LongLeftFlank
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Posts posted by LongLeftFlank
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17 hours ago, Haiduk said:
Statistic of issued videos of Russian FPV strikes from June 2022 to September 2023 from LostArmor.
UKR soldiers also say as Russian artillery is degrading, main threat now is becoming Russian FPV and Lancets.... Russian are still increasing production of FPV drones, they have state program of producing and operators training.... But how much we can produce, it's a question.
Many of volunteers afraid we can lost a racing with Russia in FPV-building. Russia still gets free all components not only for commercial-type drones, but also for Lancets, using US, Germany, Japan and Switzerland electronic, engines etc.
Kamil Galeev has been beating the drums on the importance of cutting Russia off from its longtime electronics suppliers *and* advanced tooling OEMs in the West since early in the war:
When it comes to Russia/China, I feel that US analysts may:
1. Overestimate their capabilities. Especially at the high end
2. Underestimate their capacities. Especially at the low end
They can produce terrifying amounts of "dumb" stuff e.g. artillery shells, while struggling with sophisticated products
....Another thing to consider is that:
1. Subtractive (cutting) operations were absolutely revolutionised in recent decades
2. Pressing/forging - not so much
-> While dependency [on foreign suppliers] in (1) is nearly absolute, in (2) there is a far greater degree of self-sufficiency. Not that you should make artillery shells on mid-20th c equipment. But you can.
With missiles it is very different. It is mostly machining and machining depends upon the modern CNC machines -> chokepoint.
[Even if] there's a Chinese multi-axis machine in a Russian military plant, it will be almost certainly equipped with Fanuc/Siemens controller.... It is necessary to make Western machine tool producers stop support and maintenance of their machines in Russia.
...When envisioning an American decision maker, you can safely assume she or he is getting:
1) Lots of reports on [Russian sources of] microelectronics
2) Hardly anything on any other defence related industry, including machinery
Most [in DC] genuinely don't have any idea and think it's all about microchips... But quite a few in Brussels do
He goes into a lot of further detail on this if you read back into his feed. Also this, but no need to subscribe unless you want to support KG, the meat of it is in his feed:
https://kamilkazani.substack.com/p/who-produces-machine-tools
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This thread also touches on the forum comments earlier re Adam Tooze's take on Russian economic conditions, based on macro data.
Is ZARA operating in Russia or not? is largely irrelevant
But if Trumpf could stop maintenance and support of their machines in the Russian military plants, that would be nice.
The most critical markets are often small -> you won’t even notice them in the aggregate figures
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7 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:
The short is Kadyrov's rule is that of a clan so one of his sons will take over and, likely, things will go on as they have been. But a transition like this with so much stress and higher than usual stakes... we might need to get some popcorn.
Steve
yeah, hohols are trembling in fear right now.
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1 minute ago, billbindc said:
Tooze is acceptable.
Not as much fun as Ed Luttwak at parties though (and that's no disrespect to the good fellowship of either gent).
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1 hour ago, The_Capt said:
Gawd, I hate all economist. A quick internet search and one can get the full spectrum of “Russian economy is doin fine” to “It is collapsing right now.”
I guess the thing I worry about in all this is where are people getting the data from? Objective numbers on the Russian economy appear hard to find. The rest are supplied by Russia. For example, how much is Russia spending on this war a la GDP? Well that number is not going to come from an outside audit. It is going to come from Russian sources. And Russian sources are notoriously full of crap. If I was in Russian leadership I would want nothing more than to project an ability to outlast Heaven and Hell themselves in this war.
We can get objective reality data - exchange rate of ruble, imports and exports. But any internal metrics are going to be heavily skewed by Russian information ops.
The economic end of this war is like everything else as far as I can tell…we will know when it happens.
...I suppose the general idea is that we must regretfully put a Russian Home Front Collapse (((((Dolchstosslegende)))) in the 'nice to hope for, and not entirely outside the realm of the possible, but I wouldn't bet on it', category of causative dei ex machini for an early cease fire. Until it happens, sure.
