jasoncawley@ameritech.net

Guns are hiding until someone hits their ambush marker, or until there are so many fine targets they all open up. Hiding is their normal state. Some light guns, meant to dust scout type armor (e.g. German 20mm FLAK), are the only exceptions. I don't mind if they get discovered, since their #1 purpose is to prevent scout vehicles from discovering the heavier guns. Tanks hide when behind buildings, hills, or clumps of trees, if they aren't moving that turn, simply to reduce the enemy's chance of sound contacts. If a tank is operating in a village or behind a ridgeline, I usually try to pause a turn on hide after a change of positions, before popping out again into LOS (between buildings, over the crest) - if there is time, obviously. But I do not sacrifice speed for stealth - if I have reasons to move a tank now, then it moves.

Still as snide and hopeless as ever I see...

The variability in MG effectiveness in combat, is probably greater than in CM, but also probably greater than most who would like to see effectiveness revised upward, may expect. The main reason is simply the difficulty of seeing anything in combat, especially when pinned to the ground. In most terrain, the view from 4-6 inches height is not exactly stadium-esque. Firing a bipod gun while prone and being shot at, that is about what you'd get. A lot of the firing would be blind because of it, even with a #2 to load or spot. In my opinion, CM is not far wrong in making LMGs and the squad SAWs on their own, not too formidable because of this. But the variance was probably higher than in CM - sometimes one gun would get "hot" in another sense of the term, and dominate a little firefight for 3-5 minutes. Because the gunner just happened to be able to see each of the guys that moved, and didn't get shot himself, etc. Put a gun on a tripod with a bigger crew, nice and safe in a building with wide fields of fire, and stone or brick cover even well up off the ground and thus able to see things, and I bet the effectiveness was a darn sight better than it is in CM. For those who had no choice but to come through its LOS, that is. How to model all of the above? It is not obvious. I mentioned that I would like to see cover give less of a benefit to moving troops, on another thread. Someone replied that MGs were more likely to fire often against troops moving in the open as of some revision. Not exactly the same thing. I'd like to see the %exposed numbers up north of 50% for anybody running (in LOS, of course). Right now, it is too easy to get through their range "envelope" if there is any kind of cover, without slowing down appreciably. To simulate "hot" guns and also the effects of spotting problems, mebe the ROF should vary with some randomness, crew quality, and type of cover the shooter is in (building good, woods poor, over a wall good, foxhole in brush poor, etc). So sometimes a machinegun team would shoot 1-3 extra times in a turn, but often like now or one time fewer.

Someone wanted actual figures for the size of the reserves, which I didn't give before. The total reserve force is 865,000. 353,000 Army National Guard, 207,000 Army Reserve, 106,000 Air National Guard, 86,000 Naval Reserve, and 40,000 Marine Reserve. So that puts the whole force at 2,234,000 active and reserve. The portion of the total population that comes to, is 1 out of 125, or expressed as a portion of those employed, 1 out of 60. [This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 03-29-2001).]

To Gregory Detch - well, I gave 13, not your 11 nor your hypothetical 15. I didn't count division HQs, I counted brigades. But whatever, the total manpower figures are there, and the OOB is on the link for anyone who wants to quibble about how to count them. I take it your meaning is, some of the brigades aren't at full strength? I'm sure that is true. A lot of tail per bit of teeth, though, to get just 11 divisions out of 474,000 soldiers.

http://www.defenselink.mil/ Average length of initial enlistment is 4 years active, 4 years reserve duty. 50% of enlisted men re-enlist after such a term, except in the Marine Corps, where there are more volunteers than slots, and only 25% get a re-enlist "berth". For officers, the length is 6 years and the same 50% portion "re-up" after each. The Air Force only gets about 95% of the re-enlisters it wants, and there are shortages in certain specialties - e.g. computer technicians, linguists - in high civilian demand. As for the educational level, of course the officers are college grads, the enlisted are high school grads, 3/8ths with some college. The portion of the enlisted scoring above national averages on standardized tests is 66% - bit lower in the Army and Army reserve, higher in the Air Force, as you'd expect. None of the above shows any marked change in the last few years. The force is smaller, the op-tempo higher, than ten years ago, of course. Which means the people there are doing a harder job. And there is more wacky political silliness going on, even than usual from such a huge bureaucracy, again compared to 10 years ago (but not to 20 or 30, when it was much worse). Oops. I did it *again*. I answered a direct question, and I cited *numbers*. Arrrgg. The litte buggers are *everywhere*. Will the plague never end? - LOL.

