winkelried

i waited for this one sure, but the statistics show also that the relationship between the different types of weapons used to kill a tank is more or less stable over time. i would have to dig a bit deeper, but you could e.g. deduct (on both sides) xx% for AT weapons and leave the rest for tank-on-tank losses. In the end you would get to the same kill-ratio.

as i mentioned above in 1944 the Tiger was to some extent obsolete ...

Another figure - just 5% of the tanks deployed in Citadel by the Germans were Tigers ...

Then you didn't understand, that the Tiger was never intended to play the main role. First he was designed to be a breakthrough tank based on Guderian's concepts elaborated in the late 1920s/early 1930s. Second it was then used to create a Schwerpunkt in a battle through the deployment of the schwere Panzerabteilung. Third it never was deployed in numbers to play the main role. The main role was assigned to the standard medium tanks Pz. IV and Panther as they formed the core of all operations.

sure - i never trust statistics either - but you can check them. have a look at the total soviet tank losses in WW2 (after Krivosheev): Total tank losses 83'500 (5'200 heavy, 44'900 medium, 33'400 light) Total SPG losses 13'000 (2'300 heavy, 2'100 medium, 8'600 light) whereas the Germans lost 29'415 tanks and SPGs between 1942 and January 1945 (loss figures for the rest of 45 are very patchy) on all fronts. Now when we compare 1942 and 1943 where there was some action against the Western Allies, but the main fighting took place on the Eastern Front we can get the following figures (again from Krivosheev): Total Losses 1942 Soviet - 15'000 ; German - 3'284 ; Kill-ratio 4.57 (all over) Total Losses 1943 Soviet - 23'500 ; German - 9'549 ; Kill-ratio 2.45 (all over) if you include the 1'276 German tanks/SPGs which were refitted in the factory you get 8'318 losses for 1943 with a kill-ratio of 2.83 now these figures include German losses on the Western front, so the total kill-ratio favours the soviets. Comparing this kill-ratio of 2.4-2.8 with the average kill ratio of 6.3. for the Tiger battallions makes the Tiger figure to seem realistic.

Another offensive action is for example: 7. January 1943 attack of the s.Pz.Abt. 503 with II./Pz.Gren.Rgt. 128 attacked with 17 Tiger I (out of 20) and 20 Pz.III (out of 31). Successfully reached the assigned targets, destroyed 18 Soviet tanks against the loss of 1 Pz. III. 9. January Successful reduction of the Soviet bridgehead at Wessley. Destroyed 8 T-34 at the loss of 2 Tigers and 1 Pz III. All other Tigers except one had to go into repair due to AT fire damage Between 16 and 20 February the s.Pz.Abt. 503 conducted several counter-attacks around Rostov. Destroyed 23 T-34 and 11 AT-guns at the loss of 1 Tiger. During these operations the s.Pz.Abt. 503 destroyed 23.4 enemy tanks for the loss of each Tiger. They seem to have been very good to recover damaged tanks from the battlefield as the lost only one Tiger to self-destruction.

a bit too simplistic but a good try even with a bit of overstatement the kill-ratios sound ok when looking at the total kill-ratios and the reports of the western allies - i am sure that there are some interesting figures available in soviet archives too.

Here the statistics for the schwere Panzerabteilungen Einsatzstatistik Verluste im Kampf = combat losses Selbstzerstörung = destroyed by crew Sonstige Verluste = other losses Gesamtverluste = total losses Feind-Abschüsse = kills Kill/Loss-Ratio Kampf = K/L-Ratio combat Kill/Loss-Ratio Gesamt = K/L-Ratio total

