Chief

Here's a thought for CM2+ that I had not seen on the board. My apologies if it has already been aired. I'd like an option that permits a side to randomly reduce the soldiers in a personnel unit by a set percentage. (That is, the percentage is set for all units in the force -- the individual reductions are applied randomly.) Reduced units would come with the longer-term effects of the casualties, but would not be broken, shaken, stirred, etc. at the scenario start. Why? Will this could be used to simulate a beat-to-crap unit that hasn't even had time to reorganize its depleted units into fewer full strength ones. For instance, you could apply a, say, 20% reduction to a unit that had just gone through a preliminary bombardment, or that had been the subject of a vigorous pursuit. Whaddaya think?

CM is a righteous game. My long-time gaming bud and I both independently bought the game after catching the CGW review. When we saw what we had, we practically fell into each other's arms weeping. I mean, in retrospect, it was a real uncomfortable moment. But then CM does that to people. To qoute my bud, a present-at-the-creation player of the original Avalon Hill Squad Leader and all its progeny "It's the only game we'll ever have to buy." Of course, he then immediately began to speculate about the launch dates of the planned sequels. Buy the game! ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

Oh, and, and: 5. An increased fog of war setting with less information on the enemy (and perhaps your own guys). 6. (Seeing that this is a flame-free zone) crews who abandoned ship occasionally climbing back aboard. I can document at least one historical case of this for AFVs, and suspect that I could find ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

For CM2, my wish list would be: 1. Artillery barrages -- massive, mindless preset meatgrinders that march relentlessly forward (and occasionally backward) across the map in true Russian fashion. If you're not taking 5% casualties from your own barrage, your not following closely enough. 2. Immobile (field phone-equipped) FOs. 3. More fortification detail: trenches, tanks dug in on three sides but not four, fortified buildings, perhaps with basements. 4. Booby-traps for the inevitable urban scenarios.

My wife tells me I'm 46. I'm struggling to do the math . . .

Those in search of a flak experience should play the Allies in "Night at Cheneux". I just did, as I'm playing through all the Bulge scenarios. It's some considerable ugly. As to the US M16, I would like to see it in the game. While the US Army did not use AA weapons to engage ground targets as frequently as did the Heer, there are well documents instances of both SP and ground mounts being used against infantry. The was particuarly true in the Bulge, where the Germans succeeded in penetrating well past the US front lines.

Well then Chupacabra, but how does CM model anti-armor close assaults? Is infantry presumed to have Molotovs, grenade bundles and such, or is an infantry assault on an MBT useless unless the infantry have a demo charge? To date, I think that all my infantry kills on armor have been via shaped charge weapons. ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

Well, my previous post (On National Characteristics) was locked down faster than Alcatraz, but I did want to respond to a few of the responses. On victory points. I'm not proposing that victory points simply reflect the relative abundance or scarcity of equipment. I'm proposing something more subtle: that the victory point system (either by purchasing values or an adjustment for victory point values) encourage players to build forces similar to their historical counterparts. I would not make a US 105 FO 1/2 or 1/4 the cost of a German equivalent, but I would try to adjust the relative values of US FOs and US infantry to take into account the relative scarcity of infantry and the relative abundance of FOs in the US force structure. Perhaps the VP structure already does this (although I don't see it yet), or perhaps this is too subtle to be worth doing, or perhaps this is not a big deal because most players don't use the point system to buy units), but that's my idea. On doctrine and experience, I do think that small unit behavior in different armies tended to converge as units got experience. (And I also think that this was not always a good thing from a battalion CO perspective, and vets would tend not to do the dumb things that were sometimes required to serve higher unit objectives.) I still think, though, that some residue of training and doctrine adhered, even as experience levels mounted. This was the result of equipment influences (like building a squad around a single weapon such as an MG42) or deeply held tactical beliefs (like starting attacks with probes for weakness).

