jasoncawley@ameritech.net

A very informative article; thanks for posting the URL. Any more from the same fellow(s), about other vehicles? Found the answer - he has the Marder II as well, and the M3 halftrack. With more in the works. Nice stuff. One point about an item in the article. At one point he expresses some surprise or confusion about a comment from a source, that the TC and driver only, had radios, when it was clear to him the radio was by the hull MG gunner when it was present. I believe the first part is about intercom mikes inside the tank - that is, only the TC and driver could talk to each other over such a system, with the loader and MG gunner expected to talk to the other guy in their fighting compartment. Another interesting tidbit is the statement that the thickness of the front glacis increased to 60mm as the war progressed. I wonder if that might not refer to the *turret* front only, though, and have been misinterpreted by the author. I think the turret was uparmored by about that amount, but I haven't seen the hull front listed as above 47mm at 60 degrees. The turret, of course, did not have quite the slope of the upper hull, so it needed greater thickness to give roughly the same protection. [This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 04-02-2001).]

German 84th Infantry division was in 15th Army reserve on D-Day. It did not fight in Normandy. That fits with a deployment in the Pas de Calais area - the 15th Army sector was Le Harve and northeast on D-Day, and moved farther northeast, to the channel ports (Boulogne, Calais, Dunkirk) soon after, giving up the Le Havre area to front-line armies. At the time you mention, the Canadian 2nd Infantry division was attacking north toward the French coast around Calais. After isolating the garrisons of the channel ports, the 2nd turned over the job of containing and reducing the fortifications to the Canadian 3rd Infantry division (mid September), and moved on to the Scheldt (the waterway leading to Antwerp). The overall goal at the time was to secure ports, with elimination of the V-1 launch sites as a byproduct. The following is a Canadian narrative of the time period - "The 2nd Canadian Infantry Division also began its forward move on September 6. Its task was to clear the whole coastal area east of Calais including the heavily fortified port of Dunkirk. On September 7-8 its 5th Brigade captured Bourbourg, south-west of Dunkirk, and was then tasked to contain the Dunkirk garrison, estimated to be some 10,000 strong, which held a wide perimeter of outposts in the villages of Mardick, Loon-Plage, Spyker, Bergues and Bray Dunes. Loon-Plage was occupied on September 9, simultaneously with nearby Coppenaxfort; Mardick fell on September 17. East of Dunkirk, in the area of the Franco-Belgian border, the 6th Brigade occupied Furnes, Nieuport and La Panne. The Canadians received great assistance from the Belgian White Brigade, the national resistance movement, which furnished exact information concerning the enemy's strength, defences and minefields. West of LaPanne, the brigade cleared the area of Bray Dunes as well as the nearby village of Ghyvelde. The 4th Brigade, on September 9, moved north to occupy the Belgian port of Ostend. This port, although fortified, was not defended by the Germans. However, the harbour installations had been partly demolished and delayed its opening. From September 28, pending the opening of Antwerp, stores and bulk petrol flowed through Ostend to alleviate the maintenance problem. The 4th Bridgade then moved to the southern outskirts of Bruges to assist the 4th Armoured Division in that sector. Fortunately, the enemy withdrew without contesting possession of the city, and the Canadians entered the city to an enthusiastic welcome from the people. The brigade now turned south again to Bergues, a key feature of Dunkirk's outer defences, which was finally occupied on September 16. But the enemy showed no sign of relaxing his grip on Dunkirk and the port could only have been taken by a major attack with heavy support. The decision was, therefore, taken to simply contain the port with minimum forces and to concentrate every available resource upon opening Antwerp. This freed the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division to move to the Scheldt area at once. During the month of September the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was fully occupied in clearing the Channel Ports, Boulogne, and Calais, and eliminating the enemy's cross-channel batteries at Cap Gris Nez. As well, it eliminated the flying-bomb sites from which the enemy had bombarded south-eastern England - London in particular. Unfortunately the Germans had determined to maintain the Channel Ports at all costs. These ports were designated fortresses to be especially protected and defended to the last. LeHavre, Boulogne and Calais were taken only after massive attacks combining air and ground assaults. Further, the port installations were destroyed and although the ports were in Canadian hands they were not yet working. On October 1 the only harbours north of the Seine receiving Allied shipping were Dieppe, its subsidiary Le Tréport, and Ostend." Incidentally, the name of the Panzer Leader scenario may refer to a UK war memorial and cemetery located at Reichswald, which was the later site of a forest battle that Canadians were involved in. But that is not where the 2nd was fighting on 7 September. The fighting in the Reichswald area was during Operation Veritable, in mid-February 1945. On that occasion, the 2nd Infantry seems to have fought units of Panzer Lehr and 116th Panzer (or what was left of them post-Bulge) - I do not know if they fought the 84th Infantry then too, or what. The Reichswald fighting, incidentally, was some of the toughest the Canadians had. It is not clear which fight the scenario is trying to depict. But the February 1945 fighting may be more likely, rather than the date you actually have. I hope this helps. [This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 04-02-2001).]