Active duty personnel as of February was 1,369,000. That breaks out 474,000 Army, 171,000 Marines, 368,000 Navy, and 355,000 Air Force. The Guard and Reserves provide added depth, on roughly the same scale or a bit less - not too many Marine or navy reservists, though, compared to Air and Army. If you want a detailed order of battle, by units, you can find it here - http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/9059/usaob.html If you want a synopsis, summing up all the info on that page, it is about as follows. The Army has the equivalent of about 7 heavy divisions, active, plus 6 more light, active, if you count the independent regiments and brigades etc. About the same amount again in the Guard and reserves, with an 7-4 breakdown heavy vs. light. "Light" means airborne, air assault, mountain, light, etc. Heavy means armor and mech. The army also has numerous independent artillery brigades (for corps and army level, etc) in addition to the divisional artillery of the above forces, 4-5 divisions worth active and slightly less, on top of that, in reserve. In addition, the Marines have about 4 divisions worth active and 1 in reserve, counting all the smaller units. Medium in weight, with APCs and some tanks, but not as much mechanized firepower as the Army heavy divisions. The air force has 5 heavy bomber wings (B-2, 2 each B-1 and B-52) and 2 light ones (F-117, a second mixed w/ some A-10), plus 2 heavy bomber wings in reserve (B-1), along with 8 A-10 wings also in reserve. On the fighter side, there are 28 active wings and 24 in the Guard and reserve. The active fighter wings are split about 40-60 F-15 vs. F-16, while most of the reserve is F-16. The air force also runs the Minuteman missle force. The marines also have their own planes of course, and the Navy has 12 carriers, an overkill or three of SSBNs (missle subs), and numerous surface escort groups and SSNs (attack subs). The army and marines both have flocks of choppers too. Lots of training commands, support, airlift, etc, in addition to those main forces. As for deployment, there are forces in the continental U.S., Alaska and Hawaii, Japan, Okinawa, Korea, Guam, Diego Garcia, Kuwait, Turkey, Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia, Italy, Germany, Britain, Cuba - "and all the ships at sea".

On the explosives, the other fellow's link gives figures for detonation velocity of the 80/20 mixture. I ran across another figure of 3500 m/sec for 60/40 mixture, which seems to me consistent with his figure. That gives 71% or 1/(2)^.5 the detonation velocity to 80/20 vs. straight TNT, and ~50% of that ^2 to the 60/40 mixture. That is (all numbers approximate) - detonation velocity ~7000 m/sec for TNT, ~5000 m/sec for 80/20 amatol, ~3500 m/sec for 60/40 amatol, ~2500 m/sec for AN. (Note that modern specialised ANs used in mining, with attention to crystal structure and what-not, can burn better than this - I am going by the other fellow's link with its 80/20 "almost twice" AN comment). The explosive effect would be somewhere between linear in total charge weight, and linear in detonation velocity, I would expect. So, around 85% effectiveness for the same weight would make sense for 80/20 amatol, while around 70% effectiveness for the same weight would make sense with 60/40 amatol. Obviously this is rough, but it will not be far off. Going by blast velocity alone would make the mixtures too poor, while going by weight alone would make them too strong. The above figures are the geometric mean of the two. Whatever error that estimate might involve is likely to be smaller than the error for either "endpoint" (by weight alone, by velocity alone), so the probably error range on the estimate, might be 5-10% (absolute figure - i.e. 80-90 for the 80/20 mix, 60-80 for the 60/40 mix). The moral is still that the filler difference is not a minor matter. It is a large scale adjustment, comparable to the range of filler weights. As for the weight of HE filler in the German HE shells for 75mm, I continue to have my doubts about the rounds used. You and others have in the past cited some shells with up to 860g filler, and I believe such 75mm HE rounds were made. But other types have 454g filler for straight HE, while HEAT have 500-650g in various ammo types. The question of which rounds were most common remains, to me, very much an open one, and I am extremely skeptical of procedures that amount to taking the maximum HE load for any German 75mm shell that a gun could fire, and assuming that all HE shells fired by that gun were of that type. I call this "averaging up", and I think it leads to consistent overrating of actual performances available in the field. Unless I see shell production numbers that suggest the 454g HE was a temporary stop-gap item and tons and tons of the 860g HE were made, I will continue to regard the former, or an average of the two, as a more realistic measure of the HE effectiveness of German 75mm. Incidentally, on the comparison of U.S. 75mm HE with 105mm, I do not find the "fragments at 20 feet" measure a meaningful one. That is well inside the CZ for both shells on every estimate I have seen. The 200 foot figure is more meaningful, although at that distance the effectiveness of even the 105mm is likely to be low. But at 15, 20, 25 yards, I would expect a noticable edge for the 105mm. Basically, the 75mm is not comparable in effect a 105mm round, and the comparison of what happens at ranges so close that either is effective, doesn't manage to say otherwise. I don't know that this is any disagreement; I simply offer my sense of the data you and others have given.

To German Boy - "It is doubtless vain to parcel out the various contributions, but it would go something like this." "It is doubtless vain to parcel out the various contributions, but it would go something like this." "It is doubtless vain to parcel out the various contributions, but it would go something like this." Who said it? Did you teach it to me? Did MR. Dorsosh? How many times do I have to quote the qualifications I made before I even began the exercise, before you will acknowledge that I made them?

