JasonC
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Posts posted by JasonC
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"the Volksgrenadier heavy smg squad LMGs seem to have a lower firepower than the LMGs in other squads. Why is that?"
The MG42 is really a 2 man weapon, not a one man weapon. A single 50-round belt only lasts 2.5 seconds. The AG (assistant gunner) has to link belts to belts, feed the ammo, keep the intake clear, etc. He or a 3rd usually had to give directions on where to fire too, because the ROF is so high the target can be obscured rapidly for the gunner.
The reason the VG SMG squads have lower firepower is that the second man has an MP40, not a rifle. Counting the MP 40 and the full fp of the MG 42 would really be double counting. In other units with a MG-42, there is a rifle in the squad that is not really firing. In the VG Hvy SMG, it is an MP40 that isn't firing.
Instead of having the fp of the MPs drop to -1 shooting, they subtracted the difference (rifle minus MP) from the fp of the MG line. The result is the squad does not simultaneously get the full fp of the MG, and of the assistant gunner's side arm.
I hope that helps.
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Be careful what you wish for.
Causalties in CM battles already run higher than they usually were historically. Much larger ammo loads would simply drive them higher still.
In reality, units were probably firing less often than they do in CM, and with lower average effect, over greater lengths of time. But the variance in effects of fire was higher than in CM.
It would not be realistic to raise ammo limits so high, that medium ranged small arms fire succeeded in eliminating troops in decent cover, before running out of ammo. That did not happen. The ammo limits thus operate in CM as an incentive to close, or a need to use other supporting heavy weapons, when facing infantry in cover. That is realistic.
MGs have much higher ammo limits. They are more capable of blazing away indefinately at range. That too is realistic.
Fire discipline - meaning especially holdign fire until close range - was definitely a real issue in infantry fighting in WW II. Units could not expect to blaze away at any range as long as they wanted.
As for ammo conservation, the game already provides ways of handling that. Hiding troops do not fire, and neither do running troops. Obviously if not in LOS men will not fire either. Using "run&hide" commands and appropriate destinations, it is possible to manage small arms usage in CM. And a hiding unit can e.g. use an ambush marker (including platoon HQ ones) to trigger a decision to open up if some gets close enough. Sneaking units will generally not shoot until the end of their move.
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"What time periods is it available in, anyone know?"
1941-1944, historically. I don't know about CM, in terms of months.
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"I haven't seen any of the other French tanks"
They used Somas in Normandy, more of them than the Hotchkiss actually. A heavier tank, 20 tons vs. 12 tons, and with a 47mm guns instead of the 37mm. They also used Lorraine chassis for versions of the Marder, Wespe, and Hummel.
Incidentally, in German service the Hotchkiss was called the Pzkw 38H - 735(f), while the Soma was Pzkw 35S - 739(f). Talk about trivia - LOL.
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Actually the Javelin is the new standard US ATGM for dismounted troops. It is a top-attack missle, meaning it pulls a little climb and dive stunt at the end of the trajectory to hit the thinner top armor. It should be able to take out any existing tank unless said tank is fitted with reactive armor (exploding blocks on the exterior to re-direct its blast). It has already been deployed.
The Dutch and Spanish have ordered them too. More info on them here -
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Speaking of Sicily - (almost left that out)
I'll take "failures" like that all day long. When the problem is the enemy "got away", it can't be all that big a disaster - LOL.
I understand your point, that coordination was at a low and large advantages were not prosecuted well. But there are bigger fiascos to choose from, methinks.
[ 05-02-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]
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"I stumbled across this page"
Looks like a great site, thanks.
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To everyone - thanks for the kind comments. I am glad some found it useful.
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"The Fusiliers weren't VG only"
That is correct, as to the history and the meaning of the term. But CM only has a seperate type for the VG Fusiliers. Fusilier or not both use the standard vanilla "rifle 44" or "rifle 45" squads, for formations besides VG.
In other words, the statement is true but CM doesn't make the distinction, except for the VG units. Where the VGF have 9 man squads rather than 8, and a somewhat different small arms mix.
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I am certainly not interested in revisiting war crimes which is only an invitation to restarting the war. But feats of military prowess and ineptitude are another matter, and a fine historical subject. Here are my picks.