On the long 50mm vs. T-34 stories, do your sources specify the ammo they mean? Do they specify the hit location they mean? I do not doubt that German tankers were happy to get the L43, because I think it was the first gun they got that could reliably kill the T-34 from the front, with standard ammo. The claim that the L43 could KO the T-34 from "any angle, out to 1200 meters", I find contradicted by - German training documents, tactical doctrine, and published mm penetration numbers. Unless they mean 75mm HEAT or something. I also do not doubt that German formations beat T-34 formations even with Pz IIIs, let alone with Pz IVs. But unlike some people, I do not subscribe a bit to the technical dominance story (or myth) about WW II AFV combat. I think skill, and especially the use of the tanks well above the single tank duel level, had much more to do with wins and losses than front plate penetration analysis. I see nothing out of place, for instance, in the StuG history I cited, in which 9 vehicles that could only reliably kill their opponents around 800 meters, still accounted for 18 tanks plus 2 more immobilized. I do have my doubts that certain wanna be modern panzer drivers in games, could duplicate the performance against a blind grandmother on a bad day, without the crutch of inflated technical specs, compared to their real historical counterparts - but that is another matter altogether.

P.S. You know, there is a reason the Germans developed the L70 gun for the Panther. And it didn't have anything to do with Churchills.

I have never heard of a single confirmed kill by 75L43 on the front hull of a T-34 beyond 1000 meters, using the standard PzGr-39 ammo (which outnumbers all other types produced by several orders of magnitude, so "averaging up" arguments about specialized 75mm ammo are quite beside the point). If any one has, please present it. Personally, I find the German combat practice of firing at 600-800 meters compelling. I doubt very much that the L43, or even the L48, penetrated the T-34 glacis from the front, with hull hits, at distances beyond 1 km, and using standard ammo. I find the speculation to the contrary being offered here, exceedingly thin. Incidentally, almost all the StuGs had the L48, not the L43 gun. The L43 is found on the Pz IV F2, and the early Pz IV Gs, built mostly in 1942, when StuG production was still low, because Pz IIIs were still being made. By 1943, the new tanks had the longer L48, and that is when Pz III production stops, and StuG production consequently takes off. What do I think 1 T-34 KO'ed at 1000 meters by 3 hits means? I think the fact that the commander bothered to report it is meaningful. It means he thought the kill was rare at that distance, and he almost certainly was using the L48 gun. He does not say all three shots were from the front, and I suspect that 2 of the shots did not penetrate, and the 3rd did - side shot, weak spot, near a former hit, luck of the angle on the turret, or just because the kill was marginal but possible at that distance. I sincerely doubt if every L48 shot routinely went through the glacis at that range, that he would have had anything particular to report. He gave no such details about the other 16 T-34s his unit took out, other than the range being 600-800 meters. I suspect the penetration was reasonably reliable at those ranges, and he knew it, and that is why the tactics were as they were, and his report was as it was. Incidentally, the turret armor is thicker, but nothing like as sloped as the glacis. And portions of it present less slope than other portions. It is entirely plausible that occasional hits *on the turret*, at longer range, got in. The ones that happened to not get too high an angle. Here is another item of info, a German order-announcement on combating the T-34, dated 1942 - On 26 May 1942 the General der Schnellen Truppen beim Oberkommando des Heeres distributed the following "Instructions to units on the Eastern Front for Combating the Russian T-34 Tank with our Panzers": "Characteristics of the T34. The T-34 is faster, more maneuverable, has better cross-country mobility than our Pz.Kpfw.lll and IV. Its armor is stronger. The penetrating ability of its 7.62 cm cannon is superior to our 5 cm KwK. and the 7.5 cm KwK40. The favorable form of sloping all of the armor plates aids in causing the shells to skid off. Combating the T-34 with the 5 cm KwK tank gun is possible only at short ranges from the flank or rear, where it is important to achieve a hit as perpendicular to the surface as possible. Hits on the turret ring, even with high-explosive shells or machine gun bullets, usually result in jamming the turret. In addition, armor-piercing shells fired at close range that hit the gun mantle result in penetrations and breaking open the weld seams. **The T-34 can be penetrated at ranges up to 1000 metres with the 7.5 cm PaK 40** as well as the 7.5 cm Hohlgranate (hollow-charge shells)." Emphasis added. The PAK 40 is the 75mmL48 gun, of course. Incidentally, here is another passage from the same, about fighting with with 50mm Pz IIIs - "Because the 5 cm KwK can only be expected to penetrate the flanks of the T34 at short range, the following tactics have proven been to be correct in combating them: a. Attract and tie down the opponent frontally by having a Pz.Kpfw.III take up the firefight. Choose a hull down position or drive in a zig-zag course to make it difficult for the opponent to hit the target. b. At the same time, utilizing all available cover, two other Pz.Kpfw.llls attempt to circumvent the T34 to the right or left in order to gain a position in the flank or in the rear and knock him out at short range with PzGr40 fired at the hull or rear." Sound familiar to any of the Sherman drivers out there? LOL. Also, notice the 50mm use do PzGr40, rather than PzGr39. The Germans made more than 1 million PzGr40 for the 50mm, compared to tiny numbers of it for 75mm. From the sides, the PzGr40 fired by a 50mmL60 should have done the job at ranges of 500 meters or less. The 50mmL42 would need a particularly flat hit, or to be even closer.