Adam Tooze is pretty sound; no particular ideological brief I can discern in a decade of reading him, and his historical work on Weimar/pre-WW2 Germany political economy alone makes his views on these topics well worth considering... IMHO. But sure, he has no better direct line to Gawd than any of us mortals. YMMV.
@billbindc (our go-to for the Permanent Establishment Party line
) Tooze is fair dinkum by you, amirite?
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On 9/13/2023 at 10:24 AM, LongLeftFlank said:
https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/chartbook-236-russias-long-war-economy
Adam Tooze, from late August. Not optimistic about likelihood of Russian economic collapse.
Setting aside the economist-speak, key points:
- Emigration and mobilisation may have cost the Russian workforce c.2% of male workers aged 20-49.... [Up to] 10% of the high tech workforce left Russia in 2022.
- Unlike Ukraine, Russia is running nothing like a total war economy.... [RU military spending] might be in the ballpark of US spending during the Vietnam war, at around 9-10% of GDP. This spending has provided a boost to some industrial sectors.
- The deficit in 2022-2023 of 2% of GDP is a large stimulus but far short of the kind of deficit that would trigger hyperinflation and a currency collapse. Kremlin policymakers still have measures available to sustain the militarised economy. Their planning cooly estimates the probability of rising unemployment and losses of real income.
- The war in Ukraine is woven into the fabric of public life in Russia....
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Great stuff mate!
One small mapping point: unlike WW2 Europe, power or phone poles in rural 1950 Korea would be quite rare except along rail lines, or in the immediate area of (largely coastal) industrial cities, or in the North connecting hydroelectric dams to cities.
https://photius.com/countries/korea_north/economy/korea_north_economy_korea_under_the_japa~119.html
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1 hour ago, akd said:
This is 100% not a Martian colonization thread. No, wait, 1000% not.
S̶a̶i̶l̶o̶r̶s̶ Warriors fighting in the dance hall
Oh man, look at those c̶a̶v̶e̶m̶e̶n̶ grognards go
It's the freakiest show
Take a look at the lawman
Beating up t̶h̶e̶ ̶w̶r̶o̶n̶g̶ ̶g̶u̶y̶ ̶ KevinKin
Oh man, wonder if he'll ever know
He's in the best selling show
I̶s̶ ̶t̶h̶e̶r̶e̶ ̶l̶i̶f̶e̶ ̶ ̶ Are there panzers on Mars? -
Tangentially OT, but I bought and played CM:Touch briefly in 2015, and liked it for its CM1 QB-like ease of play.
The scale (map size, AFV count and smallish fire teams) is actually pretty close to a lot of the tactical actions we see here in UKR.
Any chance of doing a quick makeover for Black Sea?
BMPs for tanks, APCs for HTs, add mines, quicker arty response, longer range ATW, thumb up the fatigue thresholds so infantry can't dash around so much over long distances.
...Could make a useful training aid too, for small unit leaders to practice the basics of recce, moving to contact, suppression and envelopment. Less of a learning curve than the full CM.
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1 hour ago, The_Capt said:
we are reduced to Taylor Swift in trying to explain the levels of dysfunction within the Russian power hierarchy.
There is nothing Taylor can't explain about like, anything.
https://defector.com/you-must-understand-that-taylor-swift-knows-me-better-than-anyone-else-on-earth
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The Russians (probably even their command, who could know better if they had any interest in doing so) and their apologists in the West are also proceeding from an rather different set of 'facts', or assumptions than the people on this board:
In their looking glass version, it is Ukraine that is rapidly running out of capable troops, particularly infantry.
- ALLEGEDLY, UA leadership (officers and NCOs) was more or less wiped out over 2022, especially in the Bahmut 'grinder'. The UA are putting unwilling, ill-trained and ill-led noobs into the field, particularly non-Ukrainians.