Country Best
Worst
Germany Sedan to Dunkirk 1940 Stalingrad 1942
UK Battle of Britain 1940 Knightsbridge 1942
US Utah Beach to Cherbourg 1944 Hurtgen 1944
USSR Bagration 1944 Winter War 1940
Japan Singapore 1942 Great Marianas Turkey Shoot 1944
Reasons - for the Germans, one was a great mobile breakthrough pressed to decision. The other was head-in-the-noose stubbornness in siege fighting for a prestige objective, leading to encirclement and total defeat.
For the UK one was a high tech, well run campaign alone against daunting odds, and a complete success. The other was a frontal charge of unsupported tanks on a PAK front and a complete fiasco.
For the US one was an example of true combined arms, air sea and land, that secured the penisula with minimal losses rapidly. The other was mindless straight ahead slogging in the worst terrain with no plan and to no real purpose.
For the USSR one was a massive coordinated ground offensive employed concentric attack and combined arms, and totally destroyed the largest army group in the German army in a matter of months. The other was mindless straight ahead slogging along a restricted frontage, at horrid cost and to little effect.
For Japan one was a true combined arms operation not merely reliant on surprise, but on execution and use of all arms, that rapidly led to the surrender of a garrison larger than the beseiging force and secured Japan's position in all of South Asia. The other was a fiasco of untrained pilots sent piecemeal on miscoordinated but large airstrikes, that destroyed what was left of Japanese naval aviation forever, without scoring a single hit.
[ 05-01-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]
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Flamethrowers cost 37 points, which means they take up a large part of your resources, more than the cost of other more useful teams. They start out with 2 people. They are supposed to be awesomely wicked and cool. As a fact, they never hit anything. Their range is too short.
And the same is true of other flames.
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Yes, light mortars can suppress point targets and the highest value target like that is a heavy PAK or FLAK. But it is a stupid AI trick. Humans leave heavy PAK and FLAK on "hide" until they have armored targets.
Light guns - 20mm FLAK, 75mm Infantry Guns - and HMGs fire at scouting infantry. And these weapons are no more expensive than the 60mm mortars that can suppress them or (sometimes) take them out. You thus wind up with even exchanges at best.
It is still useful to have that ability on-call, as it were. But it will not win the war for you against humans, who will not trade you 2 men in a scouting squad for a heavy PAK and your 60mm ammo.
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"who don't like mortars are those who don't know how to use them"
I don't think so. If you fire every round out of a 60mm mortar at a spotted infantry target in woods, without reply, then your will put down 2-3 men before running dry. Using 2-3 mortars, you can get "breaks" on a few targets, and such on-call ability is useful (as is limited smoke).
But at best, they take out assets about the same price as themselves - when and where you want them is good, but that is the overall impact. As I said, that can be useful (for suppression) but will not win the war for you.
For comparison, a successful tank can take out several tanks; a successful gun can take out a tank worth far more than itself; a successful artillery shoot can plaster a platoon with 1/3 of its ammo; a successful squad can kill several squads in close before running dry.
Light mortars simply do not have "multiple kill" potential. When a unit can expend its whole ammo load at a copy of itself without killing the target off, it is not going to win a battle for you. And therefore, excess spending on them, over-investment in them, will not win you any fights. A few are useful, many are a waste.
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"A well placed .50 or .30 crew can do damage for a full 30 turn game"
A .30 cal yes. .50 cals have 24 ammo apiece and can fire all of it in a few minutes, certainly much less than a full 30 turn game. I always run out. And the firepower difference compared to a 30 cal, is not enough to make up for the difference in shots fired. To total firepower until out or end of game, is far lower for the 50 cal.
Yes, the 50 cal has a minor anti-light-armor ability, but that is not so big a deal and a few on HTs or tanks do that job adequately.
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"I did point out an advanage of the Sherman is it's high ammo load out.
Fair enough. I do find the extra load useful and not superfluous do to early death. But one of the reasons is, with the high HE load of the Shermans, you can afford area fire tactics, especially against villages. Don't wait to spot things, just level the target. There will still be plenty of HE left for spotted targets.
Since the role of direct HE in combined arms is, to me, first and foremost handling infantry in buildings (where artillery is less effective), that extra ability is a dramatic improvement, not a trivial one.
