for the OA (Operations Analysis) department of Hughes MSG (Missile Systems Group), Canoga Park, California from February 14, 1978-September 12, 1984.  We did weapon effectiveness, countermeasures, force on force modeling, established performance requirements, developed lateral and new applications of existing weapons for an array of tactical missiles and related weapons, many of which were antitank and other categories of strike. I was also involved in a strategic program. Did I design the warheads? No. Was I intimately involved? Absolutely. Did I have access to warhead performance data? Yes. I worked independently and in teams on the systems I named. I was privy to the results of classified warhead tests for a bunch of antitank weapons from Maverick through the Skeet submunition on Assault Breaker. I've spent time in JMEM when it consisted of a huge stack of giant orange binders, most classified, including the one which meticulously analyzed (wonderful pics) tank kill causation in the 1967 War. I've studied the WSEG (Weapon System Evaluation Group) report on the Yom Kippur War. I've pored over analyses of all sorts of attacks, including reviewing and assessing strike video before any analysis was readily available. I spent a great deal of time trying to figure out how to kill various Russian targets. All at once or piecemeal by beating down individual weapon systems on a strike cruiser absent a big enough weapon to do the job. I've also worked DAS issues for US AFVs. Laser guided AS-9 and AS-10 were very scary in their time, and M113s were quite killable even from a near miss.  Additionally, I used to personally and privately consult for Dr. Hans Mauer, who was CTO for MSG, ex- Paperclip scientist and technical genius. One such discussion ultimately resulted in TOW 2B Aero. I've worked in all of the following weapon areas: antitank, air-to-air, air-to-ground, antiship, runway attack and rapid repair, SAM, DEW, Deep Strike, Spec Ops, anti SUAWACS and more.  
 
As I said before, I've never served; I have spent, all told, a few hours in operational tanks in the field; haven't been shot at, been mined or broken track in a swamp. I'm perfectly happy to learn from those lie you who've been in combat, including my now retired brother George, who have years of experience. Indeed, I relish and appreciate getting the insider perspective of the BTDT crowd, whether still serving or retired. I am a lifelong student of weapons and war. I freely grant my knowledge base is badly out of date in places, but a great deal of what I learned is still quite useful. I'm glad I made the suggestion I did, for it's taught me a great deal in the process. If it's not operationally viable in real world terms, therefore even theoretically in game terms, I'm fine with that.
 
If my memory of underpass height is correct, then I'd say that a static detonated 122 from above is a bit high as far as my estimated Ainet HOB (1-2 m), but certainly should give at least some sense of what to expect. Igloo thanks the insurgents for increasing cooler sales via KBR!
 
LukeFF,
 
I do wish you'd stop confusing your unit motto with acceptable social behavior--which yours isn't.  Your compulsive need to snipe at me indicates insecurity on your part and doesn't reflect well on you. 
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

akd,
 
I disagree with your interpretation of the reported radar on the Armata being merely that of Arena. Rather, I believe it's more akin to what Krizantema has. All WX millimetric target acquisition and fire control radar. The Russians were talking about such things (sans the MMW aspect of the radar), naturally presented as "in the opinion of foreign military experts," during the Cold War. People used to think similar talk of "200 knot torpedoes" back then was ridiculous, but the resulting Shval rocket propelled torpedo is anything but a joke. Similar discussions led to things like Tunguska, measures against GPS, recon-strike complexes and many other painful for the West developments.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

The Russians do have an electromagnetic mine plough, designated EMT-7. That's a far cry from the kinds of energy weaponry detailed in the FortRuss piece. I have no problem with the crypto gear described. 
 
EMP or NNEMP is an acute threat to electronics unless they're specially hardened. Antennae, cables, cracks and other such things are points of entry even into same. The Navy had an AIM-54 Phoenix AAM "cooked" on a carrier flight deck via battle group RF energy (radars and comms) which entered through a tiny crack in the missile fuselage. The Russians have NNEMP bombs in inventory. How do I know? The Swedes got their hands on one post SU collapse and tested it. It was characterized by their defense authorities as being "devastating to all electronics" in its zone of effect. Here's a paper on what electromagnetic/NNEMP bombs are and how they work.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Rison,
 
While I certainly don't know what's under the hood, I do have some insights to offer. In a given Russian ground combat force, the best troops will be in recon. This is an operational necessity driven by the need to gather timely intelligence, and those best suited for the task are those who worst fit the line unit model. These are the men who are clever, creative, highly adaptable and able to operate with very little supervision. Since they are, by the standards of their society, exceptional, they are scarce, therefore valuable. To further enhance their effectiveness, they are given toys which are too scarce and expensive to equip the line formations. Theoretically, both figure into the cost. I really haven't looked at them in game terms, but IRL, I suspect you'll find what senior sergeants and such will be able to do in them tasks requiring officers elsewhere. In principle, then, there is no fundamental reason why a recon squad, given an important enough target, couldn't call down fire upon it. Each squad, after all, has its own radio. Of course, our own RUS contingent may have information to the contrary. 
 
