JasonC
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Posts posted by JasonC
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OK, here is a bit more detail on the number and organization of Jadgpanzers, StuGs, and Marders used in Normandy. I'm not doing any original research, just analysing other people's numbers here. All told I find 124 JdgPz, 500-550 StuG (or StuH), and 130 Marder. Where were they?
JgdPaz - 3 Heer Pz divisions had 31, 25, and 16 JdgPz. 12SS had 10, plus 11 more in July. And a sub-unit of the 17SS (PG) got 31 after the breakout, which fought alone without reaching the rest of the division (with heavy loss).
Marder - 17SS had 12, 6 different Heer infantry divisions had 14 each, 116th Pz had 6, and 3 static infantry divison had 9-10 each.
StuG - 4 independent StuG brigades had 138, one of them a FJ formation the rest Heer. These also 30-100 replacements over the course of the battle (which is the source of the uncertainty in overall numbers). 6 Heer infantry divisions had 10 each. Two Heer Pz divisions had 6 and 10, a 3rd had 40. And 5 SS divisions had 38-45 each, 210 for the 5, one of with was PG (17SS) the rest Pz. 3 of the SS divisions used them in place of tanks (9SS and 10SS, 2 companies each of 1 Pz battalion, 17SS (PG), the whole Panzer battalion).
58% of Jgd Pz. were in Heer Pz. div.
42% of Jgd Pz. were in SS div.
12% of the StuGs were in Heer Pz. div.
45% of StuGs were in SS div.
30% of StuGs were in ind. brigades
13% permanently attached to infantry.
86% of the Marders were in infantry divisions.
Here are some ratios of TD to all towed PAK and heavy FLAK, in mobile divisions. TDs are first, PAK+FLAK second.
Heer - 2.3:1, 1:2.1, 5:4, 3:1
SS - 3:2, 5:4, 4:3, 5:4, 1:1.7, 2.8:1
In infantry divisions, the same ratio ranges from 2.7:1, favor the TD type, to none, all towed.
Incidentally, the Jadgpanzer and Marder are as rare (or common) as Tiger Is. The StuGs are about as common as Panthers, not as common as Pz IVs. Overall, if you lump together Tiger+Panther as "heavy", then the breakdown of types in the Normandy fighting runs -
31% heavy
36% Pz IV
33% TD types
Pretty close to 1/3rd each, I'd say. If you want to move the JdgPz category they are ~5% of the total. Note, that means 5/8ths of the German armor force was not armored enough to stop a short 75mm AP round from the front.
Or if you like bell curves -
5% Tiger
26% Panther
36% Pz IV
28% JdgPz + StuG
5% Marder
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"StuG detachments were not parcelled out"
Uh huh, right. That is why if I ask "where was the 902nd StuG brigade in Normandy?", I get 4 different answers in 3 days, and then find out that 21 of the brigade's 31 AFVs are with the 91st infantry 2 days later.
Name a single occasion in which 3 StuG brigades were used together, en masse, as a "shock reserve". You won't find one.
Name 5 occasions in which StuG brigades were used as complete units, no parcelling, and without being subordinated to a local infantry division or KG. Or, when a KG was formed around them, instead of them being included in a KG.
Or, name 3 times when a frontage was assigned to a StuG brigade and not to another other unit at the same time.
Of course they were parcelled out, that is what they were for. The higher command organization simply let the area commander decide where they were most needed and thus who to give them to, and when to take them back. It was a *property right* over their aid and use, not an operational reality.
Do you think that because Tigers were also assigned to Panzer Corps that therefore they were never attached to divisions and KGs, but instead were always used en masse at the corps level? Give me a break.
All of which, incidentally, is exactly the function that seperate TD battalions and independent armor battalions performed in the U.S. army in the same period, or why they were not permanently asssigned to a single infantry division. Being independent as a battalion meant that higher ups could remove them from a division's sector, into reserve, before assigning them to another division. It also facilitated divided attachments, as when one company is given to each division in one corps, or to 2 divisions across their boundary, etc.
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redwolf said U.S. infantry only had 57mm AT. Sort of, but not quite. The infantry regiments, yes. All ATGs serving with infantry divisions, no.
The initial ATG plan was based on 37mm AT guns, back in North Africa days. Each battalion had 4 (in the HQ company, the AT platoon of it), then there were another 12 at the regimental level, the regimental AT company. These were changed to 3 and 9 57mm guns respectively, before D-Day. So each regiment had 18 57mm, an infantry division had 54 of them.
But there was also a TD battalion for every infantry division. Actually, 60 of them all told served in the ETO or Italy. And in mid '44, half of these were towed battalions, each with 36 76mm AT guns.
The actual history is that in North Africa they had all been self-propelled, but ad hoc vehicles. There were 76mm on half-track chassis, and 37mm "portees" on 3/4 ton pickup trucks. The M-10 then came out, as the first purpose-built TD, putting the same 76mm gun (based on an older 3" AA gun) onto a Sherman chassis. Troop experience in the desert, meanwhile, had shown that the ability to dig in and hide, and thus lay ambushes more easily, could be more valuable than the mobility of being self-propelled (at least, for the 37mm on a pickup truck!). So the troops asked for towed "TDs" (i.e. anti-tank guns; the U.S. said "TD" just like the Germans said "PAK"). By early 1944, half of the available TD battalions had 76mm towed pieces.
In France, with rather more terrain cover than in the desert, it was quickly found that the self-propelled (and armored) versions were much better than the towed guns, and the units switched again. The Hellcat also became available, and later the Jackson. By January '45, 20% of the TD battalions were still towed 76mm, 20% still had M-10s, 23% had Hellcats, and 37% had Jacksons. But on D-Day there were few Hellcats, and the units were split about 50-50 towed 76mm or M-10.
With its TD battalion attached, a typical U.S. infantry division had 90 AT weapons, 54 of them 57mm, 36 of them 76mm. The latter could be towed or tracked. For comparison, typical German infantry divisions had between 24 and 45 PAK, most of them 75mm but some 88mm heavy FLAK, some older 50mm, depending on the composition of their divisional AT battalion and the 13th, 14th etc companies of their infantry regiments. (24 - 12x2 in 2 AT battalion companies, 3rd with light AA. 45 - 12x3 in AT battalion + 3x3 in regimental AT companies).
Incidentally, while I am at it I might as well add the AA component info. The U.S. attached 1 automatic weapons AA battalion to each division. Those had 32 40mm (earlier 37mm) AA, plus 32 quad 50s. Each Corps had two more of those battalions. At the army level there were more auto weapons plus the heavy AA battalions, each with 16 90mm and 12 50 cal. All told there were several hundred of these AA battalions, enough for 1 per division at division level, again at corps, and again at army level.
Obviously this degree of effort would have been better spent putting more 90mm AA, 76mm AT, or 40mm AA at the division level, since the German air threat hardly merited the level of effort (1/4 of a million men served in the AAA). But at the time the force had been planned, the German airforce had been looked rather more dangerous than it turned out to be.