No sir, what upsets me most is that the entire thing is based on a complete fabrication, an imputed meaning or intent (to be exact, etc) that I explicitly denied in the very paragraph that set you and others off. You have been slandering me, but arguing against a straw position of your own contruction, despite repeated calls upon you (and others) to examine and react to what I actually said. This has been pointed out to you, several times, by others as well as by me. You haven't taken the slightest notice of any of them, and have persisted in the lie that I made claims of exactness I never made, which others acknowledge I never made, and which I have proved I never made. And I don't give a damn what you think of anything, because I consider you - to put it delicately - inclined to prevarication in your favor in the heat of debate - but I am interested that others see that I have not said, the things you persist in attributing to me, for your own rhetorical purposes. [This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 03-23-2001).]

Part of the reason the MGs have lower confirmed kills, is they do a higher portion of their hitting at range, where confirmation ismuch less likely. To the man with no name - part of the problem with pinning not being common enough, in my opinion, is an overrepresentation of "veterans" in CM battles, and an unrepresentation of "greens". Greens get pinned a lot more easily by ranged MG fire, and find it muhc harder to navigate. Personally, I wish the CM QB default made mixes of green and regular the standard option, instead of regular and vet. I find the vets too resilient for realism, when there are too many of them around. And their rapid responses to orders mask the excellent command-delay features and reduce the importance of all the command-control features of the game. The other issue I think is somewhat off, in a way that hurts MGs in CM compared to in reality, is the degree of protection offered by "concealment" type cover, to moving troops. Running through woods you get % exposed numbers around 25-30%, which cuts down the FP dramatically at medium ranges. If %exposed numbers were more closely tied to movement state, not just the type of terrain the men were in, then ranged fire would pin more than it does. You can tell this is going on, because the AI doesn't take so much care to avoid open ground, and it does get pinned by multiple MGs (as another fellow noted). But humans keep to the cover, and keep the dashes across the open short. Which is fine, they should. But they should not get quite the near-invunerability to ranged fire out of it, that is "on offer" in CM today. I'd like to see a system where the full benefits of cover were only available to stationary troops, with crawling and sneaking guys getting most of it, moving guys maybe half, and running guys only a modest edge. Then have the %exposed improve on a sort of delay-counter when a unit slows or stops - can vary that time by troop perhaps. I think this would give a much more realistic sense of the vunerability of movement, and why short halts, fire and movement etc were used. It would also make it rather tougher to just run close enough to defenders to evaporate them, counting on mere numbers to overwhelm the "foxhole advantage".

And thus those who started the whole thing in the first place, retire with one of the last possible arguments, that those they have assailed without basis, have been long-winded in defending themselves. Everyone is supposed to think I started it, when somebody else did. Everyone is supposed to think I made everything a matter of numbers, when somebody else made that the whole issue. The flame war is all the fault of the man flamed. Incidentally, I was told at the outset that my description of the battle was "spot on", and that even the disliked conclusion was "valid". It was only numbers that were objected to, and incidentally only 2 of them. I wrote 25 paragraphs on the battle of Stalingrad, and I mentioned the width to breath of the city, the length of time for various things to happen, several numerical descriptions of areas and distances, one numerical referrence to nutrition, and dozens of comparative "several", "large", "few", raised prices and lengthened times, extreme this and increasing that, none of which bothered anyone a bit. But horror of horrors, in 25 paragraphs of narrative, 2 of a dozen (that's 12) numbers offered, did not make sense to some of our dear readers. Therefore, I supposedly leave all the human history out of war and waste everyone's time with stale numbers, while those who start useless flamewars over that exact subject and keep on after it like energizer bunnies, are poets and heroic martyrs to the human drama of war. You can tell, because they cared so much more for my narrative, than for the 2 numbers they didn't "grok". Right? [This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 03-23-2001).]

