The_Capt

I have to admit, one thing that did make me nervous in the second year of this war is a complete lack of a coherent western strategy with respect to this war. We throw stuff at Ukraine until their military looks like a traveling circus. We have never articulated strategic objectives nor really outlined how we intend to achieve them. And we definitely do not have a coherent 2-4 year plan on how to outlast Russia. I suspect we applied western lenses (again) to last years summer offensive and assumed victory. This makes me very nervous for post-war reconstruction, which may very well be just as messy and ad hoc. This whole thing feels very “making it up as we go along” and we need to change that.

C’mon cite the whole analysis: Despite these achievements, Russia faces significant limitations in the longevity and reliability of its industrial output. Of the tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles, for example, approximately 80% are not new production but are instead refurbished and modernised from Russian war stocks. The number of systems held in storage means that while Russia can maintain a consistent output through 2024, it will begin to find that vehicles require deeper refurbishment through 2025, and by 2026 it will have exhausted most of the available stocks. As the number of refurbished vehicles goes down, industrial capacity can go into making new platforms, but this will necessarily mean a significant decrease in vehicles delivered to the military.

I think the broader point is that Ukraine is not a teenager - all the tragedy but no accountability or responsibility. There were a lot of strategic failures in the run up to this war and they do not all lay at the feet of Europe or the US. The global arms industry is incredibly large and Ukraine could have leveraged that to be much better prepared for what was a pretty obvious threat on its eastern border. (https://www.brookings.edu/articles/its-time-to-stop-us-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/#:~:text=A total of 73% of,averaging %2410.7 billion per year.) Of course hindsight being 20/20 it is also fair to admit that no one really thought Russia would go this far. We pretty much expected another nibble in the Donbas, maybe consolidate that strategic corridor. A full on grab was not the assessed most likely COA. Further Ukraine did move mountains within its military in those 8 years, the most important of which was to set themselves up for integration into western C4ISR. As has been noted, we are where we are, which is here. And all that really matters is what we do now.

Yes, I wasn’t really trying to single you out personally, there has been some obstinate talk on “Ukraine must sue for peace” coming from certain quarters and it needs to be addressed. The peace you describe sounds a lot like Korea, which I honestly think this is where things will go. But Korea had to come after nearly two years of stalemate. Both sides had to agree in good faith to a cessation of warfare that allowed each side to pursue their own agendas. It was “good enough” to call. In my opinion, right now, this war is nowhere near this point. And this is not on Ukraine, it is on Russia. Had Priggy made the push to Moscow, thrown out Putin and then sued for negotiations…maybe - even if it meant dealing with that nut bar. But Putin and his regime have clearly signalled this is a make or break fight for them. With them still in power and actively attacking, there is not room for negotiations as they will be dictated within Putin’s framework. We are not in a position to dictate terms or even hope to get a rational outcome. Putin will likely demand Ukrainian neutrality, which is just a thin veil for a vulnerable insecure Ukraine he can retake later. He will demand Ukrainian demilitarization, which will translate to a withdrawal of western support. He will also likely demand “de-nazification” which will mean basically whatever enters his pointy little head because it is so poorly defined. None of this works for us and even opening that door will be taken as a sign of weakness. My thinking is we need to break Russia’s military hands, retake that strategic corridor and push Russia back to 2022 lines…then we can ask “had enough?” To do it now is a fools errand.

We are definitely at a “we have forgotten the faces of our fathers. - moment” in the West. I have already heard this war framed in terms as either the greatest success or worse failure in the western system since the end of the Cold War that may very well shape the rest of the 21st century. I am personally uplifted by how much we rallied. We were within inches of tossing NATO out the door and other western unions were under similar assault. I think the question now is whether or not we can follow through and finish this thing? Remember we still have a Ukraine to rebuild once this is all over. The West definitely has interests in this war and Ukraine is essentially defending them. My back gets up when some people act like Western support is an entitlement however. People forget that it is our public who actually own all this support - they paid for it. So we have to convince them that this is worth their money. This means we cannot simply throw out our own democracy in order to pay for this war, as ugly as it gets at times. At its worst this turns into US/Western bashing day, which frankly is not helpful. Anyway, we are in a valley right now, no getting past it. But we will simply have to push through or risk losing what those that came before us sacrificed a lot to build.

