LongLeftFlank
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Posts posted by LongLeftFlank
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9 hours ago, cesmonkey said:
Ex-USSF TTG who now runs Turcopolier following the passing of Col. Lang had this quite interesting comment on the sabotage campaign.
As I hope most grogs here know, the Special Forces core mission is less to be Rambo superman commandos than 'Jesuits of Democracy', providing training, liaison and, when required, shadow leadership for allied fighters, conventional or uncon.
Support for the Ukrainian 'Forest Brothers' and other anticommunist movements in Iron Curtain Europe was one of their earliest projects, though generally unsuccessful and still mainly classified.
https://turcopolier.com/russias-main-link-to-china-paralyzed-after-tunnel-sabotage/
I’m fairly confident this is the work of SBU or SBU led partisan sabotage. Since early in the war, things all across Russia have been catching fire and blowing up. I doubt it’s all due to industrial accidents. This concentration of UW activities across both the occupied territories and Russia is a product of Ukraine’s total national defense doctrine and, I’d like to think, many years of MTTs from 10th SFG(A). This was our reason for being ever since the group’s activation in 1952.
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I don't post gore pr0n or drone kill shots that have no tactical insight or relevance, but I made an exception for this grim walkthrough (second video). The vids aren't related AFAIK
There are at least 20 bodies in this area, with a hodgepodge of kit. Nothing too obviously dismembered so I assume it wasn't heavy HE that did it, but it's still on the ground shots of dead human beings. You have been warned.
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Drones and EW still evolving...
(per NoelReports)
In the conditions of modern war, the high intensity of use of enemy UAVs, aviation, missile weapons, the role of EW specialists is difficult to overestimate. Our soldiers in advanced positions desperately need reliable protection from swarms of Russian drones. We are talking about modern developments of the so-called trench EW complexes.
As the Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Lieutenant-General Ivan Havrylyuk, informed ArmiyaInform, the Ministry of Defense, together with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, completed the testing of tactical means of radio interference to barrage ammunition and FPV drones, developed by domestic enterprises, which confirmed their tactical and technical characteristics in conditions of use close to to combat Currently, these tools are recommended for codification and registration as standard items of supply for the purpose of further supply to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. At the same time, it is planned to test a number of tactical means of radio-electronic combat against UAVs and UAV detection means in the near future.
Among the systems that were recently put into operation by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine is a radio-electronic warfare complex, which is used to combat all types of enemy UAVs, capable of suppressing control signals, GPS, GLONASS, Galileo and Beidou satellite navigation data transmissions, as well as creating a variety of false signals The complex has a passive system of detection and direction finding of drones.
Currently, two more samples of domestic "trench EW" systems are undergoing codification in the Ministry of Defense. We are talking about a complex that will counter Russian Lancets and a complex that will protect against enemy FPV drones.
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There seems to be a series of strikes going on targeting Russian air defence assets in and above Crimea, possibly following on the damage done by the freak storm.
I've observed before here (and I am far from the only one) that retaking both banks of the Dnpr river mouth, preferably as far in as Oleshki Sands prior to a ceasefire seems quite strategically important to Ukraine, as it not only puts Kherson out of tube artillery range but somewhat lessens Russian ability to interdict shipping out of Odessa and Nikolaiv.
This terrain is infantry country; marshy (is it true the Ukes can also reflood a lot of this area if they want to?) and road poor. It also lies at the exposed far left end of the Russian front, and is hideously difficult to resupply and support. As we see....
Any RU defence would need to rely heavily on air power. Sytematically degrading their AD network seems like a nice first step, especially if Ukraine fields F16s this coming spring.
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1. Strykers in action! (I think - this may be training footage, say the comments)
Are those antimissile flares they're firing?
2. Financing?????? WTAF!!!! How does one make a fortification in a war zone a 'bankable' infra asset?
Separately, they talked about attracting resources, financing the construction of fortifications, and formats of cooperation with private business.
I mean, Lt. Minderbinder had a revenue-generating solution, but that's fiction.
Perhaps Zelenskyy really has taken a few too many hits off the neoliberal privatisation bong....
3. Russian-side drone footage from early Nov, grainy but some tolerably long takes.
4. Up close and personal on the Krynki bridgehead. Nothing 'sensitive' in this footage, just X being X.
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So long, and thanks for all the fish!