- ALLEGEDLY, on some fronts these troops are being forcibly kept in the field by nAzov fanatics, Mansoor Chechens and skinhead mercenaries (primarily Poles).
- ALLEGEDLY, several million bourgeois Ukrainians have fled overseas or bribed their way out of serving. 'NATO's proxy war' is extremely unpopular among Ukrainians under 30 across all demographics.
- ALLEGEDLY the Ukrainian domestic economy, which is run by (largely Jewish) oligarchs living outside the country, has never fully mobilised for war except inasmuch as it can profiteer off it.
- In any case, 'so-called Ukraine's' economy, infrastructure and society can never function separately from Greater Russia without being entirely rebuilt, ground up, and that's allegedly impossible under wartime conditions. The entire project is a scam, or at best a NATO-fed delusion dreamed up in London by, well (((((the usual suspects)))).
- ALLEGEDLY, since so-called Ukraine cannot sustain it, since 2008 UA is basically a NATO construct and puppet force, entirely dependent on NATO/NGO stocks and direction. These are now rapidly running down owing to poor discipline, wastage and pilferage.
- ALLEGEDLY, Western military organisation, experience and doctrine is ill-suited to fighting against the Russian army, and the hohols only do ok when they ignore it and fight in the Cossack (Russian) way. Giving them first line Western kit is actually an act of desperation; there is little else to send now.
- ALLEGEDLY, any quality edge the hohols might have enjoyed in 2022 in terms of drones, night vision, missiles, ISR, etc., is now largely closed and Ukrainian troops are now the ones getting trench bombed. China, being the world's workshop and wanting NATO to lose, is quietly providing huge quantities of pretty much anything Russia can't make itself.
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Again, all these points are 95% false, so don't even bother to refute them or pretend I am advocating them.
But negatives are by their nature (and by design) quite difficult to disprove, and there's enough 'supportive' anecdotes out there for people like McGregor and Big Serge to wave about, along with a bunch of handwavy 'you know nothing, bourgeois Western fools!' historical pseudo-analogues (Kursk, etc.).
....Since holding a different view of the world is impossible -- as others pointed out above -- the Russians choose to believe the above 'facts'.
And while folks like Rybar or Girkhin may admit Red Army performance in the SMO has also been weak, under their chosen set of facts, it's now merely a matter of bringing their 3x weight advantage fully to bear, and holding on before NATO's puppets, wait for it....
Collapse.
Like I said, don't bother to beat up this straw man. The point is, they can 'find' their own facts if they choose to, and have done so.
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33 minutes ago, billbindc said:
Edward Luttvak was yattering on about this topic over the weekend and taking exactly the wrong conclusion...which he claimed to be that since Russia was convinced it couldn't lose then it wouldn't. There *is* a mismatch between the sides in that Ukraine and the West are making reasonable cost/benefit analyses of the situation (even when we disagree with them) while Russia isn't really doing cost/benefit analysis at all. And the idea falls apart when you look at what it would look like if Russia "won". It would still be a high sanctioned pariah state with heavily armed neighbors watching it like a hawk, a permanent externally supported insurgency and a resource extraction economy reliant on an entirely cynical dictatorship that covets Russian territory in Far East.
Where folks like Luttvak (who for the moment let's pretend isn't just being a controversialist/opportunist/clown) don't understand is that Russian intransigence and/or inability face reality is simply a function of time and resources. Russia has been steadily losing this fight since about 6 weeks after it began. It's *already* had an almost successful coup attempt designed to reverse the trend. A third to a half of Russian war related industries are understaffed because more than a million younger Russians would rather try to eke it out in Tbilisi than serve in the war. Conscription has already been enacted multiple times because average Russians don't want to fight this war. The ruble is once again losing traction and reserves are going in the wrong direction.
So while it's tempting to say "the Russian's won't quit", there is every indication that they *are* quitting the war...and losing...already.