Why do I include this here? Because some of the German divisions wound up including AA in their AT battalions, not having divisional AA battalions. (Some did, most didn't). So an apples to apples comparison requires including the FLAK/AA too.
So, 36 76mm, 54 57mm, 32 40mm was the standard "PAK and FLAK" load-out of a U.S. infantry division with its attachments - with the 76mm either towed or SP TDs, about 50-50 chance of either around D-Day, moving to 20-80 favor the SP TDs by January '45.
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StuG "brigades" (= battalions), by year
1941 - 16
1942 - 22 - 7 more formed, 1 reassigned to GD division as its StuG battalion
1943 - 37 - 16 more formed, 1 gets Elephants and becomes an AT battalion
1944 - 45 - 14 more formed, 4 become AT battalions, 2 become SturmPz Battalions
1945 - 47 - 2 more formed
June 1944 there were 48, distributed as follows -
East - AG North - 5
East - AG Center - 9
East - AG N. Ukraine - 9
East - AG S. Ukraine - 8
Italy - 3
France - 2
Germany/refit - 12
For comparison, in 1941 the total number of mobile divisons by year was
1941 - 24
1942 - 31
1943 - 44
1944 - 48
1945 - 54
Most had 2, the PzGdr divisions only had 1, regular armor battalion. So in 1941-42, the ratio of independent StuG battalions to armor battalions in the mobile divisions was around 1 to 3, from 1943 on more like 1 to 2.
Which does not count the AT battalions of the mobile divisions, which went from towed (41-42) to Marder (43) to Jadgpanzer (44-45) over time, with StuG often filling gaps during the second half of that. Counting those the number of TD type battalions was about the same as the number of Panzer battalions.
Not even counting the organic AT battalions of the infantry divisions, which got such Hetzers as were made in the final year, and already had Marder and StuG companies in several cases before those arrived, as noted in the Normandy details.
TOE and reality are two different things. When the home front supplies 17000 TD type AFVs compared to 14000 tanks (second half of the war), the armor at the front is going to reflect it, whatever doctrine says.
There has been a lot of talk on this board in the past about the "failed" TD idea. Well, everyone used the TD idea in WW II. There is often talk about the "error" of parcelling out armor to support the infantry. Well, everyone parcelled out a significant portion of their armor to support the infantry in the second half of WW II.
Why? Because both made a lot more sense than some here seem to think. Because combined arms is very useful, and sacrificing all the benefits of combined arms on the altar of the gospel of "mass", is not economy.
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"only a handful of infantry divisions had only a handful of SP guns shows how insignificant they were."
Poppycock, those were half of the infantry divisions that fought in Normandy. And there were ~70 battalion-sized StuG units (perhaps 50 at once) with their component parts supporting the infantry divisions.
You cannot find a way to make the most common AFV types of the whole war "insignificant", however you want to parcel them out. It does not matter whether they were carried on the rolls of a "brigade" in an army or on those of a part of an AT battalion in several divisions. The result was still 3 10-StuG companies spread over the line to stiffen the infantry.
Of course the PAK were numerous, there were 2 75mm PAK for each StuG, Marder, Hezter or JgdPz over the whole war. But those types were 1 part out of 3 of the non-tank, heavy PAK weapons in the german force mix. (Otherwise put, 1/3 PAK 40 was an armored TD rather than towed). And there were twice as many of the TD types as there were Tigers and Panthers combined; about as many as Tigers, Panthers and Pz IVs combined. The tanks were just more concentrated, in the mobile divisions of course.
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StuGs and Marders were certainly used in the divisional AT battalions of the infantry divisions, and not just in the last few months of the war. In Normandy, 6 infantry divisions - the 243, 326, 331, 346, 352, and 353, each had its AT battalion organized as follows -
1st company - 10 StuG
2nd company - 14 Marder
3rd company - 12 20mm or 9 37mm FLAK (motorized).
These divisions had a 14th company in each infantry regiment with 3 towed PAK, usually 75mm but sometimes 50mm. The 14th companies also manned Panzerschreck teams, in addition.
The 91st infantry had 21 StuG in 2 companies.
The 708, 709, and 716 "static" divisions each had 9-10 ersatz Marders in the first company of the divisional AT battalion. The guns were German 75mm PAK, and the vehicles were put together in the field. But it is unclear whether the chassis were German halftracks or capture French vehicle conversions, in the case of these units.
On StuGs in general - "Most often they were independent battalions and brigades (sic) that would be attached to corps or armies and most often use as fire brigades against armor breakthroughs". Actually there were 70 independent "brigades", which were battalion sized units but employed artillery designations for sub-unit sizes (thus battery rather than platoon e.g.)
Assigned to army or even army groups, they were attached to corps and divisions, and were the armor that infantry units were most likely to see. They were definitely meant to be parcelled out along the front for stiffening. The "brigade" level organization most likely handled mainly administrative, personnel, and supply tasks, since it is apparent that the vehicles themselves were often assigned to infantry formations a company or two at a time. Incidentally, that is one reason it is often hard to locate a given "brigade", and "it" is often reported in different places attached to different units, simultaneously or nearly so.
Smaller numbers of vehicles equipped Sturmartillerie battalions of SS divisions, and in the late war often filled in for missing JgdPz in Pz Division AT battalions (SS or Heer). One battalion sometimes filled in for missing tanks in Pz and PzGdr divisions, or independent Pz Brigades. Those are about the only occasions where one can find reports of a whole battalion (30+ AFVs I mean) going into action as a group. A company (~10 StuG) was a far more common tactical "commitment" size in the infantry divisions.
StuGs were used only in limited numbers in the early war. 16 battalions participated in Barbarossa, 4 with mobile armies or corps, 12 with infantry armies, compared to 70 over the whole war. They formed an increasing portion of the armor later on, as the Germans passed to the defensive. 1500 vehicles built through the end of 1942 (roughly half 75L24, half longer 75 in 1942), 3000 more in 1943, 6000 plus 1000 StuH in 1944.
On Marders - they equipped AT battalions exclusively. Originally (mid 42), these were mostly in the mobile divisions, Pz and PzGdr AT battalions. Late war they are found scattered in infantry AT battalions, after the mobile divisions got better TDs. 2600 all types, from mid-war on.
On Hetzers - they equipped AT battalions in infantry divisions from July 1944 on, as they became available. The 15th and 76th infantry divisions were the first to get them. 2600 all types, last year of the war.
On Jagdpanzer - they equipped AT battalions of Panzer divisions in the late war, starting in March 44. Also used in place of tanks in some independent Panzer Brigades (e.g. 105 and 106). 1900 all types, last year of the war.
As for the halftracks, I know the TOE was only 1 Pz Gdr battalion in each mobile division, plus the recon battalion. But they did not have even that in the early war. In the early war Pz Divs, the infantry component is mostly trucked and what isn't in trucks is on motorcycles. The recce battalion makes more use of armored cars and also of motorcycles. Halftracks are rare, not enough to fill out a TOE of "recce plus 1 battalion PzGdr".
