Vanir Ausf B

Ok, fair enough on the multiplier. But even 2x gets you 120,000 total casualties. That is an impossible number. No way could Russia be holding a front that long with those loses. But yes, we will have to agree to disagree since no one knows the real numbers.

Well then what is? LOL You have to use some multiplier. Obviously no one knows the real numbers, but if you use multipliers much larger than 3.5x you quickly get into astronomical body counts. Russia didn't mobilize anyone before the war. They went in on Feb 24th at peacetime strength. Here, this has been posted before IIRC, but this is Kofman's analyses. It may not be correct but I would bet it's a lot closer to correct than Karl from Estonia's Note these are from a month ago so are outdated, but I think the methodology is sound. So how can we figure what might be plausible Russian KIA and total casualties? First, its hard to go off of oblique official estimates and selective intel releases. Things won't add up. No good way to know what is being counted or how. Also, it can change over time. For example, it appears at some point US official BTG counts started to include the DNR/LNR units whereas before it seemed they did not. So the initial BTG counts of 125-130 may not have included the 'separatist' corps or Rosgvardia. Also, these estimates are done in ranges and with confidence levels. Governments typically release these figures without explaining the estimate range, or their confidence level in those figures. So you might be hearing a conservative or a high estimate. Combatants in war will often overstate opponent losses and understate their own, or not release those figures at all. This is to be expected. The numbers are intertwined with information operations, considerations of own troop morale, external support, etc. The first problem is figuring out Russia's initial force. As we've come to learn the average BTG size was probably not 800, or 750, but probably closer to 600. Not all units deployed as BTGs, but the main maneuver force was possibly 80-90k. Auxiliaries such as 'separatist' army corps, and Rosgvardia might be another 20-25k. And an unknown amount of non-BTG dedicated support units. These are difficult to estimate, but they would not dramatically inflate the force involved. Making a third of BTG formations combat ineffective (50% casualties) could require just 3.3k KIA. Indeed, 10k KIA could easily add up to 45k total casualties or more. 15k KIA would take it towards 75k. I'm using just 3.5 as a multiplier here (imagine applying x5.7). The problem with higher range KIA counts is that you quickly develop input/output problems. There are more casualties than could feasibly be involved in the fight. That is, certain numbers become implausible given the size of forces involved. What about Russian reinforcements? Well, assuming 10-15 BTGs additional from the rest of the force, and other sources like mercenaries, you might be looking at another 10-12k troops in the war during the second phase. It does not dramatically alter the picture. Alternatively, one could assume 150k forces massed on UKR borders on Feb 23rd (not 190k total op related force). Here I'm doing what I advised against, using opaque official figures, but I know it is tempting. 1/3 of that figure, as total casualties, could come from ~12k KIA. This is all circling around a target. Given the gaps, my own confidence is quite low, but I think some of the figures out there don't reconcile well. Based on what I suspect, but ultimately don't know, I think 7k is low, 15k is high, and 10-12k KIA might be the middle. To me this is a high casualty figure both relative to the potential size of the force involved, and Russian casualties in other wars. However, others might have a different take on this.

I did the math in my head wrong. It would be 180,000. 40,000 x 3.5 = 140,000 WIA. 140+40=180,000

Then pick a better number. I'm just pointing out that 40,000 KIA would translate to roughly 185,000 total casualties. There would be no Russians left in Ukraine.

Well in that case I would like to see Karl from Estonia's estimate and how he came up with it. Kofman is quite explicit that he has low confidence in that number, that it could have been as low as 7,000 or as high as 15,000. But that is beside the point, which is that it can't be anywhere near 40,000. If it were the UA would be half way to Moscow by now.

That 40,000+ KIA number won't die. A month ago Kofman estimated Russian KIA at a more realistic 10-12,000. It's probably 15,000-ish by now.

"Yesterday our soldiers successfully used their bodies to intercept thousands of bullets."

Putting to bed the question as to whether T-62s were the only usable tanks the Russians have in storage...