maybe to give this discussion another direction (to compare the tanks I use the LOS armour which is calculated as LOS = armour / COS(slope angle)) Concepts Conceptually the Tiger I (Sd.Kfz. 181) was an up-armoured and up-gunned Pz. III/IV tank. The idea for a heavy tank like the Tiger I dated back to the concept of the Durchbruchswagen (breakthrough tank) in 1938. Development went then through different phases (one could count VK.6501, VK.3001(H), VK.3601, VK4501(P) amongst those) until it reached a point when serial production of the new tank started in August 1942. The armour design for the new tank differed only marginally from the design of Pz.III/IV (e.g. almost vertical armour plate for the driver) and e.g. the KV-1 - the main difference was the thickness of the armour all around. The tank had wider tracks and a new wheel design - and naturally a heavier weapon the 88-mm-KwK 36 L/56. By 1944 the Tiger I was – to some extent – obsolete. The Panther Sd.Kfz. 171 (in contrast to the Tiger I) was a completely new design for a medium tank based on the experience with the T-34. Conceptually it was based on an excellent gun, strong frontal armour (where most of the engagements would take place) and relatively high mobility with the compromise of limited side armour to keep weight low (still reached 45 t). It fielded sloped frontal armour which increased the frontal LOS armour by almost a factor of 2 (in addition to the effects on deflection). The side LOS armour of the hull didn’t differ significantly from the Tiger I and the Tiger II (despite all rumours) – the side armour of the turret was weaker than Tiger I and II, but still significantly stronger than the Pz IV. This concept influenced a lot of post war tanks and is still implemented today. The Tiger II (Sd.Kfz. 182) was the replacement for the heavy Tiger I, but was a new design based on the concepts of the Panther – not an evolution of the Tiger I, but of the Panther – and developed in parallel with the (later cancelled) Panther II. It made a big jump again in the frontal armour. The side armour didn’t differ significantly from the Panther (hull) and the Tiger I (hull & turret). Operational Use Both Tigers were used almost exclusively as heavy tanks in the schwere Panzerabteilungen of Heer and SS (some Tiger companies in specific divisions as an exception) and were used for the “Schwerpunktbildung” and usually attached to Corps, Army or even Army Group level. The Panther was designated to become the successor of the Panzer IV in the armored formations – a plan which could not be executed due to production issues (tooling/refurbishing of production lines?). This “mass”-deployment came to the surprise of the U.S. forces in Normandy which assumed, after the experience in Italy where Panthers showed up only in small numbers, that the deployment of the Panther would be just like the Tiger. Comparison Tables I did two comparison tables for LOS armour where you can see the difference between the German tank types (LOS F = frontal LOS armour, LOS S = side, LOS R = rear): In this graph you see, that the LOS side armour does not differ significantly for the German tanks. I would not be surprised to see similar results for other nations. On the other hand, you see the jump frontal armour makes with the introduction of sloped armour with the Panther and later the Tiger II. In turret armour the difference between the heavy tanks and the medium tanks is most obvious. Here both Tiger I and II offer more protection than Panther or Pz. IV/III - but the Panther still is significantly better than Pz IV/III. Various The production cost of a Panther was not significantly higher than a Pz. IV. The Tiger I roughly the double of the Pz. IV. The issues with clutches and transmissions were common to most of the tanks in WW2 (e.g. it seems that each T-34 was shipped with spare clutches and transmissions from the factory!) and grew even more important with the weight of the tank (e.g. KV-2, Tiger, …).

yes this is true even for today's tanks. the problem is usually solved with a generator pumping filtered air into the tank to create an overpressure.

No direct command, but what you can do is to keep the sherman in cover. give it, say 20 seconds of pause, rush into firing position. fire a few smoke rounds (you can target by clicking on the waypoint and can limit the number of shells e.g. with another pause) and retreat back into cover. btw - should be standard procedure anyway to expose your tanks as shortly as possible.

haven't read this, but remember an event, where US shermans fired with WP against king tigers where the frontal armor had cracked (poor late war quality it seems) and the WP entered the tank through these cracks and the crew had to bail out. although don't think this is modeled in CMx2

not my experience. in the QBs i played als Allied - i learned not to fear panther HE too much. there is in my (subjective) experience quite difference between the panther HE and the Pz IV or Pak40 HE against infantry..