From midwar on, the halftracks become much more common, equipping 1 Pz Gdr battalion per mobile division and by 1944 often 2 of them (over TOE, 1 per regiment), and the recce battalion is generally in halftracks plus 1-2 armored car companies. A portion of the pioneer battalion is also commonly halftracked.
Only 3000 halftracks were made from the start of the war until the end of 1942. 18000 were made in the second half of the war. Armored car production showed no increase. Light armor thus moved from AC heavy (plus motorcyles) to AC rare and haltrack common, over the course of the war.
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"the Pz. IV was intended to support the Pz. III."
Correct. The TOE pattern was 1 company of Pz IIs for scouting, 2 companies of Pz IIIs as the bulk of the force, and 1 company of Pz IVs for the HE arm. Not everyone had even that many.
As for infantry, the early war force had infantry in the Pz divisions, motorized, with 1 battalion in each division on motorcycles. They did not yet have flocks of halftracks - some, but the bulk of those came later.
If infantry formations kept up and were available, sure they might mix somewhat, but it was not a case of "infantry support" tanks at all. The British use of 3" howitzer tanks mixed in with formations equipped with 2 lbers had a similar rational. The point was that low-caliber tank guns (37mm, 50mm, 2 lbers didn't even have HE ammo) had limited HE ability, something that did not change until 75mm guns (and up) were standard on most AFVs.
Essentially all the armor was in the Panzer divisions. When they wanted to spread it more, they increased the infantry and decreased the tanks in the division mix - that didn't "settle down" until 1942, and not completely even then.
Later in the war, Marders and StuGs spread AFVs to the infantry divisions, in their divisional anti-tank battalions; but early war those were towed guns.
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"Your batallion mortars could be supporting someone else as much as the divisions 150s"
Mm, no. Shorter range means they can't support nearly as many units. Divisional 150s might fire at any target in the corps.
Of course, a simple difference of 1 minute is a one-size fits approximation to the reality. A more detailed system might use the log of the number of units in range of the supporting battery or something. Thus -
battalion mortars support 3 units - 1.1
regimental cannon company 9 units - 2.2
divisional arty supports 27 units - 3.3
corps arty support 81 units - 4.4
It is probably close enough as is. But if anything needs changing, it is the fast response time of the heavier guns, which would have to go upward.
As for the idea "but I've got this corps level FO right here, the battery is entirely designated to support me, and on call anytime", it seems to me that is mere excess of literalism. Nowhere is it written that a battery has only 1 FO out and about in the world. A game system needs some way of abstracting the support of so-and-so much fire for guns this or that big. The FO system does that. Of course it does it with far more certainty than any real WW II commander could have, about who would actually fire in support of him, how rapidly, how accurately, etc.
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"largely because Hitler favored a "divide and rule"
There may be something to that, in that the whole political system avoided centralization anywhere except the top, in favor of competing side-by-side organizations. That limited the ability of any bureaucracy to question orders (with "slowdowns", offered resignations, all the political arsenal of the "technocratic" bureaucrat), since it would just be bypassed when it did.
And the Germans never abandoned a running production line. Which is a complete contrast to the practice of every other country. They also did not add a new running production line any time after the move to full mobilization of the economy, after Stalingrad - although they did make variants (e.g. TDs on the same chassis).
Each initial vehicle type has descendents throughout the war. The question for a *new* plant could be "what should we make?", but for old ones it was always "what *can* we make *out of this*?" The Tiger and Panther projects were the only new ones during the war on any scale. And both of them were developed during the window, after the war was fully underway, but before Germany went to full economic mobilization - when the economy lost flexibility (to plan inputs farther up the chain, etc).
It is useful to look at the chains of descendents to get a sense of this. I am sure many here know such things but some probably do not.
Pz I chassis made "goliath" demolition vehicles after the Pz I was discontinued, also some limited-runs of assault guns and such.
Pz II chassis made Marders and Wespes.
Pz 38(t) chassis made Marders and Hetzers.
Pz III chassis made StuGs.
Pz IVs were made throughout the war, but the chassis was also used for JgdPzers, Hummels, Brumbars, and Nashhorns.
Panther chassis made Jadgpanther.
Tiger chassis made Elephant (rival model not used for main Tigers), Jadgtiger, Sturmtiger.
Besides the divide and rule aspect of things, there is another obvious reason that older assembly lines were left running. They were the only source of spare parts for existing vehicles made on the same chassis. The Pz I chassis could certainly be dispensed with. But when Pz II chassis were used for Marders, a decision to shut down the line afterward would have meant every Marder II soon breaking down. Wespe production not only kept the line working, it kept Marder IIs running.
The definite imperative seen in the entire lot of them is to get a bigger gun. Armor was quite secondary. Upgraded, highly capable tanks like the Panther and Tiger, were only a portion of what was going on.
Consider the Pz III chassis, the most prevalent type in the early war, with its only serious rival for total number produced the Pz IV, even counting the whole war.
It started as an all purpose exploitation tank with a 37mm gun. Then it upgraded to short 50mm, then long 50mm, all the while as the main battle tank of the Pz. forces. Last it got a short 75mm, during the period in which the Pz. IV was supplanting it as the main tank. Then it did not die, but went to a 75L48 as the StuG - with a smaller number mounting 105mm howitzer for HE work. These were not a side-show; there were more StuGs built than Pz IVs let alone Panthers. They served in the infantry and in AT battalions of the mobile divisions.
The gun bore doubled (tripled for the late HE version). Was this driven purely by enemy armor plate? That certainly had much to do with it. But even the HE versions got much heavier. A more powerful gun was just seen as more useful than a pop-gun in a turret.
The Panzer IV started as a close support tank, with better HE meant to handle guns and infantry for the Pz regiments. It got a 75L43 by mid-war and soon after the 75L48 it kept to the end. The gun length doubled. Turretless versions carried howitzers with twice the bore of the original, for the HE job.
The Pz IV and the StuG were both also extensive uparmored. The benchmark was certainly the T-34/76. They were improved until their less sloped but heavier armor gave as good protection. Their guns improved until they were same bore and higher velocity.
To give an idea of the numbers of these things, there were 5800 Pz IIIs made, then another 10450 StuG, StuH, and other guns on III chassis in the late war. Total of that chassis 16250, about 2.5 times the production of Panthers.
The Pz IV was a minority type in the early war, with only 1125 of the short 75L24 model built. But ~7400 of the long 75s were as it became the main type, along with 4600 other types (about half JgdPz, the rest scattered among SPA, assault guns, StuG IVs, etc). That is 13125 of all types, about twice the production run of Panthers.
In addition, the production run of the Czech Pz 38 chassis was not insignificant or limited to the early war. There were 1400 of the actual 37mm armed tank. 400 were converted to Marders, plus another 1000 newly made ones, 400 150mm SiG assault guns, and 150 Flak panzers. Later, 2600 Hetzers from the same chassis. The total production run of Pz38 chassis comes to ~5600, almost as many as Panthers. The Pz II chassis adds another 3200, split roughly ~1/2 tanks, 1/4 Marders, 1/4 Wespes, making 8800 total from these two lighter types.