The Russian war-time light tank force and its development into the SU-76 was substantially the work of N.A. Astrov, who led the design team at No. 37 factory in Moscow. They had a little outside help on early SU-76 models. This factory, incidentally, was relocated to the Urals when the Germans neared the capital late in 1941. The basis for all the designs was a pre-war amphibious light tank design, the T-40, first designed in 1940, of which only ~200 were made, most during the war. The design team at No. 37 started the T-60 in July of 1941, less than a month after the invasion, and tanks were in action by December. The Podolsk machine works made the armored body, while the chassis were made in Gorki and at No. 138 factory, Kirov. No. 37, and No. 38-Kirov factories made the T-70, starting in January of 1942, with tanks in action by March. Several teams worked on the development of the Su-76. The T-70 modification first accepted was the work of the bureaus of Generals Petrov and Grabin, starting in October 1942, though the vehicle was not designated the SU-76 until December. Development was at No. 38 Kirov again, and at No. 92 Gorki. No. 38 also worked on the T-60 variant and built prototypes (OSU-76), but the T-70 version was preferred. Just 26 vehicles were produced by the end of 1942, so they were probably prototypes. Astrov's team at No. 37 designed the SU-76M variant, based on the T-70M model, and the other SU-76 prototypes. Production of that type began in May 1943, and 1,900 SU-76 of all makes were produced by year's end. By 1945, 12,600 SU-76s had been built. So they had a pre-war design to work off of, the T-40. Lead times were on the order of 3-8 months, and by the end of them substantial numbers of vehicles appeared rapidly, probably worked on in parallel. (E.g. T-60s produce in 1941, sources give 1800). Designs were initiated quite early - e.g. T-60 design after seeing German light tanks in action for 1 month. Then the same team made a 45mm version almost immediately after the first type had been fielded. The first Marders appeared in April 1942, the Marder II started in July. The Russians were designing the SU-76 by October of the same year, while full scale production was about 1 year after the Marders began. Overall, there were 6 factories involved, 1 main design team and a few supplimental ones for the early SUs. For comparison, the Czech model German chassis were produced by Skoda and CKD, while Pz IIs were made by Daimler-Benz, Henschel, Wegmann, Alkett, MIAG and FAMO, but only by FAMO still in the mid-war. Wespe were also made by FAMO, naturally enough. Marders were made by Alkett, Wegmann, FAMO, MAN, Daimler-Benz, and BMM of Prague. Hezters were made by BMM and Skoda. The Russian process was vastly more centralized. And the production numbers overall are higher by about a factor of four. They weren't playing a design war. They were perfectly willing to copy ideas and use whatever chassis came to hand. They were playing a production war. The result was 2-4 times as many items of comparable ability, 6-12 months after the Germans fielded something. In heavier AFVs there was more learning from and competing with each other both ways, with potentially more at stake in technical differences. In the lighter "utility" stuff, they just mimicked and implimented Zhukov's maxim - "quantity has a quality all its own". Russians ain't bad at chess either.

OK, some analysis on the question "can MGs ever be rushed? Doesn't the gun just shoot more and stop everybody?" Take the ROF of the MG as 1200, for the MG42. For other MG types it is lower, both in WW II and after, with ~450-900/minute more common. 20 rounds per second in other words, while 10 +/- a handful is common with other MG types. Now, imagine the MG gunner is using true "spray fire", sweeping the gun back and forth to cover a wide arc in front of his position. How slow do the sweeps have to be, to actually "stop everybody"? At 100 yards range, imagine the MG is sweeping a 60 degree arc, 30 degrees to either side of the "straight ahead" direction. Then the width he is sweeping across is 105 yards (1/6th of a circle radius 100 yards). If he needs 1 bullet every 2 feet side-to-side and his spread is perfect, then he need 158 bullets. Therefore the sweep must be slow enough that it takes 8 seconds to swing through that arc. But in 8 seconds, a man can run much of that 100 yard distance. Not all of it - world record times in the 100 meters on flat tracks are 9 seconds. As a rusher gets closer, he may leave the 60 degree front angle, to the sides. And presumably once he gets within grenade range, the MG is in trouble. Now consider the same sort of analysis, but at 50 yards, and imagine he needs a 45 degree angle to either side, that close. Then he must sweep 1/4 of a circle or 79 yards side to side, and needs 118 bullets. So now he needs a six second "swing" through the arc. That is a long time when there are enemy within one or two short rushes of grenade range (count it out). But also notice, that if he has targets at different ranges, the speed of the swing and the arc he has to traverse through are different. If the fire is grazing, so the bullets all carry out to longer range, the 6 second sweep through the 45 + 45 degree arc, will put out 120 bullets (obviously), which at 100 yards out will give only about "half coverage", ~ 4 feet between each bullet's flight path, side to side. If instead he traverses rapidly (e.g. to avoid a rush and hit-the-dirt on the side away from the current "spray", garden sprinkler fashion), then he is not going to put out a "wall" of bullets but only a random chance of hitting someone. Say he traverses 45+45 in 2 seconds, repeating the sweeps. At what range does this give a solid bullet-wall? 40 rounds, 80 feet of arc length, do the math, get 51 feet or 17 yards away. That is much closer than a grenade-lobber needs to be. Out at 30 yards, he's got perhaps a 57% hit chance. At 100 yards, spraying this fast the hit chance is only 17% (assuming "right 2 feet" equals a hit - since shots may be high or low or go through legs or by ears, not quite this high). What does this mean for a rush by a team or squad? With the above kind of spray, it would amount to 1/6 at 100 yards, 2/6 at 65 yards, 3/6 at 30 yards. Take 2 shots at 100, 2 shots at 65, 1 shot at 35 - 10 seconds of spraying all told, as the attackers run 65 yards. Then an individual man has a 16% chance of making it to grenade range. But the cominations then kick in, because a nearly 1/6 chance is not so bad a bet with 6 or 12 men trying. The chance that at least 1 out of a team of 6 makes it that far, is 64%. One out of a squad of 12, 87%. I am not suggesting this is what typically happens. Usually the attackers get pinned, meaning they find spots they will not be hit, in such sweeps or at all, and then they try short rushes to closer spots to throw grenades, or fail to move because they see the men that try, get hit. Morale and terrain work this way and that and something happens. The point is simply to show, that even a high ROF MG does not have the physically ability to erect an impenetrable bullet wall out to grenade range and beyond. It may have the *moral* ability to do so, because who wants to play Russian roulette with 5 chambers filled? But if a squad of men did, most likely one would get the empty chamber and KO the MG. Now you have some idea why they give medals to the guys that do this to help their buddies.