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1 minute ago, billbindc said:
The Luttvak/Kissinger comparison is entirely apt. They are both courtiers who specialize(d) in telling elites what they want to hear under a veneer of respectability and a scrim of intellectual verbiage.
Yup, just like every successful c̶o̶u̶r̶t̶ie̶r̶ ̶c̶o̶u̶r̶t̶e̶s̶a̶n̶ consultant, ever!
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2 hours ago, Astrophel said:
I hope you are right concerning the active engagement of US agencies. I agree about Kissinger - he created a wall of opposition to western policy, unintentionally perhaps, but he was always focussed more on next week than next decade.
8 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:"Power is the greatest aphrodisiac" was the loathsome, lecherous old toad's consulting business strategy as well.
Kissinger was the archetypical DC Insider and 'celebrity intellectual', constantly cross-trading on innuendo deriving from his universal 'access'.
But if you read transcripts of any interview or opinion piece, there's simply... nothing there. Any rando off the street would have been laughed out of the room for banality. But not the Good Doctor.
Ed Luttwak, whom I've cited a few times on here (to the annoyance of my esteemed friend @billbindc) is a variant of the same animal. Ed's fatal error though was/is always to be too fond of his own views, exposing himself to actually being proven flat wrong. Not Henry.
I will close my malediction with a pungent anecdote from apostate CIA officer John Stockwell's memoir "In Search of Enemies", lovingly enclosed in a quote bubble for those who don't care a toss about Kissinger.
*****
John Stockwell, “In Search of Enemies”:
The Kissinger Grunt
December 2, 1975.At 2 :00 P.M there was to be a meeting of the Interagency Working Group on the third floor, “C” corridor, of the Central Intelligence Agency at Langley, Virginia. The civil war in Angola was going badly for our allies, and the CIA had formally recommended a major escalation-the introduction of American military advisors-to the secretary of state, Henry Kissinger….
Using a pointer, I started at the top of the map and talked my way down through the battlefields, bringing everyone up to date since the previous week’s meeting. In the north our allies, the FNLA and the elite Zairian paracommando battalions, had been routed and were now a broken rabble….
On November 24, the CIA had presented the 49 Committee with optional plans costing an additional $30, $60 or $100 million, but with the Agency’s reserves expended, there were no more secret funds….
Kissinger was, as always, preoccupied with other matters of state and his rather complicated social life. Ambassador Mulcahy had had difficulty gaining an audience, but had, finally, succeeded. We would soon know with what result.
At the outset, Potts had confided a desire to make the working group sessions so dull that non-CIA members would be discouraged in their supervision of “our” work. He had succeeded brilliantly. Working his way laboriously down a long agenda, he generally took three hours to cover one hour’s material, while his listeners struggled with fatigue, boredom, and the labor of digesting lunch in the poorly ventilated conference room. Inevitably breathing grew heavier, heads would nod, bounce up, then nod again.
I myself never dared to sleep; a colonel in a room full of general officers. Today, at least, there ought to be enough interest to keep them awake for a while; after all, we were meeting to plan a major escalation of a war. I finished my presentation and sat down.
Potts turned to Mulcahy and spoke pleasantly. “Well, Ed, what did Kissinger say?”
Mulcahy tamped his pipe and sucked on it for a few moments, apparently having trouble framing an answer. Potts watched him quietly. Finally Mulcahy spoke, “He didn’t exactly *say* anything.”
“Did he read the paper?”
“Oh, yes. I took it to him myself just a few minutes before he left for Peking. l insisted he read it.”
“You mean he didn’t make *any* comment? He just read it? and took off?” Potts looked baffled, exasperated.
Mulcahy nodded ruefully. “He read it. Then he grunted, and walked out of his office.”
“Grunted?”
“Yeah, like, unnph!” Mulcahy grunted.
“He’s going to be gone ten days!” Potts scowled. “What are we supposed to do in Angola in the meantime? We have to make some decisions today!”
Mulcahy shrugged ·helplessly. They looked at each other.
“Well, was it a positive grunt or a negative grunt?” Potts asked.
Mulcahy studied for a moment, considering. “It was just a grunt. Like, unnph. I mean it didn’t go up or down.·”
This group of somber men were supervising the country’s only current war. They were gathered today to discuss steps that could affect world peace. No one was smiling. Mulcahy grunted again, emphasizing a flat sound. Down the table someone else tried it, experimenting with the sound of a positive grunt, then a negative one, his voice rising, then falling. Others attempted it while Potts and Mulcahy watched.