Of course they KOed Panthers from the sides. APHE vs. solid AP issues were hardly going to stop them from doing so.

Paul's question is a fine one, and I don't know the answer directly. I have the muzzle velocity of the L43 as about 750 m/sec. For the L48 it is marginally higher, more like 800 m/sec. In both cases with PzGr39, which is by far the most common form of AP ammo for these guns types. Against 30 degree slope, the penetration envelope at 100-500-1000-1500 meters goes 98-91-82-72 for the L43, and 106-96-85-74 for the L48, by my source. So that is down 16%-20% for the two types (at 1 km I mean), and to more nearly even numbers. If the penetration is going like the energy, then the drop off in speed would be somewhat less than what Paul asked about. But it is more than the initial difference - the penetration of the L48 at 500 meters is slightly below that of the L43 at 100 meters, so presumably the speed is dropping on the order of 50 m/sec in 400-500 meters of flight. I'd guess down ~100 m/sec, but it is just a guess from other people's data. Incidentally, CM gives slightly different figures for penetration, with the Pz IVG lower, the Pz IVH and StuG III about the same, and the PAK40 somewhat better than my figures. They may have been trying to account for slight gun differences (e.g. some of the Gs had L43, but that was the model that changed over) and ammo availability (maybe a bit more likelihood of PzGr40 ammo for the towed PAK e.g.). If you go by CM estimate of the effectiveness of 60 degee armor compared to 30 degrees, then you'd expect penetration ranges as low as 500 meters for the L43 vs. the 47mm front armor of the 1942 model T-34 (and later). With more like 800-1000 meters for the L48s. The 1941 model T-34s have a little less armor, though, and armor quality issues might increase the ranges, slightly. Incidentally, the 50mms are going to need short range shots with good ammo, or hits on the lower hull from ranges around 500 meters, even from the sides. Even the L60 ones. To most of the stuff the Germans had in the field, this baby is every bit as daunting as the Panther is to Sherman drivers, in some ways worse. To illustrate that point, here is the mix of AFVs the Germans had available in for the Kursk battle in summer, 1943 - Elephant - 45 Tiger I - 133 Panther A - 200 Pz IV L43+48 - 859 Pz IV L24 - 54 Pz III 75L24 - 153 Pz III 50L60 - 542 Pz III 50L42 - 109 Pz II - 107 Plus some StuG (but not yet numerous - the Pz IIIs are still there), Marder, and a few captured T-34. Overall, ~400 tanks that could kill T-34s at long range, ~1000 that could kill them at about 1 km, and another ~1000 that needed close flank shots. They faced ~2500 T-34s, plus ~1300 light tanks, and a few hundred KVs and SUs (each).

The Romanians did indeed provide the largest force - of leg infantry, with poor weapons, officers and morale. They had 37mm and 47mm AT guns that could not hole anything above a light tank. They started the war with about 100 toy tanks with MG main armament. The Germans supplied then a number of 37mm gun Czech tanks - into 1943. They finally got some real tanks for their lone armor division, about 200 Pz IVs and StuGs, in 1944 - then switched sides in August of that year. As leg infantry, they were used in the attacks on Odessa and Sevastapol. In the case of the former, the attack was their own show, and it was not exactly a roaring success. They lost 90,000 men and most of the Russian garrison was successfully evacuated by sea. In the case of the latter, they provided about 1/3rd of the force under Manstein's command, did not do anything spectacular, but performed well. It was their best combat performance of the war, and lasted a matter of days. They were also foolishly assigned the flank positions for the Stalingrad campaign, a role for which they were extremely ill-suited. They lacked the heavy AT weapons, and the mobility (other than some horse cavalry of dubious combat value) to operate on the wide steppe. They had obsolete equipment, poor command, excessive frontages, little depth of reserves. And predictably, they fell apart in days when hit powerfully, taking catastrophic losses in the process. At least one of their commanders had the good sense to go over the head of his commanders to his government, to ignore "hold at all cost" orders. About all you could say for them in that affair, is that they had a more rational head of state. You can read more about the battles, from one of their countryman's perspective, here - http://www.infonet.ro/personal/armata/battles/odessa.htm http://www.infonet.ro/personal/armata/battles/sevastopol.htm http://www.infonet.ro/personal/armata/battles/don.htm http://www.infonet.ro/personal/armata/battles/kalmuk%20steppe.htm