Looks like the MQ-1C Gray Eagle sale may be delayed or canceled. https://www.yahoo.com/news/u-drone-sale-ukraine-hits-213218697.html

It's not so much the finished products as it is the raw materials. _____ WASHINGTON — The United States has relied almost entirely on China — and to a lesser extent Russia — in recent years to procure a critical mineral that is vital to producing ammunition. The mineral antimony is critical to the defense-industrial supply chain and is needed to produce everything from armor-piercing bullets and explosives to nuclear weapons as well as sundry other military equipment, such as night vision goggles. “There is no domestic mine for antimony,” according to a 2020 report from the U.S. Geological Survey, a government agency. “China is the largest producer of mined and refined antimony and a major source of imports for the United States.” _____ https://www.defensenews.com/congress/budget/2022/06/08/the-us-is-heavily-reliant-on-china-and-russia-for-its-ammo-supply-chain-congress-wants-to-fix-that/

Speaking of casualties... _____ "Up to 1,000 Ukrainian soldiers are being killed or wounded each day in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, with 200 to 500 killed on average and many more wounded, a top Ukrainian official said on Wednesday. The big picture: President Volodymyr Zelensky said on June 1 that 60 to 100 Ukrainian troops were being killed daily as Russia stepped up its Donbas offensive. Over the past two weeks that number has climbed significantly according to David Arakhamia, who leads Ukraine's negotiations with Russia and is one of Zelensky's closest advisers. Ukraine has recruited one million people into the army and has the capacity to recruit two million more, Arakhamia said, so it has the numbers to continue the fight in Donbas, where Russia has been gradually gaining territory. Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley was asked about the rate of Ukrainian casualties on Wednesday and said it was difficult to estimate but previous media reports of around 100 killed and up to 300 injured each day had been "in the ballpark of our assessments." He was not responding to the latest Ukrainian estimate. Milley also said Russia had taken "huge" losses and Ukraine was fighting effectively." _____

Xi Jinping says:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/10/were-almost-out-of-ammunition-and-relying-on-western-arms-says-ukraine?CMP=Share_AndroidApp_Other That's 150,000-180,000 rounds per month. I wonder how many 155mm shells NATO has and can spare?

Apparently English proficiency is required for the Caesar unit commander. I'm still flummoxed by that UI. The Caesar has never been exported to an English-speaking country, as far as I can tell.

Distressing if true.

Friedman's comments on Dougherty's analysis. This is right up @The_Capts alley: This is a good thread, but I'm going to highlight the same dynamic not in terms of attrition versus maneuver, but in terms of mass, maneuver, firepower, and tempo. These are the four physical tactical tenets from On Tactics, which isn't built on an attrition versus maneuver dichotomy. It's absolutely true that neither side has the mass to facilitate maneuver like the Wehrmacht and the Red Army did in WW2. Moreover, massing forces in space and time today under pervasive ISR is dangerous. But maneuver is still happening, it's just facilitating firepower. As so. This is contributing to the highly "attritional" fighting. This is a major trend in tactics since World War 2. Instead of mass facilitating maneuver which is supported by firepower, maneuver needs to facilitate firepower. Both sides are figuring this out, and Russian doctrine is designed for this (although they missed something.) What they missed is a new role for mass. That's what@C_M_Dougherty highlighted. Mass now needs to exploit the effects of firepower. The pattern is no longer mass to maneuver to firepower, but maneuver to firepower to mass (for exploitation). So what about tempo? Because Russia lacks the mass to exploit firepower, Ukraine doesn't have to outright defeat Russian maneuver. They just have to slow it down because the effects of firepower are always temporary. Plus they're on the defense and time favors the defense. The Ukrainians have taken advantage of tempo since day one, always slowing and bogging down Russian actions until they collapse on their own. Mass could compensate for that but the Russians just don't have it. These tactical trends (pervasive ISR, maneuvering to facilitate modern firepower, massing for exploitation) aren't unique to the conflict in Ukraine. The technology will drive everyone in this direction. The other issue here (connected with tempo) is the initiative. Ukraine is on the defense but they have the initiative. Russia has to attack and they have to do so in places with logistical infrastructure. Their choices are constrained. This is a problem for US forces because doctrine and structure is designed for 1) a world of mass facilitating maneuver, not maneuver facilitating firepower, 2) faster is always better, and 3) the offense has the initiative. Which is not to say that these 3 assumptions will never be true. Merely that they may not be. But forces built around their universal application will struggle. Transitions to a force design that matches the modern tactical dynamic will be contentious. Which is what we're seeing with the USMC force design debate. FD2030 is creating forces designed more for using maneuver to facilitate firepower and it's blowing some minds.