Seriously and @squatter can look here too. For anyone advocating Ukraine pursuing peace negotiations or suing for peace - easy to say but no one in this camp has provided a coherent theory of what that would look like right now. Let’s say “Ok, you guys are right. Ukraine is out of options here. There are no viable way for Ukraine to continue to prosecute this war.” Ok, so what? What would peace negotiations look like? How exactly do you guys see these “peace negotiations” happening. Every time I ask this question I get some hand waving but no one has yet to unpack just how any peace negotiations could end up in anything but weakened western influence and a more vulnerable Ukraine that Russia is going to exploit. What peace negotiation, that Russia is going to accept - while, as we are continually reminded, Russia is still capable of waging offensives to take ground? What possible leverage does the west or Ukraine have in guaranteeing Ukrainian independence and security. Is Russia going to offer reparations? How about war crimes prosecution? Is Russia going to give up an inch of ground it has taken? Are they going to push for recognition of Crimea and Donbas as Russian provinces. This is what is so disingenuous about this line of advocacy - at best it is delusional liberal left “let’s give peace a chance”. At worst is it far right BS designed to program failure into this entire war so that their presidential candidate can be “right all along”. In both cases the idea of peace negotiations right now is an empty coffin where actual ideas on this war go to die. We may very well need a negotiated end-state in this war, but suing for peace now, while on the back foot is going to embolden Putin and his regime…and is exactly what they are looking for in order to promote themselves “Look we brought them all to their knees”. But let’s open the floor. Please walk us through what a peace process would look like right now. Let’s stop sideline heckling on won’t work and tell us what you think will work.

I mean these are fair points, and I am not in the "Yay us!" camp. But frankly it is a small miracle that anything happened at all. The West was woefully unprepared for this entire thing, and that is on us. As for Ukraine. Well if we are dolling out harsh but fair truths, they definitely could have been better prepared as well. If I were living next door to Russia, I would make damned sure I had security guarantees that matter (oh wait, I do and we did). I would also be working very hard, like Finland and Sweden just did, to make sure if I needed a quick entry into the western fold that I was ready for that. Corruption and dithering happened inside the Ukraine government as well. I think that no one on this side of this war was truly ready for what actually happened. The West rallied and frankly pulled off the impossible, as did Ukraine - how quickly we forget the miracles of Mar '22. I do not think it is fair to flush all that down the toilet now with revisionist history and hysteria. The West continues to support Ukraine. Billions in aid are still moving. The US is putting on a shameful display of just how fragile its democracy is right now, and ignorant power hungry politicians are exploiting it for personal gain. But I remain confident that 1) Ukraine will adapt. They are leading modern warfare right now and learning incredibly fast, 2) The US and West will eventually get there - democracy does suck at times, but it is the best we have, and 3) Russian decline is occurring as a direct result of #1 and #2. Their ability to be a threat is declining in the conventional space. Hopefully this is a "darkest before dawn" situation and not the abyss that some insist it has become.

You definitely could. Bigger means more weight, but greater speed. Fewer landing options and higher signature (sound and profile). My best guess is that a smaller lighter force first and then if conditions merit, scale up (if you have the stuff) to larger craft and vehicles. Those 14 foot assault boats I posted can carry about 2400 lbs, so just over a metric ton. Trick with the Viking will be weight distribution and balance. Then you can get into fast boats/gun boats but they attract a lot of attention. The good news is that they also have a better chance of outrunning a Russian FPV.

FFS, this is just an extension of "it is all the West's fault", a modern Ukrainian "stab in the back" myth in the making. Could support have been better coordinated? Could it have been better overall...definitely. But the poor weak West managed to send in over support greater than the entire Ukrainian pre-war GDP...but that clearly was weak tea. Now you snap your fingers because we did not send enough Abrams and Bradley's and were cowering under the glare of Putin? The first rule of warfare is "know the war you are in." The first rule of coalition/partnership warfare is "do not turn on each other." But the sentiments you are pushing here are sorely testing my resolve.

Equipment and money = yes. Direct action = no. So you are seriously going to use Cold War spending with this current war? That is your start point? Ukraine is happening within an entirely different context. I mean Cold War defence spending during the Cold War is an entirely different league: https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/USA/united-states/military-spending-defense-budget And now we are back to "what have you done for me lately?" Like the Western world is some sort of war concierge.

