Vanir Ausf B

A serious problem for Russians.

The Financial Times article that tweet references says nothing about 300+km HIMARS ammo. Until we see a credible report I would assume it's not true.

I have wondered the same. I recall a similar interview with a female SP artillery operator a while back. There was also this female volunteer from Brazil. Tragically, she was killed last week.

IIRC the literal translation is "Tanks a lot!"

Tochka-U, it seems.

As Haiduk mentioned.

It's the former, according to some Ukrainian pilots: “They were very useful and important in the very first days, stopping those columns [of Russian armored vehicles and troops heading toward the capital Kyiv], but now that they’ve built up good air defenses, they’re almost useless," Moonfish said. TB2s are still being employed for "some special operations, including attack missions," according to Juice, "but, in very rare situations and in exact conditions." https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukrainian-fighter-pilots-call-bull****-on-need-for-mq-1c-gray-eagle-drones Ninja'd by Haiduk

Dustin Walker has some thoughts on this and related items from the announcement. The V Corps HQ in Poland: this is not the HQ itself (which is at Ft Knox), but its forward command post that simply goes from being rotational to permanent. Destroyers in Spain: US already has 4. Navy has been in the process of going to 6 for years. Agreement with Spain may be new, but the move is not. F-35 squadrons in UK: already planned to station 2 squadrons at Lakenheath. Difficult to imagine this is really 2 more on top. If it is, that would be a mistake given the need for 5th gen aircraft in the Indo-Pacific. Baltic rotations: important to keep building a small, sustainable, but responsive and potent US presence. If we’re shifting to deterrence by denial in the Baltics, European allies should provide new forces required. Rotational BCT in Romania: Finally more focus in SE Europe/Black Sea. This BCT rotation was suggested in the last admin (only then it was at the expense of 2CR in Germany). Will this impact fielding & deployment of MDTFs with full capability suite in the Indo-Pacific? HQ elements in Germany: ADA BDE HQ, SHORAD battalion, CSSB HQ, Engineer BDE HQ all seem like “deterrence package” elements the US Army has been planning for years, but were delayed by last admin. Again, doesn’t appear to be new. Air defense in Germany/Italy: Questionable that the US should be deploying more of our high-demand/low-supply air defense capabilities to Europe when our allies have capability and capacity (NASAMS, SAMP/T) and we’re lacking in the Indo-Pacific. Overall, not sure US deployments in Europe are being guided by any consistent rationale other than a basic desire for reassurance. With competing demands for forces in short supply, standard should be higher. https://twitter.com/dustinrwalker/status/1542175369851199488

Provides perspective on General Sir Patrick Sanders' earlier comments about needing more mass.

Interesting speech by the new UK Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Patrick Sanders. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chief-the-general-staff-speech-at-rusi-land-warfare-conference "The scale of the war in Ukraine is unprecedented. 103 Battalion Tactical Groups committed. Up to 33,000 Russians dead, wounded, missing or captured. A casualty rate of up to 200 per day amongst the Ukrainian defenders. 77,000 square kilometres of territory seized – 43% of the total landmass of the Baltic states. Ammunition expenditure rates that would exhaust the combined stockpiles of several NATO countries in a matter of days. "this year alone we have supplied 9500 anti-tank missiles, of which over 5000 were NLAW. We have already provided UK-based training for 650 AFU soldiers, and in the coming months, the British Army will deliver battle-winning skills to a further 10,000 Its just started. Russia often starts wars badly. And because Russia wages war at the strategic, not the tactical level – its depth and resilience means it can suffer any number of campaigns, battles and engagements lost, regenerate and still ultimately prevail. In Ukraine we’ve seen the limitations of deterrence by punishment. It has reinforced the importance of deterrence through denial - we must stop Russia seizing territory - rather than expecting to respond to a land grab with a delayed counteroffensive. To succeed, the British Army, in conjunction with our NATO allies and partners, must be in-place or at especially high readiness - ideally a mix of both. Tripwires aren’t enough. If we fail to deter, there are no good choices given the cost of a potential counterattack and the associated nuclear threat. We must, therefore, meet strength with strength from the outset and be unequivocally prepared to fight for NATO territory. If this battle came, we would likely be outnumbered at the point of attack and fighting like hell. Standoff air, maritime or cyber fires are unlikely to dominate on their own – Land will still be the decisive domain. And though I bow to no one in my advocacy for the need for game changing digital transformation, to put it bluntly, you can’t cyber your way across a river. Success will be determined by combined arms and multi-domain competence. And mass."