“Well,” Potts said. “Do we proceed with the advisors?”
Mulcahy scowled and puffed on his pipe, uncomfortable in his position as Kissinger’s surrogate.
“We better not,” he said finally, “Kissinger just decided not to send Americans into the Sinai.” Everyone nodded in agreement. Inaction was safe, and easier to correct.
2 hours ago, Astrophel said:My malediction to Henry is all in the quote bubble above, as it's lengthy and not everyone cares. Apologies for the formatting issues.
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CM worthy. Would I had time....
https://nitter.net/Pouletvolant3/status/1729811441664872892#m
Bakhmut (RU source, via GirkinGirkin below)
This is DavidD, so season to taste. But I don't disbelieve it either.
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7 hours ago, The_Capt said:
The UA Summer offensive failed to achieve visible results. I am sorry but no one (including you, Mr Broken Clock) were able to articulate why this condition would occur given the information we had at hand.
Further, you and been crying about the sky falling pretty much since March of 22. You will excuse the class if we did not jump on board another LLF doom and gloom exercise.
The obstacles were a concern. We did push back on the whole “Lolz Russia” wave because those obstacle belts looked pretty well developed to my eyes. What was missing was the RA ability to defend them. Given the abysmal losses and state of affairs of the RA after the Winter offensive how on earth they managed to defend an 800km frontage and actually cover those minefields is frankly beyond me. If you wish to impress explain that. How did the RA logistically, ISR and simple combat power manage to actually cover all those obstacles? Let alone do it effectively? Please state your thesis. If you stand in a field long enough and cry “lightening” one day you will be correct. That does not mean you actually understand how lightening happens.
Nice tantrum, not to mention an absurd caricature of my many posts, and of my overall outlook on the war. I'm going to take the rest of this pissing match into a quote bubble, so folks can flick by it.
8 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:Since the start of the thread, in spite of all the meming and jackassery, I've also tried to find and share credible frontline reports. In fact I'm pretty sure I was first to surface a lot of the feeds that folks here quote regularly. I would hardly put the vast bulk of this material in the Roepcke class. In fact, I've often tried to highlight stuff that supports or confirms good points made by you, Steve or others.
Also, I don't give a rats about impressing anyone. I'm just an energy industry w&&ker who builds CM scenarios when I have time, and have never pretended to be anything more. So that's just yet another gratuitious put down, to which I say
you.
I don't know why I should even bother "stating a thesis" given your determination to treat anything I say with open contempt, but fine, maybe it will yield some useful discussion. I've provoked that before, several times. Also, you did say 'please' and yes, I'm actually Canadian too.
a. It was quite obvious to me (yay, me) that the NATO-style Big Buildup, Followed By The Big Push to the Green Fields Beyond was going to be, pace Anzio, not a wildcat but a beached whale, given the minefields and I didn't even dream of the density that they actually employed. It was a Kursk replay, everyone was saying so, including Gen. Zaluzhny. I thought Front Aviation would play more of a role than it did, and was also surprised (and cheered) by the relative feebleness of their artillery.
b. But my 'thesis' -- which like everyone else's here has had to recalibrate with new information, especially regarding the drone revolution -- was and remains that rather than trying to build a New Model Army modeled on NATO heavy brigades but with laser beams in the freeking heads, Ukraine was, and is, far better served transforming the bulk of their force into something as close as possible to "1200 Ranger (or Jaeger or Cossack or PAVN) battalions", doctrinally focused on ambush, infiltration and envelopment.
Hence all my 'wailing' about how the UA ought to be mobilising significantly more infantry, from a much larger pool of men; this is brutally hard service and troops need to be rotated out, and train green cadres.
Similarly, their armour should be centered on independent tank battalions, tasked to ops where their armoured fist or screen is called for.
Artillery, well, I generally follow the consensus here, but it seems Aerorozvidka blazed the trail with on-call drone spotting and fire support for all sizes of formations.
...Would this '1200 Ranger battalions' force structure have obtained a different result north of Tokmak in summer 2023? Unlikely, but these battalions could have commenced aggressive ops in this zone as early as last fall, when the Russians were still infantry poor and vehicle-bound, and the Zaporozhe-Vuhledar front was relatively porous, with vulnerable supply lines and significant partisan activity. No way the Ivans could have trucked all those mines to this zone, let alone laid most of them.