A few 60mm zooks did kill T-34s in Korea, but it was quite rare. We have reports of T-34s taking dozens of hits from them, including some from the rear, and driving on. 75mm recoilless rifles also hit them in the turret sides without apparent effect. The 3.5" zook is essentially a panzerschreck. Same caliber. They did not have any trouble KO-ing T-34s. Other ways that T-34s were taken out include 105mm HEAT. 105mm HE was used to break their tracks, before enough HEAT was available in theater. Aircraft also took out a number of them, with 5" rockets and napalm. Pershings had no trouble with them. T-34s caused serious trouble in Korea only in the first few months of the war. ROK forces had a few hundred towed 37mm AT guns, a handful of M-8 armored cars, and thousands of 60mm bazookas. They killed very few T-34s, mostly by bazookas when they did manage to. By the time the fighting was around the Pusan perimeter, the North Koreans were down to about a battalion's worth of tanks, which were used in penny-packets, platoon sized or less by U.S. standards. By then, the U.S. had large numbers of Pershings, Chaffees, and Sherman-76mm in the country. The NK armor still managed to cause tactical trouble occasionally, a handful spearheading mostly infantry attacks, but their days of operational impact were over. The Chinese had a few units of T-34, and by Soviet records anyway, around 20 IS-2s as well. But the war from the time the Chinese intervened was mostly an infantry and artillery one. And "mountain infantry" style fighting is what they were best at, where they did have a definite edge at first. The Americans were too road-bound. By spring of 1951, that had mostly changed, and Ridgeway found ways to deal with them successfully. The last two years were stalemate, with occasional artillery flurries and fights for particular ridges, more like WW I really. Meanwhile peace talks went on.

To Guy w/gun - Nope, the brew ups didn't have anything to do with gas vs. diesel, it was the ammo going off, not the fuel. And I have never heard about any wet ammo storage on a German tank. Part of the problem was that the early Shermans, in addition to "dry", placed some of the ammo at the sides of the turret, instead of the rear and floor. That made side penetrations more likely to cause a brew up. A second cause was probably the high velocity of the German shells, compared to the Sherman's armor. It is a lot easier to cause the ammo to go off, if the round is going to go clean through the back of the turret as well as through the front. Incidentally, one fellow speculated that maybe the issue was APHE stuff. I hardly think so. The U.S. short 75mm shells would take out Pz IVs and StuGs, but against 110mm at 60 degrees, it is not even close. It was not a matter of shell deficiencies. A gun that weak was just never going to punch through armor that strong. The front protection on a Panther is better than that on the other common German types, by more than a factor of 2. Better caps and such do-dads might help a 76mm AP against a Tiger I, but 75s weren't going to do anything from the front, and even 76mm tungsten rounds can't reliably get through the Panther front hull (unless they get some down-angle from terrain, or something).

I was indeed referring to Eisenhower's request, which was for British built guns. You are right that it was too late to make 17s in the U.S.; that one had already been "blown". Eisenhower took the reports of the inferiority of the Sherman very seriously. He asked for detailed reports from the tankers themselves, well down the org chart. He heard back that the main complaint was the gun, that the men could get first hits but when those didn't kill a German tank, men and tanks were lost because of it. The tankers said they needed more souped-up ammunition and better guns. He heard that the British 17 did the trick and asked for a boatload of them, but the Brits needed all they could make; they were still in their Firefly upgunning program themselves. So they made do with the U.S. 76mm as an upgrade gun, and converted more TDs to 90mm. Incidentally, the allocation of the 76mm was bolixed somewhat too, with units in action not getting enough upgrades, while late arriving armor divisions, the 8-14th AD, the 16th, and the 20th, got full load-outs of them (though lost vehicles were often replaced with 75mm). Saving shipping space is the likely reason for that one. It would obviously have been better to spread the available 76mm guns to all armor units, with those already in action the first priority. But that probably meant a boatload of guns, and a later boat with tanks on it with 75mm when the higher numbered ADs shipped, and they figured, save a boat-trip and put the 76s on the tanks to be sent next. Which didn't help the 2nd-6th AD tankers facing Panthers and Tigers in the Ardennes, with only 1-2 76mm per platoon. (Plus TDs, to be sure).

Here is another combat report. A StuG company (9 vehicles) engaged several T-34s and bagged quite a number of them over the course of 3 hours (17 KOed, 2 immobilized). The unit report adds that the tanks were destroyed at a distance of 600 to 800 meters. And it sees fit to note that a single T-34 was KO'ed at 1000 meters "by 3 shots". Sounds to me like the kill was marginal from the front at 1 km, and SOP was to tackle them from closer than that. Which fits the limited technical data I've seen, and other reports of 75L43-L48 vehicles holding their fire down to 600-700 meters.