prefer human players :-D keep my kill list only for those :-D

Looking from the Allied side - if you meet the cats in open terrain - you're done. but as soon as you have some cover and ondulation they can be beaten quite consistently. i use the following tactics: if possible fire with artillery at the cats - 25pdrs are nice due to their high ROF, then 105er and 155er are the ones you need. if you can't kill the cat, you do damage to their systems and you may immobilize them. artillery is important too for the second approach. i use the arty to separate the cats from their infanty and then assault them with zook/piat teams. here again, damage and immobilization can do the basic part of the job. a sherman or two help to finish them off when they can't move any more and/or can't see anything anymore. on the defense the 6pdr is an excellent gun at short ranges. getting into a reverse slope position certainly helps. here again immobilization and damage is the target. Smoke is also your friend against the cats. The Sherms carry quite some smoke rounds. Fire them close to the cat and then run the Sherms/zooks/piats etc forward. so combination of artillery, smoke and a good mix of at-weapons takes the magic of the cat's away. to me the tigers and the panther make no difference - i just kill them then they're a heap of smoking metal :-D

In CMBN you may also argue that the sidecar motorcycles in the recon batallions were largely substituted by Volkswagen (Kübelwagen & Schwimmwagen) in 1944 (this process started in 1943 AFAIK). IIRC there were no significant units using sidecar motorcycles in western Europe in the time period CMBN is about and the sidecars were relegated to courier duties. On the other hand there were quite a few bicycle units - mainly as reserve units. BTW i prefer that BFC invests its resources in stuff like German Paratroopers, FFI, Maquis etc than in motorbikes ...

What is even more interesting, is that the Goliath/Borgward weren't German innovations, but were based on a French design :cool: by Adolphe Kégresse which fell into German hands in 1940. The original use of the Borgward seems to have been mine clearing which they did apparently well in the battle of Kursk in 1943. But combat reports involving Ladungsträger are pretty rare. The units were often used in an armor role. What I have for Normandy and a bit later: 23.6.44 Pz Kp 315 (Fkl.) attacks British positions with Borgwards with no effect (Heavy AT fire). (undated - 10./11.7.??) 4./Pz.Abt. (Fkl) 301 subordinated to 12. SS Panzer-Division attacks positions at Hill 112 with Borgwards. 31.7.44 4./Pz.Abt. (Fkl) 301 between Andre-sur-Orne and May-sur-Orne with no success. August 44 Pz.Kp. (Fkl.) 319 attacks bridges across the Maas between Lüttich and Verviers with Borgwards. 29.11.44 Pz.Kp. (Fkl.) 319 successful mission against attacking U.S. Forces in the area of Immendorf (?). For the Goliath it is true that if seems to have been a failure. At then end of the war there were still around 6'500 of them left.

the Borgward IV was the larger of the two main German remote control tanks, but just 1'200 were produced compared to the approx. 7'600 Goliath. The Borgward was designed to drop the explosive charge so that the vehicle could be re-used (where the Goliath was destroyed by the detonation). Although it was relatively big, with its 4-5 tons it was nowhere close to the Sherman so much to the accuracy of these reports. In 1944 the armor of the Borgward was somewhere on the weak side. In 1944 the remote controlled tanks normally were deployed in the (s.)Pz.Kp. (Fkl.) and operated from Tiger I or StuG III. The companies had 16 Tigers (or 10 StuG III) and 45 (36) Borgward and would definitely an superb addition to CMBN - after mid-44 full Fkl. battalions were formed.

You're doing everything right - there is no way to get the file significantly smaller. Only way out of this situation is to use dropbox or as I do besides this to use skype in direct connection.

not the same weapon Roma was sunk by a "Fritz X" which was basically a radio guided ballistic bomb and HMT Rohna was sunk by a Henschel Hs 293 which was a truly radio guided glide bomb where the launching airplane didn t need to overfly the target.