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"it did not have the targeting equipment erquired!"
Sights are easily supplied; it is a trivial issue. They were being made for Jacksons, so obviously they could have been made for the AA guns.
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"The Marder wasn't a planned vehicle anyway, there was no production, just conversion."
Not true. Of 2600 marder made, only a few hundred were conversions from existing vehicles. Most of them were made instead of tanks on the same chassis. In particular, the Pz II and Pz38 production lines turned out new marder IIs and IIIs respectively, instead of Pz IIs and Pz38s, production of which was halted when the switch to Marders was made.
"we still don't have sufficient detail...what would happen if the opponents has heavy tanks and you don't"
Not true. The Russians had essentially no heavies at Kursk, facing 90 Elephant, ~100 Tiger I, and 200 Panther in T-34/76s. They won rather decisively. It is also among the most studied passages in the entire war. The Allies had no heavies in Normandy, facing 125 Tiger and 650 Panther. They won rather decisively. Again one of the most studied passages of the war. The Germans had about as many heavies in the Bulge, with the Tigers the King variety this time. Again the Allies won rather decisively, without any heavies of their own. Again one of the most studied passages of the war.
The heavies certainly proved useful on each of those occasions, but never decisive. They were operationally defeated by superior numbers of vanilla medium tanks. The processes were attrition, stripping other supporting arms from the heavies, fights in multiple directions, isolation and fuel problems, breakdowns. The ascendency heavier tanks did possess on a tactical scale, and especially one on one, simply did not extend to the operational scale, in a large enough battle and against even moderately superior overall odds.
Incidentally, I agree with the previous poster that the Germans would have been better off concentrating on the StuG and the Pz IV, but for a different reason. They should have gone to war mobilization sooner. And the additional "taughtness" that would have created in the economy, would have precluded large, new, additional engineering projects and new weapon systems, with no raw material streams planned for their use in their proportions, etc.
The timing is easy to see in hindsight but harder in practice. The first occasion it should have been possible is the begining of 1941, when the decision was made to attack Russia. Perhaps it could only be planned then, and not implimented until the summer and the actual invasion - otherwise surprise might have been lost.
Now, the problem is at that time they had a few short 75 StuG, many 50mm Pz III and those short 50s, and short 75 Pz IVs. And these tanks had only 30mm armor. They were not yet the types sufficient to mass produce, and would have required the same upgrading as later. It is an open question how easy that might have been, if the economic mobilization had already been ordered. I think they probably could still have done it, though. The managed the switch to long 75s and heavier armor with the lines still in operation, after all.
The actual economic mobilization was not ordered until 18 months after the invasion. It rapidly produced a 2-2.5 increase in AFV production rates in the first year, and despite heavy bombing an increase to ~6.5 times the initial level a year and a half after that.
If you shift those production increases one
year to the left, earlier, and plateau the last (1944) level, then you get a lot more tanks overall. And you get them sooner, where they make more of a difference. In return, the types would probably not have included more than limited runs of Tigers and Panthers - perhaps akin to the later war runs of Tiger IIs and Jadgpanthers, from after mobilization.
The overall result would have been ~7000 fewer heavier tanks, most of them in 1944 and some in 1943. In return, there would have been more like 25000 additional StuGs and Pz IVs (the 7K heavies not built, plus the difference between 1 year at pre-mobilization output, and 1 year at the 1944 rate).
In 1942 there would have been several thousand, ~5000, more StuGs and Pz IVs, perhaps enough to hold Stalingrad flanks, perhaps not. In 1943 there would have been a very large number, ~20000, StuGs and Pz IVs, of varieties equal to T-34s in effectiveness. The production rate of these types would have matched the T-34. The fleet sizes would have been much closer to even, or outright even, instead of a large factor favor the Russians. The Germans would have been out ~2000 heavies in return. The likely result would have been a stabilized front in 1943, with most of the Ukraine still in German hands.
The adage includes "first-est". The true trade off that was involved in the heavy tank program, was time. They were developed during the delay between full-scale war with Russia and economic mobilization. By delaying, the Germans had more development time, and produced two excellent tanks. But these were not decisive operationally. First-est could have been.