...btw, you yourself shaped a lot of my thinking on this stuff, but it wouldn't be the first time I learned a lot from a know-it-all bully.
The Ignore key is over there.
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14 hours ago, The_Capt said:
Or attack somewhere else. I guess this is my point. Ukraine got pulled into a tactical battle of attrition of Russia's choosing and then Russia went and created massive defences elsewhere. To my mind that is not a win no matter how much the RA of Wagner lose in that initial battle, unless it can break the Russians overall. It clearly did not. So I think we are trying to make a virtue out of circumstances that were not optimal.
Now how the UA got pulled into this? - e.g. Bakhmut but unable to attack anywhere else. Is a major question. Did they over extend last Fall? The UA needed to defend Bakhmut and attack to disrupt the obstacle mess the RA built. Better yet attack elsewhere along the line to pull the RA laterally and cause direct stress. If they could not do that while the RA could do the inverse then there is a deeper problem here. Russia can continue this cycle until they have locked up the entire front, and then still pick and choose where to attack.
This also does not track as we know that both forces are roughly the same size in country.
I agree completely with your assessment. And hey, here's a tune you might actually like.
****
But while we are in hindsight mode here, I am also going to point out that I was sounding nonstop alarms about the risks of giving the Russians breathing space to dig in and lay mine belts in the land bridge, as early as May 2022. Of course I wasn't the only one saying it here (or on Twitter). For example...
But I also took a huge ration of crap from the Cool Kids here for being defeatist, or at best over-hasty. Cuz, you know, Russia was immolating itself before our very eyes and Time Is Not On Russia's Side (that's a literal quote, oft repeated), that Russian fortifications were a joke, and that only a very large and meticulously planned UA offensive (with NATO training and kit!) was going to achieve meaningful results.
On 11/28/2023 at 1:02 PM, LongLeftFlank said:May 2022...
I'm talking about a conventional attack by c.2 UA heavy brigades in the general direction Melitopol; to destroy or rout Russian forces opposite and force a full scale RA relief effort which has every chance of turning into yet another C-Fk and further sapping their strength.
The infantry-heavy UA actions to clear the Kharkiv environs and menace the Izyum LOCs can continue. They aren't using their heavy forces for those; the built up terrain is not favourable.
Russia is reeling now, mainly from its own manifest incompetence. A summer 'pause' lets them off the ropes to regroup and dig in.
I take note of the valid points by @The_Capt about the drain on battered Russia of manning such a long frontier.
But remember, they have no choice but to make that heavy commitment, realign their shredded economy to China and wait for better days to resume their mucking around.
I don't buy Steve's thesis that there will be sustained partisan warfare....
Let us also consider the huge drain on Ukraine (40 million souls) of becoming an armed camp for the foreseeable future, manning a long hostile frontier with a huge (Western-armed) standing army.
I continue to insist on the 'rapid' (or 'early') part because as the Russians dig in and sow millions of mines, it will be terribly costly to achieve those break ins. The Verdun shoe will be on the other foot then, I fear. Western military thinkers love their big systematic OVERLORD buildups, but there is such a thing as waiting too long.
I worry that for all our confident theorising, the front 'freezes' along the Dnepr land corridor and Sievertsi Donets (yes, no doubt the Russians will eventually vacate Kherson and east of Kharkiv). Ivan will dig in, revert to 1980s tech and mine the sh%t out of everything. So by fall, the sheer human cost of retaking the lost lands becomes higher than even the hardest line Ukrainians can stomach. While Putin manages to keep the lid on far longer than any non-Russian could possibly imagine.
It's a risky course for UA to just keep on gnawing away at RA with HIMARS, counterbattery fire and infantry probes, straight into the winter. The brave Ukrainian people pay an awful price for every day this drags on. I also continue to believe Ivan is frantically digging in already ('freezing his gains', or trying to) and the longer offensive action is put off, the bloodier and more fraught retaking those lands is going to be.
...So, again, my view is that they either need to take some risks and find a way to solve for larger offensive ops, or else materially ratchet up the Russian death rates to a level that forces their withdrawal.