Just stop it. This war would be over in a day if the US and West fully slammed down...and then we would be dealing with the next war right behind it. In what universe do you imagine Russia quietly skulking back over the border, avoiding all eye contact and gracefully accepting defeat if the West rolled in all the dice? Should we support Ukraine, absolutely. Should we fight this war for you, no freakin way. Don't believe me? Ok, let's take a look at the last time two nuclear powers got involved in a conventional war...oh wait, there really have not been any. Closest we ever came was here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_wars_and_conflicts And this skirmish was within a year of Pakistan becoming a nuclear power (maybe). So in human experience we have gone to incredible lengths to keep nuclear powers out of direct conventional wars...why do you suppose this is? Cut the "West is to cowardly" and "nukes are not a thing" BS because it clearly is an underlying calculation in this war and just because "you think so" is not going to change that.

Taking the Viking as the example, it comes to roughly 1 x assault boat per vehicle (plus driver): https://www.utvdriver.com/yamaha/viking/ https://shop.tacticalinnovations.ca/military-series-assault-boat-140/ You would have to adapt the boat but that is not a serious problem. So 20 boat rides to get 20 of these beasts across. Say another 20 for ammo, crews and supplies. A 40 x boat crossing (say 50 - for redundancy and losses). Now do you do them in a single lift? Yes, if you can, but that is likely too big and will get picked up. So this is likely a 2-3 trip operation. Given the width of the Dnipro: Lets call it 1km on average. Boat with a decent 40 hp motor and that kind of weight, we are looking at decent walking speed - so say, 5 km/hour - taking into account wood and Styrofoam silencers around engine which cuts efficiency. So 20 min crossing (give or take). Offload - 10 mins, trip back 20 mins. If you want to shift sites (say a km or two up or down stream) you will have to relocate, which takes time. I am thinking 3-4 hours to get 20 of those beasts over the water with crews using 20-30 assault boats. So operation in phases: - Combat divers and swimmers go first to link up with LRPs you already have in place. They clear bank, setup offload points and beach management. Need at least 3-4 sites. They then roll into bridgehead force with what they can carry on their backs - so small arms, drones etc. - Main body bridgehead force goes first. So, vehicle crews etc, with heavier weapons. - Then vehicles in waves, likely 2-3. Offload and clear the beaches/landing sites. Get em into hides and patrol bases. Pick your night. Foggy/rainy is best, stormy second best. Sound will be a major issue. Once you get them up and over the follow on support op gets a lot easier. You can set up rolling far bank DPs and caches. Troops can source water locally. Ammo, food, fuel and medical will be the major issues but with this light a force, manageable. Now you have roughly a light company with wheels who can make trouble up to 20-30 kms deep. Now do that 3 more times and you have a raiding battalion. Each of those small teams with FPVs and Javelins (and maybe some mines but they take weight) could make serious trouble in the Russian backfield. Heavy UAS re-supply and casevec would make a significant difference. Russian troop density is in and around 100 troops per km, which is really thin. Almost zero depth, no real rotations and thin c-moves. Then you go conditions based on the planning - if the raiding bn is getting serious pushback, let them just make trouble (hit and runs etc). If they can actually get RA forces to fall back, well you have a bridgehead for something larger, but that is a whole other thing. Risky and may not work. But to my eyes it has a better chance in the risk/opportunity space than trying mechanized breaches over incredibly dense minefields with higher Russian troop densities. But...and it is the major one, you have to resource it.

Yeesh. Well on the bright side, Ukraine is infinitely better than the other major war partners we had over the last 25 years (governments of Iraq and Afghanistan). But it won't be Western support that kills Ukraine in this war - it can damn well hurt it and create really terrible end-states. But the mess that is western support at times, pales in comparison to what will happen if Ukrainians lose the will to fight. As we learned in both Iraq and Afghanistan - we can send people all the money and guns, but if the will to create their own future is not there it will all mean nothing. If Ukraine loses the will to fight, we could easily see Kyiv fall. The West will retreat to Poland and draw some pretty stark lines - because it will have to. It will create a political "out" for the West, "it wasn't us, it was them...oh well." Russia will stay boxed up. Western political parties will frame the outcome as a gross negligent failure for "them" and a resounding endorsement of "us", the blame game will go into overdrive. And we will deal with the post-war mess. Meanwhile Ukraine will be in for retributions and dark days out of the middle age as Russia enjoys it new gains and make a show of it...all the while the rot and pressure will build to a breaking point later.