Of course, the Germans avoided early mobilization for entirely different reasons, not *in order* to have development time for heavier tanks. The latter was a byproduct. They did it to reduce strain on the population for political reasons, out of excessive optimism driven by irrational or politically inspired contempt for the Russians, to avoid centralizing effective power in the hands of someone like Speer, etc.
But it was the real trade-off. Mobilizing earlier and making more, but less capable AFVs would have increased their chances in the overall war. Mobilizing later gave them later, higher tech designs, but also a crushing disparity in numbers. And to cope with the latter, they had to use every available chassis type, rendering the impact of better heavies marginal, since they were a small portion of the force.
One man's opinions. I've had my say on this stuff, though, so I will let others go over their own ideas. I think it was a useful discussion.
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Or, otherwise put, and at the risk of continuing to oversimplify -
The Germans had 100 odd 88s PAK at the front shooting tanks, and 100 odd 88s FLAK in the rear shooting planes, and 100 odd 88s FLAK in between, switch hitting. While under intense air attack. Meanwhile, all the U.S. 90mm were in the rear not shooting non-existent German planes.
Now, if the U.S. had attached just 15 heavy FLAK battalions to the division with assigned frontage in Normandy, would this have denuded England, or the landing sites? No, not even close. But it would have given every U.S. division 16 more heavy guns, duel purpose AA or AT. A battery might have been guarding the HQ or a dump. The others would be available as a battalion, or attachable to the regiments as batteries.
And then the U.S. would have had as many 90mm poking their noses along the front, as the Germans had 88s poking their noses back the other way. I think that mighta helped morale just a tad. Not to mention the physical help from 12-32 extra high power guns in a TD "front" to deal with German armored counterattacks.
Yeah, they would have had to train the men. Somehow I think they could have managed, seeing that all the AT guys were civies too a few years earlier. It doesn't strike me as rocket science. Obviously, duel use of a powerful weapon gets more out of it than non-use of it does.
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"most 88mm guns in the front lines of the German army in 1944 were not FLAK - they were PAK"
Worth examining. Initially I was skeptical, simply because the 88 FLAK was a much more common item. But "at the front", the case may be close - see below.
"the Allies had no way of knowing (the Luftwaffe wasn't a threat) at the time"
Um, sure they did. They flew regular fighter sweeps and did not encounter enemy AC west of Germany. And the guys on the ground were not constantly being buzzed. And the radar showed little on the threat board. And they strafed German airfields.
Of course there was a ton of light and heavy AA in southeast England to intercept buzz bombs. But the U.S. AA force was additional, and the buzz bombs stopped flying after August-September to boot (when the launch sites were overrun).
The primary defense of installations from air attack was the fighter force anyway. Of course they would leave something. But 250,000 men manning 350 battalions of AA, with only ~50 of those ever seeing a German (direct - another ~50 probably saw a few planes or were in the area of 2-3 raids), is a scandal any way you cut it. I mean, 350 battalions is a lot of war material.
As for the idea that the 90mm was unsuited, they plopped it into the Jackson TD because they needed more hitting power, and it worked tolerably well there. Enough so, that 2/5 TD battalions used Jacksons by the end of the war. There are numerous stories of Panthers KOed by 90mm from the front. There wasn't T ammo for it, that was about the only significant drawback.
It was bad doctrine, period. The automatic weapon AA did do some damage up at the pointy end (still could have done more IMO). The 90s basically did not, though they were far more capable.
Next to the factual question of German usage. First the reason for my skepticism.
The 88 PAK was a relatively rare item - 3500 built all told, 43-45. The 88 FLAK was abundant - 14300 built, 4 times as many.
But it is an empirical proposition, so I decided to look and see. Here are the 88s, PAK and FLAK, that I found in the Normandy OOB -
HQ level AT units -
6x88PAK, 36x88PAK, 27x88PAK, 15x88PAK (attached 2SS), 21Pz 24x88PAK, 77Inf & 85th Inf each 12x88PAK in 1 *arty* battalion, 91st Inf 8x88 PAK + 2x88 FLAK. Total 88PAK in Normany - 140.
The mobile divisions had 90 88mm FLAK (18,8,8,0,12,0,12,12,12,8). 5FJ had 12.