Judging from what I've read, the situation with RUS LRFs and LTDs is pretty ugly vs US. The equipment is heavy and awkward, as contrasted to US gear like this which is lightweight and gives ranges to plus/minus 1 m out to 20 klicks. This one doesn't reach as far, but it provides integrated daylight and thermal observation capabilities, LRF, LTD and geolocation functions. Certain units might also have the AN/PEQ-16A, which is pretty impressive, but is by no means the bottom of the toy box, as seen in the AN/PSQ-23, for snipers and squad leaders. Systems like these give the US and US equipped allies tremendous capabilities, but they're relatively cheap for the US to build and field en masse. No idea how that plays out in the game, either. 
 
These are but a few examples to show how things might work under the hood, but it all comes down to what criteria are used and what relative weights are assigned to which aspect. I submit, for example, there's a world of difference between a fully trained Russian soldier and his/her American counterpart. Training time, training quality, training aids, live fire ammo allotments and more all favor the American soldiers. Indeed, I think a strong case could be made that, generally speaking, US units should be superior, not because they're US (that would be ridiculous), but because they have an overall standard of training and equipage which is the envy of the armies of the world. Until recently, no one had anything like NTC, as a case in point. Back when I was a Threat Analyst, I used to cringe (for OPFOR) over Russian flight hours/ per fighter pilot of 120, vs 300+ for NATO, with many more live fire opportunities, not to mention things like RED FLAG. OPFOR had nothing remotely equivalent. 
 
Given the high complexity of the issues, to the extent I understand them, I'm glad I'm not MikeyD. I suspect there are times when his SAN loss, in trying to weigh, assess and decide a per man or unit value, is greater than that resulting from an encounter with a Lovecraftian shuggoth. Tech is cheap for the US, but producing veritable state of the art soldiery isn't, and it's long been a verity that the US prefers expending firepower over soldiers' lives. That trend has not only continued but expanded. An expression of that preference is an impressive new toy which definitely saves lives. No one in it, but can still dish out the pain.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8CxP7E2r8lA
 
I shall be most interested to see how the various unit values and such get sorted out over time. I also miss things like the Ambush command and the Combined Arms setting, which theoretically should prevent some of the nonsense I've run into in my current "computer picks both sides" QB, in which I have more bodies than seats. Oops. We're not UK and have no LOB provisions by which to fix this awkward problem.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

exsonic01,
 
Maybe I can help. I used to work for the firm that made the TOW. Both TOW and ITOW used a xenon beacon which was tracked by the guidance system on the launcher, with steering corrections automatically generated by the position of the crosshairs on the target. The missile tracker could be interrupted by both battlefield dust and other environmental effects, but also by vehicular smoke (diesel on exhaust manifold) artillery smoke and smoke grenades. The idea behind Shtora was to deceive the TOW guidance system by making it think the false optical signal was the real one by first "outshouting" the tracker beacon, then feeding false information back to the launcher designed to cause the TOW to break tracker lock and crash.
 
TOW 2 shifted from the optical band xenon beacon to the thermal band "waffle iron," a heated honeycomb structure on the missile's rear. ISTR the xenon beacon was retained for the sake of backwards compatibility with earlier launchers lacking thermal sights. This was important because TOW 2 had a much more powerful warhead which now was the diameter of the missile body, making the missile lethal to much more serious threats than either TOW or ITOW could handle.
 
That was a kluge, but the real value of the TOW 2, TOW 2A and TOW 2B lay precisely in using the thermal beacon as primary guidance. Since thermal sights, such as the AN/TAS-4 night sight on the TOW, can see right through battlefield obscurants, vehicular smoke, artillery smoke, visual band AFV deployed obscurants and most WX with ease, this makes the countermeasure problem much more difficult. Strobing lights aren't going to cut it, which is why Arena was integrated. It provides hard kill to deal with whatever can't be caused to crash or driven off course. Defeating any TOW of the types named requires breaking the SACLOS link driven by being able to see the beacon from the launcher. TOW 2B Aero uses RF command guidance, so Shtora is helpless against it from a direct EOCM perspective.
 
Javelin uses an IIR (Imaging InfraRed) seeker which operates on fundamentally different principles than does TOW. With Javelin, the countermeasures are no longer working at breaking a command link, but at hiding from, misdirecting or destroying the missile seeker, whose guidance computer knows what your AFV looks like and is coming for you! Unlike, say, a UKR Corsar, which is a LBR missile, Javelin emits nothing, locks on and launches. Once it's away, you can shoot the operator squarely between the eyes, and the missile will very likely still kill you. If you do the same thing to the Corsar operator before missile impact, the missile will crash, and he will die. That is the power of Fire and Forget. If the Javelin comes in horizontally, then Arena has a good chance of defeating it. but for the sake of keeping the vital on the steppes vertical profile low, Russian tankers have an APS which simply can't deal with high divers which come in over its vertical coverage.
 