Lol, I was going to wind you up (again) by posting his latest tweets (he's still pushing the idea of this Russian -- now Wagner -- "outta nowhere" right hook through the Pripet marshes to sever the Uke supply lines at Lviv!), but abstained.
But I tell you, the man is great fun at parties.
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43 minutes ago, Bearstronaut said:
"A Elbereth! Gilthoniel!"
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2 hours ago, Eddy said:
Latest article from Kofman and Lee in War on the Rocks.
Perseverance and Adaptation: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Three months In - War on the Rocks
Well worth the read, although it's long.
The Ukrainian military continues to struggle with scaling offensive operations, and conducting combined arms operations at the battalion level and above, with most attacks being at the level of a platoon or company....
Western official criticism that Ukraine won’t mass forces, and accept the inherent casualties in such an assault, fails to appreciate the real constraints on that military’s capacity to employ forces at scale. The United States has been misinterpreting this as a failure to commit forces to the offensive.
Given the challenges the new brigades faced at the beginning, brigade assaults with multiple battalions instead of companies likely would have exacerbated coordination issues and led to greater losses.
Ukrainian forces prefer sequenced assaults, making fires the decisive element and exploiting with maneuver, less so using fires as a supporting component of a maneuver force.
These much criticized 'company scale' actions aren't exactly pinpricks and seem to me well-suited to the fragmented combat environment and to the limited support/resupply/medevac capabilities of the UA. Kind of like Normandy, as others have noted, where even divisional attacks break up rapidly into smaller close actions encompassing 1 or 2 fields. Not much situational awareness of what's happening in the next hedgerow.
Also, they don't seem to wind down because the Russians reinforce and then outnumber the attackers. The 'scenarios' basically end once the enemy guns find the range.
In sum, this just doesn't seem to be a 'run the enemy out of reserves and then break through' kind of fight. At least not tactically.
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https://kyivindependent.com/isw-russian-operations-limited-by-lack-of-infantry/
Quotes the 28 Aug ISW:
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2023
The Russian military command has consistently relied on VDV formations as both an offensive and a defensive force and they are likely degraded from their high operational tempo. The degradation of these forces will likely weaken Russia’s ability to sustain complex defensive operations and almost certainly disrupt any Russian intent to resume offensive operations at scale.
As I recall, more important than any 'elite' status, VDV battalions were also organisationally better suited for the battlefield conditions of this particular war than the infantry-poor and roadbound BTGs of the regular Russian army.
At this point, is the remaining VDV cadre able to integrate and command an influx of mobiks and Central Asian migrants with limited Russian language? Or do these guys just more hapless trench jockeys in sailor shirts? perhaps with a slightly higher priority for kit and resupply (I think the commander of the VDV is also still commanding all the ground forces in Ukraine now?). If the trucks can get there of course.
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Two-thirds of Ukrainian soldiers die from blood loss.... ‘You have to drag a person with your hands approximately three to five kilometres. You can’t drive there even in armoured vehicles because of the heavy shellings and mines.’
Medics, she says, try to avoid using the official first aid supplies issued to them, because of the admin that is involved.... Why should Ukraine ask for more medical equipment, when officially the shortage doesn’t really exist?
To allow for one medic for every 30 soldiers, Ukraine needs to train at least 15,000 combat medics.
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In Kharkiv... a Soviet-era sanatorium converted into a rehabilitation centre for soldiers in need of psychological support.... This centre, one of five around the country, caters for 100 soldiers at a time, with a programme containing elements ranging from aromatherapy and swimming through to individual and group therapy sessions – we visited one session discussing what to do when your buddy freezes with fear on the frontline....
Soldiers arrived feeling “moral, mental and physical exhaustion,” he said, with sleep problems the most common symptom, worsened by lack of rotations from the frontline. But Ukraine needs troops and 90% are sent back to the battlefield.
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22 minutes ago, fireship4 said:
yes cheers, bookmarked, but in my experience it often doesn't capture the latest threads or posts.