The III Flak corps had 108 88mm FLAK at the start, and got 53 more in the battle. It lost at least 35 in ground combat. It was mainly used for AA, and claimed 450 aircraft shot down. The unit also claimed 80 tanks by the 88s, plus a dozen by other means (Faust) and 14 armored cars (which may have been by light AA).
A Scottish verdict - not proven. The number of 88s of each variety seem to have been about the same, for front-line combat, at least in Normandy. The ratio in the theater (for 88mm of course) was 2 PAK to 3 FLAK, and the ground combat losses of the III FLAK corps, plus the 102 attached to the divisions, basically equals the number of PAK versions present. How many more of the 126 additional 88 FLAK - that were in, or went through, the air defense 88 pool - saw ground combat, is not certain. It is unlikely it was more than ~45 more. So the overall number used in ground combat was similar.
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"Shermans really aren't any better at anti- infantry work."
You probably aren't saying this from experience, or you would know why it is wrong. The rate of HE may be the same. But a Panther will run out of HE in 5 minutes shooting like that. The Sherman will keep it up for 11 minutes. Just a little difference there - twice as many buildings demolished.
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Yes, the Americans are underpowered. Combined arms has to make up for it. Everything becomes teamwork, because you cannot rely on any one item in the arsenal to knock down everything before it.
The tales of 50 cals being so great seem silly to me. They don't have enough ammo to sit still and blast, and are too slow to move anywhere. Flamethrowers (with engineers, too expensive unless those pay off) cost too much and die too fast. 60mm mortars can be effective, suppressing single spotted enemy weapons, HMGs and guns especially. But their ammo is severely limited. ~10 shots will land near their target all told before the mortar runs out, so they are not going to win the war for you.
The infantry units you want are squads, MMGs, and bazookas. The MMGs and Zooks are fast enough to maneuver with the squads. The MMGs have about the same firepower as a squad at range, half of one close up. Use them in pairs. 2 of them have the firepower of a German HMG, but are harder to suppress and can take higher losses. Alone they are weak. Zooks can hurt anything and are very cheap; take plenty. They will do bunkers better than flamethrowers will, as well as their primary AT role. More of them means flank shots are more likely.
The 1945 infantry is much better of course. It has the power to fight from range. The 1944 pattern is weak compared to the better German types (e.g. it can't duel at range with Pz Gdrs or FJs), and its best characteristic is staying power under losses. Both are also good in close combat / grenade duels, just using numbers.
But you do not want to match the Germans item for item. You want assymetrical match-ups or many-on-one cases of teamwork. Infantry should finish off enemy infantry only after artillery or direct HE has softened it up.
Use direct HE for infantry in buildings, indirect for everything else. Infantry can take out gun crews and teams directly, though you want to suppress guns first unless you can reach them at close range, e.g. through the side of the woods they are in or whatever.
Sherman 75mm, Sherman 105m, and Priests are the direct HE providers. Avoid the 37mm pop gun varieties, M8 and Stuart - they are not what some crack them up to be and the gun is generally inadequate.
For indirect HE, use 155mm and 105mm. 81mm mortars are fine on defense or for smoke, but lack the punch to hurt decent troops in decent cover, severely enough. The 105mm gives more ammo, but do not be fooled by "35 rounds", the 155mm is an effective artillery module, because each shot is likely to hurt something. The extra expense of VT is generally not worth it. In woods you often get the effect for free, and in the open it is often overkill.
The only other useful form of supporting anti-infantry fire I have found, is an ad hoc tactic meant to simulate AA automatic weapons. On defense you can include 40mm Bofors, but on attack do this -
Buy 2 M3A1 halftracks
Buy 4 M1917 HMG (water cooled)
Put the MGs in the HTs, run them to the back of whatever body of cover is available - scouted by the regular infantry beforehand. You want to be 250-300 yards from the target, not closer. Unload the slow MGs into the woodline or front of a building, seperated from each other enough, to not all be under one artillery footprint. Then pop the HTs around each end of the cover. Hose.
The reason it can work is that these types have very high available ammo - 150 for the HTs, 125 for this MG type. They can afford to fire 8 times a turn for half the battle. The cumulative effect of 8 MGs firing so many times can be significant. Usually, it will drive enemy back to reverse slope, behind buildings, interior of woods etc. Then you can rush. The range protects from enemy small arms, dispersion helps against arty, and the MGs can use some cover.