Incidentally, it is not like the HMG 42 doesn't have 3 times the firepower of an LMG 42 already in CM. As well as nearly 4 times the ammo load. So don't assume the greater rounds being put out by the tripod mount, isn't modeled - it is. In game mechanics terms you see four "shots", but each of them is coming from the same machinegun type, but doing 3 times the damage of an LMG "shot". So they are already firing "longer bursts". The game just resolves them as more powerful discrete shots - which is not unreasonable, since the longer bursts are hitting one area with more bullets.

Firing bipod mebe, Kwazy Dog. But firing tripod, the gunner isn't even looking at the target. The barrel is locked in place with a pin on the tripod, slightly loosened. He taps (slaps, more like) the side of the barrel with the palm of his hand to slightly traverse the gun. An NCO with a pair of binoculars watches the "fall of shot", and tells him which way to slap. When the range needs to be changes, a few twists more or less are dialed into the elevating screw on the tripod. The real issues are ammo consumption and heat, to a lesser extent barrel wear. An MG42 will run through a 100 round belt in about 4 seconds. You can link them one to another to make a continuous belt, certainly. If fired literally continuously, you would burn out the barrel in less than 3 minutes, assuming you didn't get a jam. Not just, "change it", but "exceeded service life in total rounds through barrel", burnt out. In intensive fire situations, MGs could indeed raise their firepower, sometimes enourmously, at some risk of jam or breakdown. And they sometimes did. How to handle it in game terms is a tougher question.

SS Panther and Pz IV - 5 tanks All Tigers, Heer Panthers and Pz IV - 4 tanks StuG & JdgPz - 3 tanks There were some formations still using 4 tanks in the StuG formations, but 3 vehicles per platoon was more common for them. There was also a difference above the platoon level. Some companies had 3 platoons (Tigers, StuGs, Jadgpanzers), others had 4 (Panther, Pz IV). Rare ones had 2 (Jadgtiger). Some battalions had 3 companies (Tigers, StuGs, Jadgpanzers), others had 4 (Panthers, Pz IV). Again Jadgtiger had 2. There was only a single command vehicle at the company level for the StuGs and Jadgpanzers, besides the ones in the platoons. But 2 command tanks at the company level for all the other types. And in certain minor formations the structure was different again. E.g. an independent panzer brigade had a different structure.

gunnergoz gave a good first pass. CM point limits will also keep you in the right ballpark in QBs. In scenarios, don't give more than 1/3rd of a side's points in artillery form. Part of the issue here is that artillery gets some of its power by intervening where it is needed, while letting other places "starve". And it can shift who is being supported quite rapidly, as a battle shifts to now this area hot, now that one. The most common form of artillery support on all sides was 81mm mortars (3" for the UK forces). Everyone had these at the battalion level (only exception is German armored PzGdr). They would support whatever company is engaged, so they can be present in any scenario of company size up to battalion. Just one module of them, 1 FO, unless most of a 2nd battalion is also present. The next most common form of artillery support would be fire by a battery, or a whole battalion, of the divisional artillery. This means 105mm for U.S. and Germans, 25-lber for the UK forces. And the amount could be just 1 FO, or it could be 2-3 all firing together. That represents a "battalion shoot", by one of the typically 3 artillery battalions in the division. A full battalion of support would be more common, for a battalion infantry force, obviously. In extreme cases, there could be so much artillery firing in support of a single battalion, that you might as well just call the whole thing off. Meaning, there wasn't any fight at the CM scale of things; the opposing sides didn't get close enough for that. There were too many shells falling on one of them, or between, for too long. Less common forms of support, but on the order of 1/3rd of the time not "snowballs chance", are heavier tube artillery, the most common being 150mm and 155mm. (Not sure what the equivalent is for the Brits - 4.5" or 5.5" mebe). These again could be 1 or could be 2-3 together. Or, the medium mortars - 120mm German, 4.2" allies, which you'd get in a single FO. German 150mm rockets also belong here, but with 2-4 of them possible (they are innaccurate, but can put in a "spoiling barrage" at the start). German infantry might have 75mm in addition, 1 FO, if they don't have 75mm infantry guns deployed on-map for direct fire. All the stuff heavier than those types would be rare. Some special units types would have slightly different forms of support. U.S. cavalry recon, tank destroyer units, and paratroops, would have 75mm support. In the case of the paras, 2-3 of them, or even 2 75mm and 1 105mm, singles for the other unit types. German gebirgsjaeger (the mountain infantry) would be similar, with mostly 75mm support. When mixing support types, you can count the 81mm as seperate and sort of ordinary. Don't count it against the rest. A single 75mm added, the same. A single battery of 150mm or higher, or and number of German 150mm rockets, can also be a sort of add-on. Otherwise, pick one type. E.g. a U.S. armored task force, battalion sized mixed tank n armored infantry, 1x81mm plus 1-3x105mm. Or, a German infantry company, 1x81mm. Or, a British reinforced company w/ a tank platoon, 1x3" mortar plus 1x25-lber As you climb from company to battalion sized, you can think of the support as 1 FO per company, with the first being the 81mm. Topping out at around 4-5 FOs, though (e.g. for a reinforced battalion). YMMV. Remember, in the real deal they weren't hard-wired to support this unit instead of that. They fired where the action was. But then they ran out of shells (or their "daily ration" of them) and didn't support the next guy. So it isn't a hard and fast rule, just a ballpark level that comes out about right.