Russia isn't going to fade away or bleed out on its own on its current trajectory. It can't take much more of Ukraine, but if not shoved out of what it has, it will keep digging in, keep up positional warfare and bombardments through 2023 while whining for a cease fire (in place).
By late 2023, Ukraine is 'Okrajina'. A dismal borderland, an armed camp having to man a hostile horseshoe shaped frontier of some 1000 miles, with some 15% of its 40M people exiles or under enemy occupation, another c.5% physically or mentally shattered, and another c.20% living within Russian tactical artillery range. No rebuilding, few non war-related jobs, no investment, no clear way to plan for the future. Wholly dependent on Western aid, vulnerable to corruption and factional gangsterism.
With every week that goes by, the land bridge area -- the one piece of ground Putin MUST hold (beyond the Feb 2022 lines) to give his fig leaf 'victory' -- becomes more analogous to the built up Kursk salient of mid-1943; belts of trenches (prefab bunkers?) plus mines, mines and more mines (remote controlled mines, smart mines, wheeled mines, etc.).
Continuous channeling and killing zones, to slow and then blast UA forces with old school mortars and rockets (which Russia can still produce in bulk with a little Chinese help). And their tac air arm will become more formidable supporting such a static defence. It is unsafe to assume he never learns, and eventually the Ukes may run out of ways to surprise him.
A "retro" Russian army, even poorly commanded, trained and resupplied, can make the Ukrainians pay dearly in blood and equipment for every meter of ground.
There's no "snow eating fog" solution I can see for this case.
I also have little faith in a Panzerkiel of Western ubertanks, with or without supporting EW / CSIR / TAC and accompanying waves of combat sappers (Ukrainian dac cong) blasting and slashing a way through the Russian mine belts to Melitopol, or more likely the (partisan contested) heights between Melitopol and Mariupol.
...So, you're exactly right: it's logistics. Rot these bastards out first, before you hit them. Then eat them using technoed up assault infantry, selectively supported by AFVs. Snow eating fog.
And you already know my best guess on that: kill all the trucks.
So maybe my 'cracked lens' isn't so cracked after all.
On 11/28/2023 at 1:02 PM, LongLeftFlank said: -
Avdiivka.
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9 hours ago, The_Capt said:
Oh that is fine. We can smoke cannabis too. We just can’t defend him on the internet….it is a law, got Royal assent and everything.
OK, that should end that sidebar.
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9 hours ago, The_Capt said:
As a citizen of Canada who has been in the military for over 35 years and has worked all levels of tactical, operational, strategic and political. I can definitely say that any defence of LLF is not supported by my nation.
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13 hours ago, Carolus said:
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With tongzhi (同志) like these....
(for 'mine' read 'mortar shell', although it could certainly be turned into an IED)
The Russian military does not have indigenous 60mm mortars in service that could fire this ammunition.
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Positive development in the threatened northeast face of Avdiivka.
"Avoid losses?" Or "avoid further losses?"
https://nitter.net/Pouletvolant3/status/1729083086472900816#m
Note what appears to be Russian air strikes.
Per Perun's latest, the Ivans are using air-delivered glide bombs to back and fill for their flagging artillery arm. All the more important in this case (if true), since Avdiivka is basically a suburb of Donetsk city. If they can't sustain artillery in volume up front here, they probably can't do it anywhere.
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No despair in this beauty.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the front, Pepe the Frog called, he wants his lips back.
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Sorry squire....
Ask Charles to add 'splody ammo cookoffs to the ever lengthening CM3 queue.
41 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:He was a cruel man, but fair!
Breaking.
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On 11/26/2023 at 6:03 PM, LongLeftFlank said:
Thread: https://nitter.net/secretsqrl123/status/1728615103182897188#m
Analysis by Tatarigami's group (AKHZ is the coke plant)
Thread: https://nitter.net/Tatarigami_UA/status/1728171185790443845#m
Trading ground for blood... temporarily on the south face of Avdiivka salient? Euromaidan often reports through blue and gold tinted glasses, so season to taste.
There are still small forests full of Ukrainians in the north, vineyards turned into extensive trench networks, the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant and fortifications around it, the hamlet in between, and the former air defense base that surround the vulnerable Russian bridgehead.
The situation around the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant was quite simple – Russians conducted head-on assaults on Ukrainian fortifications with remotely-controlled machine guns and were destroyed by them.