Other annoying facts for the usual spiel are - 1 - The primary limitation on military equipment the U.S. could field was not production, it was shipping space to get the stuff to the front. A Sherman took a lot less space than a heavier tank. 2 - The Germans were not operating a fleet of uparmored tanks, contrary to the repeated portrayals on this board and elsewhere. 70% of German late-war AFV production were vehicle types that could not stop a 75mm short AP round. Pz IVs, StuGs, and Marders, together outnumbered Panthers, Tigers, and all heavier types, by more than 2:1. In the majority of the German army - the infantry forces - StuGs and Marders were the only AFVs available. Why did they make them when they knew how to make better? Because they needed the numbers, and no, you can't just switch. 3 - The western Allies produced 4 upgunned tanks or TDs - 76mm Sherman, Firefly, 76mm TD, 17-lb TD, or 90mm TD - for every uparmored German AFV produced. Such upgunned vehicles comprised 40% of their fleets. And most of those German AFVs were facing the Russians. 4 - The U.S. may have refused the 17-lber before Normandy, but after it they requested 10,000 of them. The Brits couldn't meet their own needs and said no. 5 - The U.S. was slow to get 76mm Shermans to the troops at the front, and that was indeed because of pig-headedness by the brass. They were still about 3 times as common as a Panther was on the western front. 6 - The U.S. faced heavy tanks (Panther and above) in quantity for 3 out of 11 months of combat on the western front - in Normandy, and in the Bulge. The rest of the time, German armor in action was quite scarce. On both occasions, the better German tanks certainly helped them, but did not change the operational course of the battles, which were decided by numbers and attrition. 7 - The causalties in U.S. armor units in WW II ran 1/3rd the rate of infantry units, and the same rate as other arms like TDs, cavalry, and combat engineers. Of combat forces, only artillery and AAA had lower loss rates. The primary reason is that armor was proof against the #1 cause of casualties, artillery shrapnel. Was it dumb of the U.S. not to upgun to 76mm sooner? Certainly. Was wet storage of ammunition an improvement? Certainly. Did U.S. tankers deserve better than ~60% of the fleet 75mm Shermans? Yes. Was the Sherman "a failure"? Hardly. Were the TDs a failure? Hardly. Were the Germans all in Panthers facing 75mm Shermans? Wrong genre - that is fantasy roleplaying.

I don't have detailed info on your question. But my sense of things is that the L70, 88s, and high caliber HEAT (from tube artillery, not tank guns) could deal with them from any angle and out to long ranges, 2km or so. But the shorter 75s, I think it was more like 1km. I know of examples where the German practice was to hold fire in ambush until 600-700 yards, for instance (Pz IVs and StuGs vs. T-34s, 1943 in Ukraine). That is not definitive, since first shot accuracy might have also been a consideration there, but if they had a long range edge, I suspect they would have opened much sooner, for the sake of improved safety on the replies. The Panthers and mobile 88s did so, dueling at quite long range. Incidentally, the number I have seen for the glacis is 47mm at 60 degrees, for the 1942 models and afterward, which was most of the tanks. It was 45mm in 1940-41, but that was a small portion of the whole fleet made. Nothing like the detail you are after, but I hope it is of some help.

You have it about right. For the moment, leave out the complication of exit conditions. This is how it seems to work, based on my observations anyway (corrections welcome). Add up all the objectives, your force points, and the enemy force points. That is the total "pool" of points, and serves as the *divisor* for victory level calculations. The remaining procedures do not change this divisor. Award the objectives to the side that controls them, or to neither if abandoned or contested. Live guys to the side that owns them, dead guys to the enemy side. Some units seem to be awarded to neither - either guys that run off the map, or broken/routed units still on the map, or both - I am not sure about those, but there seems to be such a category. This forms the numerator for each side, with the total of the two numerators, less than or equal to the denominator from step one. Divide each sides numerator, by the one common denominator. That is the victory level for that side, in percent. If you kill an enemy platoon, lose a friendly platoon, and take an enemy-held objective in the process, then you will increase your score by the possession of the objective, passing from the enemy column to your own. The lost men will "net" to no change (+/- the difference in point value of the platoons). But if you kill nobody and lose a platoon, then the objective will pass from the enemy column to your own, while your platoon's value passes from your column to his. Net, you will not gain anything. (+/- the difference in price, platoon vs. 100 pt small flag that is). Roughly, the small flags are worth 1 vanilla platoon or 1 vanilla armored vehicle - a little less for some common types. The large flags are worth 3 times that. But e.g. if you lost a U.S. company to take one, and only killed a platoon in the process, then you are behind for the exchange. With exit conditions it is a little more complicated, but as near as I can tell it works like this. There is an additional award for units marked "should exit for points", that goes into the denominator calculation. The amount is 2x the point cost of the unit, for whatever units are marked "should exit for points". This is in addition to the normal "life" value of the unit. If the unit exits, the exiter gets those points. If it does not exit, the other side gets those points. Points for killing the unit are additional. So, say there is a Sherman worth 120 points marked "should exit". Then at start up, it counts for 360 points - 120 life, 240 exit. If it lives and exits, all of these points go to the exiter. If it dies and thus fails to exit, then all of them go to the other side. If it lives but does not exit, then the owner gets the "life" 120, the other side gets the "didn't exit" 240, for a net result of 120 on the side trying to prevent exit. As you can see, exit conditions can heavily dominate when present, if *most* of one force is given exit conditions, and succeeds or fails en bloc. If only about half of the forces marked "should exit", manage to, then the exit results have no net effect on the numerators. The exit VC still raises the denominator though, so the result of such a "half exit, half don't" will be nearer to a draw, than it would be without the exit VC. It is worth doing a lot to fufill the exit conditions you are given, therefore - or to stop the other guy from fufilling his exit conditions. Conceptually, with exit VCs the critical battle is going to take place off the map someplace else. Whether forces arrive there or not, is more decisive than what happens on-map. (Or rather, the most decisive thing on-map, is how it will effect that other battle). I hope this helps.