Panthers were 6000 plus 400 Jgdpanther, while the Tigers were ~2000 all types, most Tiger I (1350), or Tiger II (500), the rest heavy TDs.
Those ~8400 heavier types compare with ~8200 from the light types, about the same, and 29400 from the "big two", the medium Pz III and Pz IV chassis.
Or, if you make a graph or histogram of weight of type, in the order Tiger-Panther-PzIV-PzIII-Pz38-PzII, then you'd see 2.0-6.4-13.1-16.3-5.6-3.2, practically a perfect bell curve, just slightly skewed toward the lighter end. The center types, the mean of the distribution, are right around the armor and armament of the allied rivals. By late war, all the types are carrying guns sufficiently powerful to kill Shermans and T-34s, or useful high-caliber artillery pieces. The weight changes armor protection most of all, and at the low end, crew space, ammo, etc.
Everybody needs a hammer, everything gets upgunned. Anything that can be upgunned still gets made. A hard shell is a normally distributed luxury item, from the design period between war and mobilization.
I submit this evidence suggests, that the constraints of war economy played more of a role in armored force mix than changing doctrine did. The tech race, and particularly the need to match or beat the T-34, did force a near-uniform upgunning. The rest doesn't look much like doctrine - it looks like variation and expediency.
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"heavy tanks must have played some sort of a role in this doctrine. Perhaps they were controlled by higher commands and sent to areas to create the point of breakthrough."
That was doctrine, but it was not practice. Yes, they were called breakthrough tanks sometimes. The idea was certainly to duel their way through the defended zone. The only time that was the actual use they were put to, though, was Kursk, where they failed in that respect. (In the Bulge, the infantry made the holes, with limited tank support, contrary to plan, wherever they bunched up too close because the infantry took too long).
The Tiger battalion commanders are forever complaining that the role of the Tiger had been misunderstood. They are always trying to get their higher ups to use them en masse, as a whole battalion, at one important point and for one "battle". And this was done on some other occasions, in local counterattacks or defensively, rather than breakthrough fights.
But the higher, local commanders to which the battalions are attached, are doling them out among other units for "stiffening" instead, in company strength at most and often platoon strength. The Tiger commanders complaint reflects the fact that they thus lost effective control of their full unit, and its internal organization. The local higher commanders see the effect, that they win tank duels along the line, prevent holes or shut them, etc. And that seems more useful to them.
Thus you find 1 company kampgruppes of Tigers roaming behind lines like a football "safety", plugging holes. Not at all what they were originally intended to do. But there was a definite practicality to this revised role. For the urgency of the task, obviously. But also because it tended to maximize the operational life of a Tiger. The fights were more likely to take place in controlled territory. If the fight succeeded, partial wrecks could be recovered more easily (always extremely hard with such heavy tanks). Breakdowns were less likely to lead to loss. Running distances between maintenance were lower. Etc.
That is the sense I've gotten from reading about the independent Tiger battalions. Incidentally, it is close to the doctrinal role originally envisioned for anti-tank units. There were probably doctrinal overlaps. Thus, certain Allied tanks in the early war had to be killed by 88 FLAK. A commander used to doing that with Tigers attached, might naturally see them as more survivable and potent weapons that could do the same thing.
As for the more general issue in the thread, I will address that seperately. Just thought I'd add my 2 cents on how the Tigers were really used.
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"Panther is most vulnerable to tungsten at its turret."
Yes, that is right. The U.S. 76mm even with T will generally not get through the front hull. If firing downward from a hill, the angle can be reduced enough to let a T get in there (I've seen that). And T rounds from 76mm will go through the turret front.
The normal way Panthers die is a side shot, hull or turret. 76mm T hitting them while they are hull down is the probably the next easiest to pull off.
Incidentally, the Tiger is less armored from the front, and T rounds will go through them, any spot. On the other hand, their side armor is much better, making 75mm Shermans much less effective against them.
Since either type kills essentially any Allied tank they hit (cept Churchills and Jumbos from the front), they are certainly superior tanks and outclass the standard Shermans in tank duels.
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"punch a hole through the west wall"...
Valley of Trouble, right?
"engage a panzer IV from 250 meters and have shell after shell bounce off the panzer's armor"
Doesn't sound like a Pz IV to me. Your men will not always ID a tank correctly right away, you know. Enemy units are not always what they first seem.
Here is a hint. Some German tanks have very thick front armor. But the sides aren't so daunting. If two tanks are widely seperate from each other, it is hard for a third to face both of them at once with frontal armor.
Here is another hint. Tank fire is pretty good against bunkers. Takes a couple rounds to zero in on the firing slit, but they can hit them. Be careful of the reply from guns, or use several tanks at once. MGs are no problem, as long as you button up.
And another. Enemy towed guns, mortars, and other slow heavy weapons (as long as they aren't in bunkers) are particularly vunerable to indirect fire. Since they can't get out of the way easily, and they often can't see the observor, so they can't effectively reply.
One last one. Engineer squads can clear minefields if they can remain stationary within about 15 meters or so of one, for a minute or two. "Daisy chains" are free. Other types they need to use a demo charge.
Good luck.
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"challenge" and "bloody nuisance"
I agree. Keep it simple stupid is not just for combat orders, it is also for game design.
On some of the realism points being raised, I think the common pit being plunged toward here is what I call the designer as wannabe movie director, or choreographing the player's moves. By that I mean the urge for anyone with a strong sense of what "would look realistic", to take over all the men and all the elements in a simulation, and dictate what they may and may not do. The result for the player is that he feels as though he is reduced to watching a movie directed by the game designer, about what the game designer thinks realistically happens.
This is bad game design. Even if the choreography induced is realistic. Strategy games require that the players have control of enough of the main elements effecting the outcome, that the result depends on their wits, rather than on a script. The level of control needed to make a game interesting as strategy, as well as playable, is often seen as incompatible with realism by folks that take this urge too far. In truth what they are objecting to and reacting to, is the fact that somebody else (besides them) is commanding the units, and telling them to do things the choreographer dislikes or finds unrealistic. And there is no limit to this. Any command by somebody else can always give rise to such objections.
So the goal is a bad one, not in realism terms but in game design terms. The point is not to eliminate all "unrealistic" play. That can be done quite easily by transforming the game into a documentary. The point is to maintain the strategy game elements, including playability (pace the previous comment quoted at the outset) while also blending in enough realism to sustain believability.
All of that said, however, I think the general idea of additional command and control systems could be a workable one, if toned down and using the existing game systems. And not with a view to "outlawing" "unrealistic" play, but just confronting the player with a variable, additional degree of CC problems. Not ones that require high levels of micromanagement, however.