would be interesting to get a nuke in a QB playing the allies

and mine too ... we have seen a lot of military argumentation on a potential soviet attack against the west after ww2 - quite naturally for a community of wargamers . i want to stress two (mainly) non-military points: first that Stalin’s policy was driven by the attempt to conserve his power and to protect the Soviet Union and not to extend it by taking incalculable risks and second that the newly acquired buffer states in eastern Europe (where the Soviet supply lines ran through) were far from being stabilized in 45/46. First – Stalin's doctrine (to be continued by the Soviet Union well in the 1980s) was the “Socialism in One Country” theory which he put forth in 1924. Based on the insight, that all communist revolutions in Europe after WW1 had failed, it stated, that the SU should focus on strengthening itself internally. With this doctrine (elaborated by Bukharin) he stood in contradiction of the more outwardly aggressive doctrine defined by Trotzky, the “Permanent Revolution”. Therefore with his theory Stalin broke with the Marxist/Leninist/Trotzkyist requirement for a “World Revolution”. When Trotsky was ousted by Stalin (1929) the “Socialism in One Country” became the state policy in the SU – with all the consequences like the purges in the late 1930s – and continued to be (in its core) until the downfall of the SU. This state policy had as a consequence, that the soviet leadership undertook expansive action mainly to achieve the goal of protecting the SU – especially after the traumatic events of 1941/42. The whole policy was underlined by Stalin’s personal paranoia which then became an intrinsic pattern of soviet policy after WW2. The occupation of Eastern Europe then served primarily the creation of a buffer between the West and the SU. Stalin left Austria and the territories occupied in China (well before China became communist). And after the war he only tried once at Berlin to apply soviet force directly to acquire territory from the West – all other attempts (until Afghanistan) were done through proxy’s with more or less open soviet support. So my point is that Stalin himself was too afraid of the risks he would take by attacking the West in 45/46 and that he wouldn’t take the risk to loose all he had gained in the desperate fight in 41-45. Second – The newly acquired soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe (Baltic States, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria) was far from being stabilized in 45/46. In most states truly communist regimes were only firmly established in 1947/46 or even 48. Therefore quite a force was required to control these states (in Poland alone 500’000 soviet troops were stationed after 1945). This situation held a huge risk for soviet offensive operations in Western Europe by exposing their lines of supplies to potential uprisings and partisan movements (well in the 1950s the soviets still had to deal with anti-communist partisans in the Baltic States and in the Ukraine) – in addition the population gained in these countries - even organized in military forces under soviet command - would have been of doubtful value in a war against the West. On the other hand the Western powers had their supply lines running through friendly, liberated territory and could raise new forces from the liberated areas of Europe, just like the example of France shows. Looking at these two points it seems to be understandable that a person like Stalin in 1945/46 would focus on consolidating his gains to protect the SU and his personal power from future threats coming from the West instead of taking the risk of attacking the West (which was still heavily armed by then). So no war against the West in 45/46.

just to enlarge your knowledge units of the 1re DMI fought since 1941 (Syria, Bir Hacheim, Western Desert) most of the other units fought in Italy between 1943-1944 and were then engaged in Operation Dragoon fighting their way from Southern France to the Rhine and then into Germany reaching the western parts of Austria in May 45. A good number of units were raised in 44/45 from the FFI (forces francaises de l'interieur) in the liberated parts of France. Most units had U.S. equipment and were organized along U.S. TO&Es. 1944/45: 1re Armée (de Lattre de Tassigny) 2 corps (1er, 2e) 3 armored divisions (1re, 2e, 5e) 4 colonial infantry divisions (2e DIM, 3e DIA, 4e DMM, 9e DIC) 1 free-french infantry division (1re DMI) 4 infantry divisions formed from FFI forces (1re DI, 10e DI, 14e DI, 27e DA) rarely engaged in battle, mainly used for security duty. 6 tank destroyer battallions 2 cavalry squadrons 7 engineer battallions(4 génie, 3 pionniers) 16 independent artillery battallions 12 AA battallions +various smaller units outside of the 1re Armee: +5 infantry divisions (19e DI, 23e DI, 25e DI, 36e DI, 1re DA) formed in late 44/early 45. 6 fighter groups (1 night fighter) and other units

i understand - this would be too much of a competition :cool:

yep you can buy water in cans even in the U.S. as the link shows ... bit of a degenerative trait of our civilization - i assumed that a such a girl wouldn't drink something fattening ... but maybe she's just bringing the can to her boyfriend?