Such an "MG battery" costs about as much as 1 artillery module - 180 points. Think of it as a direct fire anti-infantry "battery". A side benefit is the MGs can stop infantry counterattacks rather easily.
But the hardest part is taking out the German armor, especially against humans who take impenetrable front plates. Take TDs to deal with enemy armor. Pair the vehicles with regular Shermans. The Sherman is the flanker, the TD is the shooter. 76mm Shermans cost more and are less likely to have T rounds, so they usually are not worth it. (Brits are an exception - take the Fireflies, the gun is well worth the price).
Scout for the tank-TD teams with the infantry, and keep the zook teams moving up to reduce the area available to enemy armor. When the ranges are long and no flank shots are feasible yet, stay in dead ground.
Do not skimp on the artillery. You want to spend ~25% of the points on artillery support, when attacking. And half your AFVs should be TDs (or Fireflies if British). Do not waste your TDs engaging infantry, and never lead with them.
After a first infantry company, buy platoons and extra MMG and Zook, not additional companies. The support weapons of 1 are worth it and the HQs valuable, but too much spent on numerous HQs, and 60mm mortars + 50 cals that run out of ammo too soon, will break the bank. Do not buy more than 1x81mm (for smoke etc) - it is not powerful enough to merit additional buys.
A company with added teams, a Sherman platoon, or a full battalion of supporting artillery (3 FOs 105 or 155), will each run ~650 points. A TD platoon plus an "AA battery" (as described) will cost the same amount. Build your force around two to all of those or anything between. Additional points should be spent on single added platoons, AFVs (including Sherman 105 or Priest), or multiple zooks&MMGs.
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"just a short summary explaining the various German infantry types"
Volksturm (VS) are home guard units, old men and young boys, some poor health cases. They should be mostly conscript or green. They have small squads and are not particular well armed, except they have plenty of AT weapons (Schrecks and Fausts). They should appear in Germany only and in 1945 (a few late 44 border fights perhaps). Roadblocks, road ambushes, defense of German villages and towns. They have no heavy weapons (beyond MGs), vehicles, or artillery.
Gebirgsjaegers (GB) are mountain troops. Picked men in excellent condition. They are heavy on the SMGs, limited support weapons and artillery, no vehicles or tanks - if a mule can't carry it, they don't have it. They should appear in Alpine terrain, Swiss border, Italy, etc. Occasionally fought outside their special areas.
Fallschirmjaegers (FJ) are paratroopers. Picked men in good condition. Very heavily armed infantry squads, only limited vehicles. They were not airdropped but fought in the line as standard infantry. More heavily armed in small arms and better quality men than standard infantry units, but not always as well equipped in guns, artillery support, or vehicles.
Waffen SS (SS) - come in all types, an army within the army, but mostly mobile troops, meaning Panzer or Panzergrenadier. Picked men, tend to be lavishly equipped in all respects, likely to have tank support, heavier tanks, etc. The SS Pz Gdr squads (motorized) are particularly heavily armed. More on the various subtypes when I get to Heer (standard army), as many are duplicated. Use in areas of heaviest action, counterattacks especially. By late war, around half of the Panzer divisions were SS.
Heer (H) = standard army. The bulk of the force. These come in several varieties.
Standard infantry (H) - used everywhere, especially on defense. The plain vanilla, line infantry. Variable quality, green to vet. Little supporting armor (mostly StuG or Marder), many towed guns and support weapons, adequate artillery, many mortars. Not particularly well armed.
Security (S) - older men, lower quality, green to regular. Rear area troops, anti-partisan, installation guards, fortress defenders. Armor support rare (a few halftracks perhaps), limited artillery.
Volksgrenadier (VG) - late war, new pattern infantry formations. Many personnel transfered in from Luftwaffe or rear echelons after the collapse of mid-to-late 1944, also older and younger men (40s, teens). Decent officer and NCO cadres, but highly variable quality overall, conscript to veteran. Almost exclusively SMG armed (fewer LMGs than standard, far fewer rifles), to give high close-range firepower without too much training. Usually without vehicle support, but guns, teams, mortars plentiful. Used as ordinary infantry, but relies more on Hvy weapons for range combat. Also more likely to use reverse slope defenses (behind ridge, inside woods rather than edge, interior of a village) to maximize effect of SMGs and fausts.