EDIT: Ah, ok, you need to enter the full handle of the author (e.g. Tatarigami_UA) to bring up the full feed. I'm not great at this stuff; other oldsters here may be in the same boat.
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6 hours ago, Eddy said:
Bloody hell! If you can, it's worth reading the whole thread as there is images embedded. Suffice it to say, the whole idea that the Ukrainians would succeed if only they did it the NATO way is questionable (i.e. bollocks). This would appear to be a tough nut to crack.
"Translation:
Much has been written about the battles in the South. I wouldn't say that this is the case where it's better to see once (or multiple times) than to hear/read about it many times. Especially through the eyes of the frontline units. A thread about battles from the perspective of aerial reconnaissance:
Environment. Steppe. Fields, tree lines. Slight elevations and dips, villages, small rivers. Minefields. Whoever you may be, an armored assault group, evacuation team, aerial or infantry reconnaissance, your movement is visible from afar. The enemy has long been preparing.
Equipment and personnel can be spotted from a distance and targeted. Both sides understand that there are limited places for positions and deployment. Most likely, there's something to shoot at in almost every tree line. Confirmation is needed, of course. Primarily, it's necessary to determine the priority of the target
There's a limited number of access roads, logistical routes. Everything's been calibrated and fired upon repeatedly every day. You certainly can be spotted. Carrying out the mission while maintaining complete concealment from the enemy is mostly impossible
There has been a great deal of talk about fortifications and minefields. Every tree line has been dug up. On one stretch of the Mariupol highway, anti-tank fortifications have been installed. We're not just talking about trenches. There's an entire system of trenches, dugouts, and even undeground tunnels in some places
In each tree line, there's a network of trenches and firing positions for various weapons. AGS, DShK, ATGMs. Anti-tank ditches and mine obstacles stretch across the fields. From regular TM and POM mines to more "sophisticated" ones, all lying in wait for infantry.
Once again, it's crucial to emphasize that we're specifically discussing a system of trenches, interconnected by passageways and pathways. These pathways facilitate the movement of personnel, weaponry, and ammunition. As for what remains unexcavated, it's mined. All of this must be navigated to make progress forward.
For those who are "overly smart" and believe that the Ukrainian Armed Forces took an incredibly long time to drive the Russians out of the village of Robotyne, they must have missed the defense system that needed to be overcome in order to push the russians away from the Mariupol highway and gradually approach the village, encircle it, and finally seize control. Truly, a monumental task has been accomplished.
The russians are establishing firing points (AGS, heavy machine guns), and they mine the routes to them. They themselves move along designated paths. Our positions in the liberated territory are surrounded by mines and tripwires. Paths are cleared for ingress, and sappers gradually clear the area.Frequently, the hidden "surprises" detonate during shelling, triggered by fires that start due to the shelling (weeds, shrubs, and trees catch fire, setting off tripwires). At times, we ourselves discover and call in sappers to clear specific areas.
There's much talk about armored vehicle losses, but the issue of initial setbacks is overlooked. In the long run, it's impossible to entirely avoid armor losses, even due to the enemy's advantage in the air. However, armor serves a specific purpose that entails risks.
There's much talk about armored vehicle losses, I'll skip the topic of initial setbacks. In the long run, it's impossible to entirely avoid armor losses, especially due to the enemy's advantage in the air. However, armor serves a specific purpose that entails risks.
These actions are justified by the fact that they save lives. I spoke with a soldier who survived two direct hits on a Bradley during shelling. Even the most critically damaged equipment is recovered and taken for repairs. You can replace a piece of metal, even if it's expensive, but you can't repair a human life
Enemy ATGM operators position cameras in advance of their positions. This way, they can spot targets (all types of vehicles) in advance and engage them effectively. If successful, artillery finishes off the targets. Alternatively, they might start with air force, followed by artillery.
They hunt for evacuation teams – both vehicles and stations. Right under our noses, they hit an armored vehicle, and an evacuation vehicle arrived for the guys. They had to maneuver in a tight spot, moving very slowly on a narrow road, avoiding going off-road into a mined field. Taking risks as well. Fortunately, they managed to get them out.