I know that there have been posts before in the topic of national characteristics, but I couldn’t resist raising the subject again. So like a moth to the bug zapper, here I go. I argue for national characteristics in CM. I do so not because I think that the soldiers of different nations had certain inherent characteristics. I do not think that this was the case. I do so because I think that doctrine, training, manpower and equipment affected the ways that the armies of different nations fought, and did so in ways that could be reflected in CM. Take doctrine and training, as I understand them to have existed at the time. Each army used a sufficiently different tactical system to fight differently in the CM system. German training emphasized things like attacking weakness instead of strength, probing before committing, moving without much regard to flanks, using maneuver offensively to establish defensively strong positions, selecting defensive positions with an eye to maximizing firepower rather than cover and concealment. Russian training was fairly basic in its treatment of fire and movement, and taught that high casualties in the initial assault were an acceptable price to pay for bringing about low-casualty maneuver warfare. Russian offensive operations were often meticulously rehearsed at the tactical level (sometimes down to the individual soldier) and tended to be rigid operationally. US training was designed to turn out a reasonably skilled army quickly. Offensive doctrine fell in between the German emphasis on flexibility and the Russian concept of meticulous plans meticulously carried out. The defensive was merely waiting for enough supplies to resume the offensive. American units seemed to rely more on training from the bottom up rather than from the top down. Units published training and tactics, and tactical innovations spread laterally between units. British training seemed more tactically informed than US training, but from the top down, with an emphasis on “immediate action drills” aimed at enabling platoons to carry out preplanned actions quickly. British artillery doctrine was perhaps the most flexible of all the major combatants, with FOs being ably to call down truly astounding concentrations of firepower. Look also at equipment and manpower. These factors also controlled tactical doctrine in the ETO. Both the US and the UK faced crises of manpower, particularly among infantry. By the end of 1944, after 5 years of war, the British Army was a wasting asset (I can’t speak for the Canadian replacement situation). The US had gambled on a “small army” to build up air and naval power, and had greatly underestimated the casualty rates for infantry to boot. While the US Army was able to continue to field new draftee divisions even late in the war, it had to mount an intensive search for replacements to older divisions. Both of these armies (and particularly the US) were blessed, however, with lavish material support. Ammo, guns, vehicles, communications gear and airpower were all relatively plentiful, with temporary shortages experienced only when supply lines were stretched. From the perspective of these armies, ammo, communications and even armored vehicles were all easy to replace, but each life lost was expensive. While the German Army faced a manpower problem at least as severe as the Western Allies’, it was not in its power to solve it with material. The Heer was ruthless in stripping support units to (or perhaps below) the minimum workable size. It equipped its infantry with progressively more automatic weapons to counteract the shrinking size of squads and platoons. It relied on slave labor in factories to draft workers and send them to the front. But as the war in the ETO progressed, the German army found it harder to get supplies forward, to keep vehicle strengths up, to keep artillery operating in the face of Allied airpower, or to keep units equipped with goodly quantities of communications equipment. The result was an increasing German reliance on infantry, mortars and direct fire support both offensively and defensively. Sheer raw manpower was not a Russian problem. The Russian problem was to completely rebuild an army on the shattered ruins of 1941. The Russian recovery in 1942-43 is remarkable by any measure, but it (and the general nature of the Soviet industrial plant) left the Russians with equipment imbalances – primarily in communications, but also in the automotive area. The Russian economy was geared to making large heavy metallic things – guns, planes, tanks – but not small electronic things like radios. These critical communications shortages pushed the tactics of mass on them. Without a means to maneuver flexibly, the Soviet Army relied on intricate pre-set planning. Without radio-equipped FOs to direct fire, the Soviets had to use rigid pre-set fire plans and artillery in a direct fire mode. So what does this mean for national characteristics. I think that the factors outlined above can be reflected in CM through both the AI and the units points costs. The AI might make German units more likely to start an attack with probes, and more likely to try another route of advance if it met strong resistance to an initial thrust. Defensively, the AI would weigh lines of sight over cover and concealment in selecting positions. The AI would be sparing in its use of armor and artillery, at least until the enemy’s positions were fully developed. For Americans and British, the AI might be more resistant to abandoning an avenue of attack in the face of opposition, and more likely to dump in armor and artillery support to bull a way through. Units would be more affected by events on their flanks and more inclined to directly assault the enemy rather than try to infiltrate by and occupy dominating positions. On the defense, artillery fires and other support would be rapidly applied. In general, infantry units without armor or artillery support should be more prone to calling things off – and with US units more prone to wait for support than British units. For both countries, units would be fairly comfortable operating at a distance from command elements. For Russians, the AI might adopt a plan and stick with it until exhaustion. Heavy direct fire support weapons would play a prominent role, and artillery, when available, would tend to be massively but inflexibly applied. Defensively, concealment and cover should be emphasized, and the defense should be tough but relatively immobile. Units would stay close to their commanders. Points values could also play a role in giving a unique flavor to each nation’s forces. Disclaimer: I have not done an exhaustive analysis of the CM:BL points values, and I of course have no idea of the points values for the upcoming Russian Front effort. What I’m suggesting now is that, in addition to the absolute effectiveness of a unit, that the points system also take into account the relative value of the unit within its own army. Let’s look first at infantry. A regular 12 man US 44 Rifle Squad costs 34 points, while a Heer 9 man 44 Infantry Squad costs 29. This implies that a US infantryman is worth 2.83 points, while his counterpart is worth 3.22 points. But to the US Army, an infantryman was a scarcer commodity that he was in the German Army. So perhaps US squads should be more expensive on a man for man basis than their German counterparts. Artillery provides another example. A regular US 105mm FO with 100 rounds costs 215 points: 2.15 points per round. His German counterpart with 60 rounds costs 113 points, or 1.88 points per round. This implies a relationship inverse to history. In the ETO, US radios, artillery rounds and artillery tubes were more plentiful and so arguably “cheaper” that their German counterparts. What I am proposing is a tricky bit of balancing – a points system that pushed players to assemble forces with historical force characteristics by weighting the points value for individual units to reflect the scarcity of those units at the front. So to sum up, I make a case for national characteristics in CM, not to reflect some sort of inherent quality, but to reflect force doctrines, force structures, and the relationship between the two. If this could be properly implemented, I think that it could enhance an already great game system. ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