Good thread by Chris Dougherty: I was reviewing #ukraine maps by@TheStudyofWar, @JominiW, et al yesterday to prepare for this radio interview with @TheWorld and I wondered why the war in eastern Ukraine is an attritional slugfest and not a battle of sweeping maneuver? Many folks thought that the war would feature more armored maneuver as operations shifted east to Donetsk & Luhansk, (& as the weather changed). This makes sense, as it's more open terrain. As @gianpgentile noted in the @WarOnTheRocks podcast below, the area around eastern Ukraine was the sight of some of the largest battles in history, incl. Manstein's "backhand blow" & a bit north in Russia, the massive battle of Kursk. From 1941-43, forces in this area pushed front lines 100s of miles in a battle. As noted by @RitaKonaev below, today's fight looks more like WWI's Western Front, Mosul 2016-17, or late-stage Korean War: heavy casualties w/o much gained or lost. 3 factors account for this change. 1) the size & makeup of Ukr. & Rus. forces can't support large-scale maneuver. The German 6th Army that fought heavily in Ukraine & Stalingrad was roughly the same size as today's Russian army, & it was 1 of many armies in the Wehrmacht. Red Army forces were even larger. Both sides had hordes of armored vehicles & infantry needed to cover huge distances while securing flanks & supply lines. Such large forces could suffer horrendous losses & keep moving. Today's forces aren't big enough or designed for large-scale combined-arms maneuver. As @KofmanMichael & @RALee85 note in this superb @WarOnTheRocks piece on Russian force design. Ukrainian forces, meanwhile, are designed for territorial defense. The 2nd factor is the amount of ISR in the theater. Western intel support, along w/ Bayraktars & other drones, gives Ukraine a great picture of Russian forces. Per @DanMichaelsWSJ, this makes maneuvers like river crossings even more dangerous. W/o surprise, maneuver requires overwhelming w/mass, fires, or both. But neither side has the mass to create & exploit a breakthrough. So we get massed fires (w/o much maneuver) instead The 3rd factor is changes in terrain since 1943. I haven't done a terrain walk in Ukraine, but it's a safe bet that it's more urbanized than it was 80 years ago. Russian forces have been road/rail-bound, & the roads, rails, & bridges run through cities like Severodonetsk. These factors mean we likely won't see major breakthroughs on either side. Terrain may change hands--the Severodonetsk salient worries me--but neither side has the mass to exploit minor gains. The war now likely becomes a test of endurance.

Hope they are ok.

Latest doom posting from Girkin: "The internal political situation in the Russian Federation is also very similar to that of the eve of 1905. The authorities are frankly UNPOPULAR and are often despised in all socially active layers of the society. They only hold on thanks to bureaucracy - outrageously inefficient and thoroughly (disgustingly) corrupt. The Armed Forces are demonstrating the same depressing inefficiency, while its command - inability for adequate management (Shoygu and Gerasimov are as far from Kuropatikin in their professionalism as a petty wedding toastmaster from Bolshoi Theatre performer). In addition, instinctively feeling their own "anti-effectiveness" and unpopularity, the authorities are clearly afraid of conducting even the most necessary of the mobilization measures - afraid of "shaking up the stability". But when they do decide (the course of the war will inevitably force them to) - they will do it in the very last moment, when the "trust credit" from the society will be fully exhausted, while the deteriorating socio-economic situation of the population will be capable of provoking an explosion of anger."

Article on the challenges of operating a hodge-podge of foreign equipment. But an oversight nearly delayed all maintenance on the guns at the hard-to-reach front lines, Ukrainian officers said. The entire M777 machine is put together on the imperial system used in the U.S., meaning that using a Ukrainian metric wrench on it would be difficult, and would risk damaging the equipment. Only after sending the guns did the U.S. arrange for a rushed shipment of toolboxes of imperial-gauge wrenches, said Maj. Vadim Baranik, the deputy commander of a maintenance unit. But tools can be misplaced, lost or destroyed, potentially leaving guns inoperable unless someone scrounges up a U.S.-supplied wrench. https://news.yahoo.com/potent-weapons-reach-ukraine-faster-114318516.html

Artillery porn