I'd suggest something like this. When the added CC is used (by scenario, say), then a side is given a certain number of "command points" for use every trun. This is not a giant budget, but an integer, like "2" or "3". 1 command point equals one HQ able to operate normally that turn. An HQ is assigned a command point by clicking on it; all units under its command (red bars) are then able to receive new orders normally that turn. The orders can be anything, same as now, any length etc.
Units under other HQs may still receive orders, but they are restricted as follows. They can chose #1 a *group move*, in which all units under the HQ move (no other speed allowed), on station with one another, in the direction selected for the HQ. If a group move is used, the command delay is normal.
Or, they can choose #2 independent moves, in which case they get orders the same as now, not other changes. But the command delay times are *doubled*.
Lose of the highest-level HQ on a side will permanently reduce that side's command points by 1. Panic or worse morale for that HQ, will reduce command points by 1 until it recovers to pinned or better.
As for vehicles, it might be best to have them not be effected by any of this. Unless new vehicle platoons and vehicle platoon commanders are going to be standard in CM2, which I doubt.
The main result would thus he a reduction in *flexibility*, for a side with few command points. All the units could be given whatever orders you please, but fast reactions to new developments would be limited to sub-units at a time. Units could maintain good coordination if they move together at a walking pace. Commanders are still able to order their units to do whatever they like, but HQs without command points to spend, giving more detailed orders, will have longer response times.
I think this idea is in the spirit of Lewis' suggestion. And I think it is a way to do something along the lines he suggested without a big hit to playability, or telling the players what they can and can't do.
In quick battles, command points might come with HQs, or more properly, higher level formations bought. They could vary with the unit type, side, nationality, and experience level. In some cases a side might have only 1 command point, and would need to cycle through his HQs over several minutes to coordinate a set of complicated moves, or tolerate greater command delays, etc.
Comments welcome, from Lewis and others.
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"Discounting AT guns"
Others have talked about some of the other obvious points, but I stopped right here. Why am I supposed to discount AT guns?
Defending infantry uses guns instead of tanks for its long-range and heavy firepower. Sandbags and shoveled earth stand in for armor plate. The guns are sorta cheaper than the whole metal beast.
The big advantages of tanks in my book, by the way, is not their power against infantry - that match up turns on terrain (tanks don't do the inside of woods, etc). It is their near invunerability to artillery fire. Especially on the attack that is priceless.
Foxholes and stone buildings and dispersed placement can partially counter artillery on defense. But attackers lack such cover and usually can't afford to spread thin either, or they don't punch through anywhere.
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Originally posted by WineCape:
I think that is a pretty accurate summary. And I am sure the people at BTS will do something sensible, with their understanding of the issues. If we can add to that, great.
I also agree with two points Andrew made - first, the humorous one about SL HMGs with leaders. Phaser cannons indeed, LOL.
That was a particular clear case of a system being bent to near breaking by players finding one optimum. The factor that it exploited, was the cumulative, larger and larger effect of die roll modifiers (DRM for short), in a 2d12 probability distribution. For small mods, those gave interesting and realistic effects, but large DRMs gave out of this world, fantasy role-playing effects.
See, -1 DRM in a 2d12 system makes a 1/12 event (e.g. raw roll of 2 or 3) twice as likely. (2-4 is twice as likely as 2-3). But -4 makes the same event 7 times more likely. They made leaders and target moving in the open cumulative negative DRMs, and the result was akin to an Improbability Drive.
It is a cautionary tale, to avoid unintended "linked multiplier" effects in a combat system.
Second, I agree with Andrew that variance is good. In the sense that some randomness in the effectiveness one can expect from given weapons, makes the game tense and allows people to try things, even to try to get away with things in a sense. And this is better than a system in which all the random rolls that do take place are about equally important and small in their effects, and thus average out to more or less an "ergodic", near deterministic outcome.
The key game design factor needed to bring about that kind of edginess, is random determinations that have effects on different scales. There is quite a bit of that in CM now, especially in the tension of armor combat, tank alive or tank dead. Also in morale effects on key units doing hazardous and important things. The point is, these special events have more of an impact on the outcome, yet turn on a very limited number of random "rolls". There aren't enough of them to just wash out to an average the player can just count on.
So, you get different game play results from a 1/10 chance of a big effect, than from a lot of 1/2 chances of little ones. The second washes out to predictable, pretty much. The first can set outcomes on a knife-edge, as the saying goes.
Depending on whether an outcome is something you think players *need* to be able to count on, or not, you can lean toward the one or toward the other. Thus, players need to be able to count on their men going where they are told, most of the time. Otherwise they don't have enough control of the battle to make it a battle of wits as well as bits. But they can't know beforehand whether the schreck will kill that Cromwell or vice versa.
So the issue with hot MGs, is where they belong along that continuum. I would like players to be able to more or less count on 4 MGs getting hot if shooting into open ground over 2 minutes - 1 or 2 of them I mean, regulars. But when it is a matter of 1-2 MGs, it should be tense and uncertain.
So what does that work out to? Perhaps, when an MG shoots at a unit with low cover / high exposure, somewhere around 2% it goes hot. See how that adds up? An MG firing for a whole minute, at guys in the open 100-200 yards away, can shoot ~8 times. If 1 MG has 1 minute, its overall chance is ~15%. Two MGs for 2 minutes, ~50-50. 4 MGs for 2 minutes, ~3/4 for at least one. So you "go ergodic" somewhere around 8 "MG-minutes". Under that starts out iffy, over that somebody is going to get hot.
For what it is worth.
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"This particular bit sounds like a sheer nonsense"
Actually, what it sounded like to me was a column of refugees trying to get away from the war, not having any real idea where the front line was, and trying to get across a river in the middle of the night. And the Germans shooting the heck out of them - perhaps thinking it a strategem, perhaps not.
As for the large numbers of unarmed Russian conscripts and volunteers, there certainly were large numbers of both. But they were not a combat force. They were laborers. They made field fortifications. There are many photos of what this means, huge systems of anti-tank ditches being dug all around a city by half the inhabitants thereof, etc.
I do not doubt that replacements got weapons from the fallen, too. And in 1941, extra training had to be rundimentary (although the Germans may exaggerate this), simply because losses over 6 months equaled the size of the initial force, yet at the end of that period the force was just as large. They got much of their practical training in their first few combats.
In all other armies we know of, the newbies did poorly, almost regardless of training, but if they made it a week or so their survival chances rose to as good as old hands. If there is one thing all the vets agree on, it is that nothing prepares anyone for combat, except combat.
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Originally posted by Schutzstaffel:
[QB]the soviets had 2 main morters...
No, they also made more than *40,000* of the 120mm mortars. That is about half as common as the German 81mm, and ~6 times as common as the German 120mm, which the Germans copied from them. A great weapon, as the Germans were the first to admit. Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.
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"From what I understand, the normal use of soviet artillery would be 82mm and 120mm directly "on call" to batallion or company, 76mm regimental guns more often than not in direct fire mode, and all other calibres in counterbattery, preplanned strikes and on call to higher HQs."