In the real world, I was taught to run like hell if under artillery fires. I have no idea whether this would work in action, but the training I got (Army ROTC, 1972) was aimed at overcoming the instinct to get down in the mood and wait for it to be over. As another poster said, this may have been prompted by modern air burst ordnance. In game terms, I would add the rather cold-blooded tactic of providing a sacrificial lamb to your opponent's fires. A platoon in the open works for this. Scout vehicles work even better, because they can keep moving and survive longer. Kubelwagens, for example, can last for astoundingly long times and do some useful spotting at the same time.

The official US Army histories have large topographical maps bound in. Last I knew, they were still available through any US Government Bookstore. They also have OB details and good narratives of the fighting, and, in many cases, panoramic photos. There is variation from book to book on the scale of the maps presented. IIRC, the volumes on the Seigfreid Line and Lorraine campaigns have good tactical-scale maps. Of course, the volume on small unit actions has maps and panoramic photos that take you down to the platoon level. ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

To put in my 2 cents, I concur that Jumbos were rare. 76mm Jumbos were extremely rare. I've read that these tanks were used tactically as the point tanks in formations going up against fixed AT defenses. The official US Army histories suggest that they could take 75mm AT fire without much comment, and could even shrug off 88mm fire at reasonable ranges. The other posts here square with my information on 76mm Shermans generally. I've never seen anything that suggests a standard official TO&E mixing 76mm and 75mm Shermans in set proportions, contrary to the British practice with Fireflies and Comets. No doubt individual units worked out doctrine on this. My impression is that tank battalions in US Armored Divisions had a higher proportion of 76mm Sherms at any given time than did their "independent" counterparts attached to Infantry Divisions. ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

These get a prominent mention in the official US Army history of the Bulge. As described there, they were companies meant for the assault, with a high proportion of automatic weapons. By the time of the Bulge, I presume that this meant alot of MP44s. I can't recall whether they were always formed from divisional troops or were special formations. I'll hafta go look. ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

Thanks flks, I'll definitely try the "walk the IP around" approach to conserving ammo.

Medlinke: When you create a reserve, do you keep back a platoon per company, or a squad per platoon. I can see the utility of keeping back a squad, as I notice that my HQs stay pretty gunned up when I keep them behind the squads. And what's the "strange angle" of fire being more effective? Have you (or others) noticed that infantry is more effective if delivered from a flank? By the by, I do generally try to maneuver in cover and dead zones whenever I can, although do make the occasional exception if I think that I have an overwhelming firepower advantage at a particular point. I suspect that seeing all those tracers fly in is a "feel good" thing, but that I may be wasting .30 cal. items.

Having played around with Combat Mission (in my estimation, the greatest combat simulation ever to grace a computer screen) for a scant few weeks, I am so ungrateful as to have a few game play requests. Experienced gamers, perhaps you can tell me how you handle these issues or why they are the way they are. 1. Less artillery. Damn but FOs burn through rounds quickly. If you want to drizzle harassing fire on a position, is there any way to slow these guys down? Does “Pause” work? Re-targeting (but that’s the luck of the draw, if the missions starts at the beginning of a turn? Is there any sentiment for a “Fire but don’t burn out the tubes” command? This would be a big help for laying smoke on a position. 2. Less information. Why do I get to know the quality levels of opposing troops? (“Let’s blast the Elite guys before they kill us all.”) I’d be content to know that my guys were taking more or less fire, and then figure out whether I was up against good troops, fanatics, guys lying doggo, or whatever. 3. Less infantry fire. My guys must all have blistered trigger fingers by the time the fighting’s done. I find that I regularly run squads out of ammo in the course of a 30 turn scenario, and that’s with a covered approach march to the LD or other inactive periods. Looking at other posts, I suspect that I’m doing something wrong here. Should I have guys “Hide” more? Am I nuts to try to have squads lay down a base of fire at 200-300m, because they’re really just making noise and attracting fire when engaging troops in defensive positions. My proclivity on the offense is to shoot at whatever I can see that can shoot back, as long as I’ve preserved a maneuver element. And I notice that the AI also seems to shoot until the barrels droop. What am I missing? ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