A wise man once said, "the mind is a machine for coming to conclusions. If it can't, it is rusty." On the reports of he-man-ness recounted by brass polishers and late publicists, I wonder just a tad about selection bias on the vets that get interviewed, or that want to be. I'll let you figure it out. There is variation in war, and in every type of unit, because human beings are not uniform. It is not actually any respect for them to pretend they were. If it be well weighed, in fact, to claim every man or every man in a given unit was uniformly brave, is a sort of insult to those who actually were. It is a quite general tendency, you know. Moral characteristics attach to individuals, not to groups, classes, occupations, or categories. Not all businessmen are energetic, not all clergymen are moral, not all scientists are careful, not all judges are fair - and not all soldiers, or paratroops, are brave. And incidentally, the combat psych studies are at least as much about another subject, that is far more worthy than lack of bravery. Many men are reluctant to kill, without much if any reluctance to undergo danger for the sake of duty, or for others. This is hardly a failing, in human terms. In fact, the army was at least as threatened by the idea that soldiers resist the whole idea of killing as a duty, as they were by visions of widespread cowardice. The latter is in fact less threatening, morally speaking, to the average professional soldier, than is the former. He typically knows, rationally, that bravery is more choiceworthy than cowardice, and almost everyone agrees with him about that. He generally knows that he has more bravery than the average person. And almost everyone knows that his duty is an essential one that cannot be avoided. But killing is a dirty job, and many men feel that very keenly, even those who see that sometimes it is essential and someone must do it. [This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 03-31-2001).]

The ass is that round thing on the back. The elbows are those pointy things at the angles of the dangling dowitzes on the sides. "Redundant truth never bothers me" - Feynman Incidentally, if one wants input on things to include in a product, then listening to the customers is a fine idea. Which seems to have occurred to some people. On the other hand, if you want fawning amorous attentions, hire a lady of ill fame.

Because we won

OK, whether any of this is realistically covered in CM was the next obvious question, which Terence (as usual) had the sense to ask. I think the answer is "yes". I ran a test to see about this, which I will relate. Terence wondered in particular whether the firepower of conscripts might not be too high, if everyone is counted as up and firing. Well, in realistic conditions, conscripts are not all up and firing, because they cower rather easily when they take fire. And when they do shoot, they do not shoot particularly straight. I decided to test this in CM in my little mini-scenario lab (mu-hu-hahaha). So I gave the Germans 1 rifle-44 platoon of conscripts. I gave the U.S. 1 regular rifle platoon, with a single MMG for fire support. I made it a meeting engagement to avoid foxhole effects, but gave the Germans a defensive task in better cover - regular woods, with mostly scattered trees in front of them, seperated by patches of open ground, with occasional brush. The German HQ I gave +1 command only, the U.S. HQ had +1 to everything but stealth. Both sides stayed in command distance almost all the time, incidentally. The odds in men were 45 vs. 31, while the odds in CM points was 138 vs. 65. Now, the Germans have 3 MG-42, 8 MP-40, 1 Pistol, and 19 rifles. The U.S. had 1 MMG, 3 BAR, 4 SMG, 1 Pistol, 32 rifles. The Germans also have 14-16% cover, vs. the 25-30% average for the U.S. out in scattered trees, with occasional higher figures when crossing particular bits of open ground. If the Germans were regulars and as well led as the U.S., I'd expect them to hold, or at least make the battle a bloody exhange, since the cover difference, defense, and weapons mix would about make up for the numbers. Notice, in that case the points odds would be 138 vs. 105, or about "probe" odds, and less than the cover differential. What actually happened? The U.S. lost 6 WIA, 2 KIA and smashed the German platoon. 1 German surrendered and 5 ran off the map, the other 25 were hit. The whole affair took 7 minutes. In addition, however, the effects of the lower morale can be seen in the way the U.S. took its losses. In the first minute, a conscript fired at ~150 yards at a U.S. squad moving in the open, and flat missed, not even a temporary "alerted" result. Another managed to expose itself in woods at a distance of 175 yards, drawing fire from the U.S. MMG. The MMG fired 51 fp at 14% cover, and the conscript squad hit the dirt. It recovered rapidly enough, but the point is a tiny amount of fire was able to cause cowering. Half of the U.S. losses for the whole fight, occurred in the 2nd minute. The ranges were between 67 and 100 yards, shooting at men moving in scattered trees. 3 conscript squads were firing, although one of them hit the dirt a few times between shots. They hit 4 men, 2-1-1 on the various U.S. squads. The regulars experienced "shaken" results from these shots, and 1 experienced a "pinned" which rapidly "rose" to a "shaken". By the end of the second minute, 2 U.S. squads were back up to "alerted" and the last was "OK". All were still able to fire, and the conscripts were also still "up". In the 3rd minute, the U.S. concentrated most of their fire on one, nearest German squad. It was reduce to cowering by half-way through the minute. It never recovered, despite slackened fire at it in the 4th minute. It took 2 hits in the 5th, ran, took 2 more while running, cowered for 2 minutes near its HQ without rallying, and eventually ran off the map when that position was assaulted. The U.S. took 1 hit in the 3rd minute and 2 in the 5th, from one particularly effective volley by a single German squad. The 2nd German squad cowered in the 5th minute, with the range around 100 yards. As soon as it did, the U.S. rushed. The second cowerer got up a couple times during the rush, but was quickly back down again. A squad with 10 men left (U.S.) closed to point blank, had a moments panic when fired on by the German HQ too (loss of 8th man), recovered to "pinned", and then fought in close combat. The German squad was not defending itself and was quickly butchered. Fire shifted to the last holdout and losses on it piled up, reducing it to a half-squad. More Americans rushed in the center, had a brief firefight with the German HQ and dispatched 2 of its members, who then ran. 1 more was hit and the other ran off the map. The last half-squad was reduced to 3 men, then those ran, 2 more were hit, and the last surrendered. The conscripts were able to fire for one minute at the start of the battle with something like full effectiveness. In the period 3rd-6th minute, progressively fewer of them were firing, and U.S. losses were very low, 1 man per minute from ~25 shooters. Under this weak fire, the firepower of the U.S. forces stayed roughly constant, with only a few riflemen down, little cowering, and the range progressively closing, on average, to compensate for what there was of either. As the progressive effect of this constant fire built, 2 men, 4 men, 6 men down, the German force rapidly lost its ability to reply with any effect. The net result was that 3:2 odds attackers facing a nearly 2:1 cover differential against them, inflicted 3-4 times the causalties they took. Which means there was a large difference in the amount of shooting going on - perhaps 5 times over the whole fight. Some of that was close range fire in the last 2 minutes without any reply to speak of, some was more nearly even firing in the first 2 minutes. So the conclusion is that the CM morale system will definitely show firepower well below "everyone firing", especially with lower quality troops. If one always fights veteran vs. veteran, then one is indeed likely to get distinctly "un-Marshall-an" outcomes. To me, this only underlines a point I keep repeating every chance I get, that the most realistic fights in CM come when the force mix is green and regular, not all vet, or vet and regular. The good command delay system also matters in fights like that, too.