Volksgrenadier Fusilier (VGF) - the foot recon units of the VG divisions. 1/7 VG infantry battalions. Slightly bigger squads, sharpshooters, even fewer LMGs than standard VG. Still variable quality but a better "floor", green to vet. You'd be more likely to find them leading infiltrations, on night missions, or rear guards for retreating VG formations.
Sturmkompanie (SK) - special assault unit of picked men, formed out of a larger unit. Usually veteran, sometimes regular. Heavily armed, with big squads. Used for attacks, and in urban fighting. Often supported by Pioneers as well.
Pioneers (P) - come in many types - VG, Heer, Waffen SS, etc. Always, they are combat engineers. Fewer automatic weapons than some squad types, but equipped with flamethrowers and demo charges to destroy strongpoints. Also have mine-clearing abilities. Quality variable, from green to vet - some units mostly dug entrenchments etc, some became special assault units. Often one platoon or company of them attached to a company or battalion of another infantry type, for attacks.
Mobile troops means the infantry of the Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions. It includes both Heer and Waffen SS Panzergrenadiers, (armored), (motorized), pioneer, etc. These tend to be heavily armed and heavily supported. Armor, vehicles, good artillery support.
Essentially all the tanks in the German army supported just these types - the Tigers, Panthers, and Panzer IVs, as well as the heavier TD types, Jadgpanzer and up. All the other infantry types saw StuGs, Hezters, Marders, and occasional halftracks, but that is about it.
Fewer towed guns than the other types and generally fewer mortars, but more likely to have heavier 120mm mortar support. Quality generally regular to veteran.
Panzergrenadier (armored) - halftrack mounted infantry of the Panzer divisions, usually just 1 battalion per division only, in rare cases a 2nd. Smaller squads to fit in their halftracks, but heavily armed with 2 LMG per squad + SMGs. These units come with halftracks sufficient to carry them, which are a large portion of their higher price tag. Also use these for the armored recon battalions of Panzer divisions, attaching armored cars in that case.
Panzergrenadier (motorized) - the standard type, trucked units. Or use these for infantry riding on tanks, or dismounted before entering combat.
1 company of Pioneers per mobile division were generally armored, the rest motorized.
You would find mobile troops, SS and Heer, wherever the front is hottest or most fluid, in attacks or trying to stop Allied breakthroughs. Naturally, with the tanks.
I hope this helps.
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Here is another way of looking at supporting arms, for the U.S. infantry around mid 44. Take a typical infantry division, and assume its TDs are towed, and it has vanilla 75mm Sherman in support, the usual AA, engineers. What weapons would really be firing in defense of a battalion position?
14-18 artillery pieces (105mm)
17 direct fire guns
15 mortars
24 bazookas + 2 FTs
20 50 cal MGs
27 30 cal MGs
33 BARs
33 SMGs
400+ M-1s
The artillery would be 2 105mm from the regimental cannon company direct fire, or the whole 6 firing indirect, plus 1 battalion from the divisional artillery.
The direct fire guns would be 4x76mm towed AT, 5x75mm Shermans, 6x57mm towed AT, 2x40mm automatic AA.
The mortars would be 6x81mm, probably firing indirect, and 9x60mm, probably direct.
The bazookas are from the line companies, weapons company, and battalion HQ company. The FTs are from one attached engineer platoon.
The MGs would include 2 quad 50 cal AA, 12 single 50 cal (including 5 on the Shermans), 27 .30 cal (including 10 on the Shermans).
The BARs and SMGs are from the line platoons, the battalion recon platoon, and one attached engineer platoon.
All told, 50 ranged heavy weapons plus 80 ranged automatic weapons, rising to 76 and 113 at close enough range (zooks, FTs, SMGs), plus 2-3 rifles for each heavier weapon. Sorta gives some idea of why such an unit could hold ground sometimes.
Take away the AA and the tanks, and the heavy direct fire vs. infantry type targets drops 1/5, vs. armor it drops 1/3, and the MG type firepower also drops 1/3. Div. arty being busy would have a similar -1/3 effect on the HE tubes firing, and more like -1/2 in weight of metal.