The Russians loved mortars, precisely because they could coordinate their fire more easily, firing from closer to contact. And they had great gobs of them, an order of magnitude more 120mm mortars in particular, than the Germans had.
German commanders do not speak of no artillery fire after the preliminary bombardment, either. Instead, they talk about the need for strict fire discipline to break Russian attacks, because when they opened up too soon, the Russians would go to ground more or less intact and hit them with more indirect fire. That was probably mortars, most often.
The prelim - vs. on call distinction is real, and the weight of metal was heavily in favor of the prelim, as easier to coordinate. But the shelling the Germans would face on call included 120mm mortars, nothing for infantry and guns to sneeze at.
I'd expect relatively high delay times for Russian arty, with the mortars substantially better.
Another way to make the heavier arty types more useful for "prep" and less for on-call, is to have them fire wide-sheaf. If you overlap several of those, you will still get heavy destruction, and over a wide area too.
Another thing to make this workable, might be to have the heavier modules come with fewer rounds but with each cheaper. That would let the Russians fire all-at-once barrages more readily. So, instead of 1x105mm with 100 rounds US for 210 points, you'd expect perhaps 3x122mm with 35 rounds each, for ~75 points each or 225 total. Firing wide sheaf.
But they wouldn't work as well for point targets, on the fly as it were. The mortars and 76mm could do that job.
Just some ideas on how to get it to work.
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Well, I for one do not notice the 1 more than the 100. I mean, I bought the game 4 months ago, and I have to do a detailed test to find this sort of behavior - LOL. It was relatively hard to find simply because I don't normally make a tactical point of moving 62 men at 4 MGs, frontally, at a walk, through open ground. The things I do more often, work great in game terms, of course. But if someone did that to me and it worked, I am sure it would be noticeable enough.
Everything you say sounds great, but I have one remaining suggestion. You talked about how you and Charles considered a number of possible movement things, but there is always some wrinkle with each solution. I can believe it, because the first one I thought of, I quickly noticed had just such a wrinkle.
I thought, measure from next plotted waypoint to nearest known enemy to that waypoint ("=NxWy", and compare with present range to nearest known enemy ("=PrRg"). If the first is less then half the second, then it is an "advance" move, go to slow down. Otherwise, as now.
The wrinkle is players may set waypoints far beyond the target area they are attacking, and then use "halt" to stop. The idea was, I didn't want to have to check too many distances, so only those between known, already plotted locations would be asked about. I don't know if there is a salvagable form of that idea, but it seems to me now that it is too complicated. An example of "wrinkle", anyway.
My second take on it is to focus much more on the unit taking the fire, and on routines that seem to be used now. What about something like this?
In alerted or cautious morale states, if taking fire in the open, then check (in pseudocode) -
"If I speed up, can I reach cover following my current waypoint path within 30 seconds? If yes, speed up. Else, slow down."
End pseudocode I. If the fire or unit quality is worse, you will get results that would push to shaken or pinned sometimes. In those cases, make a different check (overrides the previous, don't do the previous) - start pseudocode II -
"Where is the nearest cover?" (somewhat like panic routine now) "If I speed up, can I reach the nearest cover in 15 seconds? If yes, change waypoint to nearest cover and speed up. Else, keep original waypoint and go to ground" (pinned or crawling).
End pseudocode II. Notice, in the case of the pinned and crawling, they still have the original waypoint, so if/when their morale recovers, they may get continue on.
Obviously, below pinned there are the panic, broken, and routed results. Leave those as they are.
The idea is to allow the present "determined" sort of behavior, only in the case of lesser morale "dips", and only over relatively limited distances (30 second rush). Otherwise, taking fire slows them down.
Deeper morale dips will make a unit break for cover if there is some nearby, and hit the deck otherwise. Panic etc like they are now.
Something to test, more than anything, unless you see obvious holes in it. Whether it works well in practice, you'd just have to see.
I'd think the change from now would not be great in most common "shot in the open" situations. Most of the time, the next bit of cover along the path is not too far off, adn the open ground shot is a sort of "snapshot" between better protected areas.
The deeper dip rule might drive people into nearby cover instead of continuing the mission a bit more often, but it is not clear that is bad. (Do all shaken and pinned units continue to their assigned spot? No).
But the change in long stretches of open ground should be pretty dramatic - much less "bulling forward" and much more caution. I mean, with regulars I notice "shaken" results on the front-runners quite often in wide open rushes. They'd be eating dirt. Even limited fire could drop rushers into "move", if the distance is too far, while they would continue the rush if the distance was close enough.
Just an idea to play with, whatever it may be worth.
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"a possible effect of enough firepower on troops with high exposure, should be that they slow down."
OK, I looked into this aspect of things, which is related to how CM handles morale for guys in the open now. In particular, whether they get more "determined" to "press on until they reach cover", or instead go to ground even if the ground is open, or instead break. I also wanted to test if this was a result of the way "run", in particular, works today.
So I ran a test with 2 US MMGs against 2 German rifle 44 platoons. The two sides start 200 yards apart, each in woods. The US doesn't move - they are on the objective, which is a ~80 yard across body of woods; the MGs are ~20 yards from each other. No foxholes. The Germans advance across 200 yards of open field, into the same body of woods as the US MMGs, and KO them there. There are some scattered trees around the clearing, off to either side, but no one tries to use them to flank. Incidentally, the German HQs are +1/+1/+1/0 and +1/0/+1/0 respectively - I did not want "2" HQ abilities throwing the test off, so I reduced a couple of those.
But the Germans *move*. No run. This allows them to use "marching fire" to try to suppress the MGs, but also means the time to cross the field will be 2-3 minutes, not 1.
So, what happens? Overall, the Germans KO both MGs for the loss of 5 men. But how it happens also matters.
The first units that are effected by the MG fire, do not continue their move rate. They *speed up*. They are trying to reduce their time in the open, to "press on to cover".
But this then has an immediate consequence. They get ahead of the rest of the moving skirmish line. Being closer, they draw *more* of the fire from the MGs. In the first minute, they front two are "shaken" and "alerted" respectively, running, while the rest continue to walk.
The squads fire back at the MGs 22 times, but hit no one and only push 1 to "alerted" in the first minute - a result of woods cover (~14% exposure numbers).
The second minute, the running front squads reach the woodline with another loss each, and immediately hit the deck. One is pinned, the other panics. The panicked one tries to run away from the MG fire, and goes 40 yards along the woodline, hits the deck, and there recovers to "cautious" by the end of the minute. The pinned one recovers and close-combats the nearest MG, KOing it by the end of the minute for 1 additional casualty.
The rest of the squads continue their walk, and overall the squads fire 25 times. The remaining MG is still has all 5 men, but is pinned by this fire, and at the start of the following (3rd) turn, panicks, breaks, routs, and late in the turn loses 3 men. It is wiped out at the start of the 4th turn.