Really hard to find good unbiased stuff. Forbes is saying they are at around 10k shells per day, which is way down from early war. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/02/15/three-million-shells-thats-how-much-more-artillery-ammo-russia-thinks-it-needs-to-defeat-ukraine/?sh=6a8a2d4e5a5b And about 2/3rd of what they think they need. Bigger picture view from RUSI on the materiel war. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russian-military-objectives-and-capacity-ukraine-through-2024

This part I do not understand. First off, western militaries have invested a lot of effort into supporting UA force generation efforts. 10's of thousands of Ukrainian per have been put through training. I understand attrition entirely. I get that casualties are high. However, how does a nation of pre-war 42 million people - now down to 36 million with mass exoduses, fail to find enough fighting aged troops to defend itself in what is clearly an existential war? And then there is this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Ukraine#:~:text=According to the United Nations,as low as 28 million. Four years ago, it looked like this: And this: https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ukraine/ Conservatively, Ukraine should be able to muster 1.5-2 million pers in its own defence in a crisis without breaking a sweat...and if this is not a "crisis"...what is? They have only tapped into less than half that number. Large numbers appear to have run away and others are resisting mobilization. If one rolls in women (it is easy to see the UA is largely male dominated) those capacity numbers get even better. Yet here we are being told formations and units are at 50%...seriously guys...WTF? Is it the FG pipeline? Are recruits being turned away? Why are the numbers on the battlefield so low? The Ukrainian president has admitted to 31k dead, so lets say 100k wounded to the point of being out of battle or KIA. That is a lot but Ukraine should be nowhere near the bottom of human capacity in all this. Is it moral? Motivation? Force Generation capability? I mean we are two years into this thing and the UA is faltering manpower-wise...why?

Good question. Light forces and SOF do not appear to be the limiting factor. I would envision this to be sustained deep raiding, actual force levels would likely be quite modest. And training and experience of these forces appears to be quite high in the UA. Logistics is the big one. One would need numerous logistical nodes on wheels on the home side to push resupply and pull back casualties. Boats and trained crews are going to be an issue. There will likely never be enough of them. Air resupply using heavy drones is one offset option. We have seen plenty of demonstrations but it is not known if the UA has enough of these to run a larger operation. Terrain. The good news is that is we are talking fast assault boats, these are pretty flexible on where they can land, which opens up a lot of options. Getting heavier with pontoons would reduce those options as these are larger more complex systems. Fires. Unknown. Drones, mortars and AGLs could be carried with the crossing force. Long range artillery is likely hamstrung by ammo shortages, much like it is elsewhere. HIMARs and air might be an option but those are expensive and one would not to risk them too much. I suspect FPVs might be the offset solution to be honest. At 10-15 km ranges these could at least push RA guns back. And once light forces manage to push further south, they would bring those FPVs with them. Opposing forces. Best we can see opposing forces are pretty light. Russia has to mange a very long frontage as well. It makes sense to go lighter on the far side of a major water obstacle to increase density elsewhere. I suspect they have hard points at obvious crossing points but in other places are likely very thin. More importantly, Russian forces in this area very likely lack any depth. This makes light force infiltration and exploitation easier. But the RA does have ISR and guns, so I would not propose this will be easy days. Staff and support. Once the planning is done, managing the operation will be complex but with less mass. One thing that has not been brought up is far bank recon and clearances (eg mines), that is a big job pre-crossing and troops that do this are very specialized, likely SOF in Ukraine. Staff capacity is whatever the UA assigns to the operation. However, they are balancing a lot of demand right now. Finally, as to “what can poor light troops do with their quads?” Or, “what is the payoff?” Well first thing they can do is bring their radios with them. This extends high resolution real time intelligence out as far as these troops can see. Then there are loitering munitions, FPV and ATGMs. At the beginning of the war we got a pretty good look at just how much damage light forces working in depth could do with some of these new systems. By extending their reach through infiltration in a weak Russian backfield, it will likely force a response from the RA as their own LOCs are threatened. Best case the light forces can secure a bridgehead in depth and then other heavier amphib/crossing options open up. But in reality I think we could expect the RA having to push forces to that sector to try and deal with the problem, which might take pressure off other fronts. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, even if half successful such an operation would shift the strategic narrative. Ukraine would be demonstrating that it is no longer relegated to its back foot. Like the strategic strikes we have been witnessing, such an operation would undecide Russian initiative…and this is not small. We would see videos of a bunch of backfield stuff. Russia would react, more stuff getting blown up. In the end, it may not yield major tactical or operational effects, however, strategic effects could be significant.