I can offer one of mine that is not historical enough but would meet your other requirements I think. It is called "the Fire Brigade.". Give it a try. P.S. If you play it solo vs. the AI, I recommend you take the Americans - at least, the first time. But it is best double-blind. [This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 03-23-2001).]

Who, to be giving out homework assignments? Why, I am the one that was being lectured on the mores of academe, science, my future career, and sundred other subjects, by folks who thought they were informing me of something I had blatantly missed, even including actual alleged errors of arithmetic, who had said everything sound in what I was being lectured about before I even began the exercise ("It is doubtless vain to...") And why? Because Mr. Dorosh was good enough to not pay any attention to what I said, and mischaracterize it uncharitably, and then the rest of the whole sick crew just assumed his characterization must be so, without reading what I wrote. Despite my repeated calls for them to do so, and my actually quoting it, twice. So far, one man confessing his "bafflement" has been the only result. To PeterNZ, I am pleased that you have stated your situation so honestly. And believe me, I am quite sympathetic to it. You can hardly imagine why I would bother to speak of literal relative weights, when I was capable of writing, at the very point of doing so, "doubtless it is vain to..." etc. And you have been laboring for quite some time under the impression, that whatever Mr. Dorosh and company ascribed to me as motive or claim made, must be so. But in the second of those, you have simply been misled by another person's slander or misunderstanding, nothing more. As several others have observed for you along the way, Terence and Croda and others, I did not claim too much for my little numbers. In fact, I called them a vain errand, before anyone else mentioned the least limitation about them. I certainly claim the right to play with numbers whenever I please, and I certainly claim that the manipulations of numbers I performed, did not violate the rules of logic, as some claimed. Since I was assailed by people who questioned me about both, and by people who pretended I had claimed things I had not, who ignored my previous words and my repeated calls to read them again, I was certainly not going to claim that all of my critics were paragons of virtue and insight. But your puzzlement remains. Why on earth would you have made the number analysis in the first place, knowing that "it is doubtless vain to..."? Everyone is ready to ascribe to me a motive of claiming ridiculous exactitudes. Everyone is ready to ascribe to me a penchant for showing off. Everyone is ready to ascribe to me closedness against all reason. Naturally, since after all Mr. Dorosh mischaracterized my claims, and they believed them. But none of the above can explain the mysterious motive, that could lead a man to give a numerical analysis, that he himself had just pronounce "doubtless vain". Why on earth, indeed? Because somebody asked. You see, gentlemen, I do not come here and write things in this forum to try to appear smart to you. I don't know you, for one. And I do not have any trouble appearing smart to everyone I've run into since I was five, because I am. There is no boast in that, it is simply factual. I have never cared about, because frankly there is no novelty in, what people think of my head. I come here and I write things, because I am trying to be helpful to people asking honest questions, questions they do not know the answers to. Sometimes I don't either. Then I go look. I don't care about the other would-be experts on this forum, or impressing them. I could care less. But the people who want to know something, something they know they do not already know, I simply and plainly want to help. So when such a question is asked, I answer it. In another thread, another fellow said as a form of criticism, that what he liked about having me here, is that I made him look humble. I am glad to be of such service sir. I wasn't aware that the fellow in question, was in any particular danger of not appearing humble, but for my services. Oh, and I am stubborn too. But you've probably figured that part out.