No system is perfect, and if BFC has carried the concept over from CMx1, there are things modeled in the game via fuzzy logic, in which weapon performance generally, depending on under the hood values set, will go a certain way, but not always. APS in the game, regardless of which particular type, even if the threat is in the engagement envelope, will generally do a great job, but it won't do a perfect job. The purpose of APS isn't saving a particular tank, but rather, protecting the armored herd as a whole and keeping more of its elements in battle, longer.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler 

Nerdwing,
 
I've exceeded my quota there for the month, so it was up just long enough tantalize before the placard appeared. Fortunately, Global Security's not the only game in town. I figure these guys know something about the ammunition. Ever helpful, they even have brochures available to peruse. I thought DU was missing, but they've simply modestly called it HEI-T and put the DU part in the brochure. The BMP-2 pic was something that that I thought would be of particular interest to modelers and the oh so talented skin makers.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

GAZ NZ,
 
Though I haven't the faintest idea whether I'm reading fact or fiction, there is no doubt in my mind that I'm reading serious military analysis. It's exactly the same as the sorts of things I used to read in translation while wearing the Red Hat as a Threat Analyst during the Cold War. I'm about halfway presently between Map 3 and Map 4, for want of a better quick reference. In terms of polemic, compared to what I used to read in the official Russian military literature, his blog is practically free of it. For which I'm grateful. Thanks for sharing this.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

There is a very interesting graphic here under the M1A2 SEP portion, in the form of a drawing which shows how, from ODS on, US thermals stack up vs Russian ones. Though the gap is closing, as of 2003, the latest model of the Gen 2 M1A2 thermals still held the edge over the Gen 2 thermals on the T-72MP. This may well be part of the problem. Nor is it just range. Look at the overall system capabilities:
 
(Fair Use from above)
 
"The 2nd Gen FLIR is a fully integrated engagement-sighting system designed to provide the gunner and tank commander with significantly improved day and night target acquisition and engagement capability. This system allows 70% better acquisition, 45% quicker firing and greater accuracy. In addition, a gain of 30% greater range for target acquisition and identification will increase lethality and lessen fratricide.
 
The Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV) provides a hunter killer capability. The 2nd GEN FLIR is a variable power sighting system ranging from 3 or 6 power (wide field of view) for target acquisition and 13, 25 or 50 power (narrow field of view) for engaging targets at appropriate range."
 
By contrast, seen from the Russian end, the numbers look pretty grim in comparison. The ESSA sight (with Catherine FC IR camera) acquisition magnification numbers aren't so bad, 3 or 12 power WFOV, but only 24 power NFOV. Thus, in 2003, the M1A2 had just over twice the max available magnification of the T-90S now. The MRT (Mean Resolvable Temperature) for this unit is 2 deg C. Still looking for the numbers for the M1A2 SEP V2. I strongly suspect they'll be better in the MRT department than the ESSA. 
 
This is, I think, a grog wargame forum like ours, and concerns either something out or something being worked. There is no game here, so I FERVENTLY HOPE I won't get into trouble, and it probably is something like the old PE Development Group I used to participate in. This link is directly pertinent to this discussion because it has actual FLIR imagery and operator experience from Bradley and M1A2 users. One of the first remarks is instructive. It talks about seeing people in the open desert with the FLIR out to 2 km! The thread also talks about the different ways the operator can adjust controls to get the best possible performance from the system. It goes way past White Hot/Black Hot.  These people appear to be operating at something close to an engineering sim of the thermals being modeled. Looks pretty deep to me. Of particular interest is that it talks about a GEN III FLIR for the Bradley. Elsewhere, I've read that the Abrams and the Bradley now have common FLIR systems. 
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Aloko Mac,
 
Not yet, but then, I barely made the pre-order deadline. Therefore, I'm not shocked. Additionally, the weather here is so bad an entire transit system has shut down operations for safety reasons. Don't know whether the Post Office is delivering. If the goodies are coming by mail, that is.
 
Andrew Kulin,
 
Didn't your handle use to be Ankulin? Or is my memory off? I recall you were a CMx1 ROW terror. On a separate note, you take beautiful photographs. Film, digital or a mix?
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

There seems to be an incorrect perception that the Abrams can't be killed frontally. ChrisND showed unmistakably in his vid series, though, that you can clobber it. RUS 5 on US 4, frontal, US force already spotted by other RUS units. T-90 AM line is hulldown and begins firing from 700 meters.  US disaster begins at 2:16.
 

 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

It occurs to me that, were the requisite coding available, it might make a great deal of military sense to hit an Abrams frontally at longer ranges with Ainet, then hit it with KE. The idea would be to destroy APS, if present, and do substantial damage to things like the visionics, optics, LWR, wind sensor, radio antennas, CROWs and other things on top, with a potential bonus of distracting and maybe disrupting the crew. Conceivably, a single Ainet burst might be enough to cripple an Abrams all by itself, effectively knocking the tank out of the battle as a weapon. The idea I've presented is somewhat akin to the 30 mm stripping of Abrams as a prelude to engagement by many other weapons, just does the stripping in one shot APS can't counter. Thoughts?
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

I do recall some scenario designers who would sprinkle their maps with burning vehicles to provide extra illumination at night. The only problem is you can see and avoid that illumination, while hand launched flares or illumination rounds from arty could be dropped right on top of you with no warning.