Oh good, you are back. So I posted links to two estimates of RA force lay down south of Kherson. From OS we have at least a decent idea that there is roughly a division down there. I then did a force to space analysis that would show roughly 100 RA troops per km. That is roughly 1/3 of the average troops density elsewhere and much less than RA offensive concentrations. But, again, you simply ignore it. I am not sure what a discussion in Kherson sector has to do with the larger strategic force comparison; however the argument was never that the “RUS are outnumbered and outgunned in Ukraine”, it was: the RA is thin at Kherson and Ukraine has on opportunity to exploit that. Well at the CFC we also do not assume the enemy is “superior in every way so every option is too hard…so let’s just quit” either. I have no doubt the RA has hard points along that obstacle but they do not have enough forces to create an effective “wall”, they have likely no depth and they definitely do not have air superiority. I mean, seriously, how much more do you need? So first off “difficult” does not automatically translate into “impossible” - that is not a good military rule of thumb. So how “beleaguered” is that force at Krynky? How much has it cost the UA to hold that bridgehead. How hard have been the RA c-attacks. You basically “have seen pictures of tired Ukrainian Marines” and translate that into “impossible mission”. So who is demonstrating bias here, in order to fit a foregone conclusion? Krynky shows that a small light force one the other side of the Dnipro can be sustained and resist RA attempts to push them out. It demonstrates that the RA do not have decisive force at Krynky and I suspect the bridgehead is acting as a patrolling base. The fact that they have held on for months reinforces this deduction. Now the real question is, can the UA do 6-10 Krynkys? Upscaling is a completely different issue. It depends on availability of trained troops, water crossing equipment, stores and intelligence. It is a complete complex operation. Is it guaranteed? Absolutely not - war is not a menu with items you can simply return to the kitchen because you don’t like them - this will be a very hard and dangerous operation. However, it is 1) possible and plausible and 2) likely one of the better operational offensive options on the table. You appear to write off any offensive operation for your own reasons, however, here is one professional military analysts who is telling you that there is an option space here given the proper resources. The risks are high, however, the payoff may be high enough to warrant the risk. Further the other options are all pretty much worse unless the UA has solved for minefields in this war. (This is your queue to get huffy again and argue with the kitchen btw) Your state position has been, and is (unless you wish to retract) - “Ukraine is out of options and as such we should be pursuing peace negotiations.” If you can provide a single post where you do not reinforce this central premise then I think we can re-assess your position. You have worked incredibly hard to remove the southern light operational option - to the point that Steve also called you out for ignoring evidence being presented in favour of your underlying position. You have also dismissed any and all other options - again to reinforce your position. You have side-stepped historical references as “out of date”, you have side-stepped force-space analysis and you have downplayed Ukrainian successes. Now, you are correct. This could all be quite innocent and you do not have a conscious ulterior motive. But now you might want to take a look at your own biases because you are definitely projecting a sub-conscious motive here. You can get all huffy and demand to see the manager, but I still smell and suspect you of political motivations that align with other posters who have come through here who employ pretty much the exact same MO on the discussion of future Ukrainian military success - ignore or downplay any analysis or assessment that would give Ukraine any chance of success; over subscribe Russian capabilities and capacity: land back at “Ukraine is done…we must sue for peace”. No argument on the transformative impact ISR has had on the battlefield. And no one is saying a water crossing operation is going to be easy. Like minefields, it will require pre-conditions which include a level of c-ISR. However, we have a proof of concept that it can be done, which is a helluva lot more than we have with respect to minefields and RA forces elsewhere. That is one large obstacle to try and cover in detail - 85-100kms. And the UA has freedom of movement along most of that obstacle (I.e. unlike a minefield they can cross at multiple locations). So what? Well if one can keep the logistical demand low, one could sustain light operations through over the water and air resupply (see: heavy drones)…you know, like in other times in history. A light force water crossing is damned hard and comes with significant risk, no getting past that. However, compared to other options it may be the best of the bunch. And it may very well work…and by “work” I mean draw RA forces away from other sectors to deal with it, which may open up other opportunities. As to “Russian stooge” and “f#cking idiot”…you realize you are the only one to make these statements in this debate? I still suspect you of ulterior motives but of course that will need proof otherwise. No, I suspect you are a guy who is entirely enamoured in your own opinion and is always pushing to be the smartest guy in the room. Now which rooms? In the end, I really do not care. Now who is throwing around “you are all f#cking idiots and Pro-Ukrainian bots”? So if your purpose was to highlight how challenging future offensive operations will be for the UA…well, ok, got it. Contribution noted. But it really appears you are working very hard to convince everyone that Ukraine has no offensive options left, and its defensive ones are nearly as hopeless…and therefore Ukraine should “sue for peace”. This will have been at least the 2nd, possible 3rd time someone has come out of the woodwork after Adiivka to push this perspective. Your approach of 1) being entirely in love with your own opinion and 2) ignoring any and all evidence or counter analysis, and 3) becoming very offended when called out, matches those previous poster profiles. Could all be innocent coincidence and you honestly believe this is the situation despite also hoping for a better outcome, but I remain suspicious. Why? Because like those other posters, you are not promoting actual discourse. You are pushing a single position without room for anything else. I am more than willing to admit a water crossing operation south of Kherson may very well fail, it is no guaranteed success. I am also very willing to publicly admit that Ukraine is definitely facing some tough decisions this year. I do not believe we are at the “beg Russia for peace” stage though and see still possible opportunities but windows may be closing. You on the other hand dismiss any and all ideas that run counter to your position. You are preaching, not discussing. Could be just who you are, but you picked a really crappy time to come out and self-actualize.