Your mortars do not have radios. The officer is shouting the corrections. The abandoned vehicle has limited damage. A busted sight, etc. PWs can indeed escape if they leave LOS of your units, or if enemy come close while no guards are around. They will run in those cases. I've certainly had it happen to me, particularly in woods where the LOS is so short. I generally order them to move to near some relatively inactive unit who can keep an eye on them, and if I can spare them, send a guard with them to the rear. You can order them off of the map and have the guard come back. Since fights are usually short, though, they often are just watched by front-line guys until after the firefight. Most of the others are just not in the CM scale. Nothing a man can do in combat in 10 minutes deserves the foxhole level of protection. As for friendly fog of war, you have mistaken CM for a mere sim. CM is a strategy game, in which the player does not "role play" a single commander, but makes all of th decisions of a few dozens junior officers and NCOs. With all respect, the lives of single officers in combat are simply not interesting enough to make a strategy game out of them. Why? Because their decisions pass through too many other wills, and too much confusion, to have an appreciable impact on a mid-sized battle. A realistic "sim" of the impact of one man in a firefight, would allow him 3 decisions - one of which would likely be wrong because of bad info - that were actually carried into effect. Picked at random out of the dozens of things he tried to bring about. Which, sorry, isn't a strategy game. Strategy games are about pitting the wits of one fellow against the wits of another, with the outcome mostly determined by said wits. That is the entire attraction of the things. And it is why, e.g. chess is a fine strategy game even though it simulates nothing. While, e.g. a sim of a single Marine's life on Guadalcanal, would be excruciating rather than fun. Wargames create good strategy games simply by giving the player control of more levels simultaneously, adding together the decisions of a few dozen men in the corresponding "reality". That makes enough decisions, control, and coordination of them, to create a strategy game, meaning one that will largely be decided by matched wits. Rather than decided by larger outside forces, fate, luck, and decisions made blind-folded and random in their execution. Of course there is a balance. The right command span, the right level of coordination and control, the right level of fog, and you get a fine strategy game with enough uncertainty and atmosphere to keep it interesting. The point is simply that a compromise is needed, lest a fine strategy game degenerate into a mere sim. Sims are a hundred times easier to make than good games; all it takes is literalism.

A fine question, I am sure others have had the same issue. The distance is 10 meters now. I think it was 15 meters back in the version that is as old as the demo. You won't see them consolidate until the end of the turn - next orders phase. Don't order them to move right on top of each other, just nearby. As for the hook-up of guns, it can take a little getting used to, sure. Move the vehicle as close to the gun as you can, but not onto it. Give the gun its order to "embark" toward/onto the vehicle, in the same turn the vehicle is pulling up. The gun will start moving as soon as the vehicle stops, and if it is close enough it will hook up right away, with no slow pushing to get closer. One useful trick is to click on the unit, set the waypoint approximately, and then hit "5" for the close-up overhead view. You will have a white square waypoint box for the end of the move. You can grab that box with your mouse and drag it around to just where you want it, then let it go. I hope this helps.

gunnergoz asked several fine questions about my statements about Russian light tanks. First a source. http://www.siemers.com/wwii/Russia/index.htm Add up the T-26, T-70, BT-5&7 ~28,000. Compare the T-60 ~6,000. Numbers of the other types are trivial compared to these makes. 6/34 = 17.6% Look at the T-60 page. T-60 companies scouting for T-34 and KV-1 companies in independent tank battalions. Same period, German doctrine was Pz II company scouting for 2 companies of Pz III and one of Pz IV (short 75). I assume the latter is well-known, if you need confirmation, and easy way to find it would be any analysis of some famous panzer division action - e.g. DAK in Libya (all operations in the same time period, 1941-1942). I am counting the T-26 as a light tank, as most sources do. It weighs 10 tons and has ~15mm of armor, on both counts about the same as a Pz II. It just has a bigger gun - and incidentally, a more cramped turret because of it, radios only in command tanks, etc. Do I assume they were all in existence simultaneously? No, of course not. The T-26s and BT series are pre-war tanks and most were lost in 1941, the remainder almost certainly lost in 1942. No new ones were made because their factories had been overrun, or because more modern tanks were being produced instead. These were 1930s models, tested against China, in Spain, and used against the Finns. They were available in large numbers in 1941, and with their 45mm main armament they were fine tanks for what they faced (though short on radios and turret room). The Russians had lousy tank doctrine, were strategically surprised, and were operationally out-generaled in 1941, as everybody knows. Tanks are also, in general, an expendible rather than a durable military asset on year-long time scales. As a result, most of these tanks were gone by, or lost during, 1942. The Russian tank fleet started that year at a fraction of its pre-war size. In 1941, the Russian were building T-60s with 20mm guns, as their light tank component. That is the first six months of the war. They were making about 300 of them per month. In 1942, the Russians starting building the 45mm T-70. Production of both types is carried out in parallel, each running about 400 per month. The T-60 is uparmored, with the 1942 versions having 25-35mm of armor, comparable to the protection of the T-70, compared to 15mm on the 1941 version. Late in 1942, the Russians are using the T-60 chassis for rocket launchers, and develop protoypes for a 76mm TD on the same chassis. A T-70 model is preferred for the new SU-76, and T-60 production is halted. In 1943, production of the T-70 continues, still running around 400 per month, until October when all T-70 chassis production have been turned over the SU-76 production. SU-76 production goes on at the same time, at around 150 per month over the course of the year. Some of that is doubtless higher SU-76 production after October - but the first few SU-76s were delivered back at the close of 1942. In 1944, all the light tank chassis production is making SU-76, at the rate of 600 a month. No more light tanks. The rate reaches 900 per month by the end of the war. Let's look at what the Germans did in the same time frame. Here is a source URL for that, if you want data - http://www.feldgrau.com/afvstats.html In 1941 the Germans were still making Pz IIs and Pz38ts. In 1942, they continued production of the IIs and 38s, but later in the year converted all production of these chassis to marders. The marder II is a Pz II chassis with PAK on top, the marder III uses the Czech chassis of the Pz38t. The marder II versions continue production into 1943, then the Pz II chassis are switched to making Wespe SPA 105mm. The marder III are made into 1944, then teh Pz 38 chassis switch over to making Hetzers. In other words, the Germans switched over their light chassis production to making self propelled guns, first lightly armored TDs, then a combination of lightly armored SP howitzers and more heavily armored, but still small, TDs. The Russians switched over their light tank production to making SU-76s, which acted more or less as their own version of the marder and wespe. The Germans took tanks with 20mm and 37mm guns, out of production in the course of 1942. The Russians took their 20mm tank type out of production by the end of 1942. The Russians continued to produce a light tank with 45mm into 1943. The Germans ceased production of Pz IIIs in 1943 (the chassis went to make StuGs). The Russians were making the changes a few months later in each case. Since production changes take a while to show up on the field, the primary explanation for all of the above is that the Russians were simply copying the German moves, with a slight lag. They built a 20mm tank in 1941 because the Germans used 20mm light tanks for scouting. They built 20mm and 45mm light tanks in 1942 because the Germans used 20mm and 37mm tanks. They pulled 20mm tanks because the Germans switched to marders, then wespes. They pulled 45mm tanks because the Germans dropped the Pz III for the StuG. They made SU-76s from the chassis, because the Germans made marders and StuGs and wespes. Then they just made lots more of 'em.