Kofman on a tweet storm. A few nuggets: The Russian goal in Donbas is likely to setup a battle for Slovyansk/Kramatorsk, with an axis of advance from Izyum and another from the east, assuming they were able to get past Bakhmut. This objective appears aspirational at best. The offensive in this part of the battlefield is likely to drag on, perhaps well into July or August. Though both sides are liable to become exhausted due to losses of manpower and materiel. Kherson is where a future UA counter offensive could play out. Despite the present focus on the Donbas, economically and strategically Kherson is more significant, and it is where UA ability to conduct offensive operations will likely be tested in the future. The general lack of force availability (on both sides) has forced this into an attrition war. The Russian military holds a substantial advantage in fires, although not a dramatic advantage in manpower and materiel, hence a lack of momentum in operations. The Russian mil is using LDNR as dismounted infantry, and trying to cobble the rest together (VDV, Motor rifle units, Wagner formations) into groups capable of offensive maneuver. They shift more capable forces around the battlefield to attempt localized advances. On the UA side, significant losses in recent months have led to a growing dependence on territorial defense forces and lower quality replacements. However, the situation does not suggest UA forces are anywhere near collapse in the Donbas. Ukrainian discourse in recent weeks had begun to paint a bleak picture in part to motivate faster delivery of Western military aid. UA is in a capability trench, low on ammunition, with losses mounting, in need of artillery & MLRS to attain some parity in an attrition war. HIMARS will allow UA to conduct strikes at tactical-operational depths, hitting Russian logistics & C2. But this capability is being provided in installments and the impact could be greatest when it is first introduced, before Russian forces attempt to adapt. Overall, local mil balance in Donbas favors Russia, but long term trends still favor Ukraine. However, that estimate is conditional on sustained Western military assistance, and is not necessarily predictive of outcomes. This is likely to be a protracted war.

Except with Churchill it would have been 4 PM drunk tweets.

Into the teeth of unsuppressed AA? Doubtful. They have cruise missiles for that. Russian air is very active, but they stay close to their own lines.

It's hard to know if those numbers can be trusted. For example, Ukraine claims to have shot down 217 fixed-wing aircraft and 184 helicopters but Oryx confirms 35 and 48, respectively.

When all your tractors are busy towing Russian tanks use Mi-24 helicopters to harvest wheat.

Slightly longer version of the video showing the strike on the M777s, in two parts. Geo-located 48.866308, 38.389871

Just wait until you hit 50 members. Trust me, nothing happens but bickering.

NY Times article offering various observations and opinions. Nothing earth shaking. https://www.yahoo.com/news/pivotal-period-ukraine-u-officials-115145667.html

I now have a new podcast to listen to.

Not sure what that is based on. The Russian Army in general is heavily mechanized. But in any event, the interesting takeaway is that the 3.5 multiplier is just for WIA. It doesn't include MIA or POWs, both of which may be very significant in their own right.

Oh BTW, I was able to dig up the source for Kofman's 3.5 multiplier. Turns out it was not based on Western numbers.

Ok, fair enough on the multiplier. But even 2x gets you 120,000 total casualties. That is an impossible number. No way could Russia be holding a front that long with those loses. But yes, we will have to agree to disagree since no one knows the real numbers.

Well then what is? LOL You have to use some multiplier. Obviously no one knows the real numbers, but if you use multipliers much larger than 3.5x you quickly get into astronomical body counts. Russia didn't mobilize anyone before the war. They went in on Feb 24th at peacetime strength. Here, this has been posted before IIRC, but this is Kofman's analyses. It may not be correct but I would bet it's a lot closer to correct than Karl from Estonia's Note these are from a month ago so are outdated, but I think the methodology is sound. So how can we figure what might be plausible Russian KIA and total casualties? First, its hard to go off of oblique official estimates and selective intel releases. Things won't add up. No good way to know what is being counted or how. Also, it can change over time. For example, it appears at some point US official BTG counts started to include the DNR/LNR units whereas before it seemed they did not. So the initial BTG counts of 125-130 may not have included the 'separatist' corps or Rosgvardia. Also, these estimates are done in ranges and with confidence levels. Governments typically release these figures without explaining the estimate range, or their confidence level in those figures. So you might be hearing a conservative or a high estimate. Combatants in war will often overstate opponent losses and understate their own, or not release those figures at all. This is to be expected. The numbers are intertwined with information operations, considerations of own troop morale, external support, etc. The first problem is figuring out Russia's initial force. As we've come to learn the average BTG size was probably not 800, or 750, but probably closer to 600. Not all units deployed as BTGs, but the main maneuver force was possibly 80-90k. Auxiliaries such as 'separatist' army corps, and Rosgvardia might be another 20-25k. And an unknown amount of non-BTG dedicated support units. These are difficult to estimate, but they would not dramatically inflate the force involved. Making a third of BTG formations combat ineffective (50% casualties) could require just 3.3k KIA. Indeed, 10k KIA could easily add up to 45k total casualties or more. 15k KIA would take it towards 75k. I'm using just 3.5 as a multiplier here (imagine applying x5.7). The problem with higher range KIA counts is that you quickly develop input/output problems. There are more casualties than could feasibly be involved in the fight. That is, certain numbers become implausible given the size of forces involved. What about Russian reinforcements? Well, assuming 10-15 BTGs additional from the rest of the force, and other sources like mercenaries, you might be looking at another 10-12k troops in the war during the second phase. It does not dramatically alter the picture. Alternatively, one could assume 150k forces massed on UKR borders on Feb 23rd (not 190k total op related force). Here I'm doing what I advised against, using opaque official figures, but I know it is tempting. 1/3 of that figure, as total casualties, could come from ~12k KIA. This is all circling around a target. Given the gaps, my own confidence is quite low, but I think some of the figures out there don't reconcile well. Based on what I suspect, but ultimately don't know, I think 7k is low, 15k is high, and 10-12k KIA might be the middle. To me this is a high casualty figure both relative to the potential size of the force involved, and Russian casualties in other wars. However, others might have a different take on this.