KAB's are one of the biggest fears. The russians use them extensively. I can't speak to their accuracy, but the weaponry is powerful. They attempt to target logistics and command centers, just as we do. They don't hesitate to simply fire on roads. Forward defenses in settlements are constantly under shelling.
The aerial reconnaissance linked system Orlan-Zala-Supercam is effective and causing issues. They identify targets and launch Lances, releasing them in swarms along with KAB's. They attempt to break through and hunt down vehicles.
The recaptured positions are even more calibrated. Bombs are not spared. No lack of mines either. The tree line where one of the crews was operating was simply leveled. Only a palisade remained, and a well-made trench ceased to be usable.
The russians use a standard tactic for their armor. The route to the firing position is determined, usually in a way that keeps the vehicles under visual cover of the tree lines and eventually positions them in an open space for shooting. They quickly expend their ammunition and retreat
Vehicle cannot be completely concealed. Dust clouds are visible during movement, and the vehicles can be seen shifting between tree lines, while drones provide visibility as well. The main task here is to execute the firing mission quickly enough to prevent artillery targeting or counterattacks using FPV or ATGMs.
I understand why the russians are intensively butthurt due to the loss of the village with six streets. They put in significant effort to prevent the Ukrainian Armed Forces from advancing. Defending is easier according to all norms. On the other hand, we're putting in a tremendous effort to break through. And when we succeed, it shows that our efforts are paying off
Thank you for your attention. I might continue sharing in the future."
Many thanks to you, @The_MonkeyKing and others here for providing reports on the on-the-ground military situation and tactical dynamics.
I don't do Xwitter ever since Musk made it nonnavigable for nonsubscribers, so threadreaders or copypastes of key points and graphics are greatly appreciated!
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55 minutes ago, Eddy said:
Autumn Approaches: Part 1 - Reports by The Lookout (substack.com)
The most important single factor here is that the Ukrainians struggle to conduct operations at scale. The largest we have seen are battalion attacks, but mostly there has been company- to platoon level operations. This means that the offensive mostly has been a series of individual actions the Russians can respond adequately to.
On the positive side, the Ukrainians have increased the efficiency of their counter battery work, putting real pressure on Russian artillery.... Russian ammo shortages, especially compared to last year, are real, but Russian artillery remains remains very much in the fight.
Russian forces in the south have also been fighting according doctrine, in contrast to elsewhere, earlier in the war. They have a lethal mixture of ISR, ATGMs, aviation (especially rotary wing) and artillery. This, in combination with fortifications, mines and wide open terrain, negates many of the often talked about Russian deficiencies. They have also been able to rotate companies and battalions, an important measure for coping with attrition.
Except for the transfer of the 7th Guards Air Assault Division, there has been no significant transfers from other sectors.
Many have ridiculed the fortifications since the Russians started digging last fall, but fortifications are- and have repeatedly been proven effective in this war.
Good stuff, assuming this is factually accurate. Key quotes above.
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4 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:
Good reading to refresh: https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1655584386601951238.html
Ukraine is now reaching zone3
"Zone 4: Prepared main defensive line. Massive multilayered trench lines with anti-tank ditches and dragons’ teeth obstacles. Extensive minefields are likely. These fortifications form nearly uniformly continuous defensive belt across the front. Built 3-4km deep."
This thread is *really* good, many thanks. Design material here.
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34 minutes ago, paxromana said:
Or maybe it's the Red Queen? believing many impossible things before brekkie?
Can you all take this North Africa DAK red herring to another thread, s.v.p.?