So overall, the front 2 squads each lost a man in the first minute, and went into some sort of "not-quite-panicked" morale state, in which they pressed for cover but were going to face some morale "hit" or "collapse" as soon as they reached it - or varying severity. They lost 3 more in the next minute, one avoided the enemy and the other KOed the enemy because the close combat odds were good enough.
The rest of the force was quite effectively shielded by the "front-runners" drawing the fire. Their marching fire was not lethal at all, but once under 100 yards with many shooters, did break the remaining MG - though global morale might have hurt there too (other MG dead, no command, etc).
I tried it again with 4 US MMGs. This time the Germans lost 24 men, but KOed the MG position. The story was similar, but the forward squads where more badly handled, and after them enough firepower remained to hurt the following main skirmish line.
Specifically, in the 1st minute the lead squad lost 3 men, is shaken, and is running. Another nearby squad has lost no one, but is also shaken and running.
In the second minute, the 4 MGs hit 11 men. The two forward squads are going fast enough to reach the tree line. One makes it with 4 men down, gets pinned, and ends the turn with 6 men down and pinned. It did not close combat because it was a little too far from each of 2 MGs, that were lighting it up.
The second, without any losses, panics then breaks in the open, and runs sideways toward some scattered trees. It reaches them unharmed and recovers to alterted! by the end of the 2nd minute.
As those clear, the rest of the line takes fire and 8 more men are hit (11 all told in the 2nd minute), some accelerating to "run" under the fire. They shoot back 22 times with little apparent effect, perhaps a few altereds or cautious results at most.
In the 3rd minute, everybody and his brother reaches the treeline, taking fire in the process of course, and it is just close combat after that. It ends quickly, with 10 additional German losses, 3 KOed MGs, and 1 man down on the last by the end of the 3rd minute. In the fourth the last MG loses 3 men rapidly and the last one surrenders.
The overall losses for the attacking force were 39%. 1 squad was left with 1 man, essentially KOed (1xK98 rifle anyone?) Another was untouched in loss terms but rattled (!). The remaining 4 lost 2,2,6,6 men, the -6 men each keeping their MG and 1 MP, becoming little MG nests as it were.
It seems to me in the above there is a definite problem with the movement effects of taking fire. And it is by no means obvious what the right answer is. Because there are many other situations in which the present way of handling that would indeed be right, where units should get the heck out of the open ASAP, and worry about panicking later.
If the units slowed instead of speeded up, then the assault would look much more realistic under "move". The first units hit would go to ground (or crawl, same thing in effect). Others would move past them, and fire would them shift to the foremost one. The whole line would caterpiller along. That would be great, and it is just what you suggest.
The problem is, not every move situation is like such assaults. Sometimes it is suicide to go to ground in the open, when there is good cover, *unoccupied by the enemy*, not very far away.
This part of the problem then, seems to be a need to distinguish between enemy occupied cover and distant cover and cover sought forward on the one hand, from unoccupied cover and nearby cover and cover sought to the flanks or rear, on the other hand.
Sometimes it makes sense to *accelerate* toward the *second* of those categories of cover. But if the movement waypoint is not toward that sort of cover, the unit should *slow* because of incoming fire, instead of speeding up.
Incidentally, it would also be less ruinous to go to "crawl" or stationary in the open, if the cover from that were better than moving, assaulting, running. Even if the effect is not large. How so? A small cover difference may lead the enemy shooter to prefer a different target, at a slightly greater range. Thus going to ground can works as an "after you, Alfonsi" sort of thing.
For what it is worth.
[ 04-19-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]
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No "wow" is justified, it is an entirely vanilla task, part of emplacing an artillery battery. First you get the guns set up, but once all that is done you go to "improve positions", aka dig in. And part of the task list there is to set up the MG perimeter for the battery, make a fire plan, sight them and dig them in, fill out range cards, etc. Everyone involved is supposed to know about it. The only point was, it isn't a game abstraction.
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posted by Wreck:
"just downgrade the move status of units under exposed fire, with the idea that they are trying to get less exposed."
I think that is a fine idea. Really, that would help a lot, and be realistic. So the all out dash speed would be for shifts of troops from position to position (mostly anyway), but assaults would not manage to keep speed that high.
I also like the added move types Steve is talking about. Fits with the previous too. The main thing I want to see is the cover reduced (exposed% higher) in fast moves, and both of these have that tendency.
As for the hot-MG idea (higher ROF), that sounds fine to me as well, but I would not make its onset "deterministic". That is, I would have a random roll, a task-check kind of thing, to "go hot". And if that could be linked to the exposure of the units being fired at, I think that would help.
Why? Well, if a player can count on much higher ROF with an MG, say, at close range, then the firepower of the MG team rises more steeply as the range drops, and MGs aren't better long, worse short compared to standard infantry. In other words, the relative firepower at various ranges (compared to infantry), has to stay roughly right, as well as the absolute (rush-stopping).
The main thing to avoid there would be "hot" MGs regularly firing at people in cover, just because they were fairly close. MGs aren't assault guns. So linking "go hot" to target exposure might cover that case.
As for having something random in it, the idea is that will leave lone MGs fairly vunerable to rushes, especially short ones. Larger groups of MGs would have 1-2 go hot, with greater certainty. So 4 interlocking MGs would take on a characteristic that 1-2 would not necessarily have - to wit, a high probability at least one of the MGs gets "hot".
(When you consider how, in reality, multiple MGs make it easier to get enfilade lane effects *somewhere*, that seems justified to me).
One doesn't want to make every MG invunerable to close attack by standard infantry, obviously. But this is less important than some sort of linkage to target exposure.
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Originally posted by Wreck:
[QB]I am a bit surprised by this.
If you guys think it is hard to impliment the effects of grazing fire once the direction is settled, wait until you get to the AI, and get to try to backsolve the expected results over all possible directions of fire, including the effects of targets currently in motion, in order to pick the angle of fire.
For every MG. For players solving such problems would be an interesting exercise in competitive draftsmenship and architecture, but for the tac AI it would be some minimum principle calculus of variations do-hickie in a spikey peg-board phase space of angle choices. It is ridiculous.
And unneeded, because the real problem with the way rushes happen now is a cover effect, not a fire-lane effect, and the role of firelanes can be abstractly and on-average included in the solution. See my previous response to ASL Vet.
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ASL Vet, I know all about MGs and how they really work, I made MG defense plans for U.S. artillery battery positions, and had them set up on exercises, OK?
But a lack of the complexity involved in all of that is not the problem in CM today. Is there such complexity? Yes. Does CM lack it? Yes. Is that lack the cause of infantry's ability to rush MGs in CM? - *no*.
That one "approximation" or abstraction exists, does not on its own mean that said abstraction, is the cause of some unrealistic result. And lack of fire lanes is not what prevents MGs in CM from denying open ground areas.
I can prove it. It is simple to understand. The squads run right through the fire lanes.
MG firepower in CM does not stop a squad from crossing the MG's lane of fire. You can set up all the interlocked lanes you want - all you will do it force the attacker to cross an MG fire lane. Where it will receive the fire of a CM MG team. *Which will not stop that squad*.