There is a factor here that I think supports Matthias' statements on the origins of the skirts. How close the particular round was, to the particular armor plates, in penetrating power vs. thickness. The original Pz III and IV had 30mm of armor, turret and hull, front and sides. The sides were more vunerable, because the armor was more nearly vertical. The figures we have seen for the penetration of the Russian ATR, give up to 35mm at point blank, while others give 30mm. By the time the skirts were being fielded, the front armor of the Pz IV had been increased, to 50mm or more. But the hull sides still had 30mm, vertical plates. And the turret side and rear were 30mm, with slopes from 10 to 26 degrees (more side, less rear, varying slightly by model). There is also doubtless some variation in armor quality. The German tests Matthias mentions were conducted at 100 yards. The Russian field manual for the ATR stresses holding fire until the range is 50-100 yards. That suggests that the issue was the maximum, point-blank penetration of the ATR round. Which our other sources variously put at 30mm or 35mm against vertical plate. The Germans tested skirts with 5mm thickness, or in some cases 5mm hull and 10mm around the turret side and rear. The other round the Germans tested was Russian 76.2mm HE. I don't have the exact figures for that, and it may vary by gun model. Perhaps others have exact figures, which might test my theory. But for example, the U.S. 75mm-HE in the M8-HMC is rated by CM to penetrate 34mm vertical at 500 yards, 30mm@30deg at 100 yards, 29mm@30deg at 500 yards. Right on the borderline in other words. So, say the issue is simply that Russian 76.2mm and Russian ATRs, both have penetration abilities very close to the 30-35mm range, at combat distances (close for the ATR). Then the sides of the Pz IV, with the original armor (30deg vertical), would just barely be vunerable to these rounds. The turret might be too, with the same 30mm thickness and slight slopes. They had thickened the front armor beyond these levels of protection, but the hull sides, turret sides and rear, were still marginally penetrable by these two particular "threat" rounds. So, they add 5mm of armor to defeat these particular rounds. It was close already. They just needed to nudge it over. Why wire later? Perhaps to defeat the 76.2mm HE without the added weight. If the armor almost stops it as is, and it is fuse-quick... And still later, they discover that the space is useful against HEAT, zooks, etc. The reason I like this theory is that is accounts for the 5mm thickness of the added armor. 5mm is the extra penetration value of the upper ATR source info, and around the penetration value of 75mm HE (e.g. fired by duel purpose artillery "field guns", direct fire). It is being put on the right places on the tank - those that retained the old 30mm thickness. It explains why they didn't bother on Panthers, which have ~40mm side armor. In other words, it started as a countermeasure to a particular threat or pair of threats, without any particular emphasis on being "spaced". That just wound up helping, so the reasons for continuing to use it, spread. For what it is worth.

To Andrew - I don't laugh at the 38t at all. I don't laugh as the Pz II either, or the early IIIs. But then, I also don't laugh at the 45mm armed Russian lights. Instead, I am always amused by the idea that the Germans had great tanks the whole war and the benighted slavic hordes were trying to fight them with bailing wire and an old shoe. That'd make the Germans super dofuses for messing it up, wouldn't it? Because the truth is, the Russians had better stuff through 42, and the Germans still kicked their keisters. Then the Tiger and Panther come out, and the Russians predictably kick the Germans teeth in. Sorta makes the tech dominance story ring a bit hollow. As for the 38s, the Germans not only had a couple thousand of these Czech tanks, along with another couple thousand Pz IIs, but the chassis from both went on to field - 3500 marders, 300 SP assault guns of various kinds, and several thousand Hetzers. In fact, about 15-20% of the German AFV fleet for the whole war, came from the Czech chassis.