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4 hours ago, kimbosbread said:
Oh yeah, fantastic, get the US to ramp up weapons production, get the US an ally with tons of experience with cheapo drones land and sea…
Winnie the Flu isn’t the brightest bear on the block, but I don’t think any of this was anticipated, and the CCP is now trying to figure out how to balance their desire to be a super power with the desire to not be associated with Russia and with their brewing economic and demographic issues. Being saddled with Russia in a forever war with the west, which by the way has ramped up production of weapons that are cheap and fast and effective, and iterating hard, and might provide a way to take out China’s ships in the South China Sea and go through their air defenses???
I can’t believe China would of its own free will give the US a laboratory on how to negate both ships and missiles and missile defences in a restricted body of water (and with allies who can make the requisite munitions on a budget). They can’t be that dumb, can they?
China wants to secure undisputed hegemony over all of the former USSR east of the Urals (i.e. Asian Russia and the Stans). I would too, if I were Chinese btw. The resources of these lands are infinitely more valuable than the South China sea floor, and their de facto control by China would enhance its (resumed) status as an economic superpower.
Even anticommunist Chinese patriots view Russian control of these lands and peoples as yet another unfortunate and accident accident of history, which they generally blame on the Chinese Empire being undermined by perfidious European colonialist incursion starting in the mid 1700s. The reality though is that the Qing / Manchu dynasty, being preoccupied with its own power struggles within China plus the deeply conservative nature of Confucianism, bears most of the blame for its "century (or two) of humiliation". However, as with most of history the picture is mixed. The Western capitalist/colonial powers were indeed predatory, but also innovative (see article) in a way that Chinese civilization simply could not match at that time (Chinese people absolutely could, but mostly had to get out of China!).
Anyhoo, tying it all back together, regardless of who is in charge in Moscow, Russia must eventually realign in some way with Europe (and presumably the Anglosphere). The only alternative for them (and the West) is to accept Chinese suzerainty over all these lands, on terms more or less dictated by Beijing.*
I am talking about the rest of this century, not the next decade; the Russians can clearly live in denial for some time.
* Unless of course Xi does something stupid that sets China back a century again.
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7 hours ago, kohlenklau said:
Korean surnames successfully showing.
I am downloading the Pacific Mod to see what I might utilize (with credit to original team).
It's a mod for CMBN... giant unsplittable Italian squads made no tactical sense at all for the IJA (unless they're fighting in China), so I used Polish troops. Go ahead and use whatever you can with my blessing, although I don't know if the textures still fit the wireframes.
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6 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
The obstacle dynamic is interesting. Minefields are supposed to be useless unless “covered”. What appears to have changed is what it takes to “cover” a given obstacle. It used to be dug in troop organizations, now it is UAS and ATGMs linked to artillery. So the bill for effective coverage has gone down significantly.
This is all starting to add up to the blindingly obvious - this is not a shift to Defence Primacy, it is a shift to Denial Primacy. We have been seeing denial in the air and on land (now projected onto the sea). Denial effectively raises the cost of action to a level that is unsustainable. One does not “hold ground” one simply makes the cost per foot too high. We appear to be entering into an age of denial. Closely linked to corrosive warfare concepts as Denial essentially is very expensive friction, the question remains whether or not the UA can overcome and project its own level of friction back onto the RA at a rate higher than the RA can sustain.
It has been a summer of slow grinding and not many signs of success but remember the metrics are not territory as much as they are systemic erosion. Which side is eroding faster?
So what's 'projecting friction' likely to mean at this particular point that could lower the blood price of slogging through the mine belts?
...Russian C4ISR has been 'stressed' at multiple points for over a year now. It could still collapse, sure, but it hasn't yet. Their gunners haven't run out of tubes or ammo, or not systematically. The trains and trucks are still delivering adequate materiel, it seems.
Knocking down enemy quadcopters is hard for squaddies. And the operators are hard to locate.
What's the friction point(s) these days?
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
7 years of coaching rowing taught me that there's NO form of marine damage (usually novices running the boat into/dropping the boat on the dock) that can't be fixed up with duct tape (preferably black).
...My trademark was to assemble scraps into a little Grim Reaper, mounted above the bow ball of the most decrepit shell.