MG teams do not have the firepower to prevent movement in CM today, even in open ground. They do not have the firepower to prevent movement across long stretches of open ground when the target is *continuously* under their fire. In your fire lane solution, they would have to *cross* a lane somewhere. But right now, they can run clear *up* one, *lengthwise*, and do fine.
In order to have fire lanes that actually prevented anyone crossing them, you would not only need the fire lane. You would also need to have crossing that lane be much more dangerous to a moving squad, than it is now.
Clear? Just lanes, will only mean squads hopping merrily through lanes. Near invunerability to MG fire in the open, is quite enough to defeat your hoped-for realistic effects, from all the complexity of fire lanes.
And that shows that it is a misdiagnosis. The problem is not that the effect of MGs cannot be shown abstractly without fire-lane complexity. The problem is that the effect of MGs in the open, flat is not there. Regardless of how the MG comes to apply its firepower to the target. The result of those firepower applications, simply leaves the squad less hurt, than it would really be.
Now, there is no way to fix this actual problem, without increasing the impact that a firing MG team does to a squad that is, for whatever reason (normal, lane, whatever), hit by it while moving in the open.
Notice also, that solutions that split the fire of the team over many targets also do not solve this problem. The problem is not that the MGs can't hit "all of them". The problem is that they can't hurt even the ones they do hit. If you sprayed the same firepower over 3 units, you'd muss the hair of 3 units even less than you hurt one now, and would not come close to stopping a rush.
But any change to the effective firepower can cause other realism problems. Whether it causes other problems, depends on how this increase is brought about. There are not that many factors that go into combat resolution, so there are not that many ways to alter the current set up.
1. - you can raise MG firepower, everywhere. This makes them uberweapons, because it unduly increases their effectiveness against non-moving units, units in good cover, etc.
2. - you can increase rate of fire. If you do this everywhere, same result as before plus a lowering of ammo, that is all. If you make this range dependent (short), then MGs cease to be longer-ranged weapons compared to squads, and become just squads with fewer men and slower speed.
3. - you can put in firelanes, hoping that they will often catch 2 units at once and thus effectively increase their firepower. But the firepower on the units hit, is unchanged. They again, waltz through the firelanes.
Aside - notice, however, that this "super realism" solution attempt, predicts 2x overall firepower with decent MG lane placement, to "skewer" two targets at once. Skewering more than 2 will be rare, especially if the attacker uses loose formations. Sometimes 3, sometimes 1, often 2.
4. We've covered fp, we've covered shot frequency, both overall and range-varying, we've covered targets hit (spray with same fp doesn't help as already noted; spray with fp applied to each is like "lanes" above). Obviously quality still needs to vary, whatever solution we come up with. What else is left that effects the outcome of CM shots? Only one thing - %exposed ratings, aka "cover".
Therefore, to solve the problem of MGs not killing the squads they do manage to shoot during rushes, the factor that needs to be changed in % exposed, or something like it. What are the advantages of this approach, compared to the others?
1. it allows the effect to depend on whether the target is in the open. Cover stops enfilade fire, so this matters for lane realism. It also matters to avoid uber-weapon results If the movement-exposed link and delay is also included, then it further allows the effect to depend on the targets movement state. Crossing a fire-lane is dangerous in reality, because each man in the squad faces attack as he does so. This effect is not seen for non-moving troops, most of whom are out of the fire lane on this side or that. Open and movement related effects also do not alter the range role of MGs vs. small arms.
I saw one potential problem with a solution geered only to the movement state and the cover, open or not. That potential problem is an unrealistically high effectiveness for MGs, engaged in mere "snapshots" at any desired patch of open ground, especially ones a long way away, that in reality they could not cover simultaneously. This is somewhat related to lanes, in that an MG cannot be sighted for good lane fire on a dozen areas at once, without adjustments etc.
Thus, it seemed to me the missing factor could be captured by time of exposure. Instead of the MG transitioning to much higher firepower against just any moving target, or just any target in the open, let it get that bonus only if the target is exposed long enough to shot at it repeatedly. This discriminates wide areas of open ground from small patches of it.
The total output of fire can double in my proposal. The total output of fire with lanes, if the AI picks them reasonably well, would not be appreciably different, since usually the MG would succeed in skewering 2 targets at once in a wide open area. Indeed, the effect can be viewed, if you like, as skewering two portions (or 25% 1, 50% 2, 25% 3, etc) of the same unit shot at.
There is no need to burden the tac AI with the selection of fire lanes. And by having the increased effect hit one unit, it might actually do something to that unit, which MGs at present do not do, and would not do with just lanes.
Also, if its increased effect drives a unit to the ground, then the ordinary target-selection procedure of the AI will incline it to pick a different target for the next burst, if all the others are still closing - since it favors the closest target. Thus, if the increased fp is enough to pin a unit with a few shots, then over a couple of minutes the MG ought to engage a couple of targets, and with higher average effect than today.
Which will tend to stop rushes. Which is the point. Adding complexity is not the point. And lane complexity will not stop rushes on its own.
The kinds of effects you would see, would be akin to what lanes and skewered targets and the difficulty of crossing a lane of fire in the open, actually do in reality - multiple the firepower of MGs somewhat, and make them especially effective against units moving in the open.
But without the player needing to worry about such minutae. And without the tac AI, having to be programmed to solve such minute and complicated optimization schemes on the fly ("skewer this one and that one? Or that closer one, and maybe this one if it keeps moving?" A programming nightmare).
Once again, the problem is that squads walk through MG fire in the open. Not that the MGs don't get to fire at them because they can't spread their fp over tons of targets - because the present firepower can't hurt one target let alone three. And not that they can't lay down fire patterns - because the squads would just walk right through those fire patterns, the same as they walk right through the direct fire now.
The solution is to increase the firepower of MGs against troops moving in the open, a cover like, exposure effect in CM's present scheme of things. Such effects can be easily modeled in CM and do not require large increases in tactical complexity, either to the player or to the tac AI.
The MG gunner's ability to skewer two targets sometimes, simply shows up as doubled firepower against the target shot at, in the sorts of situations in which the MG gunner would be able to pull it off. The complexities of the MG gunner's job are his own concern, are handled abstractly by an approximate overall result, and variance in it is just packed off to the combat resolution "die roll".
German Armour development during WWII
in Combat Mission Archive #3 (2001)
Posted
"corps and armies have significant AA assets"
Oh, I am well aware of that. It remains the case that several thousand reasonably large direct fire artillery pieces spent the war staring at empty blue because the fighter sweeps had already done their jobs. Meanwhile, up at the pointy end, a lot of German critters were running around that could have used the attentions of 90mm AA.
The U.S. should have used its AA as flexibly as the Germans did. The Germans had much, much greater demand for AA heavy and light in their rear areas. Yet their 88mm FLAK did more useful front line work than the U.S. 90mm AA guns. Not for any lack of the AA guns on the U.S. side. It was purely a weakness of doctrine, an overcautious use of a potentially very potent asset.