Pillar: I can think of a situation in which I don't want infantry to stop and shoot at nearby enemies, and that's when I want to close-assault the bad guys. I find that "Move" or "Run" works well for this. I can tell a squad to move into a house and do the close in thing without fear that their orders will park them in the street 5 meters away from the door. Of course, enemy fire is another matter . . . . Not being a subtle type, I haven't used "Sneak" all that much. But if the idea is that sneaking troops will have a higher propensity to stop, drop, and shoot, then the specific functions of the two commands make sense to me. ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

That's no bug, that's how I carry around an American armored infantry platoon: 3 x M3 with 1 squad and 1 bazooka team 1 x M3 with HQ and 60mm mortar 1 x M3 with 2 M1919 MG. 5 HTs, 10 squads and teams, no waiting.

Oops, thats' 1943, not 1942. By the by, the armored infantry company in 1944 and 1945 had, as best I can derive from the official TO&Es, 20 halftracks. 10 had .50 cal. armament and were presumably either M3A1s or M2s (to tow the gun section). See my post last night on platoon organizations for more details.

Wilhammer: I can confirm that the M3A1 was apparently viewed as a replacement for the M3 in US TO&Es. I have an official TO&E for a recon troop that noted that the HTs will be M3s until M3A1s become available. I quote from TO&E 2-27 (15 July 1942), commenting on the M3A1s assigned to the troop: "Modified half-track pers carr with ring mount for cal. .50 MG and panel mounts for cal. .30 MG. Pending availablilty,, carr pers, half-track, M3 w/o armament will be substituted." All US TO&Es from this period list the halftracks as "w/o armament" and list the MG armament separately. For this TO&E, at least, the M3 and M3A1 were used interchangeably.

I have some questions about how CMers simulate Allied platoon organizations. I have three platoon types in mind: US Cavalry recon platoons, US armored infantry platoons, and British motor platoons. US Cavalry recon platoons (I love these guys). These came in two sections: a 3 car armored car section and a scout section with 6 jeeps. The platoon commander rode with the armored cars. The jeeps carried 17 men with 3 M1919 LMGs and 3 60mm mortars. For personal defense, they had 6 SMGs, 6 carbines and 5 M1s. The platoon had no organic platoons, but the company HQ had 4. So here’s my approach. The 3 M8s are easy. For the scout section, I use 3 M1919 teams and 3 60mm mortar teams, and 6 unarmed jeeps. I got issues. (A) Where’s the HQ? Can I put a HQ in an M8? Can I attach a HQ to the scout team? Where does it ride if I can? Maybe I stick it on the M8, if I can figure out where to get one? ( The MGs should be able to from the jeeps, but also to fire dismounted. Can I mount an MG on a jeep and strip it off for use on a ground mount? ( Too many bodies, too few rifles – but I figure that this is close enough for government work. 2. Armored infantry platoons. I’m back figuring from the company TO&E now. A platoons seems to have been 5 halftracks with 3 squads, 2 M1919 LMGs, a 60mm mortar, and a HQ. And bazookas. The company had 18 – say that the platoons got 4 each. Oh, and half the 20 ‘tracks in a company were M2s or M3A1s. Here’s my attempt: 3 M3s, each with a squad and a bazooka; 1 M3A1 with the HQ and mortar, and an M3A1 with the two MGs. Problems: (A) That’s a lot of bazookas, but apparently not enough. ( With patch 1.1, I don’t think that I can load all those teams into M3A1s. © BARs. The 2/44 armored division didn’t have any. None. Zippo. Not in the picture. Now I imagine that enterprising armored infantry squads found BARs all over the ETO, but I am curious about the official TO&E and how it might be simulated. Thoughts, anyone? 3. Motor platoons. British armored brigades had halftrack-born infantry battalions in their TO&Es. ASL gives the platoon organization as 4 ‘tracks with 3 squads, a HQ, a PIAT and a 2” mortar. The attempt: 4 M9A1s, 2 with squads, 1 with a squad and a PIAT, 1 with the HQ and mortar. But: (A) That’s a lot of Ma Deuces. Surely the British would not have more .50 cal. equipped halftracks via Lend Lease that the Americans had. ( If I install the 1.1 patch, many of these guys are walking. Is there a way that I can use the M3 ‘tracks with the British infantry? Well, it would be great to hear how others have taken on these issues. (Don’t shoot, I’m a newbie.)