Sentry guns.... check.
Once Russian forces started entering the industrial zone, they realized that there are virtually no shelters left to hide and establish a permanent presence because they had destroyed it with artillery. Moreover, the Ukrainian special force hunted down the Russian artillery in the region... leaving the Russian vanguard with little fire support.
Topo
https://nitter.net/Pouletvolant3/status/1728698017497100555#m
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45 minutes ago, danfrodo said:
I suppose it makes some sort of twisted sense for Putin to keep doing it.
3 hours ago, Harmon Rabb said:The latest Perun goes into possible motives, well worth the time (as usual).
(I'm not as comely as @Harmon Rabb, being a five thousand year old animated sorceror with no flesh on my forearms, but I also listen to Perun while working out)
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14 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:
It depends what is strategic goal here. If they want to grind trained and relatively well-equipped Ukrainian units defending this area in exchange for their own cannon fodder (and not elites) it is actually sound long-term plan.
Well, assuming new forms of lethal air- and ground-mobile unmanned weapons are coming into play, along with AP mines, I can see these attacks becoming an order of magnitude more bloody for the mobiks.
Below, the 'dancing floor of war'; open fields and then housing tracts (dachas) providing little hard cover.
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DavidD's sources can sometimes be suss, but his views here seem on point:
Many people are trying to link a avdiivka with the battle of Bakhmut. There are some differences.
- In the lead up the Russians had far more artillery then they do now
- The Russians started off with far better troops (lots of VDV)
- When the VDV was exhausted the Russians turned to wagner.
- Wagner had nearly everything they needed for the assault
- Russian airforce was able to fly over the city due to nearly exhausted air defense
- At the time its estimated that russia had about 10 million rounds of all types on hand
- Ukraine never fully reinforced Bakhmut and allowed for a fighting rear action to leave the city
Now today…
- Russia does not have a clear advantage in the number or type of artillery.
- The Russians are now using more mobilized reserve forces and TD brigades.
- To this point only a few SPF (SF) troops, and the 13th assault battalion (DPR) have been used with no verified VDV or other high quality troops being seen.
- On some assaults PT-76s and other out of date vehicles have been seen on the attack.
- Due to more air defense the Russian airforce has taken high losses around AVD.
- Russia is having to bring in north Korean rounds to make up for Russian stockpiles being exhausted. The NK rounds are known for being a danger to the crews using them now.
Ukraine has moved into the area 12 brigade sized units to defend the city
Thread: https://nitter.net/secretsqrl123/status/1728615103182897188#m
Analysis by Tatarigami's group (AKHZ is the coke plant)
Thread: https://nitter.net/Tatarigami_UA/status/1728171185790443845#m
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1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:
We know for sure Canada had nothing to do with that explosion. If it had, it would have already apologized for it and promised not to do it again. On the other hand, it is suspicious that Canada didn't apologize even though it had nothing to do with it. So maybe it was a double bluff?
Steve
Crash took place on the US side; first reports were erroneous.
It seems a lumber store owner and his wife were casino hopping before heading up to a KISS show in Toronto, and either their $300k Bentley went haywire, or the driver did. Car went airborne and hit a security barrier before they could do a Thelma & Louise into the gorge.
American Dream, up in smoke. Enjoy it while you got it. RIP.
5 minutes ago, sburke said:it is a long weekend here.
"God wouldn't ruin the best game of my life!"
Black Friday is global now.
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted · Edited by LongLeftFlank
Big if true, but aware that I am citing just one (aggregator) source here, will try to find corroboration elsewhere. But Teplinski is a paratrooper, and VDV is his go to, as they have been since the start of the war.
...And maybe you heard it here first, but if pushed to extremis, VDV might also become the next Wagner! They've never been totally in the Stavka chain of command -- that's by design from Khrushchev's day -- and they control the Tula-Ryazan and Ivanovo logistical hubs either side of Moscow. Plus Pskov, which sits in the Novgorod lakes region, adjacent to both the Baltics and Petersburg.
At what point do Teplinski and the sailor shirt lads (Spetsnaz, PMCs, GRU) start wondering why they have been shedding buckets of blood to shore up Putin's aging KGB alumni association and the Petersburg mafiyas, plus the bloody heathen Chechens? They've got their own mafiyas, btw.
There are more things on heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamed of in your Deep Battle doctrine.