No trained infantry in these situations are going to rely on a single weapon system. Those BTRs were in a killzone. Normally (and many of the UA soldiers on the defence would be western trained), one has redundant and mutually supporting systems covering a killzone. Direct fire to stop, fix and suppress; indirect fires to finish them off. In the video the Bradley is doing those first three and I suspect the FPVs were acting as ersatz mortars.

What is interesting is what was missing (or at least I did not see any): mortars or artillery. And they really did not need them. I guess FPVs are basically flying mortars with cameras now.

For those interested in Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs). I highly recommend: https://www.amazon.com/War-Made-New-Technology-Warfare/dp/1592402224?nodl=1&dplnkId=2283fc77-c9c7-494a-9577-81de6b679ee6 What is interesting about technoplhilia, behind the cultural undertones, is that is it always wrong…until it turns out right. Gunpowder weapons started out as dangerous hand-cannons that frankly made more noise than anything else. Until they became muskets and rifles. Indirect fire was originally a niche siege weapon until gunpowder but then was large, undependable and unwieldy..until they became artillery. Cyber is an excellent case in point. Despite the press, we really did not see it employ as a decisive capability (let alone military domain) in Ukraine. That does not mean it won’t become decisive in the future but the advertising did not match real world demonstrations. Unmanned systems have been around since the 60s and I have read/heard of them revolutionizing the battlefield since I was a cadet. However, given the scope and scale of employment in Ukraine right now, this technology might be having its Constantinople moment. The other thing about RMAs, which Boot outlines very well, is that they do not happen in a weekend…or even in a single war. These are shifts in warfare that have taken centuries, and in more modern history, decades. I can recall in the 90s the “RMA is upon us!” Followed quickly by “What Revolution?” I strongly suspect that both sides of the debate were right and wrong at the same time. We are not at the beginning or end of a Revolution in Military Affairs - we are in the middle of one. And have been likely since the late 80s. Information Technology’s full impact on the battlefield has yet to culminate but the trends are becoming undeniable. So in my experience RMAs are nasty sneaky affairs. They wait until no one is really paying attention and then you wake up one morning and drones are chasing soldiers around trees while being watched in real time.