Incidentally, with some trucks and jeeps as prime movers for guns and all the attachments, such a battalion force runs ~5000 points in CM.
Just an illustration, I don't claim it means much of anything.
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"the independent tank battalions in US formations...were not parcelled out piecemeal"
I agree, they tended to stay attached to one unit. That unit did change from time to time, though. E.g. in the early Normandy fighting, the 1st Infantry division had 3 independent tank battalions attached to it, turning into something close to a large armor division. After it won enough ground southward, most of these were withdrawn, able to refit and re-attach to other divisions. Also, I've seen some TD battalions that went through 6 or 12 switches of attachments over the course of the war. Detaching individual companies, though, tended to be a short term and tactical affair. Usually, the battalion was assigned to a division and all its companies worked with units of that division.
Two historical questions on German units/OOB’s
in Combat Mission Archive #3 (2001)
Posted
"The recoilless rifles contained in CMBO, what was their availability to which units and how often were they used?"
Both the 75mm and 105mm were rare over the course of the whole war. They were used in the Fallschirmjaegers and in the Gebirgsjaegers, places where the weight of alternative forms of field artillery were a serious obstacle. Around 650 of the 75mm model were made, and around 525 of the 105mm version. Whole war.
The times are also different. The 75mm was used on Crete, airdropped and flown in by glider and transport plane. (A mountain division was involved too, incidentally, not just FJ). Production of the 75s trailed off in 42-43, and revived somewhat in 1944, probably due to the expansion of the Luftwaffe ground forces (Goering's empire burgeoning and barging). More ammo was made in 1944, but none in 42 or 43, for the 75s.
Also, more 75mm mountain guns were made than 75mm RRs, around 1200. The weight savings for the 75 were not that great (it weighed ~200 lbs). Relatively little ammo was made for the 75s too, around 220 rounds per tube for the whole war, compared to ~2900 round per tube for 75mm mountain guns.
The likely place for 75mm RRs, then, would in the FJ units in place of regimental 75mm infantry guns, and they would be rare for that role. None were present in Normandy for instance, where 4 FJ divisions and 1 LW field division fought.
The 105mm was more heavily used in the mid war. Particularly, more ammo was made for them in 1942 especially, and a moderate amount in 43. They were used most often in place of artillery pieces in divisional artillery battalions; and, rarely, in place of regimental infantry guns (instead of 150mm SiG, essentially). There were a small number of these 105s in Normandy - 26 that I've found in other's OOBs. 12 in one FJ division as its artillery support (it lacked other guns completely), 14 in another in addition to 12 regular 105mm howitzers. (3x3 RR "batteries" in div arty, 5RRs in place of regimental guns in one regiment). The other two FJ divisions in Normandy, and the LW field division, had none.
The usage of the 105s is more clearly like tube artillery, in that around 850 rounds of ammo were made for each piece. The 220 /tube for the 75mms is the kind of figure you see for anti-tank guns. The 850 for the 105s is low for an artillery piece, but in the range of what mortars had. (For comparison, 105mm mountain guns - 420 made - had 2750 rounds per piece made for them - and the ammo was still quite scarce in 1944).
Gebirgsjaegers are more likely to use mountain 75s than the 75RRs (FJ the reverse). (Why? There are enough 75mm mountain guns. There aren't enough 105mm mountain guns). Either GB or the FJ may use the 105s in place of artillery. But used as field guns (in place of regimental infantry guns) they would be rare again in either place.
Both infantry types were liable to be understrength in supporting artillery, compared to regular infantry.
"Strumkompanie’s availability and historical use?"
That is much harder to say, because they are an ad hoc unit. They are not a seperate branch of the army or anything. Instead, a battalion or regiment about to attack forms one, by designating men out of its sub-units - like a "detail". Sometimes they would be formed around one existing company, often around pieces from several.
They were common in urban fighting, when attacking. The high casualties of house to house fighting required a large, full strength unit rather than a bunch of understrength ones, depleted by losses. So they would reorganize beforehand, into this sort of formation. In other attacks, it would vary with length of the preparation and state of the forces assembling for the attack. By no means every attack. But e.g. a night raid planned two weeks in advance? Sure. On defense they would be rare, except holding ground they had just taken or something.
I hope this helps.