To Michael - Will find? LOL. I've read everything Keegan ever wrote, and long before I ever heard of you or combat mission. Incidentally, he has his own subjects he is sloppy about, for example his absurd crusade against a straw-man Clausewitz. Which is not to say he isn't indispensible on many other questions. Back on the subject of Marshall, the U.S. Army hated his conclusions, and set out over the course of two generations to discredit his work. They did find some sloppiness. It is possible the 1/2 shooting figure, seen in Korea, would be a more accurate average even for early on. The army still took his stuff seriously (he was the chief army historian in the ETO, and eventually a brigadier general). Most of the training changes based on his analysis, occurred in the 1950s and early 1960s. So the uptick noticed between Korea and Nam can plausibly be traced to changes in training. But there is no obvious explanation of the uptick between his WW II claims - first put forth in 1947 - and the ~50% firing figure he himself found in Korea. He may have exaggerated the effect in WW II, or it may be that heavy weapons were able to carry more of the weight in WW II than in Korea. Terrain and force-wise, Korea was an infantryman's war, though with powerful artillery support, certainly. Nobody claims that everyone fires in combat. Incidentally, the comment about the hard to find VC strikes me as quite beside the point for Nam. Most of the fighting (certainly the heaviest fighting) in Nam was against NVA regulars, not VC guerillas. And plenty of those fights were as stand-up, shoot-it-out as you please. I do not disagree, however, that there was lots of area fire - terrain playing a big part in that, which may have been what you meant.

MarkEzra is quite right. The army took it very seriously, and they changed the way rifle training was done. Pop up targets as he mentioned, also human-shaped targets instead of bullseyes. And increases in portions firing were definitely noted as a result. The breakdown of combat pysch reactions remains very much a real issue. What the better training has mostly managed to do, is to get people in the 2nd and sometimes 3rd categories, to at least sometimes shoot. A lot of area fire results, but it is fire. A disproporionate amount of the fighting is still done by a natural-fighter subgroup. This is not all that hard to understand. A 150 man company can walk onto a battlefield with enough ammo to kill a division of enemy. But if it kills or wounds a unit the same size of itself, discounting what supporting artillery does, then that is a rare and bloody fight. More typical is 1/3rd that amount. Why? Because both sides are avoiding the danger the other side presents, enough to keep most of the shooting at longer distances, or blind to keep the other guy's head down. It is easy for a subgroup that is willing to expose itself to get aimed, clear LOS shots, to account for most of the actual wounds inflicted. Incidentally, in air combat, where aggressiveness is even more essential to success, much the same thing was found. 20% of the pilots got 80% of the kills. The only thing that the stand-out group had in common beforehand, was a greater propensity to get involved in fist-fights while still in training.