This is the other major flaw in the thinking within the “sue for peace” crowd…what peace? All war is negotiation. However, that negotiation is framed by realities on the ground. So while this war may very well end in some sort of Korean Peninsula solution on lines yet to be determined. Like the Korean War both sides had to be forced to the table by military facts. So the narrative coming out of the MAGA/Macgregor crowd is that 1) Ukraine has no hope. No military solution exists for Ukraine and they build everything else around that central “fact”. 2) seeing as point #1 is a universal truth (and no room for counter-factuals exists within that universe), the Ukraine must sue for peace. And of course their own Glorious Leader will somehow make an equitable and enduring peace happen. This is utter bullsh#t. Even if one accepts point #1 - and there is a growing pile of evidence the Ukraine is not “done”, as planes keep getting blown out of the sky - this theory completely fails to define just how their version of “peace” will happen. Russian “peace negotiations” in the past have been self-serving and onion skin thin. If Ukraine begs for peace right now, it will be from a position of weakness. If the West begs for peace right now, it will be from a position of weakness. Does anyone think that Putin is not going to exploit this fact? Russian peace terms will be their terms. They will be designed to ensure: future Ukrainian vulnerability, a clear demonstration of Western weakness and failure, and promote Russian superiority. If Ukraine sued for peace right now I have zero doubts Russia would be asking for war reparations…from a country they invaded. Russia would also likely demand legitimacy and recognition for the territories it captured. And would make sure they set conditions for successful future actions - they will call it “Ukrainian neutrality”. There is no easy tap out in this war. It is a real war where endstate will emerge directly from military outcomes. As a minimum Ukraine must freeze this war on its terms, not Russia’s and the West needs to support that. The “fantasy” in all this is not the prospect of future Ukrainian military success, it is the entire belief that there is another option when dealing with Russia. I suspect there will be an end line in all this and I am less and less convinced it will be the pre-2014 border; at this point pre-2022 will be a stretch. But it is definitely not where we are today. Ignoring the lines on the ground, Russian sacrifice is not high enough to force them towards anything remotely looking like an equitable peace negotiation that we could trust.

A common western critique has been that Ukraine "needs to upscale". Last summers offensive appeared to be penny-packeting - "why can't they get mech to work? Must be because they do not know how to do Bn level manoeuvre. It is their Soviet tradition (which does not even make sense with respect to upscaling)" I am in the camp that after 2 years of war the UA knows how to fight this war better than we do. It looks like they have picked their "upscaling" effort.

Oh that is interesting. RU strikes on static positions are up, but vehicle strikes are still well out of balance. That suggests that UA ISR is still superior. Infantry is also interesting but is likely tied to increases in static position numbers. My advice for the UA is to keep hitting the vehicles - it is a freakin long walk to Kyiv.

I had a chance to hear him speak at the operational symposium and frankly I think we agree on more than we disagree to be honest. Where we disagree is "why" things are occurring in this war, on the ground. I think troop quality and C2 are factors but they are not what is driving the shifts we are seeing. I think technology has conspired to shift warfare...again. These changes are significant and need to be addressed by western forces or we face trouble ahead. Kofman get caught up in his own contradictions: Ukraine must upscale and concentrate forces but cannot because of C2 culture. Concentration of forces is extremely dangerous due to ISR and deep fires. O.K. so which is it?

I am going to need to see a lot more than Adiivka to buy into this assessment. The RA would have to actually translate tactical (very costly) success into something else. Something we simply have not seen. As to the condition of the Ukrainian defence forces...I mean what do we really know. Challenges and suffering but you seem to portray an organization on the edge of collapse. In a lot of ways I do feel sorry for Ukraine. I really don't think you (they) fully understand what is going on here. You are the proxy in a western proxy war - pure and simple. Proxy war means we are only so invested and your pain and suffering carries only so much weight. The West has become adept at ignoring pain and suffering. No one is going to risk the larger game on Ukraine. So no NATO formations, no deep strikes on Russia itself, and no, no-fly zones. Unless we get pushed into by Russia, those options are off the table for the foreseeable future. Better to hope for Russian collapse. So here we are. Ukraine is between the Devil and Deep Blue. The West will cobble together support as best it can. In reality money and data are the two most important resources and both are flowing. The RA is no shape for major operational movements. They will likely continue this "death by inches" to sap morale. So Ukraine can wither change the game, shift narratives, which is what I suspect a lot of this deep action is all about. Or give up...but that really is not an option either.