To MrSpkr - No, Marshall was not talking about "teeth to tail" issues, he was indeed talking about the troops actually in combat, in the firing line. And Terence has it about right, that it follows a sort of social 80-20 rule. In combat, the psychological reaction is the biggest issue. Marshall based his conclusions on careful and detailed research, a model in its time and in many ways, even since. He interviewed men coming out of combat, about what they had done and what others had done. He found that reactions broke out into several stereotyped roles within the group. One portion fought the enemy, another smaller portion cowered (or rarely, ran away outright). Most did neither of the above, and instead focused their efforts on actions that helped the group, but without directly fighting the enemy. Those include carrying ammo and equipment, spotting, treating wounded and getting them to safety, clearing jams, loading magazines or ammo belts, acting as runners and delivering messages or warnings. Some in the middling category would fire if on crew-served weapons, or if everyone else was firing, in some coordinated and visual fashion (aka a "mad minute"). About half in this majority group exposed themselves to enemy fire, perhaps more than was even necessary, while the other half avoided doing so. The psychology of the thing has to do with inhibitions about killing people, as well as reactions to personal danger. Some react to such danger with a "fight" response, naturally, over and over. They are reacting to the enemy, and also "displaying" to the rest of the group, or trying to lead by example. They go through a cycle of increasingly reckless disregard for their own safety, until most of them reach a "burnout" stage and become apathetic about both combat, and their own fate. A second group reacts with dedication to the group. They imitate the fearlessness about personal danger of the first set. But they do not kill, or only rarely do so, when it is a group action (e.g. crew served weapons, mad minutes, occasional "rescue" situations). These types can be as brave as you please, running through barrages or MG fire to rescue a fallen comrade, etc - but they are just not killers. After a period of burnout, they may pass into either the 1st category or the 3rd, or not. A third group reacts to the danger by seeking their own safety, but remains committed to the group. They avoid exposing themselves, are always shouting "get down!" and the like, and try to avoid drawing fire. But psychologically, they must do something to help the group in its trial, or they can't live with themselves. So they do things that are useful, that do not involve too much danger. Carrying things, including weapons, ammo and wounded, treating wounded after they have reached safety, loading - the grab-bag of "labor" tasks in combat. In the fourth group, the primary response to combat is disbelief, stun, followed by submission - meaning the attempt to make aggressive people stop being violent and dangerous, by appearing unthreatening to them. This rarely means outright surrender, unless the enemy is very close. It does involve a disregard for dangerous commands and a disconnect from the welfare of the group. People who responsed this way still obey orders - meekly. But they wouldn't hurt a fly. They sometimes do useful things, but more often they do not, and are found after the battle is over, cracking jokes, often ones about the unbelievable craziness of it all. There are no reliable indicators of which class someone falls into, before the event. As Montaigne wittily put it, "one who has never been in danger cannot answer for his courage". The types are definite and personal, extending from combat to combat, with only marginal variation up and down the list. A greater propensity can be found for the first category, in highly aggressive people, in a literal and almost animal sense of the term. As in, how many fist-fights does this guy get into outside of combat. But not all that fall into the 1st type of response, fit this stereotype, and not all who act that way out of combat, fight in the real thing. Naturally leaders are found most often in the second class, and in members of the first who are not anti-social, and are peaceful outside of combat. A solid portion of the natural fighters don't have an ounce of leader in them, being focused on the enemy, not the group, and on killing, not winning. A large portion in the first class also experience "battlefield psychosis", in which they forget everything they did from some moment in the fight, until it was over. A typical comment is "then I just put my mind someplace else and I guess the training takes over. I really don't think I did more than anybody else out there." This, from a 20 year old kid whose foxhole had 100 dead enemy in a perfect semi-circle around it. He will tell you in great detail everything that happened before the enemy "rush". After that, he can't remember a thing. His mind does not accept what happened, what he did. Armies are complex social organizations, not machines. And real battle isn't a game.

I'm interested, but where is it? A link, a link, my kingdom (which I don't have) for a...

I think Grisha's list is basically right. Yes, there were other formations, but not significant ones in combat. For example, the Slovaks did provide 2 divisions. But they fell behind the march in 1941 for lack of adequate transport, without seeing any serious action. A single brigade was motorized to keep up with the rest of the German forces, later increased to a single division. It was in like 2 battles and did quite badly. The less mobile forces were used as rear area security troops. What was left of the mobile force was pulled out of the line, supposedly to refit but it never really did. They tried to use them as a regiment or battalion alongside German units, but morale was abysmal by then, and in the end they just formed a contruction battalion out of the leftovers. Incidentally, Italy had by far the biggest army of any of the other powers mentioned, but few Italian units served in Russia, and did less. The Hungarians had enough Czech-built armor to equip one panzer division, and to replace its tanks once over the course of the war. The Finns fought well of course. Other than those cases, the Axis minor allies were added leg infantry with poor weapons, officers, and morale. They should be in the game because beating on them, wherever part of the line was assigned to them that is, was a useful Russian strategy.

You can take the advantage away by giving the attacker a handicap, when you think they *don't* need it. The default numbers edge for attackers just reflects the fact that attackers, attacked, precisely because they did have a local edge in numbers. I mean, that is where attacks come from - LOL. In fact, the usual attackers edge was considerably larger than the default level in CM, but to get a decent fight only a modest edge is given to them. The defender starts with the objectives in attacks. That is the "compensation". The attack has to go through him, or destroy his defenses, or displace him. If an attacker sits on his board edge, he will lose the game. Whereas in a meeting engagement, if both sides